

Mikhail Shereshevsky

# THE SOVIET CHESS CONVEYOR

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#### PREFACE

M. Shereshevsky is popular in the chess world as one of the leading coaches in the former Soviet Union, as well as the author of the books "Endgame Strategy" and "Endgame Contours", the second one with master L. Slutsky as a coauthor.

Three of his pupils A, Alexandrov, E. Zayac and I. Kadimova became junior champions of the Soviet Union. Believe me, I have been a junior champion myself, this title is one of the hardest to ever achieve.

E. Zayac and A. Kovalev are grandmasters now. A. Alexandrov, P. Korzubov, G. Sagalchik, A. Ryskin, E. Raisky, T. Grabuzova, R. Eidelson, E. Horovetz and T. Zagorskaya are strong national and international masters, whereas I. Kadimova won the World Championship for girls up to 18 years of age.

All these results enable us to talk about the already established "Coaching School of M. Shereshevsky" and you can get a first class impression about if after you read this book. It is my opinion that chess players of all levels will surely find a lot of useful information to be able to improve their chess class.

20.世h3 △d7 21.星fe1 ਊh8 22.星;a8 星;a8 23.c4 ᡚf4 24.c5 dc 25.5\e5 Ae8 26.dc \d8 27.Ac4 \d4 28.\de 3 \da1 29.\df1 章:f1+ 30.4:f1 當b4 31.c6 bc 32.bc 公d5 33.當c1. The rest of the game was played in a mutual time-trouble, but I managed to realize my advantage with White. 

Aq7 7.0-0-0 0-0 8.f4 d6 9.€1f3 b6 10.h4 h5 11.e5 #e7 12.Ad3 Ab7 13.€e4 €d7 14.€fg5 de 15.fe c5 16.c3 cd 17.cd Bad8 18.堂b1 5b8 19.5d6 里:d6 20.ed 堂:d6 21.4e4 4:e4 22.5):e4 世d5 23.€)c3 世f5+ 24.世c2 世q4 25.d5 with a decisive

advantage for White. The course of these two games, despite some mutual

imprecisions, unavoidable when you play active - chess, was favourable for White throughout the games. The other players in the Tilburg tournament were so impressed that no one ventured to play 1... 2f6 against me to the end of the tournament in the games with the guick time-control. The book is an easy and enjoyable reading. Some

passages may seem to you extremely original, some other you may find discussible, but I promise you are going to enrich your understanding of chess tremendously.

> B. Gelfand International Grandmaster

The problems of coaching and improvement in chess have been treated in the chess literature before, but the interest towards these subjects enjoys a real revival lately. This is more than easy to explain. The contemporary erudite chess reader is tempted by the possibility to master new methods of work to improve his class.

I think that the book you are holding in your hands has been written by one of the best Soviet coaches M. Shereshevsky. This book will certainly attract the players who do not want to limit their chess studies to reading only theoretical literature.

M. Shereshevsky, who coached a lot of talented players. boys and girls (I. Kadimova and A. Alexandrov included, who became European and World Junior Champions) shared his coaching experience generously. The book contains plenty of annotated games and original opening variations, as well as general recommendations on the methods of coaching. The author treats the problem of the formation of the opening repertoire of the chess player extensively. M. Shereshevsky thinks that the opening repertoire should comprise the beginning of the work with the young players. This concept is opinion upon you. The material, which constitutes the part of this book devoted to the openings, can present an interesting reading to the young players as well as to the experienced professionals.

Despite the fact that the theme about the openings occupies a central place in this book, the chapters treating the study of the chess classics and the improvement of the endgame technique are written admirably. M. Shresshersky is the author of two wonderful endgame books ("Endgame Strategy" and "Endgame Contours") and he presents a lot of concrete examples on the way you have to improve your play in the endgames and the way to connect your studies with playing over games of the great chess masters of the past.

A. Yusupov International Grandmaster

#### AUTOUR'S PREFACE

"When man has no system in his knowledge, the more he knows, the greatest the mess in his head."

Herbert Spencer

There are a lot of nice chess books about the openings, as well as on problems of the middlegame and the endgame. Numerous books have been written about the methods of coaching the player in some narrow aspect like the technique of cabulation of variations and the acquiring of the useful habit to make a plan for the game. I don't happen to know about any book on the methods of improvement of the player who has reached a certain level and would like to become a master.

The author made an attempt in this book to describe his work with the chess players from the level of "first degree" up to the level of an International Master, in the dimension and the stages it had been done in practice. We can compare the coaching of the player with the building of a house and as you know- every person with enough common sense would never start to build without a design. The building will usually be a true copy of the design, while the style of the chess player is rather unpredictable in his development and may fluctuate away from the intentions of the coach, but our comparison, was rather abstract. The coach has to be sure however, that he has a definite vision about his intentions and final aims, otherwise his work may not bring anything fruitful. The chess information will form a mess in the head of the pupil and cause only frustration to his soul. I have spent a lot of efforts in team- work with players who devoted 5-6 hours. a day to chess, yet they didn't achieve anything substantial, just because their preparation was not planned and thought over beforehand. Afterwards, when there appeared a general direction and concentration upon certain aims, the time they worked on chess was shortened twice and the results were really beneficial. For example, I

started my work with Maya Koen in Bulgaria in the autumn of 1990, when she took the severith place in the Bulgarian Championship for girls, and she even failed to qualify for the Championship for women. The girl devoted to chess at least 5-6 hours a day. We worked together, following the methods described in this book and in an year she became the Bulgarian Champion for girls, won the silver medal in the Championship for women and the brorze medal in the World Championship for girls. The time she worked on chess decreased about twice, but nevertheless she won the Bulgarian Championship for women and became an International Master.

This book has been addressed mainly to coaches and chesspleyers that like to work independently. The suggested methods have been tested in practice and proved to bring excellent results. It is based upon my experience of work with chess players from two generations, the majority of which reached the International Master level. I am taking about ordinary players, and not about great chess taients like Boris Gelfend and Vasili knanchuk.

Elena Zayac, Alexei Alexandrov and Ilakha Kadimova won the Championship of USSR as well as European and World Junior Titles, having started to work with me as "first-degree" novices.

I would still like to dissuade the reader to expect any immediate results. The coaching of his chess player is a lasting and strenuous job and not a joly five-minutes bitz game. The long-exity of this process depends on the capabilities and the diligence of the student as well as on the experience and the enutition of the coach. Chess is a variable and complex game. You don't have to expect any radical qualitative changes in your play earlier than six months. Keep your patience and desire to improve, even after at first your results in tournament play may deteriorate. I have witnessed this strange phenomenon to cour sometimes, i.e. the new anonach to the qame brings about a

The system of awarding titles and degrees in all kinds of sports in the former Soviet Union was rather complicated. Regarding chess, you got "degrees" first, starting from fifth to first, and then you became a "candidate-master",

temporary stagnation. For example a gifted tactician thinks over the formation of the plan, something he has never done before, and accordingly he misses a nice tactical opportunity. After some time everything is bound to change and end favourably.

You will begin to solve easily the problems that caused your failures before and you will start to combine strategy with factics harmonized. The playing of simple positions and endgames will be as enjoyable to you as the sharp factical fights. You are going to elevate to a new level of quality in your play, which I hope will lead to an all-out improvement in your practical results.

The eminent American psychologist Date Carnegie made an interesting observation in his book about public speaking: ... we never advance steakily. We do nit thy prove gradually. We do nit by sudden jerks, by abrupt starts. Then we remain stationary a time, or we may even stip back and lose some of the ground we have previously gained. These periods of stagnation or retrogression, are well known by all psychologists; and they have been named "plateaus in the curve of learning." The weak ones give up in despair. Those with grit persist, and they find that suddenty, overnight, without heir knowing how or why it has happened, they have made great progress. They have lifted from the plateau like an aeroptiane. Abruptly they have gotten the knack of the thing."

These thoughts are applicable to the process of learning in general and chess makes no exception. I have met many times with the moment of lifting from the plateau with a thrill and pride and joy, but it had always been preceded by a long, patient and strenuous work.

Finally I would like to mention that every conscientious coach has his own concepts that are edifying and sometimes maybe discussible. This book does not aim at imposing views of the methods of improvement of the chess player.

The author is sharing with the readers his methodics with the hope it will be useful to the chess coaches and players who would like to perfect themselves single-handedly.

### WHAT WOULD YOU START WITH?

You are an experienced and qualified chess-player and you would like to try your best in the field of chess-coaching. Suppose you have met a young and promising chess-player. who has made a strong impression on you. You decide to go on working together. What to start with? The opening! Why do you have to start, your work with the opening? It is well known that the deep understanding of the middle-game and the ability to play the endgame well is much more important. The reason is very simple. No chess-player can play successfully in a tournament if he does not have a satisfactory opening repertoire. You can improve in chess only by studying, analysing and playing in tournaments. Therefore, the chess-player must be very well prepared in the opening to be able to start playing in a tournament at any time. Evidently you can never be perfectly prepared, but you can as well try to. Now you can see that a whole lot depends on the chess-player's opening repertoire.

I would like to familiarize the reader with the methods of my work on the problem of choice of openings and studying them with young players, most of which became strong masters in a very short period of time. My final object was to convey to my pupils opening knowledge that might "serve" them for years to come. Moreover the openings that we studied together enabled the young players to work additionally on their own, on middle-game and endgame problems, in connection with the openings we had chosen. All that added a lot to their understanding of the game, in between some very important competitions. The chess-players that worked on the openings in that fashion, needed only to analyse their own games thoroughly, read the current Soviet chess magazines, the "Chess Informant", the Dutch "New In Chess" and could

"feel safe ", even if they had "missed" some important game somewhere. I could not even imagine to treat all my pupils as one. They were all so different in their understanding of chess, in style, as well in their choice of openings on the threshold of entering "the great chess scene". When I started working with them, however, it was inconceivable, at the level of "first degree" \* to even talk about style of the future chessplayer. All I had to understand as a chess-coach was the "likes" and the "dislikes" of the player. I had at first to eliminate his "chess-illiteracy", give him some idea of the middlegame and the endgame. It is immaterial whether you teach the young player to play Ruy Lopez with Black or The French Defence. What is important for him is to realize and understand the main ideas and strategies. You can generally expect some 18 months later the first "blossoms" of chess culture and style. Now comes the moment of change of the opening repertoire and its enlargement according to style.

To make a long story short, the aim of my work in the opening with the young players can be summarized as following: I by at first to set the foundations of a solid and "long-term use" opening repertoire, and timely setting it aside, to turn my attention entirely on thorough middlegame and endoame preparation.

# Choosing Your Opening Repertoire

The opening repertoire of the chess-player can vary and not only accordingly to names of openings, but much more to the method of playing the early stage of the chess game. I would like to clarify my concepts. Suppose the chess-player starts the game with 1.e4.His opponent responds with 1...c5.Now, if White would like to fight for the opening

advantage and initiative.he should play 2.0f3 and 3.d4.Furthermore, I believe that White should stick to principles, i.e. in the Naidorf he should play 6.4q5, in the "Dragon" he should play the systems with opposite-side castelling and attacks on different wings. If the chess-player doesn't do that, his analytical work would lose its creativity, and he might become an experienced player without reliable opening weapons. In fact something like that happened to grandmaster Sveshnikov, when playing with White. He did not change his opening systems soon enough and went on fighting with "second-rate" armour like The Scottish Game and the "c2 - c3 system" in The Sicilian. He still manages to support systems like that both theoretically philosophically, but his practical results have decreasing, since the element of surprise has long gone. The problems that Black must face in those systems are much

easier to cope with, than these in Ruy Lopes or the main lines of The Sicilian Defence. On the other hand, Sveshnikov has a very aggressive and excellently conceived and prepared opening repertoire with Black. He seems however incapable to change his repertoire with White, now that he is over 40; the repertoire that served him faithfully for years. I have had a long experience of work in the former USSR and I learned to know what you needed as a coach to score successes with your pupils in competitions as early as in the "kindergarten" stage. You had to try to win the teamchampionships of the district, the town, the republic, the USSR. That was the least you needed to guarantee yourself peaceful life, wage-increase and status improvement as a coach. In addition, if your pupil managed to win the individual Championship of the USSR for his age (irrelevantly 10,12,14,16,18 or 21), you and your student had the right to play in the World Championship and that secured an interesting and profitable going abroad. The eventual good result of the young player in the Championship assured the coach of the title "Distinguished Coach of the Republic" and a wage-increase for life. Naturally the importance of the result itself was enormous and you couldn't even talk about "long term" opening preparation. You needed to aim at the result of the game, to win at any rate, and the opening preparation was built alongside superficial opening-trap systems. At the beginning this method was productive but later, with the improvement of the young chess-player and his opponents. the naive opening schemes were turning into a boomerang and the youngster's opening preparation was back at the fetus stage. The coach, however, was usually busy at that moment with turning new talents on the road to quick success. The player, saddled with ineffectual openings. usually at the level of "master-candidate" had to find a way to cope with the problems by himself. He had a chance only if he had acquired along the way the capability to think critically and analyse positions objectively. He usually had grave difficulties to give up everything learned before and start building anew. That could be done by just a few.

Now lets go back to the move 1.e4 and the Sicilian Defence. I have to emphasize that I think the way White should play this opening should be a matter of principle. Why is that? The answer is rather simple and it lies within the fundamentals of chess itself. The move 1.e4 is just the first step to a quick development of forces, precipitating the fast beginning of an early conflict in most openings. Lets assume that White tries to play a slow positional game in some sharp variation of the Sicilian Defence. That strategy can only be successful against an unprepared and inexperienced by Black. The titanic fight between Kasparov and Karpov is an instructive example. The great master of "slowly" played Sicilians. Karnov (remember his match against Pollucialevsky.

back in 1974) couldn't win a single game with 1.e4 in their second match, and gave up playing 1.e4 altogether, starting with the third match. On the other hand, the 1.e4 players. sticking as a matter of principle to the most active systems with White - and apart from The Sicilian there are Ruy Lopez with its sharp schemes Jaenish and Marshall attack, the Open Variation and the different Ruy Lopez Closed lines, The French Defence. The Caro-Cann and a wide range of other systems - can rely on quick success immediately after the opening stage. It is a real challenge to play against such players and not an easy task at that. The problems that Black faces in the 1.e4 openings are much more specific and they require early pinpoint decisions in comparison with the closed opening systems. Nowadays you can categorize Short and A. Sokolov in that group of players, and not long ago R. Fischer, the 11'th World Champion, was an instructive example of the effectiveness of 1.e4. That approach has its drawbacks for certain. Chess-players like that get sometimes trapped deeply into "enemy territory". The opponent might prepare "a novelty" in some sharp opening variation and you have to solve the problems over the board, with the chess-clock ticking along, and most of the times there is no turning back. You have, on top of that, to keep a constant track on the ever increasing flow of chess information, since you can't afford to miss an important novelty in some sharp opening variation. I will show you some games as an example, but the string of illustrations of that very principle can be really endless.

# OII–Gavrikov Tallin, 1983

1.e4 c5 2.£/3 d6 3.d4 cd 4.£/d4 £/6 5.£/c3 a6 6.£/g5 e6 7.f4 £66 8.£/d2 ±/b2 9.£/b1 £/a3 10.f5 £/c6 11.fe f6 12.£/c66 bc 13.£/e2 £/e7 14.0-0 0-0 15.£/h1 £/a7 16.£/e3 £/d7 17.e5 de 18.£/e5 £/d6 19.£/a5 £/d8 20.£/a4 £/e5 21.4:f6 4:f6 22.8f3 c5 23.4c4 8b7 24.4b3 c4 25.4:c4 8:b1 26.4:b1 4b7 27.8f1 2e4 28.8f3 4d5 29.4a3 2:f3 0:1

I remember this game rather well. I was coaching toumament P Korzubov for this ("First League" Championship) and I entered the tournament hall just a little after the beginning of the round. Most of the games had just started and the players had made a few moves, while OII and Gavrikov were imitating a busy "machine-gun" dot, and the boys could hardly manage with the "demo-board". Not more than 5 minutes were gone, the two opponents had produced about 20 moves each, and it became quite clear, when L. Oll started to think, that White was already past salvation. I am not an expert in this variation, and I can not tell which exactly game the two players were repeating, or where Black made the improvement. As a spectator that day in the tournament hall I couldn't help feeling sorry for the Estonian player. Losing with White in about 5 minutes, without making a single move of your own, while the real battle all around you is just starting, can put you off theoretical disputes for a long time. L. Oll however came out of this story all the wiser, so now lets have a look at his game with Black against A. Sokolov in the USSR championship, Odessa, 1989.



Diagram 1

1.04 e5 2.273 276 3.21c5 d6 4.273 21c4 5.d4 d5 6.263 246 7.0-0 0-0 8.c4 c6 9.223 21c3 10.bc dc 11.21c4 424 12.223 207 13.295 266 14.31 3.55 15.45 dc 16.29 4 17.59 55 18.253 21c4 19.32 22.0 22.225 22.84 23.22 23.84

The two players were following the game Short - Huebner, Tilburg, 1988 up to now, which ended on the next move. Huebner played 23...c5? and after 24.\(\mathbb{E}\)h1! resigned because of the line: 24... #a4+ 25.\$f1 c4 26.\$d1 \$e1+ 27.\$:e1 #a2 28.世e2 世:h1+ 29.堂d2.Besides that, there was an analysis in the "Chess Informant" 46, where it was proved that White had a decisive advantage after 23... #e4 as well. L. Oll made another move 23...#h2+!!. and after 24.\$f1 &f4! it turned out that it was White who had to fight for a draw. 25.2f3! only move. as both 25.4d1 ae1+! and 25.4:f4 世:f4+ 26.4q2 ae3 were losing for White. 25... #e1+ 26. \$\pi:e1 \pi:a1+ 27. \$\pie2 A:c1 28.8:c1! - White sacrifices the exchange to force a draw, since after 28.望d3 堂:g5 Black must win. Now after 28... 昔:c1 29.a6 Ee8+ 30. 空d3 世b1+ 31. 空d2 世e1+ 32. 空d3 当b1+ 33.章d2 当e1+ the game ended in a draw. Had Black tried to win with 30... 當e7 (instead of 30... 當b1+), it could all end after 31.gf+ 空f8 32.堂h3 堂b1 33.4c2 堂:a2 34.堂c8+堂:f7 35.世f5+ in a perpetual.

# Psakhis – Tolnai Dortmund, 1989

1.e4 c5 2.원f3 d6 3.d4 cd 4.원:d4 원f6 5.원c3 g6 6.쇼e3 쇼a7 7.f3 원c6 8.발d2 0-0 9.a4

Black had tried 9...h5, 9...e5 and 9.... Δe6 up to then. L. Psakhis had already played a game with White against I.Smirin, Klaipeda 1988, which went on 9... Δe6 10.h4 d5 11.0-00 0... Δe6 10.h4 d5 11.0-00 0... Δe6 10.h2 d5 11.0-00 0... Δe6 10.h2 d5 10.5 e1... Δe7 15... Δe7 15



9...4:941 The effect of that sacrifice was something like the burst of a "Molotov cocktail". The true assessment of that novelty lied well far in the future, but in this particular game (comments by the winner in the "Chess Informant" 47). White put up virtually no resistance

although the rating difference between the two players was more than 100 points in favour of White. After 10.fg £:g4 11.£qf e6 12.h4 h5 13.£uc6 bc 14.£e2 £e6 15.£d3 ēe5 16.£g3 £b8 17.b3 £a5 18.£d1 £q7 19.£:d6 £bd8 20.£:d8 £:d8 21.£f1 £d2 22.£h3 ēg4 23.£b8+ £h7 24.b4 £a3 25.£:a7 £c1+ 26.£g2 £.c3 27.£:c3 £e2+ 28.£g3 £e1+ 29.£f3 £f1+ White resigned.

In conclusion now, lets have a look at two wins of the Hungarian grandmaster *L. Portisch* with Black in Ruy Lopez:

### Sax - Portisch Scellefteo,1989



1.e4 e5 2. $\bigcirc$ f3  $\bigcirc$ c6 3. $\bigcirc$ b5 a6 4. $\bigcirc$ a4 d6 5.c3  $\bigcirc$ d7 6.d4  $\bigcirc$ ge7 7. $\bigcirc$ b3 h6 8. $\bigcirc$ bd2  $\bigcirc$ g6 9. $\bigcirc$ c4 Ae7 10. $\bigcirc$ e3  $\bigcirc$ g5 11. $\bigcirc$ :g5 hg 12.d3

12...ed! 13.cd ⊈f8! – that is a new plan for Black in this position, with the intention to attack White's centre with ♣h3, #d7 and £e8, not to mention £h8 and the "h" line.

14.0-0 Δh3 15.世3 世母7 16.ደd1 ደe8 17.全f57 L. Portisch suggested in his comments in the "Chess Informani" 48 that White should have played here 17.允之 20g51 18.de 20g5 19.世2 g4 20. 14 gf 21.世位 40g2 22.40.g2 (but not 22.h4? 40g4 23.00g4 世(34) 22..星h2! 23.世h2 40g4 24.世g1 40f2 55.世/2 (9 26.世)22 世66 27.点d3 8.e4! 28.允.e4 世(84+29.世g1 世(3) 30.允任 65! with a draw.

Most probably L.Portisch had analysed that position at home extensively, while Sax had to look for his way through the complications in the severe tournament conditions. After White's last mistake, he was crushed:

17...g4 18.世e3 Eh5 19.シh4 E:h4 20.gh ②:h4 21.並d5 ②e7 22.並c4 (or 22.並:b7 ②f3+ 23.堂h1 ②f5 24.堂c3 ②5h4 25.畠q1 閏b5 26.並c6 置f1+! L. Portisch)

N.Short probably intended to improve White's game playing against L.Portisch in the tournament in Linares 1990, since he repeated the first 14 moves. It is not easy to speculate what N.Short had prepared against the line 14. Ah3 etc. but if was not to be



L.Portisch played
14...∄f61? instead and
14...∄f61? 5.2d5
2d4 16.4:g5 2ge5 17.4e3
2d3 20.8e2 2ce5 21.8d2 2e1
22.44 20.134 23.2f2 2c2
24.4.2d2 2g4+ 25.2g1 c6
26.2b6 8e8 27.4f3 2f6
28.8e1 4g4 29.4g2 4e6

30.b3 2\d7 31.2\a4 f5 32.2\c3 fe 33.2\:e4 2\d6 34.2\d4 .2\d5 35.2\f1 2\g4 and White resigned.

Grandmaster S. Makaritchev, a brilliant chess-journalist and commentator, was annotating game 6 of the World Championship Match 1990 between Kasparov and Karpov. He wrote in the "Shakhmatnoe Obozrenie – 64" magazine, 3, 1990: "You asky ourself involuntarily, while watching the struggle of the two greatest players of our time, what is the correlation between the profound chess philosophy and the simple earthly practice."

"You play 1.e2—e4 and win!" — the famous Soviet theoretician Rauzer proclaimed and...developed a lot of systems of attack for White that are still very popular now, 60 years after. Grandmaster Sveshnikov considers that it is only by means of this move that White can achieve opening advantage. Why? How? The problem is neither easy to make sense of, nor possible to check...Still, the personal hunch of most of the chess players is in favour of 1.e4, indeed. The King's pawn move requires a very serious attitude in reparation and playing to the limit over the board by its exponents. The only motto of White should be "Forward, and forward only" since compromising in the opening can lead to disaster and disappointments."

The reader should be convinced by now that the problems facing White players are really serious, when they are confronted with a novelty in sharp opening variations. I am not trying to dissuade the young players away from principal sharp moves. On the contrary, such a manner of playing cultivates resourcefulness and deserves merit. Still I must emphasize that an approach like that requires working over an enormous flow of information and takes away time of vital necessity for studying the endgame, the chess-classics and the variety of other ways to improve.

The move 1.d4 is not so aggressive in its essence, as the king's pawn move. Still, in most lines when White plays principally, Closed Opening's positions that arise are rich in strategic ideas which is essential for the development of the understanding of positional play by the young player. It is much easier for the player to choose lines suitable to his style in the King's Indian i.e. the sharp Saemisch system, or the less obliging 92–93 system, or after 1.d4 2nf6 2.c4 e6 he might choose 3.2c3 and play Nimzo-Indian or 3.2c3 which is calm and leads to the Queen's Indian. Both decisions are equivalent, while in the Sicilian-Dragon you have to attack, playing White's side.

I think that the explanation of this is in the essence of the chess game. The move 1.d4 does not require necessarily the swiftest of developments, and White has a multiple choice of methods of opening strategy suitable to the style and temper of the chess-player. Remember we set ourselves the pragmatic task of development of opening repertoire for the young player in a short period of time. That repertoire should be part of the fundamentals of his chess education and should provide him ample opportunities to study the other parts of the game. It is my deep conviction that 1.d4 is the better solution to this problem than 1.e4, although I believe that future belongs to players that will loak both.

So we made our choice – 1.d4. You can expect two kinds of opening strategy of Black which is easy to differentiate as "black square" (Black surrenders the center – 1.d4 £/16 2.c4 g6 3.£/23 £/27 or 1.d4 £/16 2.c4 c5 and then attacks it on the black squares) and "white square". The Nimzo-Indian Defence and the Queen's Indian Defence are part of it. The different modifications of the Queen's Gambit occupy a large part of the theory of the Closed Openings. The Dutch Defence and the Gruenfeld Defence form another peculiar breed.

Lipersonally classify the Closed Opening Systems in two groups -"quality" openings or correct openings and openings of poor quality. It is my opinion that the first group consists of: the Nimzo-Indian Defence, the other opening systems that arise after 1.d4 of6 2.c4 e6 3.of3, the different lines of the Queen's Gambit and the King's Indian Defence. Black is fiercely fighting for central squares' control in all those openings, except the King's Indian, and enjoys a large margin of reliability. It is almost impossible to imagine that White can produce some overwhelming novelty in some line of the Lasker System, in the Queen's Gambit or in the Nimzo-Indian, that can refute the opening entirely...Naturally, a lot of opening lines take part in the everlasting process of improvement and specification. Sometimes here and there Black's position looks in real trouble, but generally, Black should always hold a safe enough line up his sleeve, although sometimes a passive one, while the main line is in "the service-station" for repair. The Gruenfeld Defence and the Modern Benoni create more or less different scene. Black is actively fighting for the initiative in these openings, making in the process serious positional concessions in the center. White players can choose a line at leisure, having the freedom to suit it best to their liking and style. White can follow some very sharp lines, which require excellent knowledge of theory by Black in positions that hinge on a thread, or play quite positional schemes that make Black solve problems intricate enough, although less specific. It is understandable that Black has to follow all the opening information flow, because some new and important game might turn the tables up with disaster in practice. The Queen's Gambit, on the contrary, provides you with safety against all kinds of surprises, since you can almost always cope with them just by means of common sense. The real danger, when you play openings like that, lies in the absence of "reserve

lines." You just have to stop playing an opening like that in case some sharp line gets temporarily refuted. Presently the Modern Benoni and the Gruenfeld Defence are playable (World Champion Kasparov played the latter in his three matches for the World Title, not too successfully though, (+1 of =16), but 1 still consider these two as openings of poor qualify because Black is under the permanent threat of having to confront problems in the different lines impossible to cope with.

Now, finally there are some openings that can not even aspire for the mark of quality, like: the Albin Countergambit, the Budapest Gambit, the Tchigorin Defence, 1.04 of 5.2.04  $\Delta f5$  and some others as well. I usually start my opening preparation with the young players dealing with them first, since they are easy to look over rather quickly.

I am not going to fully analyse some exact opening repertoire in this book, but I still intend to clarify most of the key points of my work.

Now lets talk a little about the openings of poor quality. They can not comprise the permanent basis of the repertoire of the player, they are played rarely and aim at the effect of surprise. Therefore I wouldn't like to waste my efforts on their refutation, that is spending time in vain, really, I think that it is much more important to try to make the effect of surprise work for you instead, and set the game along some comfortable line of your own. Lets start with the Albin Countergambit. After the moves 1.d4 d5 2.c4 e5!? 3.de d4 the theory considers best 4.4f3 and promises White the advantage after for example 4... �f3 �c6 5.a3 (5. �bd2) ♣g4 6.b4 世e7 7.世a4 0-0-0 8.4f4 4:f3 9.af \$\dag{2}b8 10.\Dd2 \D;e5 11.\dag{2}b3 \Dag6 12.4a3 f5 13.f4 The efforts of Black are pointed at finding improvements along these lines as well. Therefore it is much more rewarding to try in practice something that might not be the best but which is certainly unfamiliar for the opponent. You should have in mind that good players don't play openings like that. So lets have a took at 4.a3/? I was coaching the Bjelorusais students' team for the all Soviet Spartakiada in 1970. One of the girls in our team G.Gull played 4.a3? in the next game, after this bitter experience. I analysed the games of the burnament and noticed the move 4.a3. I found out that it deserved serious attention. White postpones for a while the development of the King's knight, prevents Δb4 and Δp4 and resumes with the threat e2 –e3. There seems to be nothing better than 4...∠66, since 4...c5 will be met by 5.e4. Now comes 5.e3. The most natural answer is 5...de, because White plays to 5...a5 – 6.e3/3 Δc5 7.c4 €2:d4 8.Δe3 Δp4 9.Δe2 with the advantage. 6.thde 3:d66 (otherwise Black is left with a pawn down) 7..Δ:e3 €2:e5



White has achieved a definite success. Black is usually aiming at complications with attacking chances in the Albin Countergambit. Now Black has to fight for an equality with the queens changed. The position is symmetrical. White has the better development and must find the way to seize the

initiative. 8.£73.1 The only active Black piece is the knight on e5, so it has to be changed. This has to be done immediately since 8.2c3 will be met by 8...4c6, or 8.2d2 4.15 with counterplay, because of the position of 2e5 in the center, a...2/139.4g7. The chess-players are used to counting tempi, after the initial position, ever since the time of Steinitz. If we decide to evaluate the position in this way, we are going to see that Black has made a rather inferior move 2d8, while

White has made three pawn moves and a useful developing Bishop move. Besides that, White is going to castle soon on the Queen side with check.

I believe that the reader will get easily convinced that after 10.52c3, 11.0-0-0 and 12.52e4 Black will have the difficult task to fight for the draw. No doubt Black might, after a thorough analysis, find a way to gradually neutralize White's initiative. Don't forget however that we are not preparing the challenger for the World Title, but a young player. We don't expect him to crush the opponent right after the opening. We want him to obtain a complicated position on a sound strategic basis and rely to win due to good play in the middlegame and the endgame as well. We intend to go back to the opening preparation as rarely as possible, so this approach is highly recommendable.

A. Kapengut, who is "Honourable coach of Bjelorussia" wrote about his common work with grandmaster I. Boleslavsky in 64 – Shakhmatnoe Obozrenie" 21 in 1990:

"We had a lot of disputes with him on the different approaches to the creative work in the opening. I thought I had to have all the material, published on that topic, collected and thought over. And then, just like when you develop a photo, you begin to see the plans, the landmarks, the ideas for an article or the conclusions for the practical player. Boleslavsky (a member of the old school) preferred to approach the position directly, extensively. His method enabled him to find a lot and he was the standard of a theoretician. He had his weak points, however. Whenever some of his analysis were refuted, his readers were at a loss. They had nothing else to rely on".

I have been working with grandmaster Boleslavsky a lot myself, from 1967 till 1977. I can acknowledge too, that whenever he met some interesting problem he literally started the engine of his powerful "analytical machine" and was ready

to devour the position. He was, of course, more than familiar with all the chess periodicals. He was a real connoisseur of the classics (and not only the chess-classics) and he was looking over all the games of the major tournaments. Isaac Boleslavsky was avert however to all kinds of card-indexes. catalogues, sorting games according to opening indexes and whatever mechanical work. He deeply believed in his analytical faculties and rightfully assumed that he will have much better results by having thoroughly studied and analysed the position, than by looking over games of mediocre players with the hope to find the answer to the secrets hidden in the position. It is desirable nowadays, on the grandmaster level, to work over the vast amount of information, often with the help of a computer. But still, the information is necessary to prevent you not "to invent the bicycle all over again". The analysis and the constant vigil for novelties remain the chess-player's main job.

The method of work on the openings, recommended by Kapengut, is in fact more productive when you work with a high-level player who has his own style, his preferences and who is capable to distinguish the true from the false in a flash, making logical deductions in the process. Applying this method in our case is out of the question.

Some time ago, I had the idea to try to include the Modern Benoni, for Black, in the opening repertoire of the players



I was working together with. I suggested they studied the book written by Kapengut on this opening, starting with 1.d4 \$\Display86.2.c4 \, e6 3.\Display8 \, c5 4.d5 \, ed \$.6.\Display82 \, g6 7.\Display842

7... Dbd7.

Black is trying to prevent ⊕c4 and ∆f4 ever since the famous game Nimzovich - Marshall, New York 1927.

Sometimes Black is playing differently i.e. :

> 1) 7...55 which is hardly recommendable − 8.0:b5 0:d5 9.0:c4 Δb7 10.e4 a6 11.0b:d6+ Δ:d6 12.ed 0-0 13.Δe2 Be8 14.Δe3 Δt8 15.Δt3 Wth4 16.Wb3! Ba7 17.0-0 Δa8 18.Bac1 0:d7 19.Btd1 ± (Messing − Sibarevic, Chatetak a Toplice, 1968).

# 2) 7....b6!? is insufficient – 8.e4.

White tried 8.e3 in the game Boleslavsky – Tal, Leningrad 1956 (with transposition) and after 8....Δg7 9.0c4 0-0 10.Δe2 Δa6 11.a4 Δrc4 12.Δrc4 የΔb7 13.00 8e8 14%2 8e7 15.8b1 የQ4 16h3 የQe5 17.Δe2 c4 18b4 cb 19.8°rb3 የ

Now, after 8.e4 if Black continues with his development, the d6 pawn becomes weak, otherwise things get even worse:

8...4g7, or 8...5ld7 9.5c4?! (9.a4±) Δa6 10.Δl4 Δ:c4 11.Δ:c4 a6 12.a4 ter 13.0-0 Δg7 14.ted 2 0-0 was played in the game Sokolsky – Halibeyli, Erevan 1954. White had to play now 15.8e1 2e5 16.Δl1 @bd7 17.Δlg3 g5 18.Φd1 15 19.ef 2:f5 20.Φs3 87 21.6cb4 f6228a3 ±

#### 9.465+1

Borisenko – Arseniev, Perm 1960: 9 & 247 (0-0 (9...소료6)? 10.2ud6+ 발ud6 11.2ua6 2ua6 12.2ua4+ b5! 13.2ub5 법생714.발ェ읍 2ua4 is unclear, but White should play 10.世本4 업명 11.814 소.24 12.소u24 인마5 13.소ua5 진대 보) 10.소u4 b5?! 11.오ub5 진대4 12.소ua5 조금 13.aua5 진대 보) 10.소u4 b5?! 11.오ub5 진대4 12.소ua5 조금 13.aua5 진대 보) 14.aub 진대6 15.0-0 전대6 15.0-0

Black could improve with 10...Δa.6l. Both 11...€xd6? €\h5,as well as 11..Δxd6? \( \textit{Be}\) 12...£\h5 \( \textit{Ox}\) \( \textit{Cx}\) \( \textit{Ex}\) \( \textit{Dx}\) \( \textit{Ex}\) \( \textit{Dx}\) \( \textit{Ex}\) 9... Δd7 10. Δe2 The game Moiseev – Shaposhnikov, Riga 1954 went on 10...0-0 11.0-0 Ωe8 12.a4 Δc8 13. Ωc4 Ωd7 14.f4 ≣b8 15. Δf3 a6 16. ≌e2 with a big advantage for White.

> 3) 7... ②a6?! has been played as well. 8. ②c4 ②c7 9.a4 b6 10. e4

or  $10.\Delta$ gS?! like in the game Koshtchuk — Meduna, Bialostok 1979, the "Chess Informant" 27,  $10...\Delta$ e7  $11.\Delta$ h6 (but not 11.4e $\Delta$ :e4!)  $11...\Delta$ g4  $12.\Delta$ i4, and now Black had to play 12...15! =, instead of 12...00 13.h3  $\Delta$ i6 14.e4  $\Delta$ a6 15.850 1810 18

#### 10 426

Black tried to prepare 66-b5, postponing the King side development, in the game Levit – Evelsohn, Perm 1956: 10...Bb8 11...Δe2 a6 12..Δf4 b5. White had to play now 13.ab ab 14..2a5! Δd7 15..2c6 Δ:c6 16.dc with much better game.

After 10... ♠a6 White obtained a decisive advantage in the game Estrada – Donner, Vama 1962: 11. ♠g5 h6 12. ♠h4 ♠:c4 13. ♠:c4 △g7 14.0-0 0-0 15.f4 ≝d7 16.e5 ♠h7 17.e6+-.

:c4 13.£:c4 £g/ 14.0-0 0-0 15.14 ≌d/ 16.e5 @h/ 1/.el > 4) 7...a6?! 8.a4 £g7 is clearly in White's favour.

Black can try 8... Dbd7, but White now has a manoeuvre typical for the fianchetto system – 9. Dc4 Db6 10. Da3!?

The game A Petrosian — Kovacevic, Albena 1980, continued 10...Δd7 11.e4 Δg7 12.Δe2 00 13.00 且e8 14.Δf3 발c7 15.且e1. Black should have played now 15...且b8 (μπα 15...λ:244? 16.λ:24 b5 17.Δf4!) 16.Δf4 (σ 16.a5 Ωc8 17.Ωc4 Δb5) 16...Ωc8 17. ψα Δ Δca4 with about equal position.

#### 9. Pc4 0-0 10. Af4 Pe8 11. #d2

A Petrosian played against Karlsson, Erevan 1980. the "Chess Informant" 30, the inferior 11.2e4?! 2d7! 12.4:d6 (or 12.2e66?! 2od6 13.4:d6 8e8 with excellent compensation) 12...2d6 13.2ed6 888 14.a5 b5 15.ab 2ob6 16.8td2 2oc4 17.2ec4 8b4 18.e3 2b7 19.8d1 and now A.Petrosian recommends 19...8td5!

The pawn sacrifice is insufficient 11...  $\Omega$ 07/? 12..  $\Omega$ 46  $\Omega$ 55  $\Omega$ 5. The game Yanakiev - Pantaleev, Sofia 1976, went on 15..  $\Omega$ 477. Much better is 15..  $\Omega$ 4.e5  $\Omega$ 56  $\Omega$ 57. Much better is 15..  $\Omega$ 56  $\Omega$ 57.  $\Omega$ 56  $\Omega$ 57.  $\Omega$ 57.

12.a5 발c7 13.ᡚl6 ≣a7 and now instead of 14.e3 ይd7 15.ይca4 ይef6 16.h3 g5! 17.Δh2 ¼ 18.ef gf 19.Δe2 Δh6 20.0-0 ይe5, like in the game Thorgbergsson – Hamman, Linkßbing, 1969. White has to play simply 14.α3l±.

It becomes clear now that the addition of a6 and a2 – a4, in comparison with variation 3, is clearly in favour of White, because of the weak "b6" square. Besides that, Black has deprived himself of the opportunity to exchange White's knight on 4, by means of  $\Delta$ a6.

## So, 7... Dbd7 8.e4.

8. ⊕A?! ⊕A6 9.e4 does not trouble Black at all. (9. ⊕b6?! ∰b6 10.e4 ♠g7 11. ♠b5+ ⊕d7 12. ∰a4 a6 13. ♠d2 ∰c7 14.0-0 0-0 15. ♣e2 №8 = was hardly convincing in the game Kavda-Chekhov, Caracas 1976. The transposition to the flanchetto system with 9.6e3?! ♠g7 10.a4 ∰c7 11.a5 ⊕bd7 12.g3 0-0 13. ♠g2 №8 14.h3 ♭5 15.ab ⊕b6 16.0-0 does not pose any problems to Black either. as in the game Yanakiev – Antonov, Sofia 1976. Black has an excellent game after 16...⊕h5 17. ∰h2 f5 18.14 ⊕f6)

9...全c4 10. 点c4 血g7 11.0-0 0-0 12.点f4 and now 12.h37! seems too slow: 12...a6 13.a4 温e8 14.温e1 包h5! 5.世位 曾h4. 15...血e5!? looks even better -16.世宫 哲:5

Black has to play much more precisely after 12.4q5!?.

Zhidkov – Lomaja,Tbilisi 1962: 12... **2**e8 13.**2**c2 a6 14.a4 **2**c7 15.h3 **4**d7 16.**2**fe1 and now the game went on 16...**4**b6 17.Δf1 Δd7 18.Δd2 Bab8 19.⊙d1 ⊙c8 20. ⊙e3 b5 =, but 16...⊙e5 17.Δf1 h6 and g6 – g5 next was interesting as well.

Inkiov- Antonov, Varna 1977: 12...h6 13. Δh4 g5!?
14.Δg3 a6 15.a4 Ee8 16.Δd3 c4 17. Δc2 Eb8 18.a5 b5
19.ab £:b6 20.Ea2 ②g4 21.h3 ②e5 22.Eb5 ②g6
23.②a4 £b4 24.e5!±. Black had to play 16...②g4 17.h3
②e5, for example 18.4?! ②...30 19.Eb3 Bb6 20.©b2
Eb212?1 £ac1 c4! 22.Eb6 Δh3=

#### 12...a6 13.a4 @h5!

13.直e8...is also possible. 14.堂c2 堂c7 15.直ae1 Δd7 lead to equality in E.Fisher – Soos, Natanya 1965. White has nothing after 16.h3 自b8 17.堂d3 Δ:a4!.

#### 14. Ae3 f5!?

Black played 14...星e8 in the game Gligoric – Trifunovic, Sombor 1957, and equalised after 15 哲位2 置b8 (15...&c3!? 16.世记3 富:e4×) 16.星e1 暨d7 17.a5 b5 18.ab 富:b6 19.星ae1 野h7=

**15.ef** is playable in this position. (15.**△**e2 f4 16.**△**d2 **当**g5 is in Black's favour.) 15...**△**.f5. Now 16.g4?! does not seem reliable after 16...**当**n4 17**.△**2(17.gf **当**:c4∓) 17.**□**36 18.gf **□**-c3! 19 fc **△**c5 20 **□**2 **□**16 **□** 

#### Back to 7... 2bd7 8.e4 4 a7 9. 2c4.

A lot of players prefer this order of moves just to avoid the systems in which Black plays  $\Delta g4$  etc. The usual move here is  $9.\Delta e2$ . It leads to the main lines of the Modern Benoni.

#### 9 006

#### 9... #e7 is interesting. 10. Ae2

After the text move the position is rather similar to the main line with  $\triangle$ 36. The game Gorelov – Khasin, Moscow 1978, follows: **10...0-0** 11.13 (11.0-0 b51) 11... $\triangle$ 65 12. $\triangle$ 63 a5 13.34  $\triangle$ 88 14.0-0  $\triangle$ 68 15. $\triangle$ 61 15 16.6 gf 17.14  $\triangle$ 17 18. $\triangle$ 13  $\triangle$ 16 19. $\triangle$ 4.0 2.

Black can improve with 13.... $\triangle$ h5!? and now 14.0-0  $\triangle$ f4 =, or 14.g3 f5 15.f4  $\triangle$ :f4!? 16.gf 2h4+ 17.2h2 2h2:f4+→.



#### 11 Ad3

> 1) 11.4e2 is weaker, since Black plays 11... #e7! attacking the "e4" pawn immedately.

The game Ruderfer — Tataev, Moscow 1971 (with 8....a6 9.a4 included) continued 12....\( \delta d7 \) 13.0-0 \( \delta e8 \) 14.13 \( \delta e8 \) 15.35 \( \delta e8 \) 16.504 \( \delta e8 \) 15.17 \( \delta e1 \)

Δd4+ 18.⊈h1 Δ:c3!? 19.bc ā:e4 20. ᡚd2 āe8 21.Δ:h5∞. 12.ஜc2 Δd7

12... ≜e8 is possible as well − 13. ♣f3 ②bd7 14.a4 b6 15.0-0 ♣a6 16. ≜e1 o4 17. ②b5 ③e5 18. ②xo4 ③x3+ 19.gf ♣:b5 20. ab ②xd5∞, Kishney – Vekshenkov, Moscow 1979.

#### 13.a4

Or 13.0-0 萬ae8 14.f3 心h5 15.f4?! 点:c3! 16.曾:c3 堂:e4 17.点:h5 gh 18.堂f6 堂d4 19.堂g5+ 堂h8 20. 萬d1 f6∓, A. Petrosian – Kapengut. Minsk 1973.

13...≝ae8 14.a5?! (14.Δf3 h5 15.h3 �h7∓)

14... ②a8 15. 公d3 ②c7 16.0-0 ②a6 17. ②c4 ②b4 18. 当d1 ②:d3 19. 豊:d3 and now Black must play 19... ②:e4 20. ②:e4 (20. 邑e1 ②:[2]) 20... 当:e4 21. 当:e4 夏:e4 22. ②:d6 邑b4平.

> 2) 11.g3 deserves serious attention. 11...a6.

Or 11... <u>#8</u>e8 – Anishchenko-L.Levit, Minsk 1974: 12. <u>Å</u>g2 a6 13.0-0 <u>\*</u>bc7?! 14.a4 <u>#8</u>b8 15.a5 <u></u>\( \text{\texit{\text{\texit{\text{\texit{\texit{\text{\texi\text{\text{\texit{\text{\texit{\text{\te}

11... ②bd7 - Osnos - Karpeshov, Novorossijsk, 1981: 12. 鱼g2?! (12.a4) 12...b5! 13.a3 (13.②:b5 曾a5+ 14.②c3 Aa6豪) 13...b4 14.②c2 a5 15.Ba2 Aa6 16.b3 萬e8 17.f3 ②e5 18.0-0 曾b6 19 曾由1 c4!来.

White can still play, in the spirit of the fianchetto system,

12.402 £B8 13.44 ଦିଇ8 14.004 ଦିଇ8 (0r 14.b57 15.ab ab 16.005P) ቴታሪክ 17.404

 ሰይ/መ5P) ቴታሪክ 17.404
 16.2045P) ቴታሪክ 15.00 የኒኮሪክ 16.00 ቴታሪክ 16.00 ቴታሪክ 16.00

 ሰፈ7 (16.0a4?) looks bad after 17.0a4 b5 18.20c5a) 17.55 Φ.08
 18.20c4 Δb5 19.53 Δcc4! (but not 19...20c7 20. b3±) 20.55 coft 2 or 15.a5 Φ.067 16.0a4 Φ.b5 17.0-0 Φ.d4 18.40ab6 θcc7 19.14 ± 10.00

Black can try to prevent the fianchetto, playing

10... ≝e7. The game Anishchenko – Birin, Minsk 1980, (the moves a6 and a4 were played as well) went on 12. ≝c2.0-0 13.93 温88 14..4g2 ᆲ88 15.0-0 ②bd7 16.⊙c4 ②c5 17. ②c5 皆c5 18. 血柱 ±, but Black could have played better 13... ℃p41=.

However if White plays 11. Ad3! Black doesn't have the plan of counterplay that we have just seen.

# 11...*Be8*.

> 11...@h5 12.g3!?

Or 12.0-0, and now

1) Nimzovic – Marshall, New York 1927: 12... 全65?! 13.a4 紀4 14.a5 包付 15.包c4! 包d3 16.世 d35 17.ef 島15 18.44 本d4+ 19.金e3±. 12... 包4!? immediately, was much stronger: 13.a4 公d3 14 世 d3 8e8 15.55公付7 164 本44 17.堂由1公6章

2) Gerusel – Halleroth, Toronto 1957, 12... \$\frac{\pmathbf{m}}{2}\text{e8} (12... \text{\pmathbf{h}}\text{h3}? 13. \$\frac{\pmathbf{m}}{3}\text{ threatening 14.94} 13..\text{\pmathbf{b}}\text{15} 15.\text{\pmathbf{m}}\text{5} 15.\text{\pmathbf{m}}\text{5} 16.\text{\pmathbf{m}}\text{42.}\text{\pmathbf{m}}\text{6} 17. \$\text{\pmathbf{m}}\text{13...\text{\pmathbf{m}}\text{c7} 14.0-0 a6 15.\text{\pmathbf{m}}\text{c3} \$\text{\pmathbf{m}}\text{6}\text{16}. a4\text{2} \text{16}.a4\text{2}

A.Alekhine recommended

> 11... 4077! 12.0-0 曾c7 13.a4 皇ae8 14.a5 公c8 ≛ in his comments on the game Nimzovic – Marshall.

Osnos – Ehlvest, Tallin 1980: 12...a6 13.4d2 皇e8 14.a4

Osnos — Enivest, Tallin 1980: 12...a6 13..Δd2 8e8 14.a4 18c7 15.1813 c4 16.Δc2 8c5 17.Ωe2 h5 18.h3 Ωh7 19.Δc3 Δe5 20. h4 18c7 21.a5 2c8 22.Δa4 ± 14..Ωc8 is insufficient for equality, after 15.8e1 8b8 16.a5 Ωa7 17.Ωc4 Δb5 18.Δg5 ±.

Brinck-Klausen - Holm, Copenhagen 1980: 12.a4 瞥67 13.a5 公8 14.0-0 a6 15.章e1 公8 16.瞥b3 章a7 17.公c4 4d4 18.쇼e3±.

> 3. 11...2bd72? 12.0-0 a6 13.a4 £b8 is hardly recommendable. The same position was reached (with some transposition) in the game Kozma – Zaruba, Czecho-słovakia 1955. Black played 13...≝e7 14.a5 ᡚe8 15.ᡚc4 ᡚe5 16.ᡚb6 £b8. White had to play now 17.Δe2 15 (or 17...g5?! 18.ᡚc8 £c8 19.Δg4!) 18.14 ᡚd7 19.ᡚc8 £c8 20. Δf3 Δ £e1 and e4–e5±.

#### 14.f4

14.ହc4 발c7 (14...ହe8!? 15.Δf4 발c7 16.a5 ହe5 17.ହa4 Δd7 18.₽ab6 Δb5 19.Bbf 발)15.Δf4 ହe5 16.Δ·e5! de 17.a5 2e8 18.ହa4 Δd7 19.Ջcb6 Δ·a4 20. 발:a4±, Borisenko – Sokolsky. Kiev 1954.

Sokolsky, Kiev 1954.

Abeg – Flores, corr. 1980–1981, 14...曾c715.曾c2 皇e8 16.h3 公6 17.a5 b5 18.ab 曾:b6 19.公公 曾c7 20.e5±.

#### 12.0-0 a6.

Pritchett, England 1972 went on 18...⊕e7 19.**.**\$b4 **\$c**8 20.**.**\$c3! (20.**.**\$c46 **\$b**6!∞) 20...**\$b**8 21.**\$d**2±.

15.a4 a5 16.当f3 当c5 17.启fd1 邑e7 18.h3 邑ae8 19.包f1 业c8 20.业e3 当c7 21.业d4±, Ehlvest – Wojtkiewicz, Sochi 1982

#### 

13...曾c7 is hardly recommendable since the plan with c5-c4 is bad, and the Queen should control the "h4-d8" diagonal. Ruderfer – Lerner, Alma-Ata 1971: 14.曾e2 包h5 15.f4 Δd4

16.발h1 신f6 17.발f3 c4 18.쇼c2 발e7 19.a5±. Black decided to win a pawn here but White had a strong attack — 19...쇼:e3 20.쇼:e3 신h:d5 21 신:d5 신:d5 22 쇼d2 신:c7 23.f5+.

Minogina – Levitina,Tbilisi 1979: 14.a5 �bd7 15.≝c2 �e5 16.Δe2 �fg4 17.Δ:g4 ᡚ:g4 18.ᡚc4 ᡚe5. White kept the advantage after 19.ᡚb6 ₫b8 20.ᡚca4 followed by ቯa3.

#### 14.54 12

White played 14.a5 in the game Monoghina – Stemina, Moscow 1980. There followed 14..0e5 15.Δc2?! Ω[g4 16.Ω;q4 1.713 Δd7 18.≌e2 b5 19.ab №:66 20.Δa4. They reached an equal endgame after 20...Δb5!? 21.Δ:b5 ab 22.8:a8 8:a8 23.2±b5 ±b5 2.4b5 8b8! 25. ᡚd6 Δi8 26.44:15.Δe2/2 cg7 18.h3 ᡚd6.

In case White plays 14. **Δ**c2 instead of the text move, Black has 14...**B**b8 15.a5 b5 16.ab ᡚ:b6 17.f4 ᡚ:e4!? 18.ᡚ:e4 **Δ**d4 19.**⊉**h1 f5. or 14.h3 ᡚh5!.

#### 

Black has good counterplay. For example: 15.0:c4 0c5 16.65 de 17.fe 0:d5, or 15.0c2 0c5 16.27 0b3!

The statistics prove a distinct problems for Black in this variation, although White is avoiding 9.€x4 in favour of the main lines in most of the games."

Most of my students lost their vigour to study this variation further, having read this excerpt. It looks like 7... ♠bd7 promises Black good game throughout.

According to the book, "Black is OK" in some other variations as well i.e. 9... #e7!?. The next chapter of the

Kapengul's book is treating the most natural move 7...Δg7 and once again Black seems to be without any problems. I don't think that the Modem Benoni is such reliable an opening that Black can play almost anything to have counterplay everywhere. Yet, if that was still so, the young player must allways know what he should play in fact: 7...Δpd7, or 7...Δg7 – which of these two moves is better. He must have a cle ar impression, despite that sometimes it might be wrong, what his opening repertoire looks like. On the other hand, a lot of strong players, on the level of an IM and higher, who happen to play the Modern Benoni, consider Kapengul's book to be really good. It comprises a full and well selected information, and making analysis and logical deductions is

something players like that can manage themselves.

It becomes clear now that what we need is a selection of games which demonstrates the strategical plans in the position, the methods of playing the opening and the middlegame. I have always been trying to put the emphasis on the quality of the examples, and not on the quantity and besides, I prefer to use to the limit the chess clasics, thoroughly analysed with excellent comments by world's strongest players. I know a lot of young players that have wonderful card-indexes with plenty of games and are constantly working on their updating. They are not capable however to make an elementary analysis of a position, not to mention that usually they have a very meagre idea about the endgame or the classics. They still elaborate on their game collections and all that time and enormous effort are proved to be in vain by their poor practical results.

Our aim is to obtain a position with a bright strategical perspective out of the opening, trying to avoid, whenever possible, the strictly mechanical work.

Lets continue our study of the openings of poor quality.

# The Tchigorin Defence

I would like to treat this opening extremely simply.

After 1.d4 d5 2.c4 ©c6?! 3.e3!? deserves serious attention. Now if Black abstains from the centre counter-blow 3..e5, the Knight's move 2...©c6 looks rather stupid. On 3..e5 4.de the ECO gives the following variation: 4...d4! 5.ed e1:46 6.@4d 9..d4 7.d4 3.de 3.de 9..de 9..de 3.0-0-0 with an advantage for Black after the game Ret – Bogoljubov 1921. White can play 5.a3! however and we reach the position that we have already analysed in the Albin Countergambit.

What we have to look anew is the move **4...dcl?**. After 5... ±0.8+ ⊈.d8 White can choose between 6... £13 and 6.f4. The move 6... £13 looks more reliable, since after 6... £0.4 7... £2. Δf5 doesn't work, because of 8... £0.4. Black can play 6... £2.4 7... £2.4 £.13 8.gf £0.65 9... £2.6 but White has a clear advantage in the endageme because of the two bishoos.

6.14 looks riskier but if White manages to keep the central pawns connected without too much delay in the development, his huge opening advantage will be guaranteed. Unfortunately, this position hasn't been tried in practice neither by me, nor by my students.

It is unfavourable for Black to play the straightforward

6...♠b4 7.⊈d2 ♠f5 8.ᡚf3! ᡚc2, because of 9.ᡚd4, and to 6...♠e6 comes 7.ᡚa3!.

As we can see, with the help of 3-e3!? White can set the game on unexploited but favourable lines, intercepting the effect of surprise in the process. This is a very rational approach from the point of view of the practical player. The move 3-e3 is somewhere in deep shadow in the contemporary theory, therefore you don't have to fear that someone, somewhere might analyse it thoroughly. This move is in complete harmony with common sense in chess and meets all

the requirements of the position. You can at least be completely sure, in case you fail in your first attempt with this approach, that the opening position is not to blame for your mishaps. On the other hand, you can ignore the tournament practice in openings like that almost completely. Finally, if your opponent finds a way to equalize convincingly, you can give up 3.e3 and look for something else. Playing in the Championship of Bjieforussia for women in 1990, Elena Zayac was expecting her opponent to play the Tchigorin Defence for sure. She didn't want however to play an endgame and asked one of the strongest grandmasters in the world Boifs Gelfand for an advice. He recommended the following variation: 1.d4 d5 2.c4 9c6 3.9c3 9/16 4.9f3 Ag4 5.cd 9/15 6.e4 9/1c3 7/10 e 8 8d5 9/1844 9/17 10.9/155

Black avoided this line and played 3...e5? instead. The game continued 4.cd 1.d4 5.e3 115 6.115 3.d6 7.4.b5+ 4.d7 8.126 417 9.e4. White obtained a clear advantage and brought it easily home.

Gelfand belongs firmly to the world chess elite. To preserve his place there, he must have an excellent opening preparation for all kinds of surprises – a repertoire with a world-class precision. We have a long road up to Gelfand though.

Lets turn our attention now to another opening.

# The Budapest Gambit

After the moves 1.d4  $\bigcirc$ 16 2.c4 e5 3.de  $\bigcirc$ 194 | advise my pupils to play 4.e3  $\bigcirc$ 1e5 5. $\bigcirc$ 17!. What about the strange knight's move to "h3"? | understand befectiv well that if White

wants to refute this provocative opening, he must study the moves  $4.\Omega$ f3 or  $4.\Delta$ f4. The classics is also worth turning to:

Alekhine – I.Rabinovitch, Baden-Baden 1925 – **4.e4!**. "This is the best move for White in this position with a good reason. White returns the gambit pawn occupying the all-important "d5" square instead. White has to play very precisely in the next few moves, otherwise Black might successfully attack the pawn center." A.Alekhine. **4.**...\(\thick{\theta}\):e5 **5.f4** \(\theta\):g0. The other retreat with the knight 5...\(\theta\):e65 is considered best by the theory. I can offer the reader another miniature:

5...Qec6 6.Δe3 Δb4+7.Qc3 ≅e7 8.Δd3 f5 9.\text{\text{\text{mb}}}h5+! g6 10.\text{\text{\text{\text{mb}}} \$\text{\text{\text{\text{c}}}}c4 + 11.bc fe? 12.\text{\text{\text{\text{c}}} 4 0-0 13.\text{\text{\text{\text{d}}}c4 \text{\text{\text{\text{\text{c}}}} 18.\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{c}}}}} 19.\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{d}}}} 19.\text{\text{\text{\text{d}}}} 19.\text{\text{\text{\text{d}}} 19.\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{d}}}}} 19.\text{\text{\text{d}}} 19.\text{\text{d}} 19.\text{\text{d}}

6.0/3! \$\delta c5 7.15! \$\times h4? 8.0/95 \$\times 7 9.5/94 \$\times 16 10. \$\times h5+!\$
\$\quad g6 11. \$\times h4\$ \$\times 12.4\times 25 \$\times 17 13.4\times 200 14. \$\times 1.00 15.003\$
\$\times 44 16.1\tines 19.66 17. \$\times 18.4\times 18.4\times 26 19.000 \$\times 4.7\$
\$\times 22.4\times 6 \$\times 16 23.4\times 16\$
\$\times 18.4\times 18.4\times 18.4\times 22.4\times 6 \$\times 16 23.4\times 18 \times 18.4\times 1

No doubt, Alekhine was a much better player than his opponents and his central strategy deserved studying. I still try to follow my rule – to stay away from the main theoretical lines in the openings of poor quality in favour of some less analysed, strategically sound line. I can't help here making an analogy with the chess-life in the former Soviet Union. I have been working as a coach there for years and I have had a lot disputes which had turned sometimes into serious conflicts. I know personally plenty of players and coaches that long to argue and even fight over trifles. I have had a formidable experience with a rather rude and unjust attitude towards me and my students, but still I prefered to go on working in a way that I saw fit, and as for the malevolence, I managed to save my time and avoid senseless fights, by just Ignoring it.

You can for sure spend some time looking over the chess magazines of the last several years, and lyse for a while and aim at systems that are going to guarantee a huge opening advantage in the Albin Countergambit or the Budapest Gambit. Yet, do we need all that at this stage when openings like that are played just once in fifty games, while we have a reliable system on the side that wouldn't consume any more time and efforts. We have to teach the young player to win due to his work on the game as a whole, and not only to some ultrasophisticated opening preparation. Wouldn't it be much more practical if we spend all this time on studying the really important opening problems facing White in the Nimzovich Defence, the King's Indian or the Gruenfeld Defence and as for the Tchigorin Defence or the opening 1.d4 d5 2.c4 Af5 just to avoid opening disputes temporarily. Lets go back now to 5. 2h3. That move was first shown to me by one of the strongest correspondence players in the world Donatas Lapienis. We meet each other often to analyse different opening problems as coaches on various junior competitions. The last White's move seems very logical. One of the

The last White's move seems very logical. One of the White's knights will stays on c3, the other one on f4, and the "d5" square will be almost under total control. If Black develops the knight from b8 to c6 one of the White's knights will exercise a powerful pressure from the "d5" outpost. Therefore it seems that Black has to try to control the "d5" square with a pawn, so White will have excellent practical chances playing against the weak "d6" pawn instead. I understand that if Black defends well, he must obtain sufficient counterchances, still this approach in the opening brings White excellent practical results.

I am going to illustrate all this with three games of one of my students — Alexander Zazhoghine that were played in junior competitions. All these games are similar to each other, yet very instructive. Black was developing his pieces a bit carelessly, without some well thought-over game plan and invariably had difficult positions. The White player on the other hand, was completing his development following the prepared game plan, seized the initiative and then finished the opponent off by means of enterprising and effective onslaughts.

# Zazhoghine - Philimonov Grodno 1989

1.d4 2f6 2.c4 e5 3.de 2g4 4.e3 2:e5 5.2h3 d6 6.2f4 2bc6?! 7.4e2 4e7?! The fianchettoing of this bishop looked preferable. 8.0-0 0-0 9.2c3 4f5 10. 2fd5 a5?



met by 19.±Q5. 18... 2e7
19. ≝d2! White is playing for mate, setting aside trifles like the
"f6" pawn. 19... 2rd5 20. cd ≦e8 21. ≦f2! f5 22. ef ≝:h4 23. g3!

#d8 24.f6 c6



25.4f8/ Black resigns.

# Zazhoghlne – Yanukovic Vitebsk 1990

1.d4 ②f6 2.c4 e5 3.de ②g4 4.e3 ③:e5 5.②h3 ②bc6?!
6.②#4 4\( \Delta\) 4\( \Delta\) 4+ The exchange of the dark square bishops is in White's favour. The move 6...g6 looked sensible.



## Zazhoghine – Miezis Vilnius 1990

1.d4 ①f6 2.c4 e5 3.de ②g4 4.e3 ②re5 5.\textit{\textit{h}} 2 \textit{g6 6.g3} \textit{\textit{g6 8.g3}} \textit{\textit{g6 8.g3}} \textit{\textit{g6 8.g3}} \textit{\textit{g6 8.g3}} \textit{\textit{g6 9.g3}} \textit{\textit{g6

#### 9#62.4:d2+10.#d2.0-0.11.@c3



Once again White's advantage is out of question.

11....Ea8 12.205 \$\frac{\pi}{206}\$\frac{\pi}

20. Ec2 Oe6 21. Ead1 Oef8 22. Ed2 Oe7 23. Efd1 b6 24. Ed8

Δb7 25. Ee8 Ee8 26. b4 Oe6 27. f5 Oe5 28 Efb3 c5 29. bc

Δf3 0. Ea4 Ef8 31. c6 Off3+ 32. Eg2 12. c6 33. Ec6 03d4

34. Ec4 Oc4 35. Ec7 Ob5 36 Ec6 Black resigned.

Naturally, Black's play in all these games was far from perfect but the world-class players play openings like that very seldom if at all, so to start with a system like that with White is entirely satisfactory.

By the way, if we compare the games of Alekhine and Zazhoghine (God forgive for the sacrilege...) without knowing who plays White, it will not be easy to tell which one was played by the great champion, and which by the unfamiliar master's candidate, since the level of opposition by Black was about equal.

I am at a loss how to name the next opening of this sort i. e. 1.d4 d5 2.c4 \( \textit{\textit{d57}} \)?. Some years ago, it was favoured by V. Malanjuk, one of the strongest IM's in the USSR at this time. I had to seriously prepare for our game in the Championship of the Armed Forces in Odessa 1981, having in fact no reference books around. After 1.d4 d5 2.c4 \( \textit{\textit{d57}} \)? I made my choice upon 3.cd. Black must play 3...\( \textit{a.b1} \), and now comes

4... \(\mathbb{L}\)d7, or 4... \(\mathbb{L}\)d7, because of the two bishops and the centre, so what is left is the move 4... \(\mathbb{L}\)d8. \(\mathbb{L}\)d1. \(\mathbb{L}\)d2. \(\mathbb{L}\)d2. \(\mathbb{L}\)d2. \(\mathbb{L}\)d3. \(\mathbb{L}\)d2. \(\mathbb{L}\)d3. \(\mathbb{L}\)d4. \(\mathbb{L}\)d4. \(\mathbb{L}\)d4. \(\mathbb{L}\)d4. \(\mathbb{L}

I would like to remind the reader that I never opened the Encyclopedia" even once to try for an advantage after the recommendations of the author. I got used, ever since I was a child, not to trust the reference books blindly, but to use them just as a landmark for analytical work on the openings, checking almost every move in the main lines.

For example, in the position in the Tchigorin Defence that we looked over some pages before, the "Encyclopedia" refers to the game Gligoric – Mariotti in the "Chess Informant" 21, which continued 11.0g4 2:c3 12.2d1 2:a1 13.2c2? (13.4b5 is better) 13...0-0-0 14.4b2 2:a1 15.2c2? (13.4b5 is better) 13...0-0-0 14.4b2 2:a1 15.2c2 2c5 16.2c1 0.2c1 17.2c5 2.8c5 18.2c1 2.8c1 2.8c1 2.8c2 2.9c5 2.8c1 2.

"Phisculture and Sports" publishing house. Every chessplayer must have his own theory of chess openings which should include some new and some old, but updated schemes, variations, thoughts and moves. We are trying to develop such a kind of opening repertoire that will help him to think in terms of strategy, lead him to constant improvement in the skill of positional play and enable him to pose problems to his opponents complex enough to solve. Yet if pos sible, our opening choice should be a bit away from the latest opening fashion to avoid getting drowned in the flow of new information. Accordingly, if you decide to enlarge your opening repertoire with some new variation, ask yourself the following ougstions:

Do I have to do that just now because this line seems to be played lately by almost everybody?

Wouldn't it be better if I turn my efforts on some less popular variation, which is positionally sound although less familiar?

We are going now to turn our attention on the openings of good quality. White can hardly rely on a serious opening advantage in these openings and because of that my work with the young players is restricted in the first stage to the explanation of the main strategical ideas and the choice of lines that lead to complex positions abundant with active possibilities.

### The Queen's Gambit

We are going to start with the Queen's Gambit Declined:

1.d4 d5 2.c4 e6 3. \(\textit{\Delta}\)c3. There is a fine point right now – Black has a choice between 3...\(\textit{\Delta}\)f6 and 3...\(\textit{\Delta}\)e7. I have had a

you just start to work together with, doesn't make any difference between the two moves and has a very vague idea about the minority attack, if at all. Therefore it is more important to turn his attention on the key moments of the struggle and mainly to the importance of the diagonal "b1-h2" in the Karlsbad System. White has the opportunity to seize this diagonal after 2... 296. What can happen next is: 4.cd ed 5.495 and now Black can not play 5... 45 because of 6.4.16. Black must choose between 5...42. or 5...65.

After S...4e7 6.e3 it becomes clear that 6...4f5 once again doesn't work due to 7...4r6 A..f6 8.1th3 and Black loses a pawn. So Black has to play 6...c6 and by playing 7.1thc2! White grabs the all important diagonal. Notice that 7.1thc2! is more precise than 7...4c3 €2e4!, since after 7.1thc2 €2e47 is a blunder because of 8...ex7 1thc7.9 €705.

Lets assume now that Black has played 5...65 and White has played 6...3. Here 6...2.f5 is possible, but after 7.2f31 White is unavoidably going to compromise Black's pawn structure on the King side, since Black can't play 7...96, because of 8.04.41.

I'll try to explain what is the point of the fight for the diagonal "b1-h7". The minority pawn-attack is one of the possible plans for White. He has three pawns against four on the Queen side. Suppose the "b" pawn reaches the b5 snuare:



The appearance of a pawn weakness is unavoidable in the Black's pawn structure — either on cf. or on d5.

Suppose now that after the moves 5... £e7 6.e3 c6 White plays 7.£/37!, instead of 7. £c2!. Black must immediately take his chance and play

- 7... ♠(5!). White has to secure the "b1" square for the rook in order to proceed with the minority attack, so he must exchange the light square bishops. The line continues with:
- 7... 15 8. 13. 16 9. 26 d3 9. 26 d3 € d3 € d4 10. 0-0 0-0 11. 2ab1 a5 12. a3 5e8 13. b4



Black can play now 13... et with about equal position. but with the bishops exchanged, a very reliable way of resistance is to meet the minority attack "head-on" with 13... b51? and to follow this with a knight manoeuvre up to c4. You have to remember that when the light sourare bishoss are present on

the board, the plan with b7-b5 for Black has serious drawbacks from the point of view of positional play. It would be useful for the reader to know that sometimes Black is trying to fight back for the important diagonal with the help of the long manoeuvre 2d7-f8-e6; g7-g6; 2e6-g7 and △f5, although usually White "takes care" of the "c6" pawn meanwhile, like in the game

### Novikov – Haritonov Sevastopol 1986



The international master A. Haritonov was commenting the game in the "Chess Informant" 42 and mentioned that instead of 20....8e8?! it would have been better to play 20....\(\mathbb{\textit{the distance}}\) = \$\text{it would have been better to play 20...\(\mathbb{\text{the distance}}\) defend with the idea of 21...\(\mathbb{\text{the distance}}\) although White's chances would be preferable. Generally speaking,

positions like that are practically without any perspectives for Black from the point of view of playing for a win. White can "work on" the weak pawn "c6" at leisure without any risk of losing. I have never been dealing with statistics, but I think that about 35 to 40 percent of games like that end with wins for White, and the rest in a draw. Black is wasting a lot of time for the sake of the light square bishops' exchange. 22.816 ©e7 23.8cb1 "8/6 22.8/b3 Ba8 25.8b7 ©f5 26.0c5 8c7. White managed to occupy the "b" file and the "c5" outpost. Black has to reconcile with the simplification of the position, due to the threat 27.8d7. 27.8b8+1 25.8b \$2.8b\$ \$2.8b\$



32.. 2a7 White's strategy was crowned with success. The "c6" lost. Black's only pawn counterchance is to attack the "f2" pawn. 33.E:c6 Ea2 34. 2d3 Ed2 35.Ec3 f5!? 36.af af 37. #f1 f4/? Black is putting up efforts create heroic to counterplay. White was threatening to displace the black rook from the "d2" square and occupy it with a white rook, after which to win the game with an extra pawn would be just a matter of time. 38.£147 I. Novikov was tempted to win another pawn keeping the compact pawn structure, but now he allowed Black to drastically activate his pieces. The right decision was 38.eff and after 38.2f6 39.92 2f5 40.9f3 White was bound to win. It was highly probable though that the time-trouble would affect both the quality of play and the result. 38.£124 39.9gf 8d2 40. 40.9g6 8lack is two pawns down but he has nothing anymore to fear. 41.8c8 2f5 42.8f6 ×2g4 43.8f4 \*2h3 44.8f4 \*3g4 45.8f1 8e21 46.0f4 £1.8f1 8e21 46.0f4 £1.8f2 £1.8f2

the fine points of this move long ago, after the match for the World Championship in 1963 between M. Botvinnik and T. Petrosian. The idea of this humble looking move is that Black intends to occupy the diagonal "b1-h7" with the bishop, if White aims at setting the game along the lines of the Karlsbad variation. For example: 3... Let 4. Df3 Df6 5.cd ed 6. La5 c6 7. #c2 a6/?. There were indeed some attempts from White to get an advantage by means of 8.e4 de 9.4:f6 4:f6 10.12:e4+. V. Eingorn played like this with White against A. Karpov in the Championship of USSR 1988, After 10... \$e6 11. \$c4 \$e7 12.4:e6 世:e6 13.世:e6+ fe 14.0-0-0 ②a6 15.星he1 ②c7 16. De4 ⊈e7 17. Ed3 White had a small endgame advantage. but the game ended in a draw. A. Karpov tried playing the same line with White afterwards against A. Yusupov. Black chose the double-edged line: 8... \@:e4 9. \@:e7 \@:e7 (9... \@:e7 10.0:d5!) 10.0:e4 de 11.2:e4+ 4e6 Karpov found out now the drawbacks of Blacks' setup playing 12.4c4 曾a5+ 13.堂f1! and after 13...\$f5 14.\$e3 €0d7 15.\$e1 \$ae8 and now the not too obvious pawn sacrifice 16.d5!! cd 17.4b5! set forth a King-side attack that brought him a brilliant victory. You can look over this game annotated by IM A. Kuzmin in "Shakhmati in USSR" 9/1988, or with comments by GM A. Zaitzev in the "Chess Informant"

Little by little however, Black found the way to neutralize White's initiative. The game *Ruban - Dreev*. Toilisi 1989, went on: 10.世/e4+ 世e7 11. \$\Delta \cdot 0-12.0-0 \pmub4 13. \$\Delta \cdot 3.5 \Delta \cdot 3.5 \Delta \cdot 3.6 \Delta \cdot 6.7 \Delta \cdot 6.6 \Delta \cdot 8.6 \Delta \cdot 8.9 \Delta \cdot 7.2 \Delta \cdot 8.6 \Delta \cdot 8.9 \Delta \cdot 8.7 \Delta \cdot 8.6 \Delta \cdot 8.9 \Delta \cdot 8.6 \Delta \cdot 8.9 \Delta \cdot 8.6 \Delta \cdo

17...fe 18. e3 aae8 19. e4 4g7 20. ad1 6b6! Black seized the initiative and subsequently won the game.

The theoretical interest towards the variation beginning with the move 7.曾c2 began to diminish. White managed to win after a sharp fight in the game Karpov - Yusupov from the tournament in Roterdam 1989 after: 1.c4 e6 2.d4 d5 3.Øc3 Δe7 4.ᡚβ ᡚf6 5.cd ed 6.Δg5 c6 7.≌c2 ᡚa6!? 8.e3 (8.a3 would be followed by 8...a6) 8... 2b4 9. 2d1 4f5 10. 2c1 a5 11. de2 0-0 12. 0-0 dd7 13. d:e7 世:e7 14. gb3 gfb8 15. da4 Da6 16.4:a6 E:a6 17.Dc5 Eb6 18.2c3 Eb5 19.Efe1 h6 20. b3 4e4 21. 2d2 4a6 22. 2f1 2:c5 23.dc b6 24.cb \$8:b6 25. 20d2 曾a3 26. 20f3 c5 27. 曾d2 4e4 28. 2e5 昌e6 (28...c4!?) 29. €)d3 q5?!. You can find this game commented by Karpov in the "Chess Informant" 47. Later however, Karpov did not use this variation even a single time in his match against Yusupov in 1989, although he could play it practically in every game, because Yusupov played with Black the Lasker defence in the Queen's gambit. Evidently the ex-world champion was convinced that Black had more than satisfactory defensive resources. It was hard to imagine any other state of affairs. Because if Black does not have enough counterplay in this variation, the Queen's gambit - one of the most reliable and checked over openings, would be under the threat of refutation

I think it would be useful to mention that after 3...  $\triangle$ e7, 4.e4 — the centre stroke does not promise White anything. If we compare this position with that one arising in the Slav Gambit — 1.d4 d5 2.c4 e6 3. $\triangle$ c3 c6 4.e4 de 5. $\triangle$ c4  $\triangle$ d4 \*  $\triangle$ -1.04 \* \* de-4 sacrifice a pawn by means of 6. $\triangle$ d2 \*  $\triangle$ d4 \*  $\triangle$ -1.04 \* \* de-4 sacrifice a pawn by means of 6. $\triangle$ d2 \*  $\triangle$ d4 \*  $\triangle$ -1.04 \*  $\triangle$ d5 \* de-4 \*  $\triangle$ d6 \*  $\triangle$ d6 \*  $\triangle$ d7 \*  $\triangle$ d7 \*  $\triangle$ d8 \*  $\triangle$ d9 \*  $\triangle$ d8 \*  $\triangle$ d9 \*  $\triangle$ d8 \*

Lets go back to the move 3... 2f6. After 4.cd ed 5.4g5 4e7 6.e3 c6 7.堂c2 the diagonal "b1 - h7" is in White's hands. He can choose between the "pawn minority" attack and some other game plans. The pawn minority attack is a very reliable plan but somehow Black finds the way through. Students that would like to get acquainted with the plans of both sides in this case might find it useful to study the part: "Typical positions with Karlsbad pawn structure" in the small but instructive book of B. Zlotnik "Typical Middle-game Positions". which was published in 1986 by the publishing house "FIC". Yet, I remember the ironic comment of master O. Dementiev. who was the coach of grandmaster A. Petrosian: "If you, in your best young years, attack the "c6" pawn, what are you going to do when you get older?" I happen to share that opinion that in the "Karlsbad variation" of the Queen's gambit, the young player should better choose a game plan with much broader strategical possibilities than the Queen side attack. I was very much impressed by the game

# Botvinnik – Keres

### Moscow 1952

1.d4 №6 2.c4 e6 3. №c3 d5 4.cd ed 5. №g5 №67 6.e3 0-0
7. №d3 №bd7 8. №c2 8e6 9. №ge2 №8 10. 0-0 66 11. Вb1.
White developed the King's knight to e2 and demonstrated his intention to start the pawn minority attack. That is usually done when the King's knight is on f3. 11... №d6? P. Keres

uses one of the best methods against the pawn minority attack of his opponent, yet he doesn't pay attention to the difference of the position of the White knight, Indeed, when the knight is on f3. Black's plan including the moves Ae7 d6. Øf8 – q6. h7 – h6, the exchange on f6 – Aq5:f6 ≌d8:f6. ∆c8 - g4 and ∆g6 - h4 often leads to a crushing victorious. attack on the King side. Here however, White's knight is on e2 and that allows M. Botyinnik to refrain from the "pawn minority attack" and start an active play in the centre. The position of the black bishop on d6 just helps the development of the White's initiative and turns out to be a decisive loss of time. 12. 2h1. The threat was 12... 13.f3! "Playing 11.2b1 White was preparing the standard queen side attack, now of course he gives up this plan in favour of the centre advance. Black can not prevent the move e3-e4 anymore, because the counterstroke c6-c5 is almost impossible in this position" - (Botvinnik).

13... ∆e7 14.Ebe1 207. 14...h6 could be met by 15. Å.h6 gh 16... \( \) £.



23... № 24. ⊘rf ≝rC 25. Δe4 ⊘e671. Black's best practical chance was the exchange sacrifice on d6. 26. ≝rh 4 g6 27. Δ: d5 cd 28. £rf ≝rd 28. £rf ≝rd to meet the attack along the "h" file connected with 30. £h3, with 30. £fs but out of the blue comes the lactical blow: 31. 2f5! £fe8 32. 2h6+. Botvinnik is not tempted to win the exchange and finishes off the game with an energetic king side attack. 32...£f8 33. £f6 2g7 34.£f3 £68 35.2£f7 £e6 36.£g5 2f5 37. 2h6 £g7 38.g4 Black resigned.

Nowadays M. Botvinnik's plan is not any clairvoyance in strategy and forms a part of the typical methods of playing such kind of positions. Therefore White is not disguising his aggressive intentions in the centre with 11.8b1 but plays 11.73 immediately.



The position is full of tension but the strategical initiative is firmly in White's hands. By the way, White never gave a "solemn cah" to necessarily play 43–84, but can eventually play 92–94 and £93 next, and sometimes when the black bishop is on e6 and the knight is on 96. he might bush floward

the "f" pawn, despite that the central breakthrough is his main objective.

The theory has dealt with the position on the last diagram extensively, but in this book I'd like to acquain the reader with the methods of my work, and not to write once again an opening monograph. Therefore if possible, I would try to follow my own games and the games of my students and also some games of eminent players that belong to classics.

Black can not prevent the "e" pawn thrust otherwise, except by 11...657, but to this 12.8ad1! is very strong, threatening 3.4.:f6 or 13.dc 4.c5 14.6.:d5. Therefore, meanwhile he has to aim at the counterotay against the not too stable white

centre. White has to prepare his active actions in the centre paying attention to the disposition of the rooks.

Grandmaster G. Timoshchenko in his game against me in the Team championship of the Armed Forces of the USSR in Minsk 1984, tried to immediately clarify the position in the centre with the move 11... 2h5. After 12.4:e7 #:e7 13.e4 de 14.fe Black played 14... 404, and almost completely finished with the mobilization of forces and is ready to attack the white centre by means of \$a8-d8 and \$f8-e6. White has to play energetically. 15.2f2!? The best position of the White's rooks will be the duplication on the "f" file. 15... De6 16. Baf1 Bf8 Black avoided the weakening of the position but lost a lot of tempi to defend the "f7" pawn. Now white grabs the initiative. 17.d5/? To choose what pawn to go forward with is entirely a matter of taste. I picked up my choice on the Queen's pawn, but the move 17.e5 had its merits. 17...@c5 18.@d4 #e5 19.@b3 ②:d3 20.增:d3 ②f6. The knight on h5 has no perspectives. besides Black has to reckon with the \$f5 threat in all the lines. 21.h3 Ac8 If 21...Ad7, 22.Dc5 is dangerous. 22.Dd2! Ad7 23. Øc4 #e7

The first impression is that White has a substantial positional advantage but Black's position is a tough nut to crack. How should White play?



I wanted to decide the game by means of strategy, but I lost a lot of time on thinking over the move 24.85d4!?. Now if Black allows the exchange sacrifice, after 25.816 of 26.46 and next £6 and e5, Black will have a hopeless position. Therefore 24...55 is the only move. The came might continue 25.946.5

White had however, a very interesting move 26.0e4. During the game with the clock ticking along, I gave it up because of 26...b5 27.0p5 世h6 28.0:17 世h5 29.0e3 4.e6 and White loses a piece. Afterwards, when I was showing the game to my pupils, someone of them found out the excellent opportunity 30.0:d5 cd (30...4:d5 31.d7) 31.d7 and it becomes clear that 31...4.17 loses after 32.e6, and as for 31...17 3



and the threat 34. #c8+ compels Black to 33... 世g5!, since 33... 直f8 is bad because of 34.e6, 33...4e6 is refuted by 34.堂c6, as well as 33...草d8 after 34.世c7 世g5 35.2f6!. It looks like White's attack has run out of steam because to 34.當c6 comes 34 Ed8 and 35 e6 doesn't work because of 35... 堂e3+ and after 34.堂c8+ 堂d8 35.堂c6 -35...當b6+ is decisive. White can simply play 34.是e1!. What has Black to do now? 34. \$d8.35.e6 \$:e6.36.\$:e6.\$d7.is. bad because of 37.\$c8+ \$d8 38.\$e8+ \$f7 39.\$c6#. 34..\$c7 also doesn't work because of 35 #c8+1 #d8 36 #c6 and after is hopeless for Black. It is possible that the best way out for Black will be 34...#f5!? 35.#c6 #f8 36.e6 4:e6 37.#:e6+ #:e6 38.#:e6 \$7. but after 39.#a6! (39.#d6?! \$e7 40. #:d5 a6 41.b4 \$d8 42.\$f2 \$:d7 43.\$:d7+ \$2:d7 44.\$e3 \$d6 45.\$\psid\$4 g6 46.g3 h5 47.h4 \$\pmedecure{0}\$e6 48.\$\pmedecure{0}\$c5 \$\pmedecure{0}\$f5 49.\$\pmedecure{0}\$b6 \$\pmedecure{0}\$g4 50. 합:a6 합:g3 51.합:b5 합:h4 52.a4 합h3 it will be a draw.). White will have substantial chances for a win. Naturally, to anticipate all this in the time-trouble was hardly possible, but the analysis afterwards proved that the advantage of White in the position after 23 moves was not just an optical illusion.

In the game Ryskin – Deiko, Minsk 1984 Black also continued with 11... 2h5 12...2r5 ≝:e7 13.e4, but here Deiko decided not to open the "T file and played 13.......4e6 instead. A. Ryskin played the straightforward 14.e5f? g6 15.14 2g7 16...2g3 which compelled Black to block the king side with 16...15. White now, having a definite space advantage and a much better piece position, begins to press the opponent on the other side of the board.



17.ᡚa4 ≌ac8 18.a3 b6 19.b4 Δd7 20. ᡚc3 ᡚfe6 21.ᡚge2

Black is constricted. The knights can not occupy the "e6" square simultaneously, the bishop on d7 is also not to envy. White has a clear plan of action mainly with the idea to attack the pawn chain of his opponent

with b4-b5 Black's position is strategically lost. 21...Bed8 22.2b5 Δe8 23.2b3 2b7 24.bc Δ:c6 25.Bac1 a6 26.0a2 b5 27.0b4 2b8 28.2bc6l. A. Ryskin without any doubt exchanges the "bad" bishop of his opponent, which has important defensive value. 28...Ec6 29.Ec6 25.c6 30.2b4 2bc8 31.Ec1 2bd7 32.Ec8+ 2bc8 33.2bf2 White is in the last stage of preparation for the pawn break a3-a4 on the Queen side. 33...2bf3 34.2bf3 35.abf2 2bf3 37.0c3 0ge6 38.0a4 2bc3 37.0c3 0ge6 38.0a6 2bc3 0ge6 38.0a6 2bc3

Lets have a look now how M. Botvinnik's scheme was tested in some junior competitions. I will turn the reader's statention on the games of two master-candidates in the junior championship of Minsk 1988 i.e. the 14-years old Alexander Zazhoghine and the 15-years old Oleg Romanov who hapened uist to start by then working with me.

### Zazhoghine – Zjulev Minsk. 1988



A very original position. What kind of plan should White strive for? The most natural course of action seems to be the advance of the "e" and "f" pawns. but Black is ready to meet 17.e5 with the centre counterstroke c6–c5. Zazhoghine begins the preparation of the centre pawn advance.

17.4b1 There was some merit in another method of action. 17.263 was worth playing with the idea after 17...65, to drastically change the character of the game by means of 18.ed od 19.2fer, or even 19.94 206 20.2fer1 analogous to game 14 of the match Bobinnik – Petrosian which we are going to deal with, later. 17...66 18.263 Ab7 19.a3 268 20. e5 2ad8 21.46. White is very consistent in his actions, but in comparison with the previous game Black's pieces are developed much more harmoniously and Black doesn't need to mechanically block the White pawns with 17-15.

21..c5/ 22.0a2 2hg7. Black threatens now to exchange wice on d4, following with the manoeuvre 全身7-d5 and the march of the "d" pawn. 23.g4f? A very risky move, but a bold and straightforward decision. 23....65. 23...cd opening the entre looked much more logical. There could follow 24.0cd 40:d4 25.8cd (25.8cd 47.8d4) 25...0e6 26.8cd5! (26.0cd5? 855 27.0f6+ 2h8) 26...8th4 27.h3 and White's position is preferable. 24.0c d4? Black succumbs to the tension and starts a counterattack that is not well prepared and boomerarghs back. It was necessary to pluy 24...hg with an unclear position. 25.0cd 8th4f1 26.0ce6 2ce6 27.4ce6 fe 28.cb 85g4+ 29.8bg 3th5 30. ba 8bc 31.ft6 9 32.8tg6+ 86g 32.8tg6+ 86g 3c.8tg6+ 86g 2c.8tg6+ 8

## Romanov – Zjulev Minsk, 1988

1.d4 d5 2.c4 e6 3. Dc3 ⊡f6 4.cd ed 5.Ag5 c6 6.e3 Δe7 7.d4 d5 2.c4 e6 3.Dc3 ⊡f6 4.cd ed 5.Ag5 c6 6.e3 Δe7 7.2ge2 Be8 10. O-0 ⊡f8 11.f3 g6 12.Bad1 ⊡e6 13.Δh4 ⊡f5 14.Δf2 White avoids the dark square bishops exchange. 14...#c7. Black takes the queen away from the opposition against the enemy rook. To 14...f5 15.e4!? might follow and then 15...fe 16.fe de 17.Δh2e4 and 18.d5 next.

15.⊈h1 Δd6 The "h2" pawn is hanging. 16.Δg1 looks very natural with the idea to prepare e3-e4.The young players are full with youthful optimism and they love king side attacks, so small wonder White preferred



16.g4l? №6 17.h4 b6? Too slow. Black had to do something against the forecoming king side attack. 17...h5l? was worth daring, allowing the piece sacrifice on g6 followed by the knight manoeuvre from e6 to g7. 18.8g1 Δb7 19.h5 White has an irresistible attack now.

24....2g5 25.fg fg 26.£f4 gh 27.gh £f6 28.h6! An elegant finish to an enterprising attack. 28...4:h6 29.±h2 4g5 30.4h4 4.:h4 31.±:h4 £e4 32.£:g7+! £:g7 33.£g1+ Black resions.

Let go back now to the expert chess.

### Kasparov – Andersson Reffort 1988

1.d4 Øf6 2.c4 e6 3.Øc3 d5 4.cd ed 5.Åg5 c6 6.≝c2 Åe7 7.e3 Øbd7 8.Åd3 0-0 9.Øge2 Ee8 10. 0-0 Øf8 11.f3 Åe6 12.Eae1 Ec8 13.©h1 Ø6d7 14.Å:e7 E:e7.



15. 2f4. The world champion is not in a hurry to push forward his central pawns and develops his pieces in the most harmonious way first. 15...@c7?! The game plan. started with this move meets with original an tactical refutation. G Kasparov. commenting the game in the

"Chess Informant" 45, recommended 15... 公的 16.皆d2 显d7, after which he intended to tear Black's queen side to pieces by means of 17.b4. 16.皆f2 公所 17.e4 de 18.fe 启cd7 19.d5/ A sudden breakthrough.

19...cd 20. Δb5! White wouldn't have anything substantial after 20. ed?! 2:d5 21.0f:d5 Δ:d5 22.2:d5 (22.8:e7! 22.8:e1 8:d5 24.Δc4 8d7 25.8:e1 8d1 with equality. (Kasparov)

20...£67 The exchange sacrifice wouldn't change the course of the game at all. In case of 20...de 21.允:d7 世:d7 22.0:e4 0:e4 23.基:e4 允:a2 24.8:e7 世:e7 25.발:a7 允c4 26.8:c1 발e4 White had 27.발:c5] paralysing the opponent completely. (Kasparov)

**21.ed ∆d7.** 21...②:d5 was losing after 22.ᡚf:d5 **∆**:d5 23.8d1.8e5.24.₩d4



23.世:a7. White could try the beautiful 23.处h5 and 23..处h5 was losing after 24.d61 基e2 25.世:f7+ 堂h8 26.是e2 ②f6 27.是e7, but Black could play 23...是e5! 24.处:f6+ 堂:f6 25.堂:f6 gf with a satisfactory position, since he can answer 26.是.f6 gf with a satisfactory position, since he can answer 26.是.f6 with 26...是d8 (Kasparov's lines). 23...b6 24.世a6 ②e47! U. Andersson does not play well in the time-trouble and loses easily. 24...②g6 was much better. 25.d6! ②:d6 26.处fd5 &e5 27.世:fb. White has now two connected passed pawns on the queen side. The rest is just a matter of routine technic. 27...②f5 28.世:d8 @:d8 29..4d3 @:e1 30. @:e1 ②g6 31.a4 堂f8 32.a5 ②d4 33.4.9g6 hg 34.8df ②e6 35.0b6 &c6 36.@:d8+ ○c48 37.b5 &c6 38.b5 Black resigned.

Alexandrov - Ziatdinov Primorsko, 1990



The first eleven moves were a repetition of the previous game.Now, White developed the queen's rook to d1 instead of the world champion's – 12.Bae1.

12.Ead1. Alexandrov's move is in tune with the strategical idea of White. Black answered

12... #a5, preventing 13.e4. 13.a3! Bad8 14. #h1. White is not in a hurry. 14... 1c8. Black's position is solid, but very passive. The pieces are beautifully and harmoniously developed in the centre, but if White manages to push forward the central pawns - Black's harmony will vanish in the haze. 15. Ah4!. The bishop strives for the "g1" square, otherwise it constantly hampers Whites manoeuvres. Had Black played 14... 2a6 on the previous move. White wouldn't have then \$45-h4-f2-q1, but still be could increase the pressure with \@e2-g3-f5. 15... @g6. Black goes on playing move after move, without any game plan. He had to seriously think about counterplay. Since c6-c5 was unconstructive presently, 15...g6 deserved attention with the idea @f8-e6. The knight on g6 is very passive. Evidently R. Ziatdinov intended to fight for the "f4" square with his pieces, the moment the e3 pawn goes to e4, but all those hopes proved to be in vain. 16. Af2 Ad6?! 17. Ag1 Ah5 18.b4! The position of the black bishop on d6 makes this move possible, because after 18...世:a3? 19.萬a1 世:b4 20. 萬fb1 Black loses the queen. 18...當c7 19.e4! The right moment for the central breakthrough. Black can not play 19... hf4, because of 20.e5! and 20... 2:d3 is refuted by 21.ed. Here, just like in the game Botvinnik - Keres, the position of the black bishop on d6 brought Black disappointment only, 19...de 20. fe 4f4. Maybe, as if to substantiate the previous play, Black occupies the "f4" square with the bishop to only make White's task easier. By the way, Ziatdinov's position was already hardly defendable. 21.e5 Ah6 22. Af5! Be7 23. De4. We have seen all that script in Botvinnik's games. He directed them in an exemplary way. 23... 4:f5 24.8:f5 @hf4 25.@:f4 4:f4 26.8df1 An6 27.94! White is collecting the ripe fruits of his strategy. There followed: 27... 4f4 28.85;f4 4:f4 29.8;f4 f6 30. #b3+ #b8 31. #f3 #d7 32.ef af 33. 4:f6 #e6 34.d5! cd 35. 4d4 #e1+ 36. \$\psi\_a2 \psi\_e2+ 37. \$\psi\_a3 \psi\_f3+ 38. \$\psi\_f3\$ \$\psi\_e6\$ 39. \$a5 \psi\_a7\$ I would like to add as an illustration to the aforementioned games, that when White's knight is on a2, the knight manoeuwre to e4 is not too effective neither on move 11, nor (after 11...h6 12...h44) on move 12. In the game Shereshevsky - Aslanov, Minsk 1981, after 11...h6 12...h4 @e4 13...£e7 £:e7 White played 14.Bae117. I intended to prepare the advance of the central pawns. 14...2df6 15.f3 It was interesting to check 15.2d1 leaving one additionally piece on the board. 15...£c3 16.£c3 c5. Black does not allow the pawn move e3 - e4, but meanwhile he gets an unpleasant endgame. 17.de £:c5 18.£b5 £:c2 19.£.c2.



I have devoted a whole chapter to endgames of this type,in my book "Endgame Strategy". Positions like that are very difficult for Black, after a precise play, defendable though. In this case however, two pairs of rooks are present on the board, which enables within the to create one more

 play with Black the position on the last diagram is hardly advisable.

To conclude — I would like to add that lately White succeeds to prepare the pawn advance in the centre with the help of castling Queen side. The Latvian grandmaster A. Shirov is a devoted exponent of such type of play in the opening. Before I start dealing with the move 3...£e7 thoroughly, I would like to mention that I have never tried to teach my students to get an opening advantage in the abstract sense of this word. What is important is that they should know the strategical plans in the position, and to be always ready to seize the initiative and to strive for complex struggle over the board.

According to the theoretical monographies the move 4e7 was invented by the Soviet master V. Alatortzev. Now, if White wants to play the Karlbad system he has to comply with the modest development of the gueen's bishop to f4 after 4.cd ed 5. Af4. This continuation was tried multiple times in competitions at the highest level i.e.; the World Championship matches Botvinnik - Petrosian 1963: Karpov -Kortchnoi, 1981; Karpov - Kasparov, 1985; Kasparov -Karpov, 1986 and 1987; a lot of candidates matches as well as in plenty of strong tournaments and Olympiads. The arising positions are typical with the dynamic pawn structure on the king side and in the centre. They attract the attention both of players fond of initiative and pawn advances, as well as of players who like to counter-attack. Players like that love to use the deffects of the pawn structure of the opponent that are usually left after too active actions. In short, you can learn a lot by studying the games of players of extra-class. Lets start well back in the hystory with the match Botvinnik -Petrosian. Game 14 of their match in 1963, started with: 1.d4 d5 2.c4 e6 3.40c3 Ae7 4.cd ed 5. Af4 c6. Black is fighting for the diagonal "b1 - h7" 6.e3 Ah5 7.g4! Ae6 A practically

forced move. To 7... ag6?! White had the sidestroke 8.h4! and 8...4:h4 is bad because of 9.曾b3 b6 10.息:h4! 曾:h4 11.公:d5 and to 8...h5 - 9.q5 or 8...h6 9.h5 and White occupies space advantage on the king side, 8.h3. In this position 8.4d3 was possible, as played by Botvinnik in the 12th game of the match, as well as 8.h4!? - also Botvinnik's invention, played by him in his game with Spasski in Leiden 1970. 8... 2/6 9.4d3 c5. It looks like everything is according to the rules -Black is reacting with a center counter-stroke to the offence on the king side. White does not intend to isolate the "d5" pawn by opening the position, but continues to calmly develop his pieces. 10. 2f3 2c6 11. 2f1! White's king will stav comfortably on q2 and the rook " h1" will be active from its original square. The position of the white pawn on q4 is not extraordinary. On the contrary, the pawn is enabling the white pieces to occupy the "g2" and "g3" squares increasing White's space on the king side. 11...0-0 12.2 a2 cd 13.0:d4! 0:d4 14.ed Exchanging the knights. White won the tempo to occupy the "f3" square with a pawn, 14... 2d7 15.#c2! 2f6 Petrosian retreats with the knight. In case of 15...g6, Black had to consider the possibility 16.4h6 Be8 17.f4, and to 15...h6 16. d2 would have been very strong intending 4d3c2 and \d2-d3 next 16.f3 \dc8.17.\de5



White seized the initiative completely. Black has weaknesses. his piece coordination is also not so bad. but still the position is not very pleasant. Its main drawback is the lack of perspective to create constructive plan of counterplay. If we try once again to make an analogy with

soccer - one of the teams is pressing forward trying to score a goal, while the other team is just watching the actions of the opponents trying to neutralize them without even a hint of an effective counterattack, 17... Ad6. Petrosian is trying to simplify but the dark square bishop's exchange, when both sides have isolated pawns, is definitely in favour of White. 18.Eae1 4:e5 19.E:e5. 19.de? would be a positional blunder because of 19...d4 20.ef #:f6. 19...g6 20.#f2 @d7 21.Ee2 @b6 22. Ehe1! "The movement of the "h" pawn looked tempting but after 22.h4 1216 23.h5 12a7 (or 23...€)o4) White was too much restricted. I decided that White should not play too straightforward in this position." - (Botvinnik) 22... 2c4. Black is somehow trying to play actively but after the exchange of the light pieces the White knight will be much better than the enemy bishop. 23.4:c4 E:c4 If 23...dc. 24.d5 and 25.2d4. 24.Ed2 Ee8 25.8e3 a6 26.b3 8c6 27.0a4 b6 28.0b2 a5 29.0d3 f6.



30.041 White played this move after all, but not with the idea of a king side attack. Botvinnik prepares the occupation of the "e5" square pushing forward the "g" pawn. 31.8:e8+ 2.18:e3 4.71 33.g5 4.e6 34.414 4.747.The bishop has to refreet. To 4.4.457 5.30f 2.865 might



The position has simplified into an endgame, difficult for Black. Petrosian's aiming to counterplay, but he blunders on his next move making his position even worse. 38...a4 39.ba "The alternative was 39.5e5 Bc3 40.ba Ba3 41.Bb2 E:a4 42.Bb6 B:a24 et. White didn't blay this. considering that

it would be better to keep the "a" pawns." - (Botvinnik)

39...Bc4 40.a5f ba 41.0c5 Af5 42.0g3 a4 43.0f4 a3 44.0c5 Bb4 45.0d3 Bb5 46.0d6 Cff 47.0c6 Ac03 48.0c5 Bb2 45.0d3 Bg2 50.0d5 Bg5 45.0c6 h5 52.0f 52.0d5 Bg2 53.d6 Bc2+ 54.0d7 h4?I Bolvinnik mentioned that even after the best 54...g51 55.8a5f 0f6 56.0d6 h4 57.d7 h3 58.8a6+ 0g7 59.8ef b 60.0e5 Bb1 50.0d6 h3 57.d7 h3 58.8a6+ 0g7 59.8ef b 60.0e5 Bb1 50.0d6 h3 57.d7 h3 58.8a6+ 0g7 59.8ef b 60.0e5 Bb1 50.0d6 h3 57.d7 h3 58.8a6+ 0g7 59.8ef b 60.0e5 Bb1 50.0d6 h3 57.d7 h3 58.8a6+ 0g7 59.8ef b 60.0e5 Bb1 50.0d6 h3 57.d8 h3 h

55.f4 £f2 56. \(\delta\)c8 £:f4 57. £a7+. Black resigned.

A wonderful game in which Black didn't make a single blunder but still was outplayed completely.

### Kortchnoi – Karpov Merano, 1981

1.d 45 2.d 46 3.2c3 Åc7 4.cd ed 5.£44 66 6.63 Åd5 7.g4 Åc6 8.h3 №6 9.Δd3 c5 10.2d3 №6 11.2d1 0-0 12.2g2 Æc8 Petrosian played 12...cd 13.£c1 8e8. V. Lepeshkin and D. Plisetsky criticize the last move of Black proposing 13...a6 instead, in their revue of the book "The World Championship Match — Merano 81" The following variation comes next: 14.dc Åc5 15.2b5 Åc7 16.2bd4 №d4 17.£c8 Åc6 18.2d4 (18.ed 29.4 19.£e1 15) 18....466 17.£c6 Åc6 20.2fc2 Æs and ②e4 next. We think that the

weaknesses on the king side do not allow White to rely on any substantial advantage." - the authors conclude.



It looks like White doesn't have anv serious advantage, but Black's defence. after 21.**B**c1 threatening 22. 4 c8 other gueen moves to c5 or c7, is still very difficult. I have to say that A. Karpov was playing better then V. Kortchnoi in their match in

1981 and won convincingly. The comments to this match were too much one-sided. The reason was that it was a real mess then, between chess and politics. Lets go back to the game, though.

14.dc ∆:c5 15. №5 Δt8 16. ②fd4l ②:c4. M. Tal annotating this game in the "64 — Shakhmatnoe Obozrenie" 21/1981 suggests instead of the last move of Black 16... ②fb6l? 17. ⑤:c4 having in mind to meet 18.ed with the sharp 18... ⑥:c4l? and after 18. ②:c4l? you can not speak about anything more than just a slight advantage for White." I studied a lot of endgames like that and devoted a whole chapter to them in my book "Endgame Strategy". Black's position is defend able after a precise play, but usually the task to defend it is not always easy.

17. 日: c8 首: c8 18. ed/ Botvinnik's idea. 18... 首d7 19.全c7 日c8 20.全re6 fe 20. 世中台 is impossible because of 21.点行



White's advantage is out of the question. White has two bishops, better piece development and a lot a space to manoeuvre. Additionally there will be a weak pawn on e6 in the Black's position. 21.2e1 a6 Tal thought 21...世行 best.

22.g5/? White could play quietly, but Kortchnoi prefers to

press home the advantage energetically.

27...2/\$3 28.g6?? 'Black's inventiveness would have been insufficient if White had played now 28...2/\$3 threatening 29.ab or 29.26(2." – Tal. 28...2/h14+ wouldn't help too much after 29.26(2...2/\$14-4) 30.26(1...2/h14-26) 33.26(2...2/h14-26) 33.26(2...2/h14-26) 33.26(2...2/h14-26) 33.26(2...2/h14-26)

28...hg 29.Ag3



 What is left is 30.\$\frac{1}{2}\text{1} 2 \text{1} 31.\$\frac{1}{2}\text{1} and now once again 31...\text{1} and Black can not lose as you can see in the following variations:

- a) 32.單f2? 包f5!
- b) 32.島c2? 曾f3+ 33.曾:f3 島:f3 岛:h3 4.魚:h4 丸d6 35.曾g2 畠:d3 c) 32.兔:h4 曾f1+ 33.曾h2 丸d6+ or 33.曾g1 曾:h3+ 34.島h2
- c) 32.全:h4 管f1+ 33.堂h2 全d6+ or 33.管g1 管:h3+ 34.皇r 管f3+

d) 32.营:h4 營f3+ 33.戛g2 營:d3 34.ab 昼f1+ 35.营h2 營付 10 35.戛f1 營f3+ 36.益h2 營e2+ 37.戛g2 營付 and White has nothing better than a perpetual. After the move in the game White can easily press the advantage home. There followed:

30.872 ©e1+ 31.5811 \$\frac{1}{2}\$172 32.472 \$\hat{0}\$13 33.85e6+ \$\frac{87}{2}\$4.633 3.555 \$\hat{0}\$15 3.655 36.565 37.553 3.554 38.566 \$\hat{0}\$6 39.5684 \$\hat{0}\$7 40.565+ \$\hat{0}\$15 41.555 \$\hat{0}\$17 42.552.The game was adjourned now but Black resigned. No fortress can be built.



This position is the best that Black can do. White wins transposing into a pawn endgame, sacrificing the queen on f5.

The game Taimanov — Rukavina was played in the Interzonal Tournament in Leningrad in 1973, and was considered to be one of the best

games of the tournament. After 8.h3 2/h6 (bad is 8...h5! 9.gh 207 10.Δe2 2/df6 11.8h2! Δd6 12.Δe.d6 12\*d6 13.8g2! with advantage for White – Kortchnoi – Nkov, Budva 1976.) 9.Δd3 Δd6 8. Spaski played like that against V. Kortchnoi in their candidates match in 1968 in Kiev. Kortchnoi failed to get any advantage in the opening but M. Taimanov, in the game we are looking over right now, managed to almost refule Black's plan. 10. ②ge2 h6?/ The creation of this weakness was hardly necessary. As Taimanov said after the game it would have been better 10...Δ:/4 11.5:/4 13/d6. 11.2:/53 Δc8 12.0-0-0 ②a6. (Diagram 34)

13.8de1 "The strategical plan of White is clear. White threatens to open the "e" line (by e3-e4 or e3.14 with an exchange) and to keep the black king on the king side and then by pushing forward the "g" pawn i.e. g4-g5 to open the "g" file. Black is virtually helpless against this plan." — (Taimanov).



21.島h1 增d7 22.島g3. **21.f3 ②h7** After 21...♠:h3 22.e4 White had a strong attack. **22.**目5g3 **△e6 23.**曾**c2 ②g8 24.e4! de 25.fe ②f8 26.**曾**c3!** 



White obtained a winning position with a simple and logical play. Black is not capable to offer anything against the advance of his opponent in the centre and the king side attack. 26...f6 27.45 was the threat 27.45 at the capable of the capable

28.de 世d7 29.5d4 28.5c6 5:e6 29.2cc6 8d8 30.4c4 fe 31.8g61 8d6 32.2c6 8:g6 33.2c6 57 34.2c61 8:e6 35.de 95 36.5d4 5g7 37.44 a6 Black can move only pawns. 38.4d5 55 39.85 54 40.4b3 g4 41.hg. Black resigned.

Lets turn our attention to the present days. The titanic fight between Kasparov and Karpov was omnipresent with Queen's Gambits. The position after 5.444 was played five times in their matches in 1985 and 1986. Both opponents were playing it, curiously enough, for both sides. In the 21st game of the match in 1985. Kasparov was White: 1.d4 d5 2.c4 e6 3. Dc3 Ae7 4.cd ed 5. Af4 c6 6.e3 Af5 7.g4 Ae6 8.h4 Dbd7. Commenting the game that gave birth to this variation: Botvinnik - Spassky, Leiden 1970, the ex-world champion wrote: "... I found out that to accept the pawn sacrifice is very dangerous for Black: 8... 4:h4 9. 4h3 b6 (9... 4c8 10.e4) 10. 2f3 4e7 11.4:b8 8:b8 12.2e5 8c8 (12...4d7 13.e4) 13.2a4 b5 14.世:a7..." The contemporary theory adds some precision to Botvinnik's analysis. After 9.2b3 9...a5 might follow - 10.4h2 世b6 (10... 4:g4? 11.世:b7 世e7 12.世:a8 世:e3+ 13.4 e2 世:f2+ 14.\Dd2 and White won soon in the game Vaiser – Dias. Havana 1985.) 11.-2f3 #:b3 (11...4:q4 was worth considering) 12.ab 4:g4 13.4:h4 gh 14.4:b8 8:b8 15.8:a7 and White is better.

17. 2 q3? White lost his advantage. The game went on 17...a4 18.5)c1 c5! 19.5)f5 4:f5 20.4:f5 cd 21.ed 466 22.5)e2 4d6 23. 2d2 4:f4 24. 2:f4 2e8+ 25. 2f1 2b8 and a draw was agreed, E. Geller playing against R. Knaak in Moscow 1982. tried to improve Black's game in comparison with the game Botvinnik - Spassky playing 12...c5 instead of 12.曾a5, but without too much success. After 13. 2ge2 ac8 14. aft 0-0 15.q5! hg 16.4:b5 寫fe8 17.曾e1 cd 18.ed ②h7 18.4:e7 寫:e7 20.曾a3 夕df8 21.堂f2 f6 22.本c2! 本f7 23.本b3 真ce8 24.真bd1 2a5 25.2f4 \$d6 26.\$d3 b5 27.\$a4 \$d7 28.h6 a6 29.2c;d5 a5 30.h7+ \$\documentum{\pma}:h7 31.\$\documentum{\pma}:g6 Black lost on time. The whole game, annotated by the winner, can be found in the "Chess Informant"/33. Black had no better fate in the game Beliavsky - Geller in the USSR championship 1983. The first 11 moves were the same as in Knaak - Geller. This time instead of 11...h6, Geller played 11...0-0. The game went on 12. 4d3 c5 13. Que2 Bac8 14. \$\frac{1}{2}\$f1 cd 15.ed \$\frac{4}{2}\$d6 16.\$\frac{1}{2}\$d2 \$\frac{1}{2}\$e8 17.\$\frac{1}{2}\$q2 費d8 18.寫be1 らb6 19.4b1 らc4 20.費d3 f5 21.4c1 らf6 22. Da3 4:a3 23. E:e6 fa 24. 2:a3 De4+ 25. D:e4 E:f3+ 26. #:f3 gf 27. 2 g5 2 d6 28. 4:h7+ # f8 29. #f1. Black resigned.

You can look over the whole game once again, with comments by grandmaster A. Beliavsky in the "Chess Informant"/35.

Now you can appreciate the importance of Karpov's novelty on the previous move. 10. 2e2.



10... 2b6 11.Ec1 Ad67/ The world champion, in his book "Two matches", criticizes this exchange offering 11... 2c4 instead. According to Kasparov after 12.4c4 dc 13.4ch6 gh, Black would have excellent counter-chances. Now White keeps firmly the initiative.

12. ②h3 . ②r44 . 13. ②r14 . △d7 . 14. Bg/11 . Kasparov solves the problem of the safety of his king in the most original manner. The king will reside on the "d2" square! On the other hand White understands that Black has the same problem to solve (to castle queen-side), so he has to displace the enemy kriight from 14 with the help of the pawn – g7–g5 move. White is not afraid of 14. . ②r4, which can be followed by 15.g5 . ②15 . 16. Bg/4! ②r11. T. ②rd.2. The touch of a real master! 14...g5 . 15.hg hg 16. ③rd.21



16... ₩e7 17.b31 g5 18.0d3 0-0-0 19.8h1 f6 20... ₩g1 0.f7 21... ₩g31 ₩d6f Black has to comply with the queen's exchange because the threat 22.0b5 is very strong. As Kasparov pointed out 21... №d6 was losing after 22.0c5 0.e4+? 23.03:e4 de 24.0a6!

24.ᡚc5 ⊉d8 25.₤d3 ₤c8 26.ᡚe2 ᡚa8?!



The endgame looks to be rather difficult for Black, meanwhile the last move is almost a blunder, overlooking:

27.£h71 "Black has to choose now between two evils. One is to give up the "h" file (as it happened in the game), or the "e6" square i.e. 27...\$g7 28.£f5 \$gq8 29.£g3.! think Black had

better choose the second..." – (Kasparov) 27...£f8 28.£h6 ②c7 29.ᡚg3 ᡚf7 30.£h2 ᡚe6 31.ᡚg3 ᡚg7 32.£ch1 ⊈e7 33. 2f2 Ed8. The world champion thought it was high time Black took care of creating counterplay with 33...b6!? 34. 451 E:h2 35.E:h2 42:f5 36.af Eh8 37.E:h8 42:h8 38.e4 477 39. 2a4 2d6 40. 2e3? "Time, time... White was in time trouble and the lack of "time-minutes" caused the loss of" time-tempi"! I thought that it would be very good to force Black to exchange on e4 improving the pawn-structure, but that was too slow and gave Karpov the opportunity to suddenly create counterplay. 40. 2h6 seems much more energetic (defending the "f5" pawn and threatening e4-e5) or 40.\$e3 (defending the "e4" pawn and threatening (2)q3-h5). Indeed, those two opportunities are hardly comparable: 40.0h6?! b6 41.e5 fe 42 de Øf7 43 Ø·f7 Φ·f7 44 Фe3 c5 45 f4 d4+ 46 Фf3 Øb7+ 47. 2g4 d3 48. 2f1 b5! 49.fg c4... and who wins? Much better is 40.\$e3 b6 41.\$h5! Now after 41...\$e8 42.b4! (preventing c6-c5) with @q4-h6 and e4-e5 next, Black can not survive. and the piece sacrifice 41...de 42.fe 42.ft 43.ef 4:f5 44. Dh:f6 \$\Delta e6\$ gives only small practical chances. I think White should win (45.b4, with the idea 46.d5+ cd 47.\ddy)" -Kasparov 40...de 41.fe b6 The sealed move. 42.b4 ∆a6 43. 2g4 2b5 Here suddenly, Kasparov saw that his analysis was wrong. On the intended 44.\$e3. 44... 2a3! would follow

slightly better position.

10...曾b6.The "g4" pawn is poisoned. 10...hg 11.hg 2:h1 12.曾:h1 Δ:g4 was losing after 13.曾h8 空f8 14.Δh7 包f6 15.Δe5 包:h7 16.曾:g7+.

11.0-0-0 fg 12.hg 8:h1 13.8:h1 g5 14. $\Delta$ g3 &:g4 15.Bd2 &:d6 16.8:h2 0-0-0 17.&:d6 All that was played in the game Miles — Georgadze, 1981/1982, which was won by White and commented by the winner in the 'Chess Informant'/33.

Lately, Black often gives up the fight for the diagonal "b1-h7" or tries to occupy it, preventing g2-g4 and provoking the complications arising after "b0. All this could look like: 1.04 d5 2.04 e6 3.0c3 .0c7 4.cd ed 5.044 .0c6 6.e3 .0c5 .0c6 8.m2 to 2.0c6 8.m2 to 2.0c

7...c5/ 8.€/3/ Black exploited the presently weak control of White over the "d4" square and made a centre blow. White decides not to isolate the enemy central pawn, since after 8.dc Δ:c5 9.€/3 €c6 10.0-0 d4! 11.€/a4 Δd6! 12.Δ:d6 型:d6 13.€/id4 €:d4 14.ed Δg4! the position is equal. (Kasparov's variation)

8... ②c6 9.0-0 White is not afraid of the mutually isolated central pawns. In case of 9...cd 10.②:d4 ②:d4 11.ed 習6 12.量e1 Ae6 13.②a4 置a5 14.a3 with b2-b4 next and White has some initiative.

9...  $\Delta g4$  10.dc  $\Delta$ :c5 11.h3  $\Delta$ :f3.The retreat of the black bishop to h5 is impossible because after 12.g4  $\Delta g6$  13. $\Delta$ :g6 hg 14.g5 Black is losing the "d5" pawn.

12. **2:13** d4. Black has excellent tactical motivation for the central pawn advance. 13.ed ②:d4 14. **2**:b7? is bad for White because of 14... ②e6!.



"How should White continue now? For example 14-ed doesn't give White anything (In fact it is Black who should try to simplify.) 14... 26'd 15.2ad1 26'6 and the position is about equal. White has a clear advantage after: 14.0:16 15.e4 0e5 17.2e2 with

the idea 12-14, but the position was becoming too simple. I wanted much more: to regroup my pieces in the centre, to finish the development and then to proceed to a king side attack. The rook move to d1 is an integral part of this plan, but once again the elernal dilemma: which rook to put on this square – the queen rook or the king rook. I decided that after 14.2ad1 White has excellent piece concentration, while the other rook on f1 will have good chances to participate in the struggle on the king side." -Kasparov.

14.Ead1 皆a5.The world champion was looking over 14...增b6 as an alternative but thought that the move played by Karpov was better. 15. ②q3/ White could play after 14...當b6 15.♣q5. or

15. 4d6! and the second, of course was better. The move 14... #a5 looks bad after 15. Ag5. But as Kasparov pointed out, with the help of some tactics 15... 2:e4! Black could neutralize the initiative of the opponent. For example 16.\(\perp:\):e4 (16.\(\phi:\):e7 \(\phi\)d2!) 16...\(\quad \text{q6}\) 17.\(\phi:\):e7 \(\phi\)fe8 18.b4!?

(18.增h4 息:e7 18.ed 增b4! 20.△e4 畠ae8 21.△:c6 bc) 18... 曾c7! (18... 曾b6 19.4c5) 19.b5 章:e7 20.曾h4 de! 21.bc e2. "You remember the difficult choice - which rook to go to "d1" with; now you can see the point" (Kasparov).

15...de 16.fe #:a2! Karpov snatches a pawn and is ready to defend with the gueen from the "e6" square. 17. ₽f5/ #e6 18. 4h6/ De8. 18... De5 is bad after 19. #:b7. 19. 2h5! a6! the only move. 19... 2h6? is bad after 20. ①:e7+ ②:e7 21. 章:f6 gf (21... 曹:f6 22. Δ:h7+ and 23. Δg5)

22.4:f8 空:f8 (22... 查:e3+ also loses to 23.空h1 查:f8 24.4c4! ②q6 25.曾:h7 曾e7 26.曾h6+) 23.曾h6+ 自e8 24.曾q7! 曾:e3+ 25.⊈h1 ≝q5 26.4b5+ 2c6 27.2e1 with a decisive attack. (Comments by Kasparov)

20. #a4 De51 a necessary move. If 20... 46? 21. 4c4! wins



21.8g3/? "I was trying to determine the outcome of the game by means of a king side attack at any rate. In this case, however there was a much better way i.e. 21.€2.e7. ±e7. 22.£.f8 €3.874. White was winning the exchange, with a transition into a technical stage, despite that to win the game

wouldn't be easy at all against Karpoy - a great master of defence in such positions." (Kasparov) 21... Af6! Black will have now an excellent compensation for the exchange - a very strong dark square bishop. 22. 4b5/ @a7/ 23. 4:a7 4:a7 24. £d6 #b3 25. ②:g7 #:b5. The rest of the game was affected too much by the time-trouble and both players were trying to win. The world champion was luckier. 26. 2f5 Bad8 27. Ef6 Ed2 28. 世a5 世:b2 29. 中h1 中h8 30. 白d4 E:d4 31. 世:e5 and Black lost on time. The final position is hopeless for Black. The world champion gives the following variation in confirmation: 31... ad2 32. 如e7 add8 33. a:f7 a:f7 34. a:f7 如g8 35.e4 #c1+ (35...q5 36.af5 aa8 37.ah2 #d4 38.e5 and White wins) 36.堂h2 堂h6 37.e5 皇f8 38.e6 q5 39.皇:f8+ 堂:f8 40.堂:q5+ 堂h8 (40...堂q7 41.堂d8+ 堂f8 42.e7) 41.e7 堂e8 42.h4! h5 43.g4! hg 44.h5 堂h7 45.堂g6+. The moves from 26th till 30th were very difficult for both sides and the variations were rather complicated. Karpov made a decisive mistake on the 28th move. After 28...\$\precep\$h8 Black could hold. The readers who would like to get acquainted with this game and its many fine points, can look it over in the Kasparov's book "Two Matches".

Some time later, another ex-world champion M. Tal tried to defend Black's position against Kasparov.

### Kasparov – Tal Scellefteo, 1989

1.dd 45 2.d4 e6 3.0c3 &c7 4.cd ed 5.Δf4 0f6 6.e3 0-0 7.Δd3 c5 8.0f3 0c6 9.0-0 cd Karpov played 9..Δg4 10.0c4 4Δg4 11.2c4 in the "Chess Informat"/48 G. Kasparov analysed the move 11.2c3 thoroughly and proved that Black can provoke favourable complications with 11...2c5 11....2c467! Black cannot achieve equality with this move. White can meet 11...2c5 with the favourable 12.2c5, because of that Kasparov recommends 11...2c7 We sympathize with Tal, since to anticipate further the brilliant strategy of White was practically impossible. 12.2c4 2c4 2c7 13.b3 4.6c1 4.8cd af afc8.



Some time ago I had been lucky to have read the wonderful comments of grandmaster B. Larsen during his best period, when he was playing his match with Tai. He had to fight against the isolated pawn. He tried to react with the traditional methods: block the pawn, occupy the neighbouring pawn, occupy the neighbouring

"c" file with the rooks, simplify the position, yet he didn't have any particular success. Then the hot-tempered Larsen exclaimed that the isolated pawn should not be blocked at all, but it should be attacked and accordingly won. I have plenty of experience of playing with an isolated pawn on the Black side of the French defence and I have to admit that what Larsen said is true, atmost to the point. While the white pieces manoeuvre around the pawn, Black can be calm. But the moment the white pieces regroup with the intention to capture the pawn Black has often to find "only moves". This attacking

strategy is not always so easy for White to accomplish, because most of the times White is weakening the control over the key square "d4". It is very interesting to see how the world champion, with the help of some tactical tricks, rearranges his pieces, attacks and finally captures the "d5" pawn.

15. 4e5/ h6 16. 2d2 2d8/ 17. 4c2/ Playing his last, modest looking but subtle move. Tal created the not too obvious positional threat 17... 2d7, so if White had played carelessly 17.墓ad1 包d7! and Black solved all his opening problems. For example 18.0:d5 ልc5 19.발e4 f5 20.발f4 ብ:e5 21.ል:f5 ል:f5 22.當:f5 當e8 and White has some compensation for the piece but not much more than that. 17... #a5. Here however, 17... 2d7 was impossible because of 18.4:q7! 4c5 19. 2d3 호:g7 20.발h7 발f8 21.발h6+ 발e8 22.신:d5 with a decisive attack. (Kasparov) 18. #d31 Another very precise move. 18.墓ad1? 章c4 19.首d3 doesn't bring White anything after 19... De4! 20.f3 f6! 21.fe de! 22. D:e4 #:e5. (Kasparov) 18... \$\sigma 18 been better to play 18... 2d8. 18... De4? didn't work because of 19.€):e4 de 20.\(\pi\):e4 f5 21.\(\ph\)c3. 19.\(\pi\)ad1 \(\pi\)d4! Wonderful move. The white gueen retreats preventing the threat 20... De4. 20. 4h3? would be a mistake after 20... De4.

20...Eac8 21. \( \Delta b3 \) Now, five white pieces are pointed at the "d5" pawn and its doom is just a matter of time. 21... \( \Delta a8 22 \) \( \Delta f4 \) Eq7.



23.世岁3/ The world champion shows a delicate technical touch. The alluring 23.44?! would have allowed Black to avoid immediate defeat with the help of some interesting tactics: 23...℃h5 24.世省 (24.世名 d4!) del 25.世;h5 是d2 26.是过2 g6

28.º h6 6.48 29.º h2 52 28.0.46 as p. 29.º h5 6.53 30.ab 6.66.(Kasparov). The "banal" 23.0.46 was possible but White doesn't want the position with bishops of opposite colors arising after 23...0.46 24.60:45 6.45 25.0.65.

23... $\triangle$ h5 24. $\stackrel{\text{def}}{=}$  26fe 25. $\stackrel{\text{def}}{=}$  25. $\stackrel{\text{def}}{=}$  17h The final preparation. Once again five white pieces are attacking the "d5" pawn and the 6th -  $\triangle$ e5 is attacking the defender of the pawn. This is a total strategical triumph!

25...a6 26.4.f6 4.f6 27.4.d5! Ecd8. 27...4.c3 was losing after 28.4.e6. 28.e4 4.c3 29.4.e6 Ed3 30.2:f7+ 2h8 31 E-d3 4f6 32 E-d8+ 2:d8



33.#:b7?? This is a blunder that has no precedence in Kasparov's games. It looks like fate decided this day to marr the wonderful picture painted by the world champion. After 33.g3 there was not much sense to continue the game further.

Diagram 43 33... 当d1 + 34. 当h2 当d6+ 35.g3 当:e6 Tal accepted the gift but he didn't manage to achieve more than a draw in this

gift but he didn't manage to achieve more than a draw in this position which was played for twenty five more moves, not without some adventures.

We have met now some different plans for White and we have the options of choice. My students, as a rule, play usually the less compelling 8.h3, after 6. Δf5 7.94 Δe6, while the world champion plays 8.h4. Petrosian in his game with Beliavsky in 1982 played 8. #d2 Đif6 9.f3 c5 10. Δb5+ Đc6 11.dc Δc5 12.Đa4 Δe7 13.Δh6 and got a wonderful position. The reader can find this game in the "Chess Informant"/33. The chess player that you have been working with, must have a clear concept of the strategical possibilities

and should strive for the initiative. I would like to dissuade the reader that the position is without any perspectives for Black and as an illustration I am going to include the game Botvinnik.

— Petrosian, the 18th of their match. I am going to use the thorough comments of the Dutch grandmaster Timman in the "Shakhmati in USSR" 71989, that I am going to abbreviate a little in the opening part to avoid repeating myself too often.

"T. Patrosian had a very original, difficult to repeat or reproduce style of playing. He left us wonderful examples of energetic attacks, precisely played endgames, since he was a profound and subtle player and he was a true professional in all stages of the game. I remember particularly well those games in which he managed to show the uniqueness of his style, i.e. games that you can tell about – that is "Petrosian" and nobody else. I think that one such game is the 18th of his match with Botvinnik in 1963. The match was developing rather dramatically until then. Botvinnik won game 14 and levelled the score at 7.7 (+2 –2 = 10). The challenger took the lead immediately after that winning game 15. The next two games ended in a draw, so the score before game 18 was 9:8 in favour of Petrosian.

and inslead of playing actively somehow he started to manoeuvre. In this aspect of the game – manoeuvering, Petrosian was unsurpassable. At first he defended calmly and then little by little took over the initiative. Somewhere around move 30 he hesitated and missed a very promising continuation. Despite that, he kept a small positional advantage which he managed to turn into a whole point at the adjournment. The game was not fairly evaluated then. M. Euwe wrote about this game as of some dull, every day event. Well, naturally that is not a game that might induce an applause in the tournament hall, but there are many things in

try to equal the score. Well indeed, he was very precocious

chess that can truly be appreciated only by experts. I have always been fascinated with this game. The reason is first of all – the mysterious and untiring manoeuvrañ of the black knights.

## Botvinnik – Petrosian game 18, match 1963

1.d4 d5 2.d4 e6 3.2c3 &c7 4.cd ed 5.£4 66 6.e3 ∆f5 7.g4 Ae6 8.h3 2f6 9.2f3 2bd7. Petrosian thought for almost half an hour before making this move. He refrained from immediate actions against the white pawn centre and finished off his development.

10. Ad3 Db6 11. #c2 Dc4.



This manneuvre is typical for Petrosian. The knight is heading for d6, the square that it is going to control the important "e4" point from. Meanwhile the opponent has the option to either capture the knight or displace it. 12.27f. As S. Flohr wrote about this moment, he wan a het from A. Koftry for a

rouble. Kotov thought that Bolvinnik would play 12. 2g5. A lot of other commentators anticipated the same move with the idea to answer 12. ...£d7 with 13.e4. A. O'Kelly recommended for Black 13...h6 14. 2g7 3 Be6 with mutual chances. I think that White is slightly better though: 15.e5 2gd7 16. 2g3 with the idea 2c3-e2-44. Instead of 14. ...£d6 15. seems much more logical to play 14...de 15. 2ge4 2ge4 16. 2g. 4g6 17. 2g5 3 od and Black has a good position. Another recommendation is 12. ...£c4 de 13.4e with the intention to castle queen side.

Black has nothing to fear from here, on the contrary, after 13...b5 he can grab the initiative.

12... 20f6 The ideal square for the knight 13.20£ 13.205 was still possible with the idea to answer 13...2.47 with 48.2h7 (14...2.h7 15...4.h7 96 16...46 4...d6 4...d6 17...4.g6). Therefore 13...4.26 is much better. I think that the best way to meet the requirements of the position is 13.2.e51. The knight is placed perfectly in the centre and White has good chances to exploit the space advantage.

13... 2c8. A mysterious move. Black created the threat 13...15, but the next move neutralizes this. Now, the following question arises: is the queen move useful? Actions like that are somehow typical for Petrosian. He wants to emphasize that to restrict the scope of choice for his opponent is his main task. 14.2c2 2d7 The knight manneuries continue.

15.f3 g6



16.Bac1. This move was condemned by a lot of commentators who thought that it was high time White played 16.e4.Only P. H.Clarke in his "Biography of Petrosian" and H. Kmoch in "Chess Review" considered this move to be the right one. Kmoch thought that after 16.e4 e1 71.e 2.bb the

white centre would not be easy to hold, so Black after cashing queen side would start the counter offence. I think that the recommendation of these two authors is mistaken irrelevant of which side Black castles on. The opportunity for White to play e3—e4 does not necessarily means that White has the initiative, since it is not easy to tell whether White's centre is strong or weak. 16... @D6 17.63. White had to

consider 17.e4 again, but on this move it was even more unclear than on the previous one. 17....2d7 18.2e2. B. Rabar in the magazine "Shahovski Glasnik" gave a wrong evaluation of this continuation. The strategical plan of Botvinnik to place the knight on 14 was completely within the requirements of the position. 18...2dc8.



"The opponents play as if they don't pay attention to each other. That is the impression, like each one has completely forgotten about the other one." Golombek mentioned in the "British Chess Magazine". This does not mean at all that the tension in the game diminished. Black is recrouping with the

idea to neutralize the White's activity on the king side. 19.a4? This impulsive move was criticized by everybody. I considered it to be the main cause of White's future difficulties. White intended to develop some initiative in the centre and on the king side, and his wish to blockade the queen side was entirely understandable. The pawn advance e3-e4 however, can endanger the "h3" awn. 19..a5.



"A very peculiar moment of the game" – Golombek wrote. "The opponents finally realized that they were playing against each other. " 20.2g3 4d6 21.5f4 Fe7

You can hardly ever imagine, if you don't know the previous

course of the game, that the knight on e7 is the queen's knight and the knight on b6 is the king's knight, 22.2ff. White is also manoeuvering with the knights considering the "e" pawn move dubious. In this case however according to Clarke's analysis Black can afford to play sharply: 22...4.14 23.4.14 de 24.9:e4 #544.25.46.46 #2d7.



25. 20d3. I am sure that Botvinnik didn't consider 25. 2h.5 to be a serious alternative, since his spent on this move only a minute. I thought 25. 2h.6t, as best after 25. 2h.5 But not 25. -20g as most of the commentators suggested. White would have a serious initiative after 26. 4.1 d6.

當:d6 27.f4 (The point was that 27...f6 was bad because of 28.fg fg 29.曾g6+ winning material.) 25...曾c7 26.曾d2. Presently White can not achieve anything substantial. This variation proves the true merits of the Black position. Black can afford castling on either side at any moment.

 the bishop. 27... 2g6. A very good move, but 27...f5 was also good as L. Szabo and M. Tal pointed out.

28.Δh2 ⊙e7. Petrosian repeats the moves missing once again the chance to start a deadly offence on the king side with 28..5f, i.e. 29.Δx6 ™63 0.№C 0-01 Indeed, temporarily Black can not increase the pressure since the pawn advance 15–14 is impossible. Despite that however, White is doomed to passively wait till his position dissipates to pieces. Hesitations were so typical for Petrosian. Plenty of times he achieved a decisive advantage and then he missed the winning line. 29.Δdf Botvinnik decided to make a try to free himself with the pawn advance e3–e4, since he didn't have anything else to do. 29..06 30.№gf /6 Black is protecting the "g" pawn. 30...15 was also possible to play, although weaker since White could organize the resistance by means of 31.Δ..d6 № d6 32. №ff /6 with a good position.



31.e4 Finally! White's centre does not possess enough offensive strength, but still it hampers the pawn advances c6-c5 and f6-f5. 31....2.h2+ 32.2.h2. Bolvinnik was hardly in doubt, whether to exchange queens or not, since his king was seriously endangered. The text move was criticized by

almost all the commentators (Clarke being the nice exception). "Unbelievable" – Flohr exclaimed – "White decided to risk and attack, and suddenly by playing e4, he was exchanging queens." Then he sighed and continued "... Utterly amazing." A lot of other commentators were at a loss, although there was not a single moment in the game, at which White could hope for an attack. Now, Wenty years later it is

evident that the importance of the central pawns was clearly exaggerated. 32...\textstyle="1.5">\textstyle="1.5"\textstyle="1.



Black is reducing the tension in the centre before he occupies the "8" square with the knight. 37... ₽18 could be followed by 38.e5. 38.fe ♀18 9... ₽0.ft An excellent defensive move. The knight is on the road to "92", where it is going to control the weakness on "14" from. 39... ₽196.

Petrosian had only two minutes left for his last two moves, so this can be the only explanation why he missed the strongest continuation. 39... £f7! put his opponent in real



trouble with the idea to put the bishop on "g6" and the knight on "e6" exerting maximum pressure on White's central hanging pawns. 40. 2g2 Ed7.

The game was adjourned here. Black has a little but stable positional advantage, since the white pawns on "b3" and "h3" are in constant need of

defending. It is amazing though, that most of the famous grandmasters at that time were thinking otherwise. Bronstein, Tal, Flohr and even Botvinnik thought that White was slightly better. It is possible that the reason for this evaluation (I discussed that in the comments to move 32) was the

overestimation of the strength of the central pawns. I am convinced that nowadays both Bronstein and Tall would not hesitate to evaluate the position as advantageous for Black. Petrosian and his second I. Boleslavsky thought that Black had a small advantage and the challenger planned to offer a draw. Boleslavsky managed to dissuade him and said that

Bot/innik had been very tired: "... You just play on, you might win." His prognosis proved right. 41.£c2. The sealed move, over which Bot/innik thought for about 15 minutes. 41.2h2 is definitely weaker because of 41... Ead6 42.£13 Ee51 43.E.0g4 Eh21 44.E.01 5 65.45.5 Eg6 46.£c2 £17. Glowed by 47....£14 and a decisive advantage for Black. 41....£17 42.£163. Bot-vinnik said after the game that this was an impulsive move and said that he should have played 22.£6d1. I can not accept such an explanation for a mistake. The loss of attention or shock points out towards an armazing lack of concentration and selfdiscipline. Besides that, I can believe anything except that Bot/innik didn't analyse well the

attention or shock points out towards an amazing lack of concentration and selfdiscipline. Besides that, I can believe anything except that Botvinnik didn't analyse well the adjourned position. Yet, it is worth remembering that the world champion did not have a second, while Petrosian had... The move 42.Bcd1 was essential, with the idea to 42...Bed8 to respond 43.0E6 i.e. 43...c5 44.d5 De5 45.0c4 0.C.24 46.bc 0.06 47.0c4 3.0c5 58.0c4 0.C.25 44.d5 De5 45.0c4 0.C.26 (Under the circumstances this is extremely strong) 43.d5 0.0c5



44.8f1? The beginning of a very unsatisfactory plan. White would like to organize some pressure on the "16" pawn, but that only enables the opponent to place his pieces on the optimal squares. The only chance was 44.₽c4 €:c4 45.bc and

next:

A) 45...\(\pmagex dg 646.\)\(\text{\texitext{\text{\texi\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\te

B) 45.-Óc6. All the commentators here recommended the pawn sacrifice 46.e5 E.e5 47.Aff5. After 47...Ed8 48.A.c6 E.c6 49.Eb1 White would have excellent counterchances. He got rid of the "bad" bishop, and the Black "b" pawn remained defenceless. Therefore it would be better 47...Ae6 but after 48.Oe3 White has, similar to variation A), excellent chances for a draw. The text move is most probably the decisive mistake.

**44...** ∆g6 **45.** ⊈e1 ②c8. The second knight is on the way to the ideal blocking square "d6".

46.8df2 8f7 47. 2d2. The special reporter of "Volkskrant" thought this to be the decisive mistake. 47.8e2 was possible and after 47... 2d6 48. 2d1 b5! White had some chances for a draw. In the game, however White lost this small hope.

47...4)d6.



Black obtained the ideal, the dream position. 48.2/54. A sad necessity but that was the only way to avoid the loss of a pawn. 48.2.2/5 49.ef. Bronstein recommended here to sacrifice the exchange — 49.8.15 50.8.15 as the only chance to put up some resistance. You need desperate sacrifices in

desperate situations. In this case, however the technical difficulties for Black are minimal. 50...£fe7, then 51...£ff7 and 52...£0f. Ag...¢f. Petrosian thought for about 10 minutes and decided that it was time to open a second front on the queen side. 50.£fb 1.b5f. Petrosian grabs the initiative and goes forward. The positional threat is 51...b4, after which the protected passed pawn will automatically bring Black the victory. 57.bM White's only chance, but now comes another blow.



55...c3+/ Sacrificing this pawn, Black is not only opening the "c" file, but he secures the "c4" square for one of the kinghts. 52.5c3 8c7+ 53.5d2 Sec4+54.5dd €a3 55.8b2. In the variation 55.8b3 €::c2 56.8c2 8c2 57.5d::c2 8c2+ White losses a piece. 55...2bad The Black knoibts are masters.

of the situation. 56.8a2 ab 57.ab ②:b5 58.8a6 ②c3+ 59.\$c1 ②:d5. So, Black has an extra pawn and a better position. 60.\$a4 8ec8 (with the threat of a discovered check.) 61.②ef ⑤f4.



White resigned.

The final position is in fact symbolic for the whole game. The position of the black knights is superb. The win comes after twenty four knight-manecuvers. Botvinnik's resistance was practically crushed after this struggle. The score became 10 and and the properties were superposition when the symbol of the properties were supposed.

to 8, and then Petrosian won game 19 and after three more draws became the new World Champion."

Pawn structures like the "Karlsbad" one can arise from a lot of other openings, sometimes with the colors reversed. Robert Fischer was White in the Caro-Kann defence in the "Match of the Century", between USSR and the rest of the world. He utilized Black's opportunities (when Black manages with colors reversed in the Karlsbad variation to occupy the "b1-h7" diagonal) in his game with Petrosian in Belgrade 1970.

After the moves 1.e4 c6 2.04 d5 3.ed c4 4.Δd3 2.c6 5.c3 26f6 6.Δf4 – the Karlsbad pawn structure has been reached with the bishop pair of White having occupied the key diagonals "h2 – b8" and "b1 – h7". The reader can effortlessly find this game in a lot of books. I would like to emphasize the similarity of strategical ideas in plenty of positions.

We have finally to look over some cases when Black is trying after 1.d4 d5 2.c4 e6 3.£0.3 £06 4.cd ed 5.£0.5 to avoid somehow playing 6.7–66. A. Bellavsky tried to follow such a strategy in his candidates-match against Kasparov in 1983. The opening of the first game was played accordingly: 1.d4 £06 2.c4 e6 3.£0.3 d5 4.cd ed 5.£0.5 £0.6 6.8 d6 7.£h4 0.0 8.£d3 b6 9.£03 £0.7 10.00 6511.£0.5 £0.6?



Kasparov found a nice tactical stroke 12. Δa61. The rest was practically forced: 12... "£c8 13. Δ:16" Δ:16 Δ:16 Δ:16 15. Δg4 Δα8 16. Δ:α5 Δ:α4 17. Δα16+ Δ:16 18. Δ:16+ gf 19. αc dc 20. Δ:α4 Δg7 and now with the move

21.Ead1!, instead of 21.Eac1 White could have set problems

to his opponent, that would be insurmountable. The game ended in a draw.

The third game was rather short: 11... Dbd7 (instead of 11... Dbc8?) 12.#f3 cd 13.ed 2xe5 14.de 2d7 15.Δ:e7 ±:e7 16.2xd5 ±:e5 17.2e7+ ±:h81 18.±:h7 2xe5 19.±f3 2xe3 20.2xe6 ±:e6 21.b3 2xe5 22.2xe5 ±:e5 23.£ae1 ±:c7 24.£c1 ±:e7 Draw. The imprecise move 12.±f3?! allowed Black to easily equalize. The right way to meet Black's defensive scheme was demonstrated by the future world champion in game 5: 12.£f5! (The first 11 moves were repeated, just as in game 3.)



White prevented the standard simplification 12. €ve5 13.de €e4, after which 14.€vd5! wins a pawn in all the lines. Black's problems do not decrease after 12...cd. After 13.€vd7! €vd7 14.Δ.e7 ≝ve7 15.≝vd4 White obtains a very favourable position against the enemy isolated pawn. Bellavskii chose

I will give the comments of Kasparov to the opening stage of this game, from his book "Through the Test of Time" ("Izpitanie Vremenem").

The natural move 12.62e5 is not even mentioned in the opening monographs, which recommends only 12.82b3. Black will liquidate the knight on "e5" (It would be too dangerous to put up with it i.e. 13...62df6?! 14.62e4 de 15 6.44 62d 16.6.465! 6.465! 6.465! 17.55 with a very strong attack). It might seem that Black has solved the opening problems, but the two consecutive consolidating moves 15.82e1! and 16.8.df! demonstrate that is far from true. The only logical play for Black, connected with 17-6, leads by force after 17.ed! de 18.ef 16.19.8.6 82b3 Cucho 21.8.db 82b3 22.624 to an endgame, in which Black has to fight shubbomly for a draw. That was not suitable to Beliavsky's taste, accordingly he decided to keep up the tension with the help of a fixly queen manoeuvre.

The easiest way to prove the futility of this was 17.82, after which Black should sooner or later comply to play the endgame that he was so desperately trying to avoid. Besides that, 17.h4!? \$\text{th} 5 18.2e2! was emphasizing the unstable position of the queen. I was thinking during the game that 17.83 keeps all the advantages of the position, but several brilliant moves in a row, found by Beliavsky, allowed him to avoid the immediate danger.

Finally, the situation when White develops the knight on "e2" and Black manages without the move c7 - c6 arose in the game Gulko - Chiburdanidze, Frunze 1985.

11.≝c2.11.h5? is a mistake because of 11...cd 12.ed 2:h5.

11... Ee8 12.0-0-0 c4?! 13. Δe2 a6 14. Δf3 Δb7 15.h5 ⊕e4. If 15...b5, then 16.hg hg 17.a3! with an advantage for White.



It looks like Black has solved the opening problems successfully. The exchanges 16.Δ.e.4 de 17.Δ.e.7 %.e.7 %.e.7 Black can neutralize the White rook on the 'h' file with 19...%g7 and \$h8 next, and equalize. White found another plan:

16.fg/ fg. Grandmaster Gulko annotated this game in the "Chess Informant" 40 and said that 16...요:g5 was losing because of 17.gf+ 합:f7 18.8:h7+ 2.h7 19.8:h7+ 합은 20.8:f5+ 합년6 21 발f4+, and in case of 16...요:g5 17.gf+ 합:f7 18.8:h7+ 합명 White was winning with 19.0:ce4 de 20.8:c4+ 합가 21.8

17. **£:e4** de 18. **£f4!** This move was the idea behind the pawn exchange. It is not good for Black now to play 18...g5, at least because of 19. **£**e5 f6 20. **£**\u00f3\u00f3\u00e4\u00e4e e 21. **£**\u00e4\u00e66.

18... Ec8 19. Dg:e4 Df8 20.g4. White won a pawn and continues the attack. 21.g5 is the threat.

20...g5 21. £e5 f6 22.f4! £:e4 23. £:e4 fe 24.de?. White could have determined the fate of this game quickly by means of a king side attack playing 24.fe and then 25. £fh2 and £df1.

27. #h8+ #f7 28.e6+! #:e6 29. #g8! mate.

# The Queen's Gambit Accepted.

I have worked a lot with young players and I can say that this opening is played in junior competitions rather rarely. After the moves 1.d4 d5 2.c4 dc the most popular continuations are the aggressive 3.e4; 4.\(\Delta\)c3, and the tricky 3.e3. I think however, that the young player should first of all learn to play the classical positions with an isolated pawn and mainly he must get acquainted with M. Botvinnik's games. Studying the classics is an integral part in the development of the young chess player. We are going still to make ourselves an exemplary program of studying the best chess player's games. I have to admit that Botvinnik's games are so many that I have never offered anybody of my students to study them as a whole. First of all you can never do that and second the play of the 6th world champion was typical with a discipline of thinking, impressive planning of all actions and a great desire to win, but he lacked the artistic easiness of achievement of Capablanca and Smyslov. Botvinnik left us a huge chess legacy but I saw that it would be very difficult for the young player to work on it move by move. The chess player can do that really after he becomes a strong master but at first it would be more useful for him to study the play of Botvinnik in the openings. His analytical approach to chess and the development of the strategical schemes, which go from the opening deeply into the middle game were something like a clairvovance at the time and let many other players understand the chess problems more profoundly. Now most of his systems are basic and the contemporary theory is set firmly upon them on the road of development. We have seen already in the Karlsbad variation that Botvinnik's ideas appeared and were modernized in other player's games. Botvinnik's schemes have always been oriented towards deep and subtle strategical struggle. They lead to complicated positions and give a wide scope to grab and lead the initiative on a sound positional basis.

Queen's Gambit Accepted, not less than in the Karlsbad system, although in his match for the world championship in 1963 with Petrosian he hardly managed to level the score in this opening. It's quite probable that the way he treated this opening, mainly with 7.a4 was somehow outdated. If we make a supposition that this system becomes once again the object of serious theoretical discussions, we can be sure that the powerful analytical brigades of the world champion and the challenger are going to develop this system thoroughly. We want however to teach the young player to play well, and we are not preparing him to candidates—matches, besides the Queen's Gam bit Accepted, from the stage of the first degree to the master's title, is not the most popular opening. Therefore the study and the application of Botvinnik's methods in the first stages is both sensible and rationskies.

Botvinnik made a heavy contribution to the theory of the

Afterwards when the chess player starts on the road to the great chess arena, he's going to choose his own schemes. Before we start to study the classical "isolated pawn" we have to spend some time upon the systems in which black's bishop goes to 94.50.1.4 dfs 2.c4 dc 3..2f3 ≥f6 4.e3 .4g4 5..4:c4 e6 6.h3 .4h5.7.2c3!



The pawn structure allows the application of different olans. White has definite advantage in the centre and intends in some suitable after moment. some preparation, to play e3 - e4. Black should be ready to meet the opponent in the centre with the move e6 - e5. He has to

decide right now where to develop the knight from 88° To play 7...&c6 seams to be with better perspectives than 7...&c7, but 8...&b5! is rather unpleasant. Because of that, in order to develop the knight on c6, the preparatory move 7...&c8 should be played first. But then White gets some advantage in the development, which he can make good use of with 8.g4! Ag6 9.&c6 (threatening 10.h4) 9...&bd7 10.£g6 hg 11.g5 bd5. Their is nothing better. In case of 11...&ch5 12.h4, or 11...&ch7 12.t4 and black knight remains isolated for a long time. 12.£c56 of 13.Ac55 of 14.Ac4!? I remember that some time long ago, grandmaster Boleslavsky showed this move to me. 14...£g5 15.£b3 0-0-0 16.Acf7 £g2 17.£ff



White has the advantage of the two bishops and a better pawn structure. Black has to fight for a draw. I have to mention that 18... #11? loses immediately after 19.2/1 £h1+20.9c.9 £a.21.1 £h5!

The move 7... 2d7 looks much more solid than 7...a6.

Lets continue our analysis: 8.0-0 Ad6 9.e4. 9.Ae2 seems very good, but Black has the additional opportunity 9... Ag6. 9...e510. Ae2 A:f3 in case of 10...0-0 11.de ②:e5 12.②:e5 Δ:e2 13.②:f7!? Δh2+ 14.⊈:h2 15.2:d1 4:d1 16.2g5 White has excellent compensation for the exchange - a pawn and a strong initiative. 11.4:f3 0-0. This position (possibly with some transposition) arose in the game Didishko - Mariasin, Minsk 1980.The game went on 12.公q5! ed 13.當:d4 公e5 This looks like a serious achievement. The white bishop can not retreat 14. 4e2 ??, since White loses the gueen 14... €)f3+!. But the next move of Didishko forces Black to fight for a draw in a very difficult endgame. 14. £ad1! The positional threat 15. 4e2 is very unpleasant for Black and the exchange 15... 2:f3+ 16.qf does not improve his position because of the threats 17.e5 or 17. 2d5. Mariasin couldn't find anything better than: 14...h6 15.£h4 q5 16.£q3 4:f3+ 17.qf £:q3 18.fq #:d4+ 19.8:d4 Efd8 20.Efd1 E:d4 21.8:d4



I have worked on endgames like that in a special chapter "Pawn Advantage on the Side" in my book "Endgame Strategy". White has occupied totally the "d" file and has the opportunity to push forward the king side pawns. Black has nothing against this plan. The game continued 21, 188. 22 27 866

23.44 Bb6 24.8d2 gf 25.gf Bb4 26.2d3 2f8 27.b3 c6 28.8d8+ 2ge 729.8h8 a5 30.8:h6 a4 31.ba 2of7 32.8h5 2o6 33.a5 2a4 34.2d2 Bb2 35.2d4 8:a2 36.2f5+ 2d7 37.8h7 2ge 38.8h6+ 2d7 39.8f6 8a3+ 40.2d4 2ob2 and Black resigned, since 41.8:f7+ comes next.

We are going to study now the games of the match in 1963, Botvinnik - Petrosian. In the second game of the match, when the score was 1:0 in Botvinnik's favour, the opening was played like this: 1.d4 d5 2.c4 dc 3.@f3 @f6 4.e3 c5 5.4:c4 e6 6.0-0 a6 7.a4. At the beginning of his chess career Botvinnik was trying to avoid this move. After that, starting with the game against V. Alatorztev, the opening of which will be part of the comments to the next game, world champion No. 6 turned to the Queen's rook pawn move on the 7th move. If we have a look at his results, all his really important games in this variation i.e. with Keres 1941, with Euwe 1946 and the match - games with Petrosian, ended in a draw. We are going to see now, however what it cost Petrosian, one of the greatest masters of defence in the history of chess, being in his prime, to manage to defend Black's position.

 of the knight – 11.2c3. 11...2d5. In case of 11...b5?! rather unpleasant will be 12.∆f6! ∆.f6 13.d5. Petrosian tries to simplify and allows a not too obvious, but very dangerous development of his opponent's pieces. If 11...2b4, White might continue 12.2c3 and we could have the position from game 10, we are going to deal with later.

#### 



14. ⊕d2! The idea behind Botvinnik's play is transparent now. After the exchange of the dark square bishops, the "a3" square will be available for the white rook and it will use the third rank for the attack on the king side.

14... Ac6 15. De4 Df4 16. Lf3 A:e4 17. L:e4 Dfd5 18. Ea3!

ac8 19.8h3! Dg6 20.4.d5. The first fruits of White's active strategy are already ripe. Instead of the isolated pawn, two isolated pawns appeared on the board with the white pieces having the much better disposition.



28.#:d8? This move was evidently based on a misjudgement. After 28.#e5! the position would have been somehow similar to the world-amous game Botvinnik — Alekhine from the "AVRO" tournament 1938. White would have been keeping the strong pressure. Now however the

game simplifies into a draw. 28...£d8 29.45 bs 30.£b8 £f8! 31.£a1 er 32.£f8+ cr8 33.£a5 £d2 34.£a6 £d3 35.£a6+ 2c8. The opponents agreed to a draw in this position. Black is recapturing the "d4" pawn and there is no sense in continuing the floth.

In game 10 of the match Botyinnik abstained from 11. 4g5 although the outcome of the opening in the second game was favourable for White So 11.0c3 Petrosian answered 11... 2b4. In his game with V. Alatortzev, Leningrad 1932 Botvinnik played in this position 12.0e5. After 12...0bd5 13. 4g5 h6 14. 4h4 4d7!? 15. 4d5 4d5 16. 4e7 (16. 4d5 ed 17 5 d7 Be8!! 18 4:e7 整:d7 19 Be1 Bac8! 20 整信 B:e7 21.萬:e7 賞:e7 22.賞:d5 真c2 23.賞b3 賞e4 and Botvinnik said that the most probable outcome would be a draw.) 16...當:e7 (16... \( \Delta \):e7? 17.d5!) 17.\( \Delta \)g6 fg 18.\( \Delta \):d5 and White man aged to get some better position and subsequently won. Master V. Chekhover suggested for Black 12... 4d7! Now, White doesn't have anything after 13. d5 ed 14. 2:d5 2b:d5 15. 4:d5 2:d5 16.章:d5 because of 16... 4q4! 17.曾c4 曾:d5 !! 18.曾:d5 Bad8.Black is using tactical means to pass through the most dangerous moment - the mangeuvre of the bishop from "c8" via "d7" to "c6" and is out of serious trouble. It is highly probable that Petrosian calculated all this line but Botvinnik made some connections with: 12.4a5!? 4d7 "It is amazing but this move loses a pawn. It would be hardly necessary to tell the reader that all this line was prepared by me before the game. Nevertheless, I made my next move not without some hesitation because I anticipated that it would not be easy to win with an extra pawn". — (Boytunink) 13.4.



13..ed 14.2vd5 2b:d5. If 14...2vd5 then 15.Δvc7 2vc7 (16.2vc5 2bd5 17.Δvd5 2vd5 18.8vd5 and Black wouldn't have Chekhover's manoeuvre 18...Δpd 19.8vd 8vd5 since the first rank is controlled by the white rook. 15.Δvd5 2vd5 16.8vd5 Δvg5 17.2vg5 h6. 18.8vd3 4vs. the threat 18.8vd2

ha 19.点:d7 当f6 If 19...當b6 20.a5 當b3. then 21.萬a3 and White still wins a pawn. 20.点:b7 且ad8 21.世a5 且d6 22.世b4 Bfd8 23.Bf1 Bd4 24.Wb3 Bd3 25.Wc2 Bd2 26.Wc7 Wf4 27.世:f4 af 28.h4 馬c8 29.馬b4 f3 30.af 馬8c2 31.b3 馬b2 32.\$\pmu\_a2 \mathread3 33.\$\mathread58+ \pmu\_h7 34.\$\mathread57 f6 35.\$\mathread5e1 \mathread3d:b3 36.\$\mathread5b3 8:b3 37.8e6 8b4 38.8:a6 8:h4 39.2g3 g5 40.2g2 2g6 41.Ea8 Ef4 42.a5 Ea4 43.a6 Draw. Petrosian managed to save this game, but to "exercise" yourself to defend a position with the pawn down right after the opening is not a very pleasant task. Most probably White can find an improvement. Even at the end, playing 36.8a7 instead of 36.8:b3 White can create much more serious problems for the opponent after 36... \$b4 37. \$ee7 \$:a4 38. \$:g7+. Anyway, in his next game in the Queen's Gambit Accepted, Petrosian avoided the repetition. I have still to add that, if Black plays 12... fd5!?. instead of 12... 4d7 White can keep some pressure after 13.♠:d5 ♠:d5 14.♠:e7 ♠:e7 15.₩e4 ♠d5 16 ♠:d5 or 16 Ø e5.

Game 16 of the match - 11... 2d5.

Evidently, the strongest move, Black impedes 4a5. 12.4d3 Botvinnik tries to emphasize the negative sides of the knight manoeuvre in the centre and starts to apply some piece pressure on the king side, 12... 2cb4 13.4b1 4d7?!. Nowadays, Black prefers to develop the bishop on "b7" with the help of the move 13...b6. In a game of the Interzonal tournament in Rio de Janeiro 1979, Petrosian played against Portisch 14.曾e4 q6 15.Ah6 皇e8 16.曾e5 but didn't have anything substantial. After 16... 4f8 17.4:f8 2:f8 18.4e4 40c6 19.世g3 公ce7 20.公d6 the opponents agreed to a draw. P. Nikolic in his game against Petrosian in Vrbas 1981, played with White 16. 2e5, instead of 16. 2e5. Black had no opening problems in this game as well, playing 16... 4b7 17. 4f3 f5 18.曾g3 4h4 19.曾h3 皇c8. Instead of 14.曾e4 White has also tried the moves 14.0e5 and 14.a5. Some players play 12. 2e4 before 4d3. Most often a very complicated fight arises with approximately equal chances in which Black often solves the problem of defence on the king side by means of f7 - f5

Lets go back to the game Botvinnik - Petrosian.



14.12e4 g6 15.2e5 △16
16.12f3 △17
17.12g3 △26
16.12f3 △17
18.14 ○16 19.2f3 Wonderfully
played. White does not allow
any simplification and the lack
of coordination between his
pieces on the queen side is just
an optical illusion. The white
long-range bishops are exerting
termendous pressure on the

king side of the opponent, which is going to be increased even more when the "h" pawn goes forward. As for the

collaboration between the white rooks, presently this is not a matter of vital importance. 19...f6. If Petrosian, who was extremely capable to evaluate chess positions properly, made such a move in order to prevent the eventual attack of the opponent, then Black had hardly a good position. 20.42:d5 ed. Bad is 20...#:d5 21.4a2. 21.h5 @e7 22.hg?! The outcome of this game was terribly important for both opponents. In game 14 Botvinnik levelled the score but right after that, in the very next game Petrosian won again. The win in this game we are following, could still have given Botvinnik the psychological and sportive advantage. Having outplayed the opponent in the opening stage. White starts to play unsatisfactorily. Naturally, the tremendous nervous tension and the physical tiredness was asserting itself. There was no need to exchange on "q6". It only gave Black the opportunity to coordinate his pieces. 22...4:g6 23. 4h4 4:b1 24. E:b1 #d7 25.b3 #f7 Black prepares further simplification with the move 25... \$\.\delta\$f5. 26.\delta\$f3 f5 27.\delta\$a3 &c6 28.\delta\$f3 \delta\$e7 29.\delta\$f4 Re4 30.0e5 0:e5 31.de Rae8 32.f3 Re2 33.Re1 Ra2?!. A very risky decision. 33...\$:e1+ was much safer 34.445?!. Black would have had a very difficult position after 34.2bc1! threatening 35.e6 \$:e6 36.\$c7. The difficulties that Black must face are illustrated by the following variation: 34.2bc1 2e6 35.4g5 ag6 36.e6! a:e6 37.4f6! a:f6 38.ac7 f4 39.ae8+ af8 40.直:f8+ 空f8 41.曾:f4+. 34...d4 35. 4f6 (35.自bd1 was better)



35... 當f7 36.启bd1 曾g6 37.曾:g6 hg 38.쇼:g7 曾:g7

39.e6? This loss of time is difficult to explain. Playing 39.≘:d4 ≘c8 40.≘h2 Ecc2 41.≘g1 White was keeping the extra pawn and excellent chances to win. 39...⊒64.

an immediate draw. 40...26c2 41.8g1? Now, White will have to fight for a draw, which was schieved easily with 41.e7. 41...8d2 42.8de1 28 43.e7+ 284 44.2g3 31 45.8e3! Only move. 45...3ab2 46.2f4 8:g2 47.8d1 8bd2 48.8:d2 8:d2 49.2g5 8df 50.2f6 14 51.8e4 8c1 52.8d4 8c6+ 53.2g5 8c3 54 28f6 17ew.

I have to mention that during the course of the match Petrosian persistently tried to avoid positions with an isolated pawn, so he played in game 6 − 8...Δe7. Next: 9.dc Δtc5 10.e4 2gd and White abstained from the move 11.e5 because of 11...2d4. After 11.Δt4 4ff 12.Δg3 2ge5 13.2te5 2te5 the game ended in a draw on the 27th move. In the next game, however Botvinnik had been excellently prepared against his opponent's plan.



The first ten moves were the same as in game 6, and then Botvinnik played boldly 11.e5/
dold 12.24d ±3.43 - 13.2a3/
∴a3 - the only move. It wouldn't be advisable to snatch the "e5" pawn i. e. 13...2:e5
14.4a3 ±3d6 15.£d1 ±47
16.4:c5 ±3:c5 17.4.55+1 ab
18.8a1.14.7a3.4 2:e5 15.63.3

You can have a look at a part of Bolvinnik's comments to this move: "My positional feeling was telling me that the preparatory move 15.b3 was definitely not the strongest so I tried to answer an impossible question: what was the best move? The move 15.b3 was taking out of action temporarily Ba3; 15.Bd1 could be answered by 15...894 16.13 81f5; 15.Ad2 was obviously a loss of time. I thought about 15.Bg3 (probably that was the best move) as well. Well. I gave up the didea to conquer the unconquerable, since the clock was

ticking along..." 15...#c5 Ea2?! The "wonders" continue. On the previous move White lost without any reason a lot of time and now he fluctuates away from his home analysis. After the obvious 16.4b2 €0:c4 (16...f6 is rather dubious after 17.18h5-96 18.8hf6) 17.bc 4d7 18.8g3 0-0-0 19.8:g7 and White has a definite advances"... (Bolvinnik).

16... ②:c4 17.bc Δd7 18. Δa3 ≝f5 19.8d2 Δc6 20.8e1 h51. Black is liquidating the threat g2 – g4 and prepares the exit of the king to "f7". after f7 – f6 previously.

21. #e3 f6 22. #:e6+ #:e6 23.8:e6+ #7 24.8e7+ #g6 25.a5 Bad8 26.4d6 Bne8 27.8:e8 Bre8. It is Black already with some advantage under his sleeve. Petrosian spent a lot of efforts to increase and realize his positional advantage but with a precise defence Botvinnik denied him the win and managed to draw on the 55th move. It is easy to understand that Black dight to lay this variation anymore.

In conclusion, I would like to remind you that we are working on the opening preparation of a chess player at the level of first degree. Of course, his strength is far from that of Botvinnik, but naturally his opponent would hardly be named Petrosian.

### The Slav Defence

White has to enter an opening dispute to try to fight for an opening advantage in this opening. White has the option, however with the right to choose the appropriate arms for the duel. I would like to clarify this, using chess language. After the moves 1.04 d5 2.04 c6 3.0c3 %6 4.0f3 e6 White has the choice between Botvinnik's variation, starting with  $5.\Delta$ g5 and the Meran, connected with the move 5.e3.

Suppose White chose the Meran. 5.e3 **\Darkov** 6.\Darkov 43 dc 7.\Darkov 64 b5 8.\Darkov 43 a6 9.e4 c5







White can make his choice one more time. He can offer a pawn sacrifice with 17.a4, or play timidly 17.b3.In both cases Black has to analyze these two lines thoroughly, because the position is very sharp and you can not afford to play it without due homework against a well prepared opponent. As you can prepared opponent As you can

see the task of White is twice easier. My pupils usually play the Meran in the Slav defence and have their own analysis which can only be confirmed as right or wrong in practice. We are going to investigate now the approach to the Meran in this book, since our aim is to familiarize the reader with the methods of work in the opening. I wouldn't like just to offer variations that the reader is going sooner or later to change when he forms his own opening repertoirs.

So, 1.d4 d5 2.c4 c6 3.2c3/? White would like to deprive the opponent of the opportunity to play the line 3.2√3 2√16 4.2c3 dc 5.a4 4√15, which might be favourable for White but if

White is oriented towards the Meran, it would be better to reduce the opponent's choice. 3...£76. Nowadays, the Winawer countergambit is hardly interesting, since White can react at least by 4.cd cd 5.e4, and as for 3...dc we are going to take a look at the brilliant game Portisch – Saidy, San Antonio 1972. 4.e3/?



In the diagrammed position the most acceptable move for Black is 4...e6, and White by playing 5.£/3 transposes into the Meran. If Black tries to squeeze through with the light square bishop in front of the "e" pawn with 4...£/15, White can after 5.cd cd (5...£):d5 6.£ge2 and 7.e4 ) 6.£fb3 force the

opponent to go back with the bishop to c8, which had already happened in the game Alekhine - Capablanca, New York 1924. Well, although world champion No. 3 managed to defend Black's position, the loss of two tempi in the opening can hardly be recommended. Following this order of moves Black can choose Schlehter's system 4...q6 which is safe enough but rather passive. The Hungarian grandmaster G. Barza recommended something very interesting in this case 5.f3!? Ag7 6.e4 de 7.fe c5 8.d5 0-0 Df3 with complicated but favourable for White position. Lets have a look now at the game that I promised you: Portisch - Saidy, 3...dc 4.e4! e5 (4...b5 5.a4 b4 6.\(\Da\)a2 is favourable for White) 5.\(\Da\)f3 ed 6. 當:d4 當:d4 7. 公:d4 Ac5 (White is easily recapturing back the pawn after 7...b5 8.a4 b4 9.2d1 4a6 10.4f4 2f6 11.f3 having much better perspectives.) 8.4e3 2f6 9.f3 2bd7 10.4:c4 0-0



We have a typical position, in which White has a pawn advantage on the king side, and Black on the Queen side. The standard plan for both sides in positions like that is to push forward the pawn majority combining this with the occupation by the rooks of the poly open file "d". L. Portisch is

treating this position very subtly. He wants to utilize the bad position of the enemy light pieces. This endgame has been analysed in the Soviet edition of the book "Endgame Strategy" and I am going to include it here without any changes.

"Black has no weaknesses and White's advantage in development is rather meager. Yet, to consider Black's position satisfactory is out of the question. The white pawns in the centre have much greater potential mobility than the black nawns on the gueen side. Still, the main drawback of Black's position is not this. His light pieces are suffocating due to the lack of space, while the light pieces of Portisch have excellent coordination. The following precise play of the Hungarian grandmaster is an instructive example of the transformation of one advantage into another. The difference in the piece disposition, which was so difficult to evaluate is gradually transforming into more than obvious defects of the pawn structure. 11.2e2 2b6 12.4b3 Ee8 13.Ehd1 4d7 14.Bac11. White is not in a hurry to double the rooks on the open file, but relies on the unfavourable position of the enemy pieces, which as I. Haitun deftly mentioned "are hanging in the air". The threat is 15.0cb5, and as for 14...4f8 15.a4l is very strong. 14... Bac8. 14... Bad8 is unsatisfactory because of 15. Dcb5 Af8 16. D:a7! Da8 (17. Dd:c6 was the threat) 17.a4! ದ್ದಿ 18. ab5 ! (Haitun) 15.a3/ Black has no space and he



19.4.260 Wonderfully played. It is a pily to exchange this beautiful bishop for the wretched enemy knight but it is very important to be able to transform one advantage into another in the process of winning a better position. Well, you always have the fear that you might go for something cheap and lose your advantage. That is the moment to

#### show real class.

It may sound paradoxical but a lot of what is called "endgame chess technique" is often reduced to the creation of "bad pieces" for the opponent, and the exchange of your "bad pieces" for the "good pieces" of the opponent.

19..ab 20. Det 52 1. Det 56.7 22. Bed2 2 M7 23. De3 2 Per 24.44 b6 25. Dd3 368? Now the white knight reaches the "65" square and the game will soon be over. As Haitun recommended Black had a wonderful chance – 25. Dg4+! including an interesting tap. If White plays carelessly 20.50?? after 52..b12+2 17.3bg3 8681 28.51.2 8cd7 29.525 cd57 after 43.526.3 8cd3 + 32.8cd3 8cd3 + and Black draws the arising pawnerdgame. White should have to play 20.52621 and by to win the knight endgame after for example 26.8cd8 (26.50.50 27.05 27.65 27.65

28.발e3 홈cd7 29.원e5 홈d2 30.원c6+ 발e8 31.휴d2 홈d2 32.발d2 원ce4+ 33.발d3! 원d6 (33...원c5+ 34.발d4 발d7 35.원a7!) 34.발c3! 발d7 35.원a6+

26,0e5 di:d2 27.8:d2 c5 28,g4 g5. Otherwise White will get a decisive space advantage pushing forward the 'g' and 'h' pawns on the king side. 29.f5 c4 30.0d4 Bc8 31.8e2 0d7. Well, the rook endgame is hopeless for Black, but any other moves wouldn't change anything much. 32.0:d7 Bd8 33.8d2 B:d7 34.0c3 Bc7 35.8d4 Bc5 36.ad4 ba 37.8:c4 Ba5 38.8c6 ef 39.gf a3 The white king manages to take care of the enemy passed pawn in the pawn endgame arising after: 39..8c5+ 40.8:c5+ bc 41.0c4 12d4 12d6 42.f6 h5 43.e5+ 0c6 44.0c6.

40.ba #:a3 41. 2d4 #h3 42.#:b6 Black resigns.

The Tarrasch defence is not the most popular opening with the young players. White has a wide choice of positional schemes, and a lot depends here on the preferences and tastes of the individual player. I am not going to deal extensively with the theory of the Tarrasch defence. I am going to acquaint you with one of the games of the author.

### Shereshevsky – Zholnerovitch Bidaoscz 1990

1.d4 d5 2.c4 e6 3.全c3 c5 4.cd. Generally speaking, if White insists to avoid the Shara — Hening gambit, he must play 4.e\u00e43 and to answer 4...cd with 5.2\u00f34 e5 6.0\u00e45 66.0\u00e5 66.7\u00e4\u00e48 abut you don't need to be afraid of this opening. One of my students, Genadi Sagaltchik used to play sometimes this gambit for Black but without too much success. White managed to win beautifully in the game O. Daniellan — Sagaltchik, Kramatorsk 1989. Atter 4...d 5.2\u00e48 47 6.2\u00e48 d4 67 \u00e8 d5 6.6\u00e8 68.e\u00e48 69.2\u00e86 69.2\u00e86 19.2\u00e86 69.2\u00e86 69.2\u00e8

ሷ:g2 16.ሷe3! ሷd5 17.ᡚ:d5 발:d5 18.ጀac1+ ၌b8 19.발a4 ሷc5 20.ሷ:c5 b6 21.ሷe7 and Black resigned.

4...ed 5.@f3 @c6 6.a3 @f6 7.Ae2 Ae7 8.0-0 0-0 9.Aa5 cd. After 9...c4 10. 2e5 4e6 11.f4 White, as a rule, has the advantage. And after 9... 4e6 10.dc 4:c5 11.4:f6 \$:f6 12.包:d5 當:b2 13.包c7 萬ad8 14.當c1 Black has to defend a rather unpleasant enggame. 10. 2:d4 h6 11. 2f4!? With this move White orients towards the exchange @:e6 followed by e2 - e4, which became popular after the match Kasparov -Smyslov. Vilnius 1984, for example 11... 4g4 12.h3 4e6 13 €):e6 fe 14 e4 d4 15 e5 l dc 16 ef 4:f6 17 bc 4:c3 18 ₽b1 ∮a5 19.世q4 with more than sufficient compensation for the pawn, 11... Ab4 !? 12. Bc1 Aq4 13.h3!. White is not afraid of 13... 
♠:d4 14.hg 
♠:c3 15. 
Ē:c3 
♠e6, at least because of 16.e3. 13.... 4e6. The idea of Black becomes clear. He is not afraid of 14 @ e6 fe 15 e4 because after 15 d4 16.e5 21 dc 17 ef Black can play 17...cb, as well as simply 17...\tau:f6. 14.a3 \( \Delta a5 \) 15.b4 4b6 15... 2:d4 is not good for Black after 16.ba and 17 a6 16 4 e6/ fe



17.65 The immediate T7.647 (et al. 8.20 et 6 doesn't work because Black seizes the initiative. White deprives the enemy knights from the control of the centre and intends to push e2 – e4 some time later. 17...€a5 18.e4 de 19...€a6 €le4 20.4:e4. Two bishops and a much better pawn

structure determine a big advantage for White at first sight, but Black's counterplay against the "12" square is enough to almost level the chances. 20...#::d1 21.Ec:d1 Ead8!



I stopped here and thought for about half an hour to make the plan for my further actions. While must play advively to take hold of the initiative. At first While must prevent g7-g5 and dissuade Black from the attack on the "12" square. 22.Ed8! 23.4.g6! The bishop leaves the wonderful central output, but now the enemy, king will not feel very

comfortable. 23....204 24.Bef.l. I. didn't enjoy of course, giving back the pawn but there was no time for 24.a4. Black could immediately force a draw after 24.a4 e 52.5.Lct 16x12.2.4....2xa 3 25.e6 4.c5. If 25.2...2xb then 26.Bef. 26.Be5 4.06. If 20....16 – 27.Be8+.27.Bd5 4.e7 28.Bd6+ 4.268 29...4.d3 a6f Black decides to immediately give up the pawn, the lost of which is unavoidable in connection with the threat 30.Au6. 30.Da ha 31 4.26.8



As a result of this forced line, the game proceeded from the previous diagram into the position of this one. White has a clear advantage without any doubt, but can White win this endgame. Unfortunately the further part of the game was played in a mutual desperate interprocessing the processing the process

able to keep the score. The outcome came as a jolt from the blue:



In the diagrammed position Black played 1...\$\pmeq4\$, and White blundered with 2.\pmeq629? which led to a draw after 2...gsf, since the move 3.\pmeq43 didn't promise anything after the "zwichen zug" 3...gff. Instead of the obvious mistake 2.\pmeq63 didn't promise anything after the description of the didness to the obvious mistake 2.\pmeq63 didn't promise after all the other with the didness to win the game after all the other

retreats along the diagonal "g1 - a7", for example to the "b6" square.

Black can not play 2...g5? anymore, because of  $3.\Delta d3 \Omega f6$ .4.fg hg  $5.\Delta e3$ , and if Black plays passively White goes with one of the bishops to e5, having displaced the enemy knight from the centre with the other bishop  $\Delta d3$ .

# The Nimzo-Indian Defence

The Nimzo-indian defence is the key opening for the chess player who is playing close opening systems for White. Including the Nimzo in your opening repertoire means you will be able to play aggressive systems in the Queen's Gambit like: 1.44 \$\int 62.64 e6 3.\int 62.64 e6 5.\int 62.64 e6 63.\int 6

On the other hand, when you play &IS on move three, you facilitate the ofientation of the opponent in the different openings and give him a much wider scope of choice. Well, I think that hardly anybody knows how to obtain some serious advantage in the Nimzovitch defence, but the number of different positions in this opening is very wide and the

strategical aspects are very complicated, so most of the strongest players in the world have a keen interest towards the Nimzovitch defence, for both White and Black. My students, at the beginning of their work with me, play usually this opening for both colors, and later when they become strong masters some of them decide to lessen the strategical risk and usually turn to some quiet schemes of the Queen's indian defence or the Catelan with White, or sometimes play the King's Indian defence with Black. By the way, I have noticed something very peculiar—the chess players that play only the King's Indian defence for Black, after having been through the Nimzo, start playing the King's Indian on an entirely different, much higher level than before. We have to discuss first the ways to include the Nimzovitch defence in White's opening repertoire.

After the moves 1.04 €76 2.04 e6 3. €03 £04 we are going to choose the move 4.e3. Now Black has the choice between 4...0-0, 4...05, 4...b6 and 4...d5, and you must have in mind that the last two moves lead to different lines, while 4...0-0 and 4...05 many times lead to one and the same variation. So, 4...06. White has the choice now how to develop the knight? We prefer the move 5.€0e2, but usually at first I suggest that my students played the sharp variation with a pawn sacrifice 5.404 £0. €0e2f £2.72.8af



7... Δe4 - The most natural move, although 7... Δt3 is also very interesting. This line hasn't been tested seriously in practice yet, and it gives an ample opportunity to the young player to test his creative abilities. Of course, White is risking a lot – it

is a pawn sacrifice after all, but it would be very useful for the young player to play for the initiative even without a pawn, and later on some higher level to work on the line 5. \$e2.1 will give you two examples of my and Elena Zayac's practice.

# Shereshevsky - Panczyk, Bidgoshc 1990

8.a3! Naturally, White can not recapture the pawn back because of the move 8...∆g6, and the move 8...∆g3 was rejected by me just for common sense reasons. Black has no weaknesses and I didn't want on top of the extra pawn to give Black some positional advantages as well, like doubled "c" pawns. 8.....∆:c3+ 9...⊘:c3 ∆:c3 10.12:c3 g6 11.e4 d6. Now White should make a plan for his further actions and maybe first of all make a decision about the future of the bishop. 12...∆h6!? Black can not castle short now and White is ready to castle on the Queen side and push floward the "T" pawn. 12....⊘bd7 1314 ⊙h5 14.0-00 12:c7. While has the inliative but Black doesn't have any weatnesses as before. The moment of orisis is approaching, 15.e5 1? 0-00 16.c5 £08 This move is practically forced to prevent the threat 17.131e4 and 18.2\text{L5}.



This is the critical position. White must find the way to continue the attack. 17.cd of 18.0e4 looks very tempting. But after 18...d5 19.0d€ 8.:d6 20.ed 8::d6 the position is something that Black could only dream about. Lets try something different – 17.4g5 f6 18.ef and Black can not play 18...⊙16

because of the 19. ©e4 ©bd7 20.c6. But Black can play 18... ≝f7 and after 19.cd recapture on d6 not with the pawn, which is bad after 20.d5. but with the rook 19... ■d6! White can

now win the "a7" pawn with 20.2b5, but after 20...2d5 21.⊕:a7+ \pib7 22.⊕b5 h6 we can hardly speak about any advantage for White. Therefore White must exchange on "d6" beforehand. So 17.cdl cd 18.2g5 f6 19.ef. In this way White forced the opponent to capture on "d6" with the pawn and it is now possible to win the "f6" pawn 19... 2:f6. The "c" pawns are not present on the board anymore and 20. De4 will be met simply by 20... bd7. White would like to open the position even more. 20.d5! It becomes clear now that Black's position is very difficult. If 20...e5? then 21.fe 當:e5 22.單de1 winning a piece 20... £hf8 ?! 21. ≝h3! White is recapturing back a pawn, keeping an overwhelming positional advantage. 21... Ede8 22. Ege1 #c7 23.de - 2h5 24. #b1. Black's position is lost. White must find the best factical solution to convert his advantage into a win. 24....2f5 25. 2d5 #b7 26.2c1+ 2c6 27. De7+ B:e7 28. A:e7 #:e7 29. B:c6+ #b7 30. #c3/. The last move of White threatens 31.8c8 and includes a subtle tactical trap. 30... 2:f4 31. Ec7+! Black resigns.

Black hasn't made any blunders in this game but still he had a very difficult position around move 20. Probably the whole concept of a passive defence on the last three ranks, just for one pawn, is hardly acceptable from the point of view of the practical competitive player.

## Zayac – Litinskaya Leningrad 1991

1.d4 ⊕6 2.c4 e6 3.⊕c3 Δb4 4.e3 b6 5.Δd3 Δb7 6.⊕ge2 4.g2 7.8g1 Δe4 8.e3 Δ.c3+ 9.⊇c3 Δg6. In this game, contrary to the previous one, Black decided to keep the bishops, 10.e4 d6 11.Δg5 ⊕bd7 12.14 e5 13.de de 14.15 Δb5



15.4e27/W hite decides not to play the most natural move 15.2e4 by the this is a mistake. Zayac didn't like during the game 15...2e7. She could play however 16.2e6 2e3 17.b4 and Black has a very difficult position since after 17...2e6 18.2e36 dd 19.2b5 he material equality allows White to convert

the big positional advantage into an almost sure win.

15... 4:e2 16. 2:e2. This is an awkward looking move.

Capturing with the gueen looked more natural.

16...c6 17.曾d6 Ec8 18.Ead1 曾e7 19.曾d2. White prefers to play a middle-game position. Going into an endgame with 19.4h4 was also possible, keeping the initiative after 19...曾d6 20.8.d6 觉e7 21.8d2 Bho8 22.b4.

19...Ec7 20.4.h4 Eg8 21. b4 2d8 22.b5. The absence of a pawn forces White to strive for an immediate crisis. Such a straightforward approach is easy to understand but is not always effective. On the contrary, sometimes it is much more difficult for the defending side when the opponent combines sharp actions with calm positional improving moves without any direct threats. Playing 22.b5 Zayac wants to secure the control over the "d5" square, but meanwhile White's pawn structure on the queen side deteriorates. The manoeuvre 2d3 – d3 – c2 deserved attention to keep the king away from danger. 22...268 23 2d6 Well, the effect of the insecure position of the white king becomes clear. Since it is too dangerous to play 23.bc 2c6 24.0c6 26.5d and Black seizes the initiative. 23...266 62 24.0c6 26.5d 2d6 2d6 56.5de2



Although White didn't play quite precisely, the initiative is still on his side.

26...95 27.8d8+ \$\frac{1}{2}\text{Erc4}\$
28.\text{Lg3} cb 29.\text{Lrc5} \text{Erc4}\$
30.\text{Bb8+7!} White starts an adventurous attack in the time-trouble and loses this interesting game in several moves. The coordination of the white bishon

and the white knight are the key factor of the position. Threatening the "e4" pawn Black tried to hamper it. Well, Black had a serious material advantage – two extra pawns. Therefore the positional advantages are much more important for White right now then the material, since White is irrevocably behind in that aspect. Consequently White had to sacrifice the exchange now with 30.81d7+1 with the idea after 30...2:d7 318:d7+ 2:c7 32.8:f7 8:e8 33.4g7 to reach a very sharp position, the outcome of which would be practically impossible to predict in the time-trouble.

30... ⊈a6 31. £dd8 ⊕g4 32. ⊕d5? White had to comply with 32... ♠d4 ⊕ef6 (32... ⊕:h2 ) 32... ⊕:5 33. £a8 £:e4 + 34. ⊈d2 £d4+ 35. ⊈e2 ⊕c6 36. £d7 ⊕f6 37. ⊕:f6 £:a8. White resigned.

Lets have a look now at the move 4...d\$ which leads to the Botvinnik's system. 5.a3 4.c3+ If the bishop retreats to "e7" White has an extra tempo a2 – a3 in comparison with the variation of the Queen's gambit arising after 1.d4 d5 2.c4 e6 3.4013 2616 4.2c3 4e7 5.e3. Besides the move 6.4013 White can try to develop this kingth on "e2" with the idea to prepare later a pawn advance in the centre or on the king side. I am going to show you two games on this theme of my student A. Zazhodnine.

#### Zazhoghine - Ahramenko Mogilev 1990

1.d4 ②f6 2.c4 e6 3.⊙c3 ∆b4 4.e3 0-0 5.∆d3 d5 6.a3 ∆e7 7.⊙ge2 c5 8.0-0 b6?! 9.cd ed 10.⊙44 c4? Black diminishes the tension in the centre and allows White to turn his attention fully to an active play in the centre and on the king side. 11.∆c2 ∆b7 12.±f3!? a6 13.∆d2 b5 14.94! White created some pressure on Black's central "d5" pawn and combined it with active actions on the king side. 14...a67 15.±g2. Zazhoghine avoids the straightforward march of the "g" pawn 15.g5 and prefers to bring some reserves over to the king side.

15... ½d87! The black queen is rather misplaced here, because of White's potential threat Δd2 - b4, but Black dan inferior position already. 16.73 Beθ 17.2h1 Δc6 18.2ce2 □fd7? 19. □g3 g6 20. ②f5! This beautiful positional sacrifice decides the game in lavour of White. 20...gf 21.gf+ ②f8 23.Δb4 ≝c7

24. £e7!! Black resigns.

In the next game, which I am going to include here without any comments. White was better all the time, despite that Black was playing much more sensibly than in the previous game. I wouldn't like to analyze games like that thoroughly. My aim is to show the reader the method of teaching opening principles to the young player on the level of master's

candidate. In this game White uses an active well thoughtover scheme, while Black is at a loss to find any suitable counter-action.

### Zazhoghine – Sarafanov Saki 1990

1.de Úf8 2.c4 e6 3.0c3 Åb4 4.63 0-0 5.Ad3 d5 6.83 Åb7 7.0gb2 b6 8.cd ed 9.0-0 Åd6 10.h3 Åb7 11.0b5 Åb7 12.0M e6 13.0c3 ¾b614.∰3 ①bd7 15.g4 Æb6 16.∰2 Æb8 17.5 ①M 18 18.0cc2 c5 19.0g3 g6 20.%h1 cd 21.ed De6 22.0c6 fe 23.Ad2 Åf8 24.g5 ①d7 25.Ab4 ∰4 26.0c2 ঐb63 27.Aff8 Æf8 28.Æd1 e5 29.Ab1 ed 30.0cd Æbb8 31.∰3 ¾f4 32.%g2 0-65 33.Æf1 №g3\* 34.%g3 0-64 35.b3 36.3d 55 37.h4 ∜7 38.h5 b4 39.hg4 hg 40.Æc8 Æb8 41.Æh1 Æg8 &42.Æh7\* æg7 43.Æh8 Åb7 44.∰4 ②b5 45.Æh5 åb 46.%e5 Åb7 47. Øf8 Æb7 48.‰g6 Æs3 49.Æh7\* Æb8 50.% Æb3 53 18.M1 Åb7 52.g6 Block resigned.

Lets go back to the move 5...4:c3+. The play might continue like this:

6.bc c5 7.cd ed 8..dd3 0-9 5.ºe2! While intends to create a mobile pawn chain in the center with f2 –f3 and e3 – e4. In this book we are going to limit ourselves to the historic game Botvinnik – Capablanca, "AVRO" tournament 1938,where this plan was played for the first time. More than half a century has passed ever since, but the strategical ideas in this position remain virtually the same. If the reader wants to get acquainted with the contemporary state of affairs in this line, he should look in the anomorpiate theoretical books.

9...b6 10.0-0 4.a6 11...2.6 2a6 12...02?! White is in a hurry to consolidate the centre, which in not under any threat anyway and deflected the bishop from the important "c1 – h6" diagonal. Nowadays the theory considers best in this position the move 1.2 2fd.3. 12... #d7 13.a4 #fe8?! A natural looking but imprecise move. The pawn exchange in the centre 13...cd 14.cd was much better with the idea to take hold of the open "c" file next with 14... #fc8. 14. #d3 c4?!



Capablanca plans to win the "a4" pawn with the help of the manoeuvre {2a6-b8-c6-a5-b3. Nowadays it is well known that to push the black pawn to "c4" is favourable for Black only when White has little or no hopes to organize the pawn advance in the centre. This game was, however one of the first

attempts to play positions like that, both for Botvinnik and Capablanca. Well, Black manages finally to realize his plan but the price he pays for this turns out to be very costly.

15.≝c2 ②b8 16.≅ae1 ②c6. The opponents are playing imprecisely all the time. As Botvinnik pointed out White had to start with the move 16.ᡚ3, while Black had to play 16...②h5 as an answer to 16.ãae1.

17. Dg3 Da5. After 17... De4 White would have retreated with the knight to "h1".



#### 18.f3 @b3.19.e4 #:a4

Both sides are close to the complete realization of their aims. White succeeded with the central pawn advance, while Black managed to win the "a4" pawn. The further development of the game should clarify who has the trump suit.

20.65 ⊙d7 21.872 Black was threatening 21... ⊙c5. 21....g6 22.14 f5 23.ef ⊙.16 24.15 8:ef 25.8:ef 26.8. The most natural move after which, what's happening on the board is more or less forced. White had a very strong attack after 25....816 26.814! which was confirmed by the plenty of analysis published in the chess literature.

26.월e6! 월:e6 27.fe 함g7 28.발f4 발e8 29.발e5 발e7



This position is an integral part of the most of the chess extbooks. The brilliant combination of Botvinnik has become part of the basic chess education. Here are the final moves of this memorable game: 30.4a31 \$2:a3 31.

34. 발17+ 업h8 35.g3!! was also winning. 34... 발c1+ 35.달12 발c2+ 36.달33 발d3+ 37.달h4 발e4+ 38.달.h5 발e2+ 39.달h4 발e4+ 40.q4 발e1+ 41.앞h5. Black resions.

Botvinnik's system has become a very rare guest of the contemporary tournaments. I can't remember a game in this system of anybody of my pupils, so I'll show you my game with E. Ubilava.

## Shereshevsky – Ubilava Cheliabinsk, 1974

 ②a5 17.直b2! 當d6 18.直b4. White neutralized opponent's pressure on the "d4" pawn in a very original way and after 18...世c7 played 19.e4! with a clear advantage (19...公c6 20.e5 €):b4 21.ab).

11.4b2?! White is defending the "d4" pawn a little bit too early, since presently it is not threatened by anything at all. Unfortunately the "e3" pawn becomes weak, 11.f3 would be much stronger with the idea to plan the actions along the standard scheme; Ba2, Do3 Be2 and then #d1 - e1 - f2, or even #e1, q2 - q4, #q3, 11... Da5 12, Dq3 Ee8



White has already some difficulties due to the dubious move 11.4b2. White has to bring to the "e" file the king's rook, to be able to prepare f2 f3 13 Ee1 De4! What can White do now? 14.f3 €\:a3 18.cd 世q5 is not very promising because White's centre does not represent strength but weakness. In case of 14.\textstyle 14. \textstyle 14.

problematic, while Black will have excellent counter-play on the gueen side. Therefore White decided to provoke sharp complications with the move 14. #h5!? Ubilava accepted the bait with 14...c4. If 14...q6 15.當h6 包:q3 16.hg cd White could try the original recapture 17.ed!? with an initiative.

15.Ac2 Be6 16.f3!? Bh6 17.世:h6 gh 18.fe 心b3 19.Bad1 £q4 20. £:b3 cb 21. £d2



How to evaluate this position? The material advantage is with Black, while the positional advantage is on the White side. Well, in a correspondence game Black's chances will probably be better. On the board in a competitive game, to play with White is much easier because White has

the initiative and very often the time-trouble is coming... Lets not criticize the play of the two opponents because there is not much sense in this, as for a thorough analysis of the position – it's definitely outside of the aims of this book. Lets just play this adventurous game to the end, in which White was luckier

21... #g5 22.6f2 8e8 23.e5 h5 24.Qf1 Af5 25.Qd2 Ac2 26.c4 dc 27.Qc4 Ag6 28.Qd6 Ac6 29.e4 h6 30.8cf b5 31.h4 #e7 32.d5 8:e5 33.8c8+ @h7 34.Qcb5 #d7 35.8c7 #sb5 36.Ace5 #e8 37.Af6 A:e4 38.8e7 #e4 39.8:f7+ @g8 40.Ab2 Black resioned.

4...0-0 As we have already mentioned, this move usually leads to a transition to some other lines if White plays principally 5.403 or 5.013. The lines after these two moves usually interpose, just like as if Black has played 4...c5. The difference in the move order depends entirely on the tastes of the chess player and sometimes on some fine points in the treatment of some key variations. Yet, now and then there is a key difference between 4...0-0 and 4...c5, which can be seen particularly well in the Rubinstein line beginning with the move 5.022.

I have been always trying to teach my pupils the Saemish system and some different lines of the "Tabia" when they play

on the white side of the Nimzovitch defence. The variations, I have mentioned, are so difficult and complicated that I do not rely that the young players, I have been working with, will learn them completely. I would like them to understand the basic strategical schemes and the key methods of playing, while the knowledge of forced variations and analysis is not so necessary, since the evaluation can often change when there is some transpositions of moves. Besides, it is essential for the chess player at the beginning of his study of the Nimzovitch defence to work on all the games of M. Botvinnik played in this opening, published in his legacy "The Chess Practice of Botvinnik". I am trying to give to my pupils some easier scheme in which White should obtain a decent position and then lead them to the study of the Saemish system.

The Rubinstein variation represents such a scheme. Well, it is complicated enough, but if you decide to follow the games of the eminent American grandmaster S. Reshevsky your task will become much easier. So. 5-⊙e2 d5 6.a3 .4e7 7.cd ed



The plan of A. Rubinstein in the diagrammed position includes the fianchettoing of the light square bishop with further active play in the centre with the help of the pawns 12 – 13 and e3 – e4, and sometimes g3 – g4. Reshevsky preferred the calm development of his pieces.

later the preparation of the movement of the central pawns comprised one of the main parts of the American grandmaster's plan. The contemporary theory considers the counterstroke 8...c5/? the only suitable reaction to the 8th move of White. Two of the games of Reshevsky are very

illustrative, both played in the famous tournament in Zurich, 1953, where both grandmasters Averbach and Taimanov avoided playing 8...c5.

# Reshevsky - Averbach

8...∆46 9..∆43 △DdT 10.0-0 c6 11..∆42 Ee8. It is interesting to see grandmaster D. Bronstein's comments to this position. Black thinks that his main task in the Nimzovitch defence has been accomplished: the pawn advance e3 – e4 has been delayed for a long time. White begins to patiently prepare the advance of the "e" pawn white Black as before adheres to the tactics of "the fortress awaits the siege", and the adventure a7 – a5 – a4 is in fact symbolic. Under the sircumstances Black's position in the next 10 – 12 moves is worsening, and staying on one and the same place with the bishop – ∆c6 – e6 – d7 –c8 – e6 has no strategical idea, so the only object of Black was to demonstrate that his position was unassailable."

12. ≝c2 a5 13. ⊙ce2 ⊙b6 14. ⊙f4 . ∆d7 15. ≝fe1 . ∆f8 16.f3 . ∆c8 17. Bac1 g6 18. ⊙fe2 . ∆g7 19.h3 a4



White prepared all his actions very carefully and now come the active central actions. 20.44 de 21.fe .4e6 22.4e3 .4b3 23.#d2. White has a very strong centre now and that gives him enough reasons to think about a king side attack. Black's position however is sound enough, so Reshevsky sound enough, so Reshevsky

decides to weaken it first, leaving aside the king side attack for better times. 23... Σ/fα7 24.Δg51 f6. A very serious weakness, but it was not easy to give Black a good advice. If

25. £e3 �f8 26.h4 £f7 27.h5 �e6 28.#f1 £f8 29.#f2 �d7 30.#cf1 c5. "Finally! Wasn't it better to play this on move 8?" – (Bronstein)

31.d5 🖒c7 32.hg hg



With the exception of the pawns a3 and b2.all White forces are connected in a powerful attacking formation. Black pieces are cramped on the last two ranks and the king's position is decisively weakened. The "e5" square is not a good enough consolation.

the open "h" file. 33...b\$ 34..Bh\$ The rook is headed to the open "h" file. 33...b\$ 34..Bh\$ ⊕e\$ 35..£h\$ Reshevsky takes away his king from the diagonal "g1 – a7". creating the threat Δc.c5, after which the capture of the bishop will be impossible because of the move the with a mating attack.

impossible because of the move \(\frac{\pi}{n}\) find with a mating attack.

35...\(\frac{\pi}{a}\) 27? This is a blunder, but Black's position was very distribut anyway. \(36.\) \(\frac{\pi}{a}\) 6.\(\frac{\pi}{a}\) 437.\(\frac{\pi}{a}\) 57. \(\frac{\pi}{a}\) 97. Black couldn't accept the exchange sacrifice.

38. Ef4 ①e5 39. Af6 A:f6 40. E:f6 설명7 41. 발명5 Eh8 42 신동+ 발:f5 43. Ef5 Eth4 + 44. 발명1 Black resigns.

#### Reshevsky – Taimanov

## 8... 2e8 9.b4 c6 10. Ad3 b5



"You need not have a high chess education to label this move antipositional and put to it a question mark which was done by almost all commentators. It's drawbacks are more than evident, but still this move was made by an international grandmaster, who no doubt saw some ments in it.

namely: Black eyes the "b4" pawn, preparing a7 – a5, with the idea to isolate one of the pawns on the queen side. As for the weak "c6" pawn, Black relies, by means of the manoeuvre \$D8 – d7 – b6 – c4 to close the "c" flie, enjoying the wonderful outnost in the process." – (Bfonslein).

11.∆d2l Reshevsky hinders the plans of the opponent very wisely. Now, 11...a5 is bad because of 12.ba £:a5 13.a4 and if 13...b4 then 14.∿a2 €:a6 15.Δ:a6. 11...@bd7 12.a4! It's evident now that Black's strategy has been a failure. 12...Δ:b4 13.ab c514.0-0 c4? The position becomes static now. The weak black "d5" pawn and the much better piece position give White a big positional advantage. It was much better for Black to exchange on "d4" and ball 14...€bb. 6.

15.£c2 a5. The "b5" pawn hampers Black on the queen side and after its exchange, White occupies the open files on the queen side. 16.ba £:a6 17.£:a6 £:a6 18.#a1! ②b8 19.#a4.#B 20.#b1 #e6.



21.8b2! A wonderful prophylactic move. Black intended to fight for the "b" file with 21...8b6, but now this would fail after 22.1645!

21...g6 22. 2ge2 Ad6
23. 2f4! A:f4 24.ef. On top of all the advantages of the White's position, now comes one more – the advantage of

the two bishops. The doubled "P pawns of White prove to be very strong in this position since they will be the spearhead of the attack against the black king. 24....0b07 25.n3 £b6 26.£a5 £b8 27.£:b6 £:b6 28.£a3 Reshevsky decides not to win a pawn with 28.€a5, but to mount up the pressure. 28....0f8 .8.a. £a4 of course wouldn't work after 29.6a.

29.4c3 .4c8 30.94f .4b7 (31.g5 was the threat) 31.f5 g5 32.8c7h6 33.2a4 8c6 34.2c5. 34.4b2 was terribly strong here, but White was in a desperate time-trouble. 34...4c8 since Reshevsky had several seconds for his last five moves, while Taminano had a whole minute!". - (\$ronselse!".

36.4d2?! The two white bishops are next to each other on the second rank just for a moment and Taimanov finds immediately an excellent tactical counterchance. 36...#b5!
37.#:c8? This move finally dissipates the fruits of the excellent previous play of White. White's idea to play for a male has no grounds. It would be much better to restrict the scope of action of the enemy queen with 37...\$\text{\text{\text{d}}} 8 \text{\text{\text{q}}} 0 to an endgame in which Black's defence would not be easy at all.

37... ≝b2 38.⊈g2 ≝:c2 39.£b4 �e4! 40.�:e4 ≝:e4 + 41.⊈g3 – the sealed move. Afterwards the opponents agreed

These games lead us to the following problem: "Why not play with White 8.b2 - b4, which does not allow 8...c5?"

If we open Taimanov's book "The Nimzo-Indian Defence", we are going to find the following answer: "8...e6. Blace begood immediately because of 8...a5 9.b5 ⊙bd7 10.⊙g3 ⊙b6 11.Δd3 Δe6 12.0-0 and White has an excellent position — Silva — Mittletu, Sofia 1957.

The calm development 8... £e8 9.0.93 ⊙bd7 also deserves recommendation. M. Euwe gives: 10.£d3 c6 11.b5 (11.0-0 b5)? 12.£d2 ⊙b6 13.a4 a6 with equality) 11...cb 12.0.b5 a6 13.0c3 b5 14.0-0 ⊙b6 and Black has a good position.

On the contrary, it is not good to recommend to try to undermine the centre with 8...b6 9. 203 c5. The game Sliva -Porath, Leipzig 1960 continued 10.dc bc 11.bc 4:c5 12.4e2 advantage," 9.462. If 9.203 Be8 10.4d3 4bd7 (10...b5?! 11. 4d2! 4Dd7 12.a4! Reshevsky - Taimanov) 11.b5 The game follows M. Euwe's analysis that we looked over already. "In this way, we can see that 9.003 does not promise White anything because of 9...\$e8 10.4d3 @bd7 11.0-0 b5.What happens however, if White plays in this moment 12.a4!? It tums out that the manoeuvre of the black knight via the "b6" square to the "c4" square is already impossible, and after 12... 4:b4 13. €a2 White regains the pawn with a much better position. Lets go back to Reshevky's move 8.0g3. We are convinced now that after a slow positional manner of play Black risks to get pressed. Lets have a look now at the other line, when Black plays 8...c5. Sometime ago my co-author of the book "Endgame Contours" master L. Slutskii noticed the

game Litienthal – Larsen, Moscow 1962, which ended with a crush for Black. It went on.

8...c5 9.dc A:c5 10.Ae2 &c6 11.0-0 Ae6 12.b4 d4 13.&a4 Ae7 14.e4.



The White position is almost winning in strategical aspect. All his pieces are perfectly placed for the dark square's attack against the enemy king. If Black has some counterplay it has to be connected with 13...£u6. Black failed to do this. So how should Black play in this variation? Most probably Black



The position in this diagram is not simple at all, irrelevant of the complete pawn symmetry and the abundance of open files. Black should defend precisely. If White manages to put the bishop on "13" Black would have a rather difficult position.

19.8fdf White has some initiative but it's not easy to convert it into a full point. The following variation is rather amusing: 19...bf 20.05 be 21.bc Δa6 22.0c3 8dc6 23.0d5 26 26.8c5 and Black still has some problems. Naturally, it is impossible to get from one position more than it can possibly give, but I repeat we are studying the system with 5.0c2 as a temporary weapon against the Nimzovitch defence, to be able to play in tournaments and to have enough time to study thoroughly the Saemish system.

In the line 1.d4  $\triangle$ 16 2.c4 6 3. $\triangle$ 0.3  $\triangle$ 04 4.e3 c5 5. $\triangle$ e2 we are going to use once again the already familiar method to avoid opening disputes just like in the variation with 4...0. Black usually plays 5...cd 6.ed d5, and after 7.a3  $\triangle$ e7 White fights for the advantage with the move 8.c5.All this is true, but we are going to play 8. $\triangle$ 14 0-9.0d  $\triangle$ 26 10. $\triangle$ 2cd5 10. $\triangle$ 2cd5

ed 11. 43. We can find in M. Taimanov's book the game: Gligoric – Matanovic, Tel Aviv 1966 which continued 11... 46 12.0-0 g6 13.4e3 2c6 with an equality.



I wouldn't like to dispute here with Taimanov's evaluation. To talk about equality, however in a position where only a pair of knights and a couple of pawns are exchanged is a little bitearly, and does not necessarily mean the game will end in a draw. I managed to find a rather jolly game Nikolaevsky – Kaijumov,

Riga 1975. 14.8c1 Ag7 15.8c5 Oe7 16.8b3 b6 17.8c3 866 18.8c1 8d8 19.0e2 Of5 20.Ag5 8e8 21.A4 8d8 22.Ac7 8g5 23.Ab5 8:e2 24.8c5 20.Ag5 8e8 21.A4 8d8 22.Ac7 8g5 23.Ab5 8:e2 24.8c3 82.6c 32.8c3 Ab7 30.8cb7 8d8 31.8d3 Oe3 32.8c1 8c5 33.8cb 1 8c2 4 34.8c2 8:d3 35.8c3 6c9 33.Ac6 5 16.3c4 78.8c2 0c2 38.Ac3 Oe1 39.Ac4 1e 40.8c5 8lack resions.

Naturally, I wouldn't like to advise my pupils to build their opening concept on such a tiny basis, but still this game shows that the possibilities to fight with White in this position are far from exhausted. We are not going to analyze this position, since this system is additional, and not the main one against the Nimzovitch defence, but I am going to mention that if Black, in answer to 14.8c1, tries to snatch a pawn with 14...©c/d 15.Ac/d 4.Ac/d 16.Ac/g Ac/d2 after 17.8c2 ig 18.8c4/d Black's problems increase.

It is high time we started dealing with our basic system against the Nimzo, preferred by my pupils. The aim of this book however is the development of a method of studying the openings and not writting an opening monograph, so we are

going to study one more type of position with a pawn wedge in the centre

After the moves 1.04 &16 2.04 e6 3.&03 &04 4.e3 c5 (4...0-0) 5.&d3 &1c6 White can play 6.a3. Why just now, and not on move 4, or on the previous move? The idea is that if you play 4.a3 &:c3 5.bc Black has the additional opportunity to play the line with 5...06, but even if Black plays 5...05, White must play either 6.f3, which leads to an entirely different system, or after 6.e3 b6! sacrifice a pawn in the line 7.&02 &04 6.&03 &07 9.e4 cd 10.cd &04 11.&02 d5 12.&03 tested in the game Vaganian — Gulko, USSR 1977, which ended in a draw after a complex struggle.

What is wrong with 7. ♠d3, after 1.d4 ♠f6 2.c4 e6 3. ♠c3 ♠b4 4.e3 c5 5.a3 ♠ c3+ 6.bc b6!

When the bishop is on "c6", such a strategy would be extremely dangerous (11....\(\Delta\)6 is the right move) because after 12.14, Black doesn't have 12...f5, because of 13.\(\Delta\)23 g6 14.dc bc 15.ef ef 16.\(\Delta\).15, while the position of the bishop on "b7" enables it. On the other hand, in answer to 12.14 f5 13.\(\Delta\)23 Black is not obliged to play 13...g6. He has an excellent position after 13.\(\Delta\)6.



In this position 8.202 sems to be the most natural move. Black has basically two plans here: to build a blocking pawn chain in the centre with d7 – d6 and e6 – e5, and to have counterplay on the queen side after the scheme: b7 – b6, Aa6, 26,5 (B, 6 – e8 – d6, In this book we are going to limit

ourselves to the first plan upon the games of the author and his pupils. White has however, a very curious move in the diagrammed position.

8.e4. The theory does not approve it on the basis of Szabo Smyslov, Moscow 1956 in which Black played 8...cd 9.cd ይኒፈ4 10.e5 1935+ 11.ይግ1 20e8 (11... ይግ5 ?? 12.Δb2) 12.Δd2 1948 13.Δb4 d6 14.Δ:h7+ ይከ7 15.ይኒፈ4 a516.Δc3 (6 17.ይከ4+ ይኒ8 with an advantage for Black. Instead of 16.Δc3, stronger is 16.Δc36 ይኒፈ6 17.ed (17.ይ14 Δd7 18.ይ)3 (6, but Black has a satisfactory position according to the analysis of M. Euwe. This variation was referred to by Botvinnik and Abramov in the "Encyclopedia of Chess Openings".

There is something very strange, however. The Encyclopedia' doesn't say a word about the training game Bolvinnik – Averbach, Nikolina Gora 1956, which was included in the 3-volume work "The Chess Games of Bolvinnik" and in the 4-volume work "Analytical and Critical Works"?!

The game didn't last too long: 12. ♠b2! (instead of 12. ♠d2)
12. ♠06 13.♠13 f5 14.♥c2! d6 15.♣e1 de 16.♠:e5 ♠16 17.h3

##C5 18.04 €044 19.50:c6 ##C6 20.8g1 8f7 21.8e3 ##C5 22.gf ef 23.Δ-e4 fe 24.8#c3 Black resigned. Well, Black's play in this game was far from perfect, but nevertheless White played very beautifully. We intended to include the move 8.4e1 no urramour and put the aforementioned game to a thorough analysis. If it is unfavourable for Black to take the "d4" pawn after 8.e4, in case of 8...€e8 White can play 9.4e3 and after 9...6e can play 10.€/31 with the idea after 10...4e6 110...4e6 110...6e8 to have the opportunity with 12.8#e2 €a5 13.6/d2 to protect the "c4" pawn safely and prepare the king side advance. When we analyzed the move 8.e4 patiently, we understood Black could fly to overpass the opponent in development and to start an immediate conflict in the centre.

So. **8.e4** cd **9.cd** d**5! 10.cd**. If 10.e5 immediately, White has to reckon with the opportunity 10...dc!? 11.**△**:c4 **≌**:d4

10...ed 11.e5 ②e4 12.ᡚe2



Had it been White's move now, after castling we could evaluate this position as strategically winning for White. But it is Black's move now and he can manage to get enough counterplay with 12...fd/ in case of 12...\$\text{mass} + 13.\text{d} \text{d} 2 \text{c} \text{d} 2 \te

in the endgame. Now, White doesn't have 13.13? because of 13... <u>#a5+1</u>, and after 14.£/ft 14...fel is possible, and if 14.£/ft 15.£/ft 14...fel is possible. and if 14.£/ft 15.£/ft 15.£/ft 16.£/ft 16.£/ft

some hopes. But if Black plays 15... **... £94!** 16.dc 世:d1 17.启:d1 **...**:e2 18.cb **...**:d1 19.ba世 启:a8 20.允b2 **...**e2 21.允:e5 the draw seems inevitable

So, we worked a little bit on 8.e4 and came to the conclusion that somehow Black manages to equalize. We can use all this knowledge when we play with Black from now on.

Lets go back now to 8. 20 €2. White protected the "d4" pawn with the idea to occupy the centre pushing forward the "e" pawn. As I have already mentioned, one of the most popular ways to fight against this plan is to build the blocking pawn chain c5 – d6 – e5. So, 8...e5 9.0-0 d6. White is not afraid of 9...e4, since Black will not be able to keep the pawn outpost in the centre 10.64



And now "that is the question - to take or not to take on "d4"

My first experience in playing such positions, after taking twice on "d4". I had way back in 1974 in my game against A. Beliavsky. It was played in the first round of the tournament of "the young masters" and was

full of erratic and nervous decisions. The initiative was constantly fluctuating, but unfortunately for me White made the last mistake.

#### Shereshevsky- Beliavsky Cheliabinsk 1974

10...cd 11.cd ed 12.全5. I decided not to play 12.全d2, because of 12...世纪6 13.是b1 世纪5. but lately I came to the conclusion that the most promising move here was 12.是b1, with the idea 13.全b2.

12... ≝e7. If 12...h6 13. Δh4 g5 14. Δg3 €h5, White has at least 15. €:d4. 13.f4. Black has the opportunity now to

simplify the position and to exchange one of the most active pieces of his opponent – the knight on "e2". 13.13!? was safer. 13....\(\textit{\alpha}\) 41.83 \(\textit{\alpha}\) 2.07 17.65! White should be in a humy to prevent Black's knights from occupying the central outposts. 17...\(\textit{\alpha}\) 627 18.65? This is a losing move. Black had to play 17...\(\textit{\alpha}\) 637 18.65 20.\(\textit{\alpha}\) 3.0 \(\textit{\alpha}\) 3.0 \(\textit{\alpha}\)



18.f5? What I said about the last move of Black is even more appropriate for this move. It is White who should lose now. After 18.Δ:h7+I 盘:h7 19.15 對d6 20.對h5+ 量g8 21.f6 White had a decisive attack.

18... 当d6 19.f6 g6 20.止h6 目fe8. This move was hardly necessary. Black could simply

take on "16" without being afraid of 21.65 \$\text{Me6} 22.\text{\$\Delta\$} \text{\$\Omega\$} dadded and Black should win. 21.\text{\$\Delta\$} \text{\$\Omega\$} \text{\$\Omega\$} (21.\text{\$\Delta\$} \text{\$\Omega\$} \text{\$\Omega\$}

24.8f3 #c5 25.#f2. As a consequence of Black's mistakes, White obtained an overwhelming attack. We played the next few moves in a mutual time-trouble. 25...\$f8 25.h5 508. (26...ah was much more logical) 27.ha ha

28.£.g6 2e8 29.£f5 ⊙.c4 30.£h3 2cd7 31.£h8 £c8 32.£h2l. Prophylactics is useful even in super sharp positions. 32.£b7! (The clarifying 32...5d6 had its merits) 33.£h4 2b8?. Here 33...±d5 was a must. Now White is winning a piece. 34.£d8 £c48 £c46 2cf 62cf 36.£c1 ±a5 37.£b3 ±b6 38.£d5 63 3£h7?! (The right place for the queen was h5 and not h7) 39...2a7



Now, it became my turn to see mistakes. I lost my last seconds to convince myself that White doesn't have anything after 40.8b1 \$25.41.8b7 \$2.57 42.\$3.57, because of 42.\$3.8b4 and since I had to make a move not to lose on time. I touched the bishop — 40.2.67. Now Black drabs again the initiative.

If I had to play with the dark square bishop, I should have complied with 40.\(\Delta d2\). Of course best of all was to retreat with the queen to "15" keeping the advantage. 40...\(\Delta b5\) This brings a dramatic change in the scene. 41.\(\Delta a2\) = 42.\(\Delta b1\) #5+ 43.\(\Delta c2\) = 44.\(\Delta b1\) #1 The rook endgame after 44.\(\Delta c4\).\(\Delta c4\) = 45.\(\Delta c4\) #1:6 46.\(\Delta c7\) #63+ 47.\(\Delta c3\) de 48.\(\Delta c11\) #1 #22+ 50.\(\Delta c11\) #1 #3 hongs victory to Black.

44... 2a8. Black prepares to push the "e" pawn, which wouldn't be possible immediately because of 45...2e.3 45...2f7 3d. 1c. 2as of 45...2f3 46...2f5 3d...2f3 47...2f3 47...2f3 47...2f3 Black managed to push the central pawns indeed, but White's pieces became active once again. The draw now, looks like the most probable outcome.

47... âg8 48. 쇼g7 些e3+ 49. 堂h2 堂b6 50. 쇼a2 âd8 51. âb1 堂c7 52. 堂g1 堂c2



53.£b6? Well, who blunders last — he loses. White was anxious to win once again. After 53.△h6 £g8 54.△g7 £d8 this nerve-consuming game would have ended in a draw.

53... <u>#c1+I.</u> I overlooked this, thinking that Black should play 53...d2. 54.<u>@h2 @c7I 55.8:a6 + @b8 56.8:d6 E:d6</u> White resigned.

### Shereshevsky- Litvinov Minsk 1972

The opponents did not follow a very precise order of moves in the opening of this game.

1.d4 ₾f6 2.c4 e6 3.₾c3 Δb4 4.e3 c5 5.a3?! Δ:c3+ 6.bc
0-0?! 7.Δd3 ₾c6 8.₾e2 b6 9.e4 e5?! 9... №e8 is better.
10.0-0 ed 11.cd cd 12.Δb2. Since the "b6" square is occupied by the black pawn, White can play this move without any preparation like 12.Bb.1.12... Ee8.



13. £rd41? White could simply protect the "e4" pawn with 13.13 with a better position, but I was templed by the positional pawn sacrifice 13...£rd4 14.6.rd4 £re4 15.Be1 4.br4 16.8e2 fg6. The tast several moves were forced.

White has two excellent bishops and a strong initiative, as a compensation for the pawn.

19.Δc3 This battery is aimed at the enemy king. 20. 1504 is the threat. 19...2g7 20. 1514! This move can be connected with multiple opportunities, like 15th and Δf6 etc. 20...16 21. 1514! White is not happy with 21. 1516, or 21.Δ-16? ≦h5. 21...1518 23.6.15 file 82.8.5 etc. 85 ±6.9.8.4.6.5



exchange a bishop for a knight in a favourable situation. White enters an endgame of bishops of opposite colors with queens on and an extra pawn.

30...±:e6 (30...de is not any better for Black after 31.±bs+) 31.±d4 ±37 32.cb ab 33.±g7+ ±68 34.±bs+ ±67 35.±bs+ d6 36.±h7+ ±68 37.±h8+ ±67 38.±d4 ±65 39.±g4+ ±67 (39...±f5 would have done Black no good, because after the exchange of the queens White gets two connected passed pawns on the king side).

40.h4 발a1+ 41.발h2 발e5+ 42.발g3 발d7 43.f3 발e6 44.ûd2.



44...±:g3+? The queen's exchange leads to a bishop ending, which is lost for Black but the other continuations wouldn't change anything much. 45.±g3 Åa4 46.±M Ådf 47.±g5 ±M7 48.£4 46.54 49.£45 b5 50.£44 £22.51.4 df 52.g4 and Black

resigned.

Lets begin to study now the same position if Black abstains from capturing the "d4" pawn.

## Shereshevsky– Yuferov Minsk 1971

10...∙∆h5



A very interesting move. Black prepares to stop White's play on the king side by means of the eccentric g7 – g5.11.457! White is in a hurry to block the center, but in vain. I was still a novice and I had almost no experience to play positions like that and I didn't have any feeling about the fine points.

11. $\Delta$ e3 was better, to answer 11...56 with 12.14; and to 11... $\Xi$ e7 answer 12. $\Xi$ d2 (12.14 is not so good here because of 12...ef 13. $\Delta$ :14  $\Delta$ :14 14. $\Xi$ :14 f5!) with the idea to play (2 – 13 and then either 92 – 94 or 04 – 05. 11.13? seems also very promising. There is some tension in the centre now, accordingly 11...95 is much riskier, and in case of 11...od 12.cd ed the two moves 12 – 13 and  $\Delta$ f6 – 15 are evidently in

- favour of White who can, besides the timid 13.**2**b1, play the sharp 13.α4 € 16 14.**Δ**α5.
- 11... De77 Black hasn't mastered the position either. I am going to give you the comments of grandmaster I. Boleslavsky to the last move of Black, from his book The Tournament "Sokolsky In memoriam":
- "Black has two retreats to a5 and to e7.Black chooses the safer one with the idea to keep the knight for the sake of defence on the king side. Accordingly Black doesn't get any counterplay. 11...\$\Delta\$ was the right move and then:
- 1) 12.f3 g5! 13.g3 堂h8 14.望h1 章g8 15.ᡚg1 營f6. Now 16.14? 处:g3 17.hg 營h6+ 18.堂g2 gf gives Black a very strong attack.
- 2) 12.14 (It is possible that Yuferov didn't like that particular move) 12...et 13.0:14 0:16! (If 13...0:14 14.0:14 16 15.e5! White has a dangerous attack i.e. 15...1e 16.2th 5 2:14 17.2th 7+ 2f8 18.g3 8:16 19.0; 14.0:15 (If 14.e5 de 15.0:15, then 15...0:15 16.2th 5 17.2t.15 0.15 18.0:15 2:15 19.2t.15 19.2t.15 2:15 19.2t.15 2:15 19.2t.15 2:15 19.2t.15 1

  - 12.f3 ⊕g6 13.g3 Δd7 14. Δe3 h6 15. №h1 White is not in a hurry and is methodically preparing his king side advance. Black is forced just to be the witness to his opponent's actions, since he doesn't have any active counterplay. 15... ⊕6 16. №c2 №c7 17. Bg2 Bae8. It is interesting to try to place on "e8" the other rook to be able to have the option to run with the king to the queen side in some lines. 18. Baf1 ⊕h7 19. №h1. The threat against the "b7" pawn is futile. White is ready to bring the queen to the area of actions. 19... ⊕g5 20 h4 ⊕h7 1.8 #20



Both players have regrouped the forces on the king side. White is in the stage of the final preparation for the decisive onslaught. Black is left in anticipation of the attack 21...\$\Delta 8 22.\$\Delta 2 25.60 2 \text{ 23...}\Delta 2 156 2 \text{ 24...}\Delta 2 156 2 \text{ 25...}\Delta 2 156 2

White wouldn't have pushed the "f" pawn, but would have played 24.q4!.

24.41 ∆g4! Black tries to mechanically stop the white pawns. 24...ef 25.gf ᡚh4 was not effective because of 26.e5. 25.8ff ±d8 26.f5 ᡚe7 27.ᡚf ±h8 28.Δe2 ᡚf6 29.±df1. The straightforward 29.ᡚd3 h5 30.ᡚf2 would solve the problem much quicklier i.e. 30...⊕eg8 31.4.g4 ᡚg4 32.ᡚg4 hg 33.±g2 ᡚf6 34.Δg5 winning the "g4" pawn.

29... **Δ:e2.** On 29...h5 White intended to play 30.**Δ**:g5 **Δ**:e2 31.**B**:e2 **②**g4 32.**②**d3 f6 33.**Δ**:d2 **②**g8 34.**②**f2 **②**:f2+ 35.**B**:f2 and Black fails to defend the "h5" pawn with the rook.

30. 2:e2 h5 31. 2g57. White plays similarly to the previous variation, but the situation is entirely different. It is the queen on e2, and not the rook and because of that Black has enough time to consolidate. The right way was to play simply 31. 2d3 20.4 32. 2nd2 and 2d3 – 12 next.

31... 294 32.8hg2 №a57 Black makes a mistake now. Playing 32...f6! 33...4d2 №g8! 34.0d3 №f7 35...6t2 0.f2+36...£t2 № 37...4d2 № 38...8g4 № 38...8g8 Black could refute the previous strategy of White, which was perfect up to now. 33...0d3 — finally. 33....0d8 34...0f2 0.or6 35...£r6 0.f6 0.f6 36.or4



Black's position is hopeless. He has no defence against the king side attack. **36...增rc3**. 36...hg 37.全g4 全h5 wouldn't help because of 38.全e5 全f4 39.世q4.

#### Shereshevsky - Anikaev, Cheljabinsk 1974



White played 10.d5?! immediately in the diagrammed position, without being afraid of 10...e4 11.dc ed 12.cb. The well-tested in practice 10.e4 is better. 10... ○a5/? 11.e4?! Now Black can transpose into the line recommended by Boleslavsky in his comments to

the previous game. In fact, if White had chosen this rather unnatural order of moves, he would have had to continue to play originally with 11. 203!

11... ⊇e8?. Anikaev plays passively and gives White enough time to take up the initiative. 11... ⊇h5! was the right move. 12. ⊇p3 ≛h4 13.3a2! ②f6 14. ⊉h1! With this excellent move White prevents any attempt by the opponent for some

activity and forces him to rely only on passive defence.

4....2d7 15.g3 2e7 16.14 f6 17.15 2f7 18.2g2 2f8. Black
has nothing better than to begin to run with his king to the
queen side. Black is strategically lost. 19.g4 h6 20.h4 2fe8
21.g5 hg 22.ng 2f8 23.2f3 2fc7 24.2h3 3fg 25.4cg5 2f6
25.8n8 8b8 27.2h51 2d7 28.2fb8 2fb8



The previous game did not require any particular explanation. White was playing for a king side advance, while Black was trying to coordinate his pieces and evacuate his king. In the diagrammed position White has to make up his mind how to turn his big positional advantage into a win.

One way to do this is to retreat the gueen to "h4", then bring the knight to "g3", the bishop to "e2" and then try to reach for the Black's "q7" pawn. I decided to go for something sharper but chose the wrong way to do it. 29. 4:767. White calculated the following line: 29...af 30.堂h8+ 寫f8 31.真a8 寫;a8 32.堂;a8+ \$c7 33.52f2 and next the knight goes to "g4", the gueen to "h8" and the "f6" pawn falls. The idea is not bad at all but I had to start with the gueen check first: 29.世h8+! 當f8 30.4:f6! and the idea will be realized in practice. Evidently, Black would have to play 29...堂e8 (29...堂c7 30.4h4) 30.堂:e8+ ②:e8 (30... 4:e8 31. 4:f6 of 32. 2g8 2e7 33. 2f8), but after 31. ▲h4 Black will have problems to draw. White has a lot of ways to improve his position: the manoeuvre with the rook to "q6", the knight can go to "q5" via f2 and h3, the bishop can go to "h5" and Black can not even retreat with the knight to "f6", since after its exchange Black will lose a pawn. I thought during the game that with the exchange 29.4.:f6 I narrow Black's scope of choice but it turned out just the opposite

29...gf 30.世孙争· 龙c71 underastimated this move. It might seems strange now, but Black manages to hold the "f6" pawn and consequently the position. The rest of the game was played in a mutual time-trouble. 31.位2 息h7 32.世88 总88 33.位24 息行 34.世h8 息f835.世h4 b6 36.心e3 心b7 37.处e2 心d8 38.世h6 心7 39.世h7 心位8 40.是g7 ah8 41.世g6 息h6 42.世g3 息h8 White was already convinced that his advantage was gone and after 43.是g8 | offered a draw, which was accepted.

### Shereshevsky – Korelov Minsk 1972

**10.e4 Be87!** A very strange move. Black is preparing to meet the pawn advance f2 - f4, but agrees voluntarily to a passive position.

11.d5 ②e7 12.f3. The beginning of a king side attack. In properties it is a one-sided affair already. Black has no counterplay against the "c4" pawn, while on the king side White is the complete master of the situation. 12...h6 13.∆e3 ②g6 14.≎h1 Be7 15.≅c2 ≌e8 16.a4 a5 17.g3 ②f8 18.≅g1 ○g8d7



Black is well prepared against f3 – f4, but White is not obliged to make a breakthrough in the best defended section of the board. Now White changes the target.

19.g4l �h7 20.�g3 �b6 21.�f5 �:f5 22.gf. The pawn structure has changed. White has at his disposal the semiopen "g" file, but the direct attack on the "g7" target is not enough to win the game. The position should be opened to give some scope for the bishops and that is only possible with the help of f3 – f4. Presently White starts to manoeuvre with the purpose to worsen Black's coordination of pieces.

**22...⊈h8 23.£ab1 ᡚc8.** 23...ᡚ:h4? would be a blunder because of 24.**£**b5.

24.8g3 f6 25.8g2 8f7 26.8g1 ②b6 27.8bf ○c8 28.4c2
Bb8 29.8b5 Ba8 30.8bf 2bb. It is very useful to create the
illusion of safety for the opponent. With those situal or
pieces, and it is not easy for White to secure the defence of
the "e4" pawn after the opening of the "e" file. Amazingly, the
White king is going to accomplish this.

31. 2g1! Ba8 32. 2x2 Ef6?! Sg1! Black played rather carelessly taking away the rook from the 8th rank. Now, to parry the threat 34. Δ.h6 Black has to move away the knight from the "h7" souare.

33... ②f8 34. ≝h3l. It becomes clear now that Black is defenceless against the threat 35.8:α7. 34... ②h7



35. 當a2! White decides not to win the enemy queen after having frightened the opponent reasonably. After 35.皇:q7 些:q7 36.**£**:a7 **£**:a7 37.**∆**:h6 **≘**a8 38.世h5 Black has the opportunity to prevent the penetration of the enemy queen 37...b6! 38.₩f7 with Ba71.

Therefore I decided to continue

with my plan without changing the material ratio.

35... 2/8 36.f4! Under the circumstances this move is very useful, since the bishop on "e2" enters the struggle with a decisive effect

36...Bb6 37.fe fe 38...c11 The white square bishop's operation should be well prepared first. 38...Bb1 39.£e31 The king should not remain on one and the same rank with the queen.

39... 2b6 40. 2d3! The last preparations. 40... 2:a4 41... 2h5! A nice finish to the White's strategy. 41... 2:c1 – desperation. If 41... 2f6 42. 2a2 is the simplest.

42.4.17 a:c3+43.2d2 a:g3 44.25:g3 a:f7 45.253 Black resigned.

### Shereshevsky - Kupreichik Minsk 1973

The order of moves in this game was the following: 1.d4 Df6 2 c4 e6 3 Dc3 Ab4 4 e3 c5 5 e32! A:c3 6 bc Dc62! 7. Ad3 d6 8. De2 e5 9.0-0 h6 10. Dq3 0-0 11.d5! Da5?!. You have to be convinced by now that the retreat to "e7" leads to a very passive position., but the move in the game is even worse. Black's attack on the "c4" pawn does not bring any success and the knight on "a5" is away from the main theatre of action - the king side. 12.e4 Be8 13.h3. White prepares [2] - f4. 13... 2d7 14.£a2 2f8?! Black's position is already difficult and it is not easy at all to give him any good advice. White is patiently improving the position preparing the advance f2 - f4. White can also play f2 - f3, \$af2 and after that f3 - f4. If 14...b6 then 15. \$\Omega\$ f5 is rather unpleasant, and in case of 14. (4)h6 15 f4 and White's initiative transforms into a decisive attack against the enemy king. The idea of Kupreichik to finish his development, preserving the control over "e5" is easy understandable, but it meets an original tactical refutation.

15.f4 ef 16.4.f4 ②q6 17.Baf2 ②:f4 18.8:f4 f6.



19.e5/ The decisive blow. 19...de?/ This move allows a very beautiful combination, but even after 19...章:e5 20.쇼c2 followed by 21.世d3 Black can hardly avoid the loss of the game.

20.E:f6! gf 21. #h5 Black has an extra rook, but all the White pieces are taking part in the

slaughter of the king. The crush is unavoidable. 21...살f8 22.발:h6+ 앞e7 23.발g7+ Black resigned.

I included the following game in this book to illustrate the first try to play the Saemish system with White at the level of master's candidate

### Zazhoghine – Bladikis Liepaia 1990

1.d4 ⊕f6 2.c4 e6 3.⊕c3 Δb4 4.e3 c5 5.a3?! Δ.c3 6.bc 0-0?! 7.Δd3 d6 8.e4 e5 9.d5. That is an interesting idea, since White blocks the center before black's knight could go to "c6". 9...h6 10.⊕e2 Δg4? Black goes with the bishop to "g6" but it has no perspectives there. 11.f3 Δh5 12.Ba2 ⊕bd7 13.Δe3 Δg6 14.0-0 ±a5 15.±b1?! White wants to try to use the weaknesses of the opponent on the king side. This would probably be a good idea, but there was no need to allow Black's queen control over the "a" square. It would have been much more logical to law 15.tb3 or 15.a4.

15...Brc8 16.g3? Why not 16.a4? 16...a6? Black does not utilize the wonderful chance to start his counterplay on the queen side with 16...\(\frac{1}{2}\)a4, and weakens his position on the same side of the board.

17.a4 世C7 18.Eb2 Eab8 19.h3. White begins now to prepare some active operations on the king side. He plans to

push f3 – f4 but deprives first the enemy knight from the "g4" square. 19... Ee8 20. Ea2. Zazhoghine plans to manoeuvre the knight from "e2" to "d2" and defends the "a4" pawn first.

20...b6 21.首b1 Eb7 22.발b3 Eeb8 23.발d1 발c8 24.으c1 으e8 25.발h2 인df6 26.인b3 발d7 27.인d2 발e7 28.발e2 인d7 29.발q2.



Black has been outplayed completely. White has prepared the pawn advance (3- 14 and is ready to start the king side attack. 28... 2077 Black intends to evacuate his king to the queen side but overlooks the hidden threat of the opponent. 29... a6 was a must.

30. 2531 This unexpected move of the white knight disorganizes Black's defence on the queen side completely. There is no defence against 31. 255

30...Ea7 31.©a5 ba 32.Eb8+ ©:b8 33.Eb8+ ©:h7 34. 202
28 35.251 f6 36.f4 Black's rook and knight look really indiculous, so Zazhoghine starts an energetic king side offensive. 36...468 37.4c2 4g6 38.g4 4.88 39.5g2 4g6+
40.h4 4.f7 41.4c2 g6 42.g5 ef 43.4c4 4767 44.gft 3g6+
45.4g3 262+ 46.253 267 47.25d1 25.c4 48.2f3 262 49.4b3 250.266 ©:88 57.4c5 267 52.4c4 ©:46 53.254 267 52.4c4 0:46 53.2

I am going to finish this chapter with the game:

### Capablanca – Ragozin Moscow 1936

1.d4 �6 2.c4 e6 3.♠c3 ـ\$\textit{\Delta}64 4.a3 .\textit{\Delta}:03+ 5.bc d6 6.\textit{\textit{\textit{BC2}}}
0-0 7.e4 e5 8.\textit{\Delta}d3 c5 9.♠e2 ᡚc6 10.d5 ᡚe7 11.f3. Well, I
don't feel like discussing the opening stage of this game

since some of the moves of the opponents are not going to withstand any critics. We are interested in the typical position and in the method of playing it, as shown by the great Cuban. 11....247? It was much better to retreat with the knight to "etb." preparing 17 – 15. In this case White would have probably hampered opponent's intentions with 12.523 (12.94?! 526) and if 12...96 13...246 5297 14.0-0 15 15.14 hoping to preserve the advantage in the sharp pawn clash in the centre. Black had to comply with this development since after the move in the game he looks completely outplayed in a very passive position.



12.h4/? T. Petrosian would have never played such a move, but Capablanca decided not to push the "g" pawn twice, and he decided to occupy the "h4" square with a pawn, before Block had managed to play №67 – g6.

dispute, so Ragozin was trying to evacuate his king to a safer place. 15.95 № 81 61.64 № 81.7.15. Capablanca blocked the position on the king side, gained a lot of space and had everything at his disposal now.

17...#e7 18.#g/2! White intends to put his knight right in the centre of the enemy camp – the "e6" square. 18...\$dds. The attempt to prevent the move 19.@bfs with 18...g6 was just provoking the crisis. In their book "Caissa's Favourites" L. Prins and M. Euwe give the following variations: 18...g6 19.!g hg 20.h5! and now:

A. 20...ah 21. ②:h5 f5 22.ef 4:f5 23. ②f6+!

- ◆ B. 20...曾h7 21.公f5 堂d7 22.hg 賞:g6 23.費h3 堂c7 24.贊h7+
- ◆ C. 20...fg 21.hg 曾f6 22.位f5 曾:g6 23.曾:g5 曾:g5 24.鱼:g5 鱼:f5 25.ef and so on.

19. 2h5 ±cr 20.gf of 21. 2gr .Adr 22.h5 ≡ac8 23.h6 ±b8 24.Eg1 ≡B7. White has created a wonderful outpost on "g7" and has a decisive advantage on the king side. Now it would be very useful to "shatter" the enemy position on the other side of the board.

25.8b1  $\pm$ 16 26.4c2  $\pm$ 26 27.4b5  $\pm$ 27 28.2c2  $\pm$ 24 29.4c2  $\pm$ 26 30.8b3  $\pm$ 20.6 If 30.8b8 White had this amusing line: 31.0e6  $\pm$ 56 32.8 $\pm$ 56 ab 33.0.0c7+  $\pm$ 27 34.0b5+  $\pm$ 55 35.cb and the knight on "a4" will be an easy prey for the white bishop on "h5".



31.441 "Capablanca deserves a real admiration for this beautiful knight manoeuvre ending with £97. Of course, we already know the ripe fruit will fall to the ground, but we don't know yet when and how. The move in the game is a wonderful finish to the work done up to now but even after

31.\$\text{de}2 \text{ White's win is not going to run anywhere. In fact White threatens 32.65, and if Black takes (31...\$\text{\lambda}.24\) 32.\$\text{\texitett{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi\text{\text{\text{\text{\texit{\texicn{\text{\text{\texit{\texitet{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texitex{\texit{\te

31...£98 32.45 © 68 If 32...€a4 then 33..£e6 33..£e2 ±16 34..£e3 b6 35.36 ±168 35..£e2 The white king in this game resembles a soccer goalkeeper who is constantly attacking the opponents goal. Capablanca took pity on his own realthrance and tables the which the hell.

36... <u>168</u> 37.Eb2 <u>168</u> 38.<u>251</u> b5. Ragozin evidently got sick with watching the final regrouping of the white pieces and decided to do something. Well, this try is basically just a demonstration of fulfility.

39.cb ⊕b6 40.≝a2 c4 41.≝a3 ≝c7 42.⊴c1 ≦f8 43.≦bg2 ≝b8 44.≝b4 ≦d8 45.≦g3 ≦f8 46.⊕e6!



# The King's Indian Defence

Black, in this opening is voluntarily giving up the centre, contrary to the Queen's Gambit or the Nimzovitch defence, with the idea to attack it afterwards on the dark squares. It is much more risky in comparison with the Queen's Gambit, but on the other hand it is easier to seize the initiative as early as the opening stage. The numerous strategical options, the possibilities to obtain different pawn structures and the constant fight for the initiative which often turns into a king side attack against the white king make this opening a very dangerous weapon. Up to now, all the tries to refute the King's Indian defence were futile. A convincing proof of that is the fact that this opening has been constantly used by the

world champion Kasparov in his last match for the world title in 1990 against A. Karpov.

Most of my pupils and me as well, we prefer to fight against this opening with the Averbach system. I was very much attracted sometime ago by the following strategical idea:

1.d4 @f6 2.c4 g6 3.@c3 Ag7 4.e4 d6 5.Ae2 0-0 6.Ag5!? h6 7.Ae3 e5 8.d5 a5?! 9.h4!? @a6? 10.h5 g5 11.g4! @c5 12.f3



and Black's position is almost lost. White is going to bring the knight to "12", via "h3", then castle short, then continue the knight maneuver 6½? – h1 – g3 and later start on the pawn advance on the queen side. The only thing that Black can do is just to walch the development of the events and award goodners's misslevers.

9. #d2 The risky play on the king side is hardly advisable here. In case of 9.g4 ②c5 10.f3 a5 (10...h5!? 11.h4 h5! Black

takes advantage of the fact that the white pawn on "3" has closed the diagonal "01 – h5", and starts counterplay on the king side, and after 9.h4 2c5 10.15°c2 Black can play actively i.e. 10...c6!? 11.h5 cd 12.cd  $\Delta$ d7 ! 13.hg fg 14. $\Delta$ :h6  $\Delta$ :h6 15.8:h6  $\Delta$ g7 16.8:h1  $\Delta$ d8 with an excellent compensation for the nawn 9... $\Delta$ c6 10.f3



10...45 looks very logical in this position, since White can not take on "h6", because of the tactical trick 11...62fe4 and IZ...£14+1, but sometimes Black plays 10...62h5.White can better resume the threat on the "h6" pawn with 11...3 and after 11...2h7 play 12.0-0.0. What can Black do now? 12...55? is

bad because 13.4:c5 dc 14.ef gf 15.f4. On the other hand Black should have in mind the eventual threat b2 – b4. Therefore – 12...a5, but now White begins some energetic actions 13.4:c5l dc 14.f4 &f6 15.6:f3 &d7 (15...&g4 didn't promise Black anything after 16.8dft).



The game Shereshevskij — Mariasin, Minsk 1983 reached this position. White played 16.15?1 and Black managed to hold the position. P. Korzubov – one of my students, pointed out after the game that White should have played 16.h4! The threat is 17.h5, and Black can not play 16..h5 17.♠g5+ 

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At the international tournament in Kopenhagen in Denmark in 1984, Kristiansen played against Korzubov 12... #e8 instead of 12... #e8 instead of 12... #e8 included in the state of 13.b4 and indirectly defends the knight on "h5", preparing 17 – 15. White however, managed to show the frewhardskich #Back's manoney. #iii 13.4.c. f5 ic. 16.6f of 14.9 d6



It became clear that Black's pieces on the king side had no play and the queen side was very vulnerable. Well, this game was played in the last round and Korzubov needed only a draw to fulfil his second IM norm so he accepted a draw, although he had an overwhelming advantage.

Lets go back to the move 10...a5. 11.0-0.0 White resumed the threat to take the "h6" pawn. Black's choice is restricted to 11...\$h7 or 11...h5. After 11...\$h7 12.94 Black has to play h6 – h5 anyway, so it would be better to do it immediately – 12...h5. If not, White is going to play 13.h4 and then make up a plan including h4 – h5 after some preparation bringing the king to the king side (after g6 – g5) and then open files on the

queen side after an appropriate preparation. 13. 2h3! hg 14. 2a5+ 2a8 15. Eda1

Some of my pupils have already reached this position and White has all the chances to develop a dangerous attack. It is bad for Black to take on "f3" since after 16.4.13 Black has nothing against the winning

march of White's "h" pawn. The best line for Black probably is to try to neutralize the initiative of the opponent with 15...②h5 16.fg ᡚf4 but after 17.h4! with ᡚh3 next Black has to defend a difficult position anyway.

Lets have a look now at 11...h5 immediately. White must prepare the development of the knight on "g1". Therefore 16.h4  $\triangle h7$ . The rest of the moves facilitate White's initiative. 13. $\triangle h3$ .



How should Black play now?
13...#th4? is bad after 14.025 6
1293 15.2411 0.95 16.025
17.263! with the irresistible threat 18.022. 13...45
15.14 and the pawn "h5" is very weak. What should White do after 13...2.h3/15? 14.8.13 f5.We couldn't find the right answer to

this question for a long time. 15.ef gf 16.¼ ef 17.**±**:4 €\16 looks very unclear. But lets ty 'Korzubov's patent' 16.**±**.c5! (instead of 16.f4 in the last variation) 16...dc 17.d6! and White's advantage is out of doubt.

Black however, is not at all obliged to determine the situation in the centre immediately with moves like 6...h6 and 7...e5 in the Averbach system. Black can choose a lot of other lines like : 6...\Deta 7..\Begin{array}{l} \text{26...} \te

Besides all that, Black has another principally different scheme of playing connected with the move c7 – c5. After 6.4g5 c5 7.d5 h6 8.4d e6 interesting compications may arise. A long time ago I tried to convince grandmaster Boleslavsky that White has a clear advantage and we had a funny dialogue – something like this: "Well, Issak Efremovitch, it tooks like the King's Indian defence is losing?" —"You must be kidding." Finally Boleslavsky managed to convince me that to try to find a refutation of this opening is simply a waste of time, besides nowadays the evaluation of the variation 6...h6 7.48.3 c8.8 e.5 is rather unclear

In short, the Averbach system requires from the while player not only an excellent theoretical preparation, but also a constant watch over the contemporary tournament practice. White also needs to deeply understand the problematics of the arising positions which is cultivated only in chess players who are permanently watching over the dynamics of the development of this system.

Lately I began to notice that no matter how seriously and devotedly I was trying to explain the Averbach system to the young players who started working with me – the probability for them to make grave blunders both strategical as well as sometimes tactical in many sharp lines is very great. Evidently, this is because the flow of chess information is almost drowning everybody and the methods of fight in the numerous pawn structures that may arise in the system are also multiple. Those mistakes, depending on the capabilities and the endeavours of the chess player frequent in a period from half an year to an year. There were no exceptions in my practice as a coach. Afterwards everything begins to fit and the Averbach system becomes a dangerous weapon against the Kind's Indian defence.

Well, to make mistakes for an year and to have mediocre tournament results is something that not everybody can

afford. Therefore another question arises: "How to master some other system against the King's Indian defence with an interesting strategical contents which needs a lesser flow of information to work on?" To solve problems like this is something that the good coach should always approach with responsibility. At first you could prepare some "novelty" and then you may work on some other different lines of the chosen variation. I would advise you to avoid inset that are currently top-fashion. I have chosen Petrosian's system. In 1988 I participated in an international tournament in Primorsko in Bulgaria and I noticed the intriguing game between the Sowiet masters I. Henkin and E. Gleizerov:



23... Bad8. Gleizerov decided to follow Hort's recommendation, and look what happened — 24. Ed2. Ed7

25.全a5/ A wonderful move. White is not afraid of 25... 全位 because after 26.意位 cd 27.世位 he has more than sufficient compensation for the exchange and is ready by

means of b2 -b4 to disrupt the enemy control over the "d4" square. 25... \(\varphi\)h7 26.\(\varphi\)c6! Another original and very strong move.

26...Edf7 27.b4 cb 28.Edf2! Ag6 29.E:f7 E:f7 30.E:f7 ##7731.2c:b4 it is time to count the chicken... White has an extra pawn with an excellent position. Black's bishops have extra pawn while the white knights look impressive. Additionally the position of the white king is much safer than that of his counterpart. The realization of the advantage was very energetic.

31... #b7 32.g4! #b8. If 32...a5, then 33.h5.

33.≝4 ! ≝17 Here 33...a5 was not good once again because of 34.≝:d6. 34.≝:d6! Δd4+ 35.≘h2 ≝12 36.≘h3 Δh7 37.⊕c6 Δa1 38.≝:h6 ≝11 39.⊕r4. Black resigned.

This game impressed the unfortunate Gleizerov so much that he decided to give up the King's Indian defence altogether and started playing the Nimzo-indian defence.

There is another interesting game, I would like to turn your attention to, between Henkin and Yurtaev, played in 1989 in Podolsk.

#### Henkin – Yurtaev

1.d ᡚf6 2.c4 g6 3. 2c3 Δg7 4.e4 d6 5. 2f3 0-0 6. Δe2 e5 7.d5 2a6 8. Δg5 h6 9. Δh4 g5 10. Δg3 2h5 11.h4 2h4 12.hg hg 13. 2hf1 The Encyclopedia of the chess openings mentions only 13. 2c2 13...15. Henkin commented this game in the book "Shakhmati in USSR" № 5 for 1990 and said that after 13... 2b.e2 14. 2c2 f5 15.ef Δ.:f5 16. 2c4 g4 17. 2cf 95 Black had a bad position.

14. Δ:f4! The essence of White's idea. Changing on "f5" would not be so effective because of 14.ef Δ:f5 15.Δ:f4 ef 16. ᡚd4 Δ:d4 17. 쌀:d4 쌀f6 18. 쌀:f6 盘:f6 19. 與h5 聲g6.

14...of Henkin considers that 14...of is the lesser evil i.e. 15.Δd3 \(\text{\alpha}\)c5 16.Δc2 although White is obviously better as well. White played worse in the game Balashov – Borodianskij, USSR 1965 – 15.\(\text{\alpha}\)d1 instead of 15.\(\text{\alpha}\)d2 The game continued 15...\(\text{\alpha}\)c5 16.\(\text{\alpha}\)c2 \(\text{\alpha}\)g5 and Black had a good position, but the Black knight was developed at "d7" previously.

15.24 ±76. In this position the exchange on "04" is not satisfactory anymore i.e. 15...±0.4 16.2±0.4 ±76 17.±16 ±16 18.8±5 ±56 19.±0.43! fe (otherwise 20.e.) 20.±:e.4 ±57 21.15 followed by ±12 next and occupation of the "h" file. Very beautiful variations were shown by Henkin after 15...£e. For example 16.-0:e4 ±67 17.0:e0! ±.e.6 18.6 ±7e.6 19.0:55 ±15 20.c5!, and if 20...±95 then 21.±0.4+! ±17 22.±17+ ±17 23.

16.소:f5 4:f5 17.ef 으c5 18.소h5! 발:f5 19.소g4 발g6 20 의44!



"c2" with this bishop.

24... Bad8 25.Be1 f3 26.gf Ef4 27.Be7 世b1+ 28. 空g2 世g6. If 28... 世:b2 29.世:b2 公:b2 30.Be8+ 萬f8 31.B:d8 葛:d8 then 32.Bb1 众c3 33.B:b7 a5 34.Bb6 with a decisive advantage.

29. ± h51 ± d6 30. ± e8+ ± f8 31. ± c8 32. ± e8+ ± f8 33. ± c2 ± f8 34. ± f1 ± g8 35. ± e4+ ± b2 36. ± e7+ ± f8 37. ± e6+ ± f8 37. ± e6+ ± f8 38. ± f8 39. ±

These two games comprise a good illustration for White's opportunities in the sharpest and the most principal line of the Petrosian system. These games are a nice starting point to analyse further, although you can try to study some other calmer schemes.

First of all you have to find your way in positions with the Black "c" pawn – already to "c5". There is a small but very instructive book "Chess Lectures" by master E. Shehtman, which was published by the "Phizcultura and Sports"-publishing house in 1989. The author is familiarizing us with Petrosian's legacy and in a chapter devoted to the Petrosian's system against the King's Indian you can find a peculiar comparison between these two positions:





And now the world champion №9 – Petrosian, explained wisely the fine points: "The basic difference between these two diagrams is that in the first one the "c5" square has been

occupied by a pawn, while on the second one it is free. The difference is enormous. The tournament practice of the King's Indian defence has shown that in the first case the black pawn on "c5" represents a buffer against the pawn advance of White on the queen side and helps the creation of counterplay on the king side.

On the second diagram, the Black knight finds a relatively safe haven on "c5", with the help of the "a5" pawn and together with the bishop on "g7" become the main actors of the arising chess spectacle."

Well, my own impressions with playing the white side of the King's Indian defence tell me that in the positions of the first type, white should be very careful when Black manages to play 17–15, since the standard manoeuvre e4: 15 – g6:15, and then 12 – 14 is not so favourable for White in comparison with the case when the black pawn is already on "e4" and the "c5" souare is vacant.





Therefore White has to refrain from the exchange on "15" rather often, allowing Black's "f" pawn to advance to "14" which creates prerequisites for a king side attack.

I am going to show you some games now which illustrate the method of White's play in such type of positions.

#### Petrosian – Pilnik Amsterdam 1956



13.04/ White is immediately on the road to the realization of his advantage. After the exchange on "c5", no matter which pawn Black captures with, it will be very unfavourable for Black positionally. On the other hand it is not good for Black to take on "b4", since the white rook will have an excellent

point for penetration - "c6".

13...h6 14...£:f6f. Of course, White wouldn't like to allow the enemy night to enjoy the "c5" outpost.

14... ½:f6 15.0-0 Efd8 16.0-0 4 Af8 17.g3 cb. The Argentinian grandmaster decided to simplify. Well, White had a much wider choice of moves than his opponent and Black didn't like to be under constant tension in connection with the exchange on "c5".

18.增b3 堂g7 19.**首fc1**! Petrosian is on the alert against his opponent's future counterplay. Black would have some tactical chances after 19.掌:h4?! – 19. ⑤e6!

19...h5 20. De3 De8 21. E:b4 Edc8 22. Ec6 ≝d8 23. Eac1
Df6 24. Lf1. The Black knight should not be allowed to the "c5" square, at any rate.

24...≅cb8 25...£h3 a6



White has outplayed his opponent completely, but Black found somehow a way to play something active. What should White do next? Dear reader, can you try to find the magnificent move played by Petrosian?

26. Ee1!! "This move, which is very difficult to understand at

first is played because of the following considerations. Black has weakened the pawn "b6" so to attack it White should put the kright on "c4", but this is not possible to be done immediately because of 26...\( \Delta\). \( \) \(

26...ab 27.ab 2h7 28.2c4 Ba2 29.Δg2. The game has been decided on the queen side in favour of White. He has only to neutralize the counterplay of the opponent on the other side of the board.

29... 查f6 30.是f1 ②g5 31.查b3 是ba8 32.h4 ②h7 33.是:b6 是a1 34.是c6 是8a2 35.查e3 查d8 This looks like the end to Black's temporary activity. White is easily winning now.

36.8:a1 8:a1+ 37.¢h2 €/f6 38.f3 \$\frac{a}{2}\$ b8 39.\$\frac{a}{2}\$ b3 \$\tilde{-}\$ d7 40.b6 \$\tilde{-}\$ c5 41.\$\frac{a}{2}\$ b2 68.\$\frac{a}{2}\$ 43.\$\frac{a}{2}\$ c7 \$\frac{a}{2}\$ 44.\$\tilde{-}\$ e8 \$\tilde{-}\$ c98 46.\$\frac{a}{2}\$ b3 \$\frac{a}{2}\$ 48.\$\frac{a}{2}\$ c8 \$\frac{a}{2}\$:b7 49.\$\frac{a}{2}\$ e8 \$\tilde{-}\$ d7 50.\$\tilde{-}\$ d8 black resigned.

### Petrosian – Lutikov Thilisi 1959

#### MISI 195

1.2f3 2f6 2.c4 g6 3.2c3 Ag7 4.e4 0-0 5.d4 d6 6.Ae2 e5 7.d5 2a6 8.Ag5 h6 9.Ah4 c5 10.2b2 Ad7?! (Petrosian mentioned that 10...2c7 was better)

11. **②b5**1 **△e8**. The "lesson" of capturing on "b5" was squeezed dry in the previous game. On the other hand if Black plays 11... **□**e7, it would be very difficult to avoid the pin and prepare f7 – f5.

12.a3 #d7 13.g4! @c7 14.@c3! Naturally, White wouldn't like to simplify the position and to facilitate his opponent to place his pieces on the seriously restricted space for mannetures.

14...a6 15.a4 #c8



Black refrained from blocking the queen side in a deadlock with the move a6 – a5.He had this opportunity several more moves and White dion't mind at all. Indeed, after a6 – a5 the theatre of actions would be narrowed, but no doubt White would have the initiative while

now Black still had some hopes to do something on the queen side. The further course of actions in this game proved that the blocking of the queen side was the least of evils for Black.

16.03 Typical "Petrosian". "This humble move is very difficult to find and is definitely worth at least one exclamation mark. White intends to bring the knight to "e3". But in order to do that the "d1" square should be vacated first defending the "g4" pawn in the process. Besides, if Black plays later 17-15, after the exchanges on "15" White would have  $\Delta e2-g4$  at his

disposal. Instead of 16.h3, 16.g5 was also good with the idea of a direct king side attack, " – (Petrosian).

16... <u>Bb8</u> 17. <u>bc2</u> <u>Ad7</u> 18.b3 b6 19. <u>Ad1</u> b5 20.a51 <u>ch8</u> In case of 20... bc 21.bc <u>Bb4</u> Petrosian wanted to change a little bit the route of the knight and bring it to "d3" via "b2" and then if necessary to prepare € -44.

21. △g3 ②g8 22. ②e3 ②e7. If Black now exchanges on "c4" and plays 24... ≜b4, White can displace this rook with the help of the manoeuvre ≝c3 and ②c2.



23... ±e8. "Black plays and behaves as if nothing has happened. Otherwise he would have retreated with the knight to "g8"; to which White intended to play 24.0-0 and now if 24... ±66 then 25.±6 0.66 26.4! (26.b4 is also good) 26... ±e8 27.f5 g5 26.b4! "(Petrosian).

24.b4l €c8 — There is nothing better. As Petrosian mentioned the complications after 24...cb 25.c5l are definitely in favour of White. For example 25...8c8 (25...dc 26.1%:c5 or 25....€c8 26.c6) 26.c5 l 26.c5 l 26.c6 l 26.

but this move is an additional loss of time and loses without a fight.

## Geller – Ljuboevic Petropolis 1973

1.d4 2/6 2.c4 c5 3.d5 g6 4.2c3 dg7 5.e4 d6 6.2/3 0-0
7.Δe2 e5 8.Δg5 h6 9.Δh4 2n6 Petrosian made an interesting comment on the move 9... ½C7 in his "Chess Lectures": "V. Hug played with Black against Geller something different several rounds before. He tried 9... ½C7 10.2d2 2h7 11.0-0 Δh6 offering to exchange the dark square bishops. Traditionally, it is considered that it is always favourable for Black to exchange these bishops if the pawn structure in the centre is blocked. The bishops that are left on the board after this exchange do not seem equal in value at all. The White bishop is restricted from the central pawns which are on white squares as well. So, this reasoning has almost become a dogma and even Geller in this game avoided the exchangwe of the bishops.

That idea has been tried plenty of times before. Remember the famous game Tal – Fischer, Yugoslavia 1959? Tal was not burdened with any dogmatic concepts then and he exchanged the bishops and later managed to prove that without the dark square bishops the Black king has been left without a very important defender, and the black position is not without defects." The game Tal – Fischer proceeded as follows (although the pawn structure was a little bit different – the black "c" pawn was on " c7") 1.d 4 2/16 2.d 26 3.023 4.g7 4.e4 d6 5.4e2 0-0 6.603 e5 7.d5 ©bd7 8.4g5 h6 9.4n4

a6 10.0-0 性e8 11.0d2 心h7 12.b4 4f6 13.4.f6 0h:f6 14.0b5 性e7 15.世位2 th7 16.世位3 0g6 17.c5 15 18.de 19.19.14 信任 20.19:14 0c 21.403 cb 22.3ea 1 世f6 23.8e6 性 32.44.f5+ 出:f5 25.世:f5+ 性h8 26.8f3 世b2 27.8e8 心f6 28.世:f6+ 世:f6 29.3f6 0g7 30.8f8 0e7 31.0a5 h5 32.h4 数8 33.0c4 b5 34 0e5 flack resigned.

Black obtained a good position in the game Geller – Hug after 12.4g3?! \$\text{mer}\$ 13.8\text{mc2} \text{ Qd}\$ 7 14.\text{Bact}\$ h5 15.\text{h3} \text{ Ag5}\$? \$\text{def}\$ 13.3\text{ (it is necessary to deflect recommended 12.4\text{mer}\$ 13.a3 (it is necessary to deflect D8B from the "65" outpost.) 13...\text{mer}\$ 14.4\text{ and then for example 14...\text{ef}\$ 15.\text{B1}\$ 4\text{ \$\text{mer}\$}\$ 16.\text{\$\text{mer}\$}\$ 2 \text{ Qd}\$ 7 15.\text{Baf1} \text{\$\text{Def}\$}\$ 18.\text{B1}\$. White exchanges the enemy knight in the centre, keeping the advantage.

10.2d2 \$\frac{\pmathbb{m}}{200}\$ \$\frac{\pm

So why didn't White play f4 in many more games?

The point is that in positions with similar pawn structure Black is not afraid of 12-46 because when the opponent takes on f4 with a piece, Black usually has an excellent control on the outpost e5.in the King's indian defence Black's knights are usually placed in such a way that the "e5" square is available to them immediately, or in a few moves. In this case however, Blacks knights are placed in such a way that the "e5" square is something like a dream". — (Petrosian).

 17. ≝d2 g5 18. Δg3 ⊙hf6 19. Δd3 ⊙h5 20. Δf2 ⊙f4 21. Eae1 a6 22. ⊙c3 ⊙g6 23. h3 23... q4 was the threat. 23... ⊈h8?



There comes a minute, even in the most complicated positions, when it is very unclear what is going to happen next, accordingly it is necessary, sometimes even obligatory to make a move, which would be useful whatever happens. To feel that moment, and In find this move is almost

an art, although I have never read verses devoted to it.

24. \(\hat{Ag3}\) \(\frac{\picos}{25.h4}\) Geller launches an unexpected diversion on the king side and manages to deprive his opponent of his control over the key square "e5". Black's position dissipates instantly. 25...g4 26.h5! gf 27.hg fg 26.e5! \(\lambda 15 \) \(\frac{\picos}{25.h5}\) 29.6.15 de 30...45 5.15 31.E15 gf 32...4e5 | \(\frac{\picos}{25.h5}\) 26.25 26.35.37! \(\frac{\picos}{25.h5}\) 26.25 27.25 27.25 28.55 26 39.868 2:e4 40.076+ Black resigned.

In positions with a black pawn on "c5", a lot depends on some precise opening lines. For example if after 1.d4 2.f6 2.d4 65.24 60 5.25 0.0 6.de2 e5 7.d5 Black plays 7...c5 immediately, White can retreat to "d2" with the bishop, i.e. 8.dg5 fig 9.dd2/? 20h5 (If 9...2e6 then 10.85c1 5/h7 11.h4! [5 12.h5] on 13.8.h5 (4 14.d3) with White's

advantage, Soos – Minic – Bucarest, 1971). 10.g3 ⊕d7 11.h3
White played 11. 2c2l? in the game Larsen – Quinteros, Mardel-Plata 1981. There followed 11...⊕d16 12.h3 △d7 13.4
2c7 14.⊕h4 and White had the advantage. 11...a6 12.⊕h2
2c16 13.⊕g4 ½h7 14.2c2 ½h7 15.2gf ⊕g8 16.0-0-0 17.ed £d.75 18.Δc3. We are following the events in the game
Franco – Quinteros, Mar-del-Plata, 1982. Although the two
opponents' actions in this game were far from perfect, White
still kept some initiative.

In conclusion of this chapter we are going to see the brilliant, the great game of Petrosian against Gufeld, in which the future world champion demonstrated the wonders of prophylactics.

## Petrosian – Gufeld Moscow 1961

1.c4 g6 2.d4 Åg7 3. €c3 Æf6 4.e4 €-0 5. Åg5 d6 6. 25d2 c5 7.d5 25 8...4d3 a6 9. €ge2 e57. The complications after 9...55 10.cb ab 11...£:5 €:e4 12...€:e4 25:5 13...£:e7 were hardly favourable for Black, but Petrosian thought that 9...55 10.cb €:bd7 was interesting with further development of the game along the lines of the Volga gambit.



"Optically, Blacks position looks very promising. After the blockage of the pawn chains in the centre the focus of the struggle moved to the sides. It looks like Black, having the possibilities to play both b7 – b7 or 17 – 15 might even have some advantage. Black however, should never forget that the pawns are pushed forward just pawns are pushed forward just

to open files and to enlarge the scope of action of the pieces. In this case the dynamic pawn structure is in favour of White, since White's forces are placed much better for the eventual opening of the position. \*- (Petrosian).

10.0-0 ≥bd7 11.a3 ≥h5 Black plans some active counterplay on the king side with 17 – 15. 12.131 – prophylactics! If Black plays now 12...15, after 13.e.1g 11.4.152 and the "15" pawn looks doomed. 12...Δ16 13.Δ16 ≥g7 14.931 This could be played only by Petrosian! His words: "White's position is so good that he can choose different plans at leisure. The pawn push g2 – g4 is temporarily delayed in favour of the modest g2 – g3, but now Black has to permanently reckon with 13–14. In a situation when one of the opponents has no opportunity organize some active counterplay, while the other one, having a large space advantage has several options to improve his position – such a manner of playing can be much more dangerous them the straightforward actions. It is very difficult for the defending side to anticipate where the darper is going to come from.."

14...2b8 15.2h11 This is another case of prophylactics based upon a very deep evaluation of the position and an excellent calculation of variations. You would like to play b7 – b5? OK, you just do it! But after 15...b5 16.cb ab 17.b4! 營6 18.6\text{this Bid next} excellent cases a pawn, or 17...cb 18.ab 營:b4 19.4e3! with \$80 in excellent.

15...½c7 16.b3/ The "cat and mouse" play continues. White is not in a hurry to play b2 – b4, but prepares first the duplication of the rooks along the "b" file. Petrosian is not threatening anything immediately, yet it is harder and harder for Black to find suitable moves. The worst thing for Black is his inability to anticipate the eventual strategical plans of his opponent. 16...Δe7 17.8ab1 公h8 18.8b2 公f6.



"Black is preparing another regrouping of forces which is infinally going to enable him to push 17 – 15.1f Black tries to accomplish it now or on the previous move, after the exchange on "5". White would have a strong pressure on the diagonal "b1 – h7", after thd 2–2.White could threaten then a3

– 94 and to open a "second front" on the queen side playing b3 – b4. All this would put Black against unsimmountable problems. Therefore the most reasonable choice for Black is to adhere to a passive strategy, awaiting the future intentions of White. Moves like 18...b6. and 19.Bb7 next were somehow increasing the defensive potential of Black's position. "— (Petrosian)

19.b4 2g8 20.de3 f5 21.bc dc 22.afb1. Black managed somehow, finally to do something but just like in the game Petrosian – Lutikov this 'activity'accelerated the loss of the game. 22...2f6. It would have been better to prevent the penetration of the White rook with 22...b6, although after 23.a4 Black's position looks pathetic.

23.B6 Δd6 23...&d7 was not good because of 24.d6. 24.Δh6/ Another prophylactic move. Here is what Petrosian thinks about it: "Black still has some hopes to withstand the pressure and to get some counterplay after the exchange on "e4" and then if White takes with the pawn Black might play &16 – 94 liquidating the dark square bishop, or if White takes with a piece i.e. ᡚe4 or Δ.e4 – Black will have the move &15. It would be useful to understand that even if all this happens, if Black manages to realize all those "threats". White would

have a clear advantage, yet White does not need to give up anything that he has achieved up to now uselessly."

24....£7. In case of 24....fe 25...£1e4 &\text{\texi{\texitex{\text{\texit{\texi\texi{\texi{\texi{\texi\texit{\texit{\texi{\text{\texi{\texi{\texi{\texi{\texi{\texi{\t

**26.gf ②d7 27.fe Δ:e5.** 27...**②**:b6 is also hopeless for Black after 28.ed **\$**:d6 29.e5.

28.Be6! Most probably this strong move was not expected by E. Gufeld. Now, the blockading move 28....2h5 is not playable because of 29.Be8+. On the other hand the only active black piece - **∆**e5 is under attack, and after 28....2f8 – the exchange sacrifice 29.B.e5 determines the outcome instantly. 28...55 29.cb e4 30.Ec6 ±68 31.Δ.ce4 ±74 32.Ecf 2h5 33.Δg5 ±9g3+ 34.±2g2 2.e4+ 35.2.e4 ±7.h2+36.±7f ±7.1.2h1+38.±72 This put an end to Black's agony and Black finally resioned.

Generally speaking, when you study the King's indian defence for White, and particularly Petrosian's system – you have to get yourself acquainted with all the games, annotations and articles by the 9th world champion – T. Petrosian who had a tremandously deep understanding of this opening in particular, as well as of chess itsself.

In his next game against the Yugoslavian grandmaster S. Gligoric he managed to find an original manoeuvre and to almost refute the scheme of play chosen by Black.

### Petrosian – Gligoric Bled – Zagreb – Belgrade 1959

1.d4 2f6 2.c4 g6 3.2c3 Ag7 4.e4 d6 5.2f3 0-0 6.Ae2 e5 7.d5 2bd7 8.Ag5 h6 9.Ah4 a6 10.2d2 #e8 11.0-0 2h7 12.04 <sup>2</sup>0.5. Otherwise Black would never manage to play (7 − 15. The diagonal h4 − d8 should be blocked somehow because White would have the move Δh5 after the exchange ef − gf. 13.6c1 15 14.13 ½c7 15.½h1. M. Tal played against Fischer 15.Δt2 in the same tournament, but the king move is stronger. This was first played by F. Olafson against Gigoric in Yugoslavia as well. 15...2f6 16.c5 ½h5. "It was surely infavourable for Black to exchange on "c5" twice, because of the loss of the "c7" pawn. Until now the opponents were playing very quickly. I was attracted by the possibility to test a positional idea which I noticed during the game F.Olafson − Gligoric. The champion of Yugoslavia was ready to get once again the same position and he didn't suspect anything..." − (Petrosian).

# 17.c6! b6 18.ef gf 19.g3!



The wonderful idea of White becomes clear now. He is going to disrupt the attacking formation for Black on the king side with the move f3 – f4, while on the queen side White has an overwhelming positional advantage answay.

19.... 2f6! - the best practical chance. After 19. ₺ 6 20 f4 ef

21.gf 2ge4 22.4h5 Black has a very bad position. 20.f4 2g7 2f.2c47/. White decided not to take on "e5" because of 21...4e5 22.2c4 f4 and Black's pieces sprung to action. But after 21.a4! Black would have hardly obtained any counterplay.

21...ef 22.gf b5/ Gligoric is very industrious in fighting for counterchances. With the last move Black intends to free the queen's rook with the help of the move a6 -a5.It is not

favourable for White to play 23.€a5, because of 23...Δ:c3 24.富:c3 曾e4+ and 25...曾b4.

23.002 © 42 4.0.16 8.16 25.0.137! "One more imprecision. The move 25.0.03 would be connected with a pawn sacrifice – 25...0.13 26.8.13 "844. But then While plays 27.8.0.13 "814 28.8.91 with a crushing king side attack. I thought that my position remains so strong that I could win without the use of any radical means." - (Petrosian).

25...a5 26.a3 ab 27.ab 2g6. After 27...是a3 White intended to play 28-b0th IBa1 29.1844. 28-b0th White decided to simplify the position winning a pawn, but now Black's knight and a bishop become rather active. 28...fe 29...bc4 3ff 30...£15 2ff 31.th5 Eff Gigoric does not allow a simplification into an endgame after 31...世行7 32.1815ft 1 and 33.815ft 1 and 33.815ft



This is an amazing position. White has two extra pawns, but the win is far from certain, even problematic. The black pieces are too active. Petrosian simplifies into a rook endgame in the time-trouble, which should end in a draw if Black defends well. It is not easy however, to recommend anything better

than that, despite the two extra pawns.

with success. The game would have ended in a draw, then. "
- (Petrosian).

42.b6!! This puts an end to it. If now 42...cb 43.£c1. After 42...£:b6 43.£ng4 £b8 44.£g7+ £n8 45.£7g6 Gligoric regioned, since after 45...£n7 46.f6 £f8 47.£g7+ and 48.£.c7 wins immediately.

In his "Chess Lectures' Petrosian analyzes the game Donner - Kavalek, Skopie 1972 in which Black played 7...h6. Well, such a move could hardly be labelled principal, but it prevents radically the appearance of the bishop on "q5". 8. Ød2 In his annotations to this move we find something very wise: "After 8.0-0 €h7 9.q3! Black should not be stubborn. since after 9...f5 10. 2h4 2e8 (or 10... 2f6) 11.ef gf 12.f4! White obtains a clear advantage," Now, we have an entirely new idea - g2 - g3 in connection with Ah4. This idea can be utilized in many other lines. In 1989 in New York city the amusing game I. Ivanov - Gelfand was played which was somehow missed by the ever-increasing flow of opening information. It started 1.d4 2f6 2.c4 g6 3.2c3 2g7 4.e4 d6 5. 263 0-0 6. 4e2 e5 7.d5 a5. This move, together with 7... Dbd7 and 7... Da6 is one of the most popular. I. Ivanov played 8.q3!?



White prepares to meet the pawn advance f7 – f5 with a wonderful place for the knight – the "h4" square. White intends to exchange on f5, i.e. ef – gf and to play f2 – f4 next. The knight from the "h4" square is going to attack the "f5" pawn and if Black plays e5 – e4, the knight can go to the blocking "e3" square via q2.Black played in "e3" square via q3.Black played in "e3" square via q4.Black pl

8... 2a6 If 8... 4h3 9. 2a5 !? is possible with 10.h4 next. 9. 2h4 ②c5 10.f3 ②h5 11.0-0?! (11.ᡚq2 was better). 11... ②f4! 12.0g2 0:e2+ 13.#:e2 4h3 14.4e3 b6 with an approximately equal position. But, if White had prevented the tactical stroke 11... 2f4 with 11. 2g2 White's position would have been much preferable. In the game Zavac - Shiva. Kwala - Lumpur 1990 after 9.2h4 公c5 10.世c2 2h8 11.0-0 Δd7 12.Δe3 b6 13.f3 ᡚh5 14.ᡚg2 f5 15.ef Δ:f5 16.≌d2 ᡚf6 White played 17. ♣h6?! which proved to be a mistake, 17.q4 ∆d7 18.h3 would have been much better. The game ended in a draw. Lets return to the game Donner - Kavalek. After 8. 2d2 Black played 8...a5. Next came 9. 2f1 2a6 10.g4!? ②h7 11.h4/? f5. As Petrosian recommended 11...≅e8 was interesting with the idea to play 12... 46 next. White would have to play then 12.h5 a5 13.aa3 and then develop along the scheme: f2 - f3, \$\displace\$e1 - f2 - q2, \$\displace\$e3 with preparation of active operations on the queen side. The initiative would be on the White side anyway.

12.gf gf 13.ef Δ:f5 14.ᡚ3 ≝d7 15.Δe3 ᡚb4 16.≦c1 e4 17.≦g1



22. #h5 (22. 4:h6 was simpler).

22... 4g4 23. 查:h6 查f5 24.f3 with a winning position for White.

The game Spielman – Ivantchuk was played in the supertournament in Linares 1991. The opening part of it is very instructive for the study of Petrosian's system. After 1.d4 £76 2.c4 g6 3.£c3 £g7 4.e4 d6 5.£f3 0-0 6.£e2 e5 7.d5 £a6 the English grandmaster played 8.£d2?? V. Ivantchuk answered 8.£e8 9.a3 c5 and White started active operations on the king side with 10.h4/?.



Now, Black played 10...15, typical for positions like this, and White answered with 11...15. that is not new at all. The "ECO" refers to the games: Larsen — Gligoric, Portorach 1958, which continued 11...26ff 12...9f 13.h6 Δh8 13.13 and then 211, Δe3 preparing a 2 — q4). 12...ha preparing a 2 — q4). 12...ha

We can try to generalize a little bit over the contents of the last game, as well as the game Donner – Kavalek and ponder over the following question "What would happen if White plays 8.2xd2 not only after 7...2a6, or 7...h6, but after 7...2a7 and 7...a5 as well, with the intention to start pushing forward the "h" pam?" It may sounds strange, but the cotemporary tournament practice gives only a partial and meagre answer to this ouestion outpting ames of the French grandmaster B.

Kouatly, who in answer to 7...a5 plays 8.h4!? Here are some of his games:

#### Kouatly – Gunavan Thessaloniki 1988

7...a5 8.h4 h5 9...dg5 ⊘a6 10...⊘h2 ≝e8 11...≝d2 ⊘h7 12...h6 ≝e7 13...⊘h7 4...h6 ≝e7 15...g3 ≝g7 16...∰g7 ±g7 with an about equal position, but it is not quite clear whether it is favourable for White to exchange queens, or wasn't it better to occupy the "g5" square with the knight on move 9.Anyway, the appearance of a black pawn on "h5" weakens the "g5" square and hinders the pawn advance 17 – 15.White has definite reasons to rey on taking the initialive playing for example 10...⊘a2 instead of 10...€h2.

#### Kouatly – R. Martin del Kampo Thessaloniki 1988

7...5 8.h4 №6 9.Ød2 h5 10/3 c6 11.②ff 0c5 12.Δe3 cd 13.cd Δd7 14.②d2 a4 15.②c4 ≝c7 16.②a3. White's position is better. White's play would have been near perfect if White had interchanged moves 10.f3 and 11.②f1 to avoid the possibility 10...Δh6.

#### Kouatly – Kasparov Paris 1989

7...a5 8.h4 №6 9.042 №5 10.94 a4 11.h5 gh 12.95 №4

13.处ff 15 14.f3 №2 15. №72 fe. Black has some initiative for the piece sacrifice. As far as I remember this game was played in a simultaneous display of the world champion against the French team and was a part of a chess-show. I don't think that Kasparov could afford to play in such a risky manner against, for example — Karpov in a world championship match.

Finally, the game

#### Kouatly - Cvitan Los Angeles 1987

7...25 8.h4  $\bigcirc$ 496 9. $\bigcirc$ 402  $\bigcirc$ 65 10.h5  $\stackrel{\text{tid}}{=}$ 47 11.b3 h6 12.hg fg 13. $\stackrel{\text{tid}}{=}$ 62  $\bigcirc$ 94 14. $\bigcirc$ 9d c6 and the position was rather complicated. In fact, this game does not clarify anything, since White's play is not comprehensive enough. Why not play instead of 11.b3, 11.h6i?  $\bigcirc$ h8 12.g3 with the idea 13.13  $\bigcirc$ 0.h5 14. $\bigcirc$ 117. And finally what is the right answer to the question: "Why not (after 7... $\bigcirc$ 07) play 8. $\bigcirc$ 02 followed by h2 — h4 next?"

The only game treating this, which I managed to find, was S. Nikolic - Kochiev. Pula 1988 and it did not answer this question satisfactorily. It went on 8. 2d2 2e8 9.h4 f5 10.h5 ②c5 11.hg (11.h6 was very interesting and if 11... Af6 12.ef. of 13.0f1 and if 13... 4a5 White seems to be better in the endgame after 14.4:g5 世:g5 15.世d2 世:d2+ 16.4:d2, for example 16...a5 17.q3!? Øf6 18.f4 ef 19.qf Øfe4 20.Ød:e4 fe 21. 2d2!) 11...hg 12. 2f3 a5 13. 4e3?! b6 14. 2d2 2f6 15.4:c5 bc 16.2:a5 4:e4 17.2:a6 4:06 18.0-0-0 2:e8 19. # ad and Black took the initiative and accordingly won. The whole plan connected with the idea to exchange the dark square bishops looks dubious. Instead of 13.4e3, 13.40g5 seems to be much more natural and if 13... 66 then 14.ef gf 15.曾c2 and Black will have problems to guess where the danger is going to come from. White can patiently prepare to castle gueen side and then make up his mind whether to play g2 - g4 or f2 - f4 on the king side.

It is high time we made some conclusions. We had a look over plenty of active possibilities on White's part. In fact, this is not a matter of theory, there are not many forced lines at all. What is important is to bring into action different positionally-motivated plans, which can be relatively calm, as well as sharp and tactical. It is very important also, that each game should be thoroughly annotated by the player after

teamwork analysis with the coach. The mistakes should be located and subsequently avoided. Every player will get some experience in this way after the sufficient period of time. All this depends on the capabilities and endeavours of the student and little by little he is going to pile up his own theory and not the "book" one, theory which has been tested in practice with bitter disappointments and wonderful successes.

# Openings Arising After 1.d4 42f6 2.c4 c5 3.d5

After these three moves several kinds of openings may arise i.e. the different modifications of the Benoni: 3...e5, 3...e6, 3...g6 and the Volga gambit 3...b5.

Lets start with 3...e5. White can continue 4.023 d6 5.e4 Aer. What happens after 5...g6, the reader should have already seen in the chapter devoted to the King's indian defence. The move 5...Ae7 is an integral part of a plan connected with the exchange of the dark square bishops. Some time ago grandmaster I. Bolestavski advised me in answer to this system for Black to play: 6...②g2 0-0 7...②g3 ↑es 8.hd/2.



With this move White prevents the exchange of the bishops and provokes further weakening of Black's position creating the possibility to go into a favourable endgame. 8...g6 Bloom of the provided in the pro

again. 9.4h6 2g7 10.h5! White does not need to enter the complications after 10.thd 2.h4. It seems like White allows the opponent to realize his plans but the following position will be definitely in favour of White.

10... 点g5 11. 点:g5 营:g5 12. 营d2 营:d2+ (otherwise White will have 13. 营h6 with a powerful king side attack) 13.营d2



Black has already done what he wanted to, exchanging his "bad" bishop for the "good" bishop of the opponent. In this position however, the decisive consideration in the evaluation of the position is the space advantage of White, and not some abstract reasoning about "good" or "good" bishops. Well,

objectively speaking - Black's bishop looks much worse then his White's countepart, since it is restricted in its movements by the white pawn chain. On the other hand the bishop that was exchanged, could have played a very important role, defending the gueen side against White's advance there. I think that the position in the last diagram is strategically lost for Black, since he can not offer much resistance against White's offensive on the gueen side. White can calmly play -Ad3, f3, a3, ab1, b4, double the rooks on the "b" file etc.and if necessary to open another front for action on the king side (mind the "h5" pawn). Black has nowhere to show any activity. If Black plays 13...f5 in the diagrammed position after 14.hg hg 15.ef gf White can play the calm 16.f3, resricting Black's pawns, but he can also try the immediate offence on the "h" file with 16.2h6, Ad3, 2ah1, Ab5 etc., which Black is hardly going to survive. You can try to get a better acquaintance with positions of this type in the second volume of my and Mr. Slutsky's book "Endgame Contours". I usually advise my students to master the realization of the strategical plans for both sides in postons of this type in the following endgames, which have been annotated in the "Endgames Contours":

#### Bertok - Geller Kiev 1959

1.d4 句6 2.c4 c5 3.d5 e5 4.包c3 d6 5.e4 **Ae**7 6.包ge2 0-0 7.包g3 包e8 8.h4 g6 9.**A**d3 a6 10.h5 **A**g5 11.**A**d2 **查**f6 12.**查**c1 **A**:d2+ 13.**查**:d2 **查**f4 14.包ge2 **查**:d2 + 15.**查**:d2



15...\( \) \(\) \( \) \( \) \( \) \( \) \( \) \( \) \( \) \( \) \( \) \( \) \(

39.ᡚ:c8+ 발d8 40.월f6 월g3 41.월f8+ 발c7 42.월:h7 + Black resigns.

#### O'Kelly - Ulvestad Malaga 1966

1.44 ይ/6 2.04 c5 3.45 e5 4.0c3 d6 5.e4 g6 6.4.d3 Δq7 7.0ge2 0-0 8.f3 ዲe6 9.4.e3 Δh6 10.25d2 4.e3 11.25e3 25h4+ 12.93 25h3 13.2.d1 25g7 14.02 25h6 15.25d2 25e3+ 16.25e3 ዲq7 17.e3 36 18.b4 258 19.25h1 20.7 20.0c3 56 21 4.e2 25 7.2 25 43 5



23.bc bc 24.ef \( \Delta\)b6 25.\( \Delta\)f2 26.g4 \( \Delta\)f6 27.\( \Delta\)a2 \( \Delta\)d7 28.gf \( \Delta\).\( \Delta\)f3.\( \Delta\)a4 \( \Delta\) 29.\( \Delta\)f4 \( \Delta\)c3.\( \Delta\)a6 \( \Delta\)c4 \( \Delta\)c4 \( \Delta\)c4 \( \Delta\)c4 \( \Delta\)c4 \( \Delta\)c4 \( \Delta\)c5 \( \Delta\)c

## Gligoric – Quinteros Manila 1973





40.93 堂e7 41.h4 fg+ 42.堂:93 gh+ 43.堂:h4 堂f6 44.堂h5 堂f7 45.处:67 墓:d7 46.处:66 墓c7 47.堂:h6 鱼h3 48.堂b5 鱼g7+ 51.堂f6 Black resigned.

Lets pay some attention now to the position of the modern Benoni arising after 1.04 2/68 2.c4 e6 3.2/c3 c5 4.05 ed 5.c4 66 6.4 eg 6.7/h Black can change the order of moves on his second and third move and I would like to keep your attention on that particular moment for a while. The chess players that are ready to play against the Nirnzo-indian defence have hetter options against not only the Oueen's gambit, but against the modern Benoni as well, in comparison with the chess players that play 3.2/t3.Besides the aggressive scheme that we are going to deal with in this chapter, White can also develop the bishop to d3 and the knight on "g1" to "e2", i.e. he has a freedom of choice. 7....4g7 8.4.05+ The idea of this bishop check is to deflect the knight on "f6" from the "e4" nawn.

8... £477. If 8... £47 or 8... £bd7, then 9.£5! Such a line is very instructive: 8... £bd7 9.£5 €h5 10.66 th4+11.33 €.133 12.hg th1 13.£e3 £.c3 + 14.bc the4 15.th3 th.13 £.13 fe 17.de 0-0, which was played in one of the games of O. Romanov. We analyzed the final position and we came to the conclusion that White should continue: 18.ed 4.bc 19.4.bc 7.th 26.de 22.£e6+ th.25 22.£e6+ th.26 22.£e6

improve on this and find some way to refute this variation even more convincingly, but it is more than enough to have one reliable refutation against an incorrect variation, since lines like that are played very rarely in the tournament practice, anyway.

So, 8... ②fd7. White can play here 9.a4, 9. ②f3, 9. △d3 but we are going to deal with a very rare continuation 9. △e2/?.



The idea of the last move of White is not only to prevent the quick advance of the pawn chain of the opponent on the queen side, but help as well the preparation of the attacking formation of the White pieces on the other side of the board. White has some advantages with the bishoo on "e2" in

comparison with bishop "d3". Black doesn't have the tempomove c5-c4, and the eventual pin  $\Delta c8-g4$  is rendered harmless in advance, and if the white knight follows the route c16-d2-c4, the bishop can comfortably take the "13" square. The drawback of the move  $9.\Delta c2$  lies in the relatively diminished defence of the "e4" pawn. Black can play 9...0-0 in answer to  $9.\Delta c2$ , or force 10.g3 with the help of 9...25 hat 10.g3 with the help of 9...25 had 10.g3 been met in practice much more often.

9...0-0 10.º£73 Be8 11.0-0. White is not afraid for the fate of the "e4" pawn, since after 11....\(\Lambda\).c3?! 12.bc \(\Lambda\).e4 Ea4 the minimal material sacrifice. White can increase the pressure patiently with 13.\(\Lambda\).c3, 14.0-4 15.\(\Lambda\).c2, 16.\(\Lambda\).c2 patiently with 13.\(\Lambda\).c3 \(\Lambda\).63 \(\Lambda\).68 14.f5. Anyway, there was not a single player to be tempted by the "e4" pawn on move 11 in

the tournament games of my pupils. Unfortunately, I have never played this line, myself.

11... Da6. The most logical move. This is the beginning of Black's counterplay on the gueen side. White has a clear scheme to improve his position. He has to bring the bishop from "c1" to "g3", the knight from "f3" to "c4", the bishop from "e2" to "f3", the rook from "a1" to "e1" and then to proceed with the central breakthrough e4 - e5.Black should not passively await all this but should strive for counterplay connected with b7 - b5. The attempt to bring back the knight from "d7" to "f6" looks a little bit dangerous. After 11... € f6?! 12.e5! de 13.fe Øg4 White can start something which is very typical for positions like this i.e. 14. 4 a5!? 曾b6 15.e6! fe 16.曾d2 with a very strong initiative. Black can not play for example: 16...c4+ 17.堂h1 分f2+? 18.章:f2 堂:f2 since after 19.4e3 he loses the gueen. In fact, by playing 11... 166, Black is in serious jeopardy to contribute to the list of miniatures

Lets go back to 11... 2a6. Black intends to bring the knight to "c7" and to prepare b7 – b5. 12.2d2/? White is maneuvering the knight to "c4" in order to paralyze the opponent attacking the "d6" pawn.

12... 2f6. This move looks satisfactory. Black increases the pressure on the "e4" pawn, without being afraid from e4 – e5. 13. 4f3.



This is the critical position in which the Black has three different options: 13...&b4 13...hs, 13...&c7. We are going to treat them one after the other

13... **②b4.** Black tries to play tactically and intends to answer 14. **②c4** with the counter-

attacking 14...b5 **14.a3!** White should play precisely. **14...**\Delta **3.** Otherwise 13...\Delta b4 would be senseless.

15.⊕c4 ⊕:c1 16.a:c1. Black managed to exchange the valuable bishop of his opponent, but nevertheless White finished his development and is ready for the central pawn-breakthrough 17.e5.

16...b5 That is the only way to do something against the central pawn advance.

17. £:b5 £:e4 18. £:e4 19. £:c:d6! White has to capture on "d6" with exactly that knight. It is important to keep the control over the "d4" square and to open the "c" file for the rook 19. 8:d4 20. #63



The position is definitely in favour of White who has in answer to 20...a6 – the elegant 21. Efe1!.

13...h5 Black is preparing a king side attack starting with 14...♠y4. 14.f5! Generally sparrendering the control over the vital "e5" square should not

be advantageous for White. But, after Black pushed his "h" pawn, the "g6" square became vulnerable and White's object to seize the initiative on the king side is easily understandable. It is worth mentioning that the move 14.h3 wouldn't prevent 14.60417, at all.

Unfortunately, the position after 14.15 has never occurred in any games of my pupils. Lets discuss a little bit the chances of both sides. It would be hardly good for Black to play the standard : 14... $\triangle$ d7 15. $\triangle$ c4  $\triangle$ e5 16. $\triangle$ ce5  $\triangle$ ce5 because of the knight manoeuver  $\triangle$ c3 – e2 – 14 followed by a piece sacrifice on "h5" or "g6". White has an almost sure

breakthrough on the king side. It looks like Black has to start with 14...\$c7.White can prevent 15...55 with 15.a4 i.e. 15...66 16.Be1 \$\tilde{\text{Ae}}\$ to \$\

Lets have a look at the third opportunity — 13.全元. White can simply play 14.全点, to answer 14...b5?! with 15.全.d6 世d6 16.e5 世b6 17.d6. Now, a tot of black pieces are hanging. Black is inavoidably losing material.

The game Zayac – Ladner, Adelaide 1988 continued: 14...Bb8 15.a4 b6 16.Be1 \( \frac{A}{a}\).60 17.\( \frac{A}{a}\).207 18.\( \frac{A}{a}\).55 \( \frac{A}{c}\).55 20.\( \frac{A}{c}\) 52 1.\( \frac{A}{c}\).75 22 and White had an extra pawn and a winning position. We do not want to advertize this or that opening scheme. I am ready to admit that some of the aggressive variations that I have given are not forced. You can always play some other opening system.

The most important thing is that the reader should have noticed by now the method of chosing your opening repertoire and the rational approach to the opening stage of the game. The young player should have a very clear picture in his head about what his opening repertoire should be, while any undecisiveness is to be avoided at any rate. I have to tell you that Yugoslavian "Encyclopedia of Chess Openings" gives very little, almost nothing about this line.

There is a game, an old one though, Lapienis – Sorokin, 1974 which went on 9. \( \textit{Le} 2 \) 0-0 10. \( \textit{Lf} 3 \) \( \textit{Be} 8 \) 11.0-0 \( \textit{D} \) \( \textit{D} 6 \) 13. \( \textit{Lf} 3 \) \( \textit{D} 6 \) 14. \( \textit{Le} 2 \) \( \textit{B} 8 \) 15. \( \textit{B} 6 \) 17. \( \textit{D} 6 \) 18. \( \textit{Lf} 3 \) \( \textit{D} 6 \) 14. \( \textit{Le} 2 \) \( \textit{B} 8 \) 15. \( \textit{B} 6 \) 17. \( \textit{D} 6 \) 18. \( \textit{Lf} 3 \) \( \textit{D} 6 \) 18. \( \textit{Lf} 3 \) \( \textit{D} 6 \) 18. \( \textit{Lf} 3 \) \( \textit{D} 6 \) 18. \( \textit{Lf} 3 \) \( \textit{D} 6 \) 18. \( \textit{Lf} 3 \) \( \textit{D} 6 \) 18. \( \textit{Lf} 3 \) \( \textit{D} 6 \) 18. \( \textit{Lf} 3 \) \( \textit{D} 6 \) 18. \( \textit{Lf} 3 \) \( \textit{D} 6 \) 18. \( \textit{Lf} 3 \) \( \t

16.允:g4 允:g4 17.世:g4 仑c2 18.世e2 仑:a1 with Black's advantage, but to make conclusions upon such a game looks a little bit ridiculous.

We have to deal now with the queen-check 9... 當h4+.

In 1985 in the tournament "A. Sokolsky – In Memoriam" in Minsk, the following amusing game was played:

\*\*Korzubov – Kapengut:\*\*

9...1144 10,93 1467 11.6/13 6\)b6 12.0-0 6\]gat 13.e5 0-0 14.\[ \text{\$\text{\$\text{\$4\$}}\$ \text{ de 15.d6 1468 16.fe }\] 8.06 12.0-0 6\]gat 3.6/13 6\]gat 5 13.\[ \text{\$\text{\$2\$}}\$ \text{ de 15.d6 1468 16.fe }\] 8.06 12.16 12 6\]gat 22.03 6\]ha and the opponents agreed to a draw, although I think that Black was clearly better. Kapengut's idea to control the "C4" square, threatening to take the "e4" pawn, starting with the move 11...\[ \text{\$2\$}\$ \) 6 proved to be completely justified. The drawback of this idea is the unsatisfactory position of the knight on "b5". White can try to use this with the following variations for example: \( 11...\) 206 \( 12.447 \) 2.624 \( 13.b5 \) \( 15.b5 \) \( 15.65 \) \( 14.572 \) 17. \( 15.65 \) \( 15.65



Lets return our attention to the move 14. £72?. Black can not capture the "d5" pawn with the knight – 14...£d5?, since after 15.£b5+ White will have a crushing attack, 15.£g5 looks also very strong by the way. In case of 14...£v5 15.a5 £vd1 16.£d1 £07 17.£d6 White has an excellent positional compensation for the sacrificed

pawn. This is probably the best for White since both 14...0-0 15.a5 and 14...\$q4 15.h3 look unsatisfactory for Black.

Well, Black can try Kapengut's idea on the next move. The game Alexandrov – Romanov, Minsk 1990 continued: 1.1.00-12.00-0 2b.6 13.8e1 Åg4 14.5g2 Åc3 15.bc 16.44 16.h3 Åd7 17.c4 Åg4 18.6f2 16.22 Åc3 15.bc 16.45 Åg4 16.h3 Åd7 17.c4 Åg4 18.6f2 16.22 Åc3 16.bc 16.42 Åg4 16.45 Åg6 16.6c 16.6c 16.4c 16.4

White's move 13.8e1 doesn't seem to be the best. 13.4 is much more logical i.e. 13...4:c3 14.bc ±re4 15.a5 2/d5 16.2/g5 ±re7 17.12:d5 ±re2 18.4.d2 4d71? 19.8fe1 4.c6 20.12:f7 8ff 21.8te2 8f6 22.8e7 2/d7 23.c4 h6 24.4c3 2/66 25.8e4 hg 26ft 26.7.g4.



This variation is evidently far from being forced but I am giving it as a landmark for further analysis trying once again to attract the attention of the reader to the methods of improvement of your opening repertoire.

Lets try to work over the positions in which Black does not hurry with the move e7 – e6.

1.de 2f6 2.c4 c5 3.d5 g6 4. €c3 Åg7 5.e4 d6 6.fh3. White deprives his opponent from moves like Δc8 – g4 and ②f6 – g4. 6...e6 7.€73 0-0 8.Δd3 ed 9.ed. This line is rather old. Nowadays 9.cd is top-fashion. White won convincingly in the game Alburt – De Firmian, USA 1990. The reader can find this game in the "Chess Informant" 50. I am expecting an information boom in this line, so the Modern Benoni is under the threat of a theoretical extermination. Lets have a look at the old-fashioned 9.ed.



Black has to play actively in positions with such a pawn structure, otherwise he would be positionally squeezed. White has a clear space advantage and can prepare some pressure on the "d6" pawn. White has to complete his development first and then start his actions along the following scheme: 0-0, £44.

≝d2, **3**ae1, exchange a pair of rooks on the "e" file, and then 94, 监g2, Δg3, ≝f4, €03 – g5 – e4 etc. in different move orders. Since it is almost impossible for Black to rely on ᡚ16 – e4, his counterplay is much harder to define. The next move is more than obvious. **9...Be8+ 10...4e3** and now the basic move of Black's counterplay 10...€nb.if 10....4f5 11...4f5 gf 12.0-0 ඬe4 White gets the advantage after 13.€e4, as well as after 13.0e2. Black coud play as well 10....£nb 11.0-0 Δ.e3 12.fe ≝e7 (Capturing the "e3" pawn with 12....£e3? gives White a very strong attack after 13.≝d2 and 14.€g5.13.e4 €bd7 14.≝d2 a6 15.£f2. We are following the game Botvinnik – Kavalek, Beverweik 1969.The game went on 15....€e5? "A very serious mistake. Black didn't have to hurry with his plan and had to defend at first the "f7" pawn with

15... 2f8. Then Black could try to reorganize with ⊕e8 and f7 f6 keeping solid although passive position, " - (M. Botvinnik) White won a pawn after 16.42:e5 哲:e5 17.草af1 42d7 18.草:f7 #d4+ 19.\$h1 €e5 20.\$f4. Now 20...\$f5 was losing after 21.直:b7 公:d3 22.世h6. L. Kavalek played 20... 4:h3 21. 4e2 ∆d7 and now, as Botvinnik pointed out White could win immediately with 22.當f6! 空q7 23.萬:d6 (23.萬d1 萬f8) 23...萬f8 24.萬f6. We have to mention as well that if Black tries to play an endgame with the following order of moves: 9... #e7+

(instead of 9...萬e8+) 10.營e2 營:e2+ 11.營e2 公a6 12.a3 萬e8+ 13.營d1 Δf5 White keeps the initiative with 14.Δ.f5 of 15.Ωh4! ᡚe4 16.ᡚ:e4 B:e4 17 €):f5 B:c4 18.4e3. Lets go back to 10... 15. White plays 11.0-0 and Black

11... ad7. If White plays carelessly, Black intends to seize the initiative with something like, for example: 12.堂d2 a6 13.a4 එe5 14.4:e5 ≌:e5 15.≌ae1 ≝h4 16.4f1 4d7 and Black's position is already preferable. The tournament practice proved that the attempt to play sharp and risky 12.g4? is also untimely. Botyinnik demonstrated an example of strategy in game against Matulovic in Palma de Majorka. 1967.12. Aa5! f6 13. Ad2 The retreat with the bishop to "h4" also deserves attention. The game Alexandrov - Savchenko

continued: 13.♠h4 ᡚe5 14.ᡚ:e5 de15.♠e4 ᡚf4 16.d6!? White wouldn't have anything after 16. Ag3 because of 16...f5 17. Δ:f4 ef 18. Δf3 Δ:c3! 19.bc #d6. 16... #e6 17.d7 The game would be very complicated after 17.4d5 公:d5 18.查:d5 堂:d6 19.f4 or 19.算ad1 (instead of 19.f4) 19...堂:d5 20.4):d5 \$b8 21.ᡚc7 \$e7 22.\$d8+ \$f7 23.ᡚb5 \$d7 24.ᡚd6+ \$e6 25.2:c8 2:c8 26.4:c8 b6 and Black regains his piece. Alexandrov failed to obtain any advantage. After 17...世:d7 18.堂:d7 点:d7 19.点:b7 自b8 20.点d5 包:d5 21.cd a very complicated endgame arose, in which White finally won in the end. It is worth mentioning that if Black plays 12... 46?!, instead of 12...f6 White easily obtained an advantage in the

game Alexandrov – Dotchev which continued: 13.允:f6 心d:f6 14.皆d2 心g7 15.崑ae1 允f5 16.允:f5 心:f5 17.g4 心g7 18.皆h6 皆b6 15.心d5 White had a clear advantage.

13..15 (14.94 was the threat) 14..194 July 15..1.15 (14.94 was the threat) riche exchange of all the rooks would help White to neutralize Black's activity and in this way would enable him to penetrate the position of the enemy king'. 16..16.41 17.15.41 July 18.10



The position is not so simple as it seems to be at first sight. White exchanged the dark square bishops with the idea to use the long back diagonal with his queen. Black must pay attention to the open "b" and "e" files, because the white queen might penetrate Black's position. It looks like Black has

an active position on the king side but this is illusory. The black knights are placed poorly and White has excellent opportunities to organize a pawn advance on the king side. In conclusion, White has a small but lasting positional advantage.

24.g3 h6?! 24... De4 was worth considering with the idea to exchange a couple of pieces after 25. ±0.2 Dc.3 26. ±c.3 C6. Generally, I don't aim at analyzing each position to complete exhaustion with the idea to find some absolute truth. I would like to help the young player to understand the basic strategical picture. I am not going to try to determine the exact moment in which the small advantage turned into a decisive one. 25. ±c.2 ±c.6 2. ±c.2 ±c.7 27. ±d.2 ±g.7 28. €g.f.1 The beginning of the active play. At first the "12" pawn will go to "4" to restrict further the mobility of the enemy pieces. The

march of the "g" pawn will follow. 28... #e8 29.f4 #f8 30. #g2 @g8 31.@f3 #b8 32.@h4 @e7 33.#c2 @f7 White has accomplished a lot. The space advantage has been increased and the king side of the Yugoslavian grandmaster became even more vulnerable, 34. 2e2 #d8 35. 2f3 \$16 36. #b2 " You don't have to look for any deep sense in the last three moves of White, or in what follows. This is the necessary tactics of waiting, when you don't have enough time at the end of the 5th hour of playing, when it becomes much more probable for the chess players who belong to older generations, to make fatal mistakes." - (Botvinnik). 36... #a5 37. 2c3 2c8 38. 2h4 2e7 39. 2f2 2c8 40.g4! "Black weakened his "q6" pawn carelessly, and suddenly White started an offensive with his last move. By the way White had an advantage anyway and he would have managed to push the "g" pawn, having secured his king at the "a2" square first. " - (Botvinnik), 40... De7 41.a5/ Dfa8 42. De2 h5 43. Df1 . Dc8 44. 2a3. The White pieces are concentrated for the beginning of the decisive onslaught. The end is near, 44... Ad7 45 Ae2 ₩a4 46 ₾f2 0 a8



47. №g6/I The logical conclusion of the fight. If 47....256 then 48.25. There followed: 47....255 - 48.25. There followed: 47....2545 - 48.255. There work is unavoidable.

We have to pay some attention to the Volga gambit. I used to play this opening with Black myself, sometime before. Little by little, however I gave it up. First of all. White can easily

avoid it playing 1.c4 or 1.04  $\otimes$ 16  $2 \otimes$ 13. Secondly, I came to the conclusion that this opening serves the purpose to play only for a draw, which is easy to make with Black in a lot of variations. When you meet players that are inferior to you in strength, you are naturally trying to beat them, while they usually don't mind a draw, but unfortunately in the Volga gambit you can not rely to achieve more than a draw. Black gets chances to win only when White plays for a win. Finally, the strategical aspects of the position are not so complicated, and by the way you begin to prefer to play with an extra pawn, than with the pawn down, when you enter adult age.

It is not easy at all to play against the Volga gambit with White. You need a lot of experience, deep understanding of the scheme you have chosen and...patience. You have first of all to neutralize Black's initiative and start to think about your extra pawn later. Lets have a look at some games.

### Shereshevsky – Lputian Minsk 1984

1.d4 №6 2.c4 c5 3.d5 b5 4.cb a6 5.ba. You can of course play simply 5.bb, but to accept the gambit is much more principal. 5..g6. There are some fine points already. With this move Black deprives White of the possibility b2 – b3, for example in case of 5...£xa6 6.g3 g6 7.£ag2 d6 (7...£q7!? 8.b3, altmoyah it is difficult to tell if White's position impross so much with the fianchettoing of the dark square bishop. Besides that, Black forces the White knight to occupy the "c3" square.

9... ②bd7 10.0-0 0-0 11. 当c2 当a5! An excellent move. If White tryes to develop his forces along the scheme: 요d2.



o4? 18.b4) 17. \$\textit{\texti

17... £a6 18.8fd1 ±d8. Black couldn't achieve anything with a pawn-push on the other side − 18...g5. White would continue calmly 19.£b5 ±d8 20.£e2 and if 20...g4 21.£e3. 19.£e1 52 £0.£fe2 94 21.£h1 h5. This king side advance was not launched voluntarily by Black. The main part of his forces are on the other side of the board but unfortunately Black has no prospects there. 22.£ff £h6 23.£c2 ±ff8

24. £c3 월g7 25. £.e5. This was playable, but the exchange of the dark square bishop was far from forced. 25.h4 deserved attention. 25...de 26.2d3 2d7 27.2D27 This is simply a blunder. It would have been much better to improve the position patiently. 27.h4 looked very promising putting an end to Black's counterplay on the king side. White's next few moves could look like that i.e. 28.⊈g1, 29.€c3 and then 30.€b2.

27...#6 28.@gf \(\alpha\)-e2f 29.\(\frac{\pi}{2}\)e2 \(\beta\). Black regained his sacrificed pawn and solved this problems \(\Delta\)\(\text{0.0}\) \(\Delta\) 23.3 \(\beta\) 263 \(\Delta\) 33.3 \(\Delta\)\(\Delta\) 243 \(\Delta\) 35.\(\Delta\)\(\Delta\) 244 36.\(\Delta\) 265 \(\Delta\). The opponents agreed to a draw here in connection with the repetition of moves: \(\Text{3.7}\) 32.\(\Delta\) 246

#### Shereshevsky - Subura Bidgoshc 1990

The first 12 moves were the same as in the previous game and after 13.8ab1 Black played 13... ⊕e8 (instead of 13... ⊕e5).



Black intends to manoeuvre with the knight − De8 − c7 − b5, and to 14.03 (with the idea 14...Dc7 15.a4) to play 14...Ba3!. Frankly speaking, 1 made a bluff here with 14..Df4? and my opponent answered 14...Dc7?, without too much thought. After 15.a4! White's

strategy triumphed since 15...04 is not good because of 16.0b5 \( \frac{1}{2}\) b6 17.0:\( \frac{1}{2}\) \times 7 18.04. Instead of 14...\( \frac{1}{2}\) o7 18.04. Instead of 14...\( \frac{1}{2}\) o7 18.04. Instead of 14...\( \frac{1}{2}\) o7 18.05 \( \frac{1}{2}\) o7 18.05 \(

Strategically, the fight is almost over. Black has no play on the queen side, therefore White has only to simplify the position and the realization of the advantage will be easy enough. 16...@e5 17.Efe1 \( \text{\( \alpha\)} \) 63 18.\( \text{\( \alpha\)} \) 3 \( \text{\( \alpha\)} \) 20.\( \text{\( \alpha\)} \) 5 \( \text{\( \alpha\)} \) 64 19.\( \text{\( \alpha\)} \) 27 \( \text{\( \alpha\)} \) 65.



White intends to bring the white square bishop to the diagonal "If — a6", then exchange the dark square bishops and then turn his attention to the king side. 21.&e47! The idea is right but the realization is wrong, 21.e3 was much more precise. 21.©c71? Now I thought for

about half an hour and understood that I shouldn't have deprived the "e" pawn from the "e4" square. I had to "take my move back". 22.4a2! Well, it is usually disappointing to admit your mistakes but to be stubborn is always worse. 22... 246 23.e3! The tactical threat of the opponent 23... 40b5 will be parried with 24.4f1, 23... \$a7 24.4c3 4:c3 25.4:c3 \$b7 26.e4 ②a6 27. £f1 ②b4 28. #d2 White has fulfilled his plan. Black did what he could possibly do and now it was White's turn. 28...f6 29.4c4 207 30.f4 2f8 31.2e3 Eaa8 32.2be1 2f7 33.e5/? Well, White could have tried to disorganize the opponents defence on the king side beforehand, but I didn't see any use to fool around. 33...fe 34.fe £f5 35.ed ed 40.曾e4 曾d8 41.是e7. The Black knight is isolated now. I decided that the most reliable way to win the game is to force an endgame. 41... 當b6 42.自f1 當d8 43.自f:f7+ 息:f7 44.息:f7+ #:f7 45.h4 #g7 46. #g2. Finally, Black got fed up and accordingly resigned. In case of 46...當f6 47.a5 當b2+ 48.當e2! wins easily.



White has the advantage.

The Gruenfeld Defence

I tried already to characterize this opening at the begining of the book. Black is trying to grab the initiative early in the game but gives White a tremendous freedom of choice. The chess players that are playing this defence since their young years, who know it almost 'by heart', usually look for another opening, as a reserve. It is very difficult almost imposible, to be in the centre of the information boom and to constantly follow the new developments in the variety of sharpest variations. The world champion Kasparov, himself failed to withstand the pressure of Karpov in his matches for the world title, so the prestige of this opening was undermined. The

score of Black (+1 -6 = 16) can hardly be labelled satisfactory. Indeed, Kasparov's only win came as a result of Karpov's blunder in a good position.

To prepare with White against the Gruenfeld defence is not an easy task but is much simpler then Black's task to play it from the other side. Nevertheless, to study one system is much easier than to study ten. White's real problem is that if he wants to make Black's life hard, he has to enter a principal analytical discussion, having up his sleeve some novetties. I will give you an example of such an analysis.

1.d4 Øf6 2.c4 q6 3.Øc3 d5. Now my pupils usually prefer different systems. A. Alexandrov likes to play the supermodern variations with 4.⊕f3 ♣q7 5.cd ⊕:d5 6.e4 ⊕:c3 7.bc. 5.∆a5, but all started with the analysis of the variation 4.∆f4 2α7 5.e3. Black can castle here, or play 5...c5, since 5...c6 leads to a variation of the Schlehter's system of the Slav defence. 5...c5 is played more often to avoid the pawn sacrifice 5 0-0 6 cd Ørd5 7 Ørd5 ₩rd5 8 Ørc7 in which Black usually recaptures the nawn, but White usually ends up with a better endgame. The game Shereshevsky - Akopian. Melburn 1988 continued 8... 和a6 9.4:a6 世:q2 10.世f3 世:f3 11.4):f3 ba 12.8q1. The idea of this move is to avoid the pins of the knight after 12.2e2 4q4! 13.h3 4h5, or 12.2d2 4b7. V. Akopian played very well: 12... 4e6! 13. 2d2 4d5 Black attacked the "a2" pawn and didn't allow White to regroup his forces, like: 14.8ac1. Øf3 – e1– d3 and then double the rooks. on the "c" file. 14. 2e5. If 14. 2e1 then 14... \$168. taking away the rook from the influence of the bishop on "c7". 14...4:e5 15.de.



White's position looks better. Black has to fight a little bit to reach the draw. This book is not however, an opening monography, so the reader can learn everything he would like to know about the variation with the pawn sacrifice on "c7" in some other books. I am going to show you some analysis about

the line 5...c5 6.dc <u>#a5</u> 7.<u>#b3</u> that you will be unable to find in the theoretical books. The <u>"Encyclopedia of Chess Openings" devotes to 7.<u>#b3</u> very little space.</u>

The main line looks like this: 7....2c6 8.≌b5 Ae6 9.£l3 dc 10.2g5 2d5 11. 2a.3c 2a.5 12.2a.66 fe 13.2a.d5 ed 14.0-0-0 et 15.2a.d5 b5 with an unclear position according to an analysis by A. Mihattchishin. But wasn' it better for White to play simply 9. 2a.5 2a.5 10.cd 2a.65 11.2b.54. instead of 9.2l37 Now, in case of 11....2c6 12.2b.2 Black does not have sufficient compensation for the pawn. Therefore it would be better for Black to keep the "C" line free for the rook and retreat 11....2m3. White develops the knight 12.2ge2.



Black has a lot of continuations but we failed to find a clear road to equality. Here are some of the lines of our analysis 12...2c3 (12...2c4 13.e) 13.2c3 ±c3+14.bc £c8 15.4c5+16.6d4 4.c4 17.4c4 £c4 18.8b1 and White is not affaid to "lose" a olices after 18...e52(19.8b7)

cd 20.cd. Maybe, Black can find some way to equalize but I want to show the reader the method for preparation of your opening repertoire, and not to try to prove analytically any absolute advantage for White.

Besides that theory recommends as reliable for Black: 7..dc 8..Δc4 0-0 9..Δl3 Δe4 10.0-0 (10..Ωe5 Δ.:e5 11..Δ.:e5 .Ωc6 12..Δμg3 Δ:.c5 13..Δe5 .Δe5 .With an equality in the game Bohm – Henley, Arnhem – Amsterdam 1983.) 10....Ω:c5 11..Δec .Δec; and also another line 7....Ωe4 8..Δeb5 .Δeb6 10.cd Δ::b2 11..Δeb .Δep 712..Δe4 .De:c5.

Lets try to analyze these two lines, one by one:

7...dc 8.4:c4 0-0 9.4f3 4e4 10.4e5 4:e5 11.4:e5 4c6.



The position is really equal after 12.4g3 2\times 25.513.1875 4\times 45.6 White has however a very interesting continuation 12.8\times 2\times 25.25 \times 5.25 ft 12...\times 25.25 \times 25.25 white has an elegant tactical stroke 14.2\times 25.25 \times 25.25 \t

13.4:b5 ∅:c5 The beautiful

move 13...2.f2 leads to an interesting position after 14.2.f2 (14.2.f2 2d3+) 14...2.f5 15.2d5 2e6f (15...e6 16.2c7] 2f8 17.2.2d1 a6 18.2.2d2 (16.2.f2) 2f9 17.e4 f5) which requires further analysis.

14...2d4!, and now both 14....2e6 15...2c6 bc 16...2a4, as well as 14....2id4 15.ed 2e6 16.0-0-0 lead to endgames in which White doesn't risk anything, playing for a win, perfecting his endgame-skill in the process.

Before we start to deal with the main line after **7. \$\textit{2} 5 @4**, I have to pay some attention to the other moves: **7...46**, **7...\$\textit{407.7...0-0}** and **7...\$\textit{206.}** 

The first one 7...a6? is ready for the wastepaper basket after 8 #a4+

The move *T...-0-07*! was played in the game Shereshevsky - Lalev, Primorsko 1990. The game continued 8.#b5! #:b5 9.cb Δbd7 10.c6 bc 11.bc Δb6 White won a pawn but fell back in development. Black can rely to get some counterplay after Δffis—a.



Therefore White should not try to compensate for his lack in development, but should try to prevent opponent's counterplay with his already developed pieces, following E. Znosko – Borovsky's advices.

12. 2e5!. Black doesn't have now 456 – e4 and White is free to continue his development.

 keeping the material advantage. 19. ②•6+ fe 20. ②•c3 £:c6 21.8d1 a5 22.8d4. It is a real pleasure to play this endgame with White. Black has week pawns on a5, c4, e6 and e7 and White can attack and win them at leisure. Suddenly the Bulgarian player deprived his opponent from his pleasures resigning the game. After 22...£b8 White still had to show some endgame technique before winning.



Once again, just like in the previous game. White has the material advantage and must neutralize the not so dangerous initiative of the opponent. More or less, this is the typical script of this line, the difference usually consists of the quantity of White's material advantage and the strength of Black's

initiative. 12.£/3/? I didn't like to fall back further in development keeping the bishop at any rate. If 12.£d1 2/64 13.9ge2 £h6 Black had some chances to equalize. 12..£d3 + 13.£g2 £/44 + 14.6f £h68 15.£ad1. The knight-check seemed to me a loss of time, because Black should go with the king to 'e6' anyway. 15..£g6 16.£d3. White defends additionally the 'c3' square with the idea to double the rooks on the 'e' like eventually.

**16... 2d7 17.8e1 8c4 18.2f1** It is possible that 16.8e3!? is preferable with the idea to have the option to go to "d3" with the king **18...**8:**f42** This move loses. Black had to exchange

the bishop 18...Δ:c3, and after 19.bc ∆b6 Black had some chances for a successful defence.

19.d6l A:c3. The only way to offer some resistance was by playing 19...66 20.0d5 Ec4 21.0c7+ B:c7 22.dc Bc8, although after 23.Ec1 White shouldn't have too many problems. 20.Ec7+ 0:d6 21.E:c3.Bf6 22.E3a3 Black resigns.

It is high time we started dealing with the move 7... 企4. The "Encyclopedia" gives some short lines: "7... ②e4! \$2.55 \$4.50 \$0.56 \$0.56 \$10.50 \$(Ruban – Semenjuk, USSR 1986 – the "Chess Informant" 41/526, 10... 4.52 \$1.1.\$11 \$4.70 \$1.50 \$1



Now if White exchanges 13.de ∆:e6, you can see Black's positional compensation even without a telescope, and lines like: 13.∆g5 f6 14.∆h ∆h6 15.∆t2 ⟨≥h4 16.⟨≥h23 ∆h5 threatening 17...⟨≥h34, or 17...⟨≥h32+ were not very linspiring for White. Evidently,

castling queen side must be discarded. Strategically White's plan in positions like this is to try to transform the material advantage into a positional advantage. White would not object to return the pawns c5 and b2 in the process of completing development, under the condition that the knight from "e4" captures the "c5" pawn. Black can hardly reach equality as the "Encyclopedia" certifies with 10... 4:b2 11.8b1 4g7 12. Δc4 ᡚe:c5. White is better after 13. ᡚf3 Δf5 14. 且d1 ᡚa4 15.ණbd4! Ad7 16.0-0 හිb2 17.4:a6 ba 18.ജb1 හිd3 19.4g3. The game A. Mihalevsky - Ohotnik, Voronezh 1983 was very instructive. Black played 10...q5, instead of 10...0-0 or 10... ♠:b2. Here is the whole game: 11. ♠g3 ♠:b2 12. ₱b1 \$a7 13.f3 De:c5 14.\$c4 \$f5 15.\$d1 (15.e4? D:e4!) 15...0-0 16 වල2 වa4 17 වbd4 ልd7 18 ል:a6 ba 19.0-0 ልb5 20 #fe1. Ac4 21.e4 e5 22.ac1 ed 23.ac4 ab2 24.ac4 Ac4 25.ac4 එd3 26.2b1 2f4 27.4:f4 gf 28.2c6 f6 29.g3 fg 30.hg 2f7 31.ºf2 @d7 32.ºe3 @c8 33.ºf4 @f7 34.@b3 @dc7 35.ºf5 a5 36 f4 a4 37 fb4 a6 38 fb6 fd7 39 fba6 fb7 40 fba4 b5 and Black resigned. In the previous line after 10... . b2 11. b1 Δq7 White can play in the same way, like in the game we have just seen. 12.f3 ②e:c5 13. 4 c4 0-0 14. ②e2, although I think that this is less convincing than 12. Ac4 and 13.43f3.Concerning 10...0-0:



We established that it is unfavourable for White to play 11.13 2::c5 12.0-0-0. After that we were tempted to play 11.14.4c4, analogous to the game Mihalevsky — Ohorhik. The move 11...g5! is much more esensible in this case. Black managed to exchange the dark sourse bishoo on "o3" with one

of the knights, and the other knight on "a6" is going to capture the "c5" pawn. We spent a lot of efforts, analyzing this position but we couldn't prove any advantage for White. We had to remember once again Znosko - Borovsky and looked for good moves with the already developed forces. This is how we came to the move 11.d6/?, leading to a very sharp and complicated position. What should Black do now? Black should strive for the initiative or for regaining the material. The white pawn on "c5" with the help of its neighbour is trying to escape from the enemy knights and later in the game White's space advantage will be a reliable prerequisite for a successful completion of development with minimal material losses. Therefore Black's best policy is to capture the "b2" pawn. 11...4:b2. In case of 11...ed 12.cd 4:b2 13.2b1 White has excellent chances to complete his development keeping the advantage, 11... 2b4 12. ac1 2:a2 13. ac4 is not very promising for Black either. 11...e5 closes the long diagonal and after 12.4q3 ∆a:c5 13.2f3 2:q3 14.hq e4 15.8c1! White seizes the initiative 12.del This is the fine point of White's strategy. Now. Black can restore the material equality by means of 12... 4:a1 13.ef ±+ ±:f8 14. 4c4 €e:c5 (14... €a:c5? 15.f3 and 16. Ad6+) But after 15. Df3 Black is going to have a hard time in the endgame.



If Black is not happy with what is going on, he must play 12...Be8 13.Bb1 Δf6. White doesn't have much of a choice either if he wants to rely on some advantage, otherwise all would be "Much Ado For Nothing". 14.€df1 Δc3+. Black's answer is forced since 14...£er?! leads after 15.€ve4

a:e4 16.4∴a6 ba 17.5∆f3 to an endgame in which Black has some chances for a draw but this is a very small consolation for the fans of this sharp opening.



What is White thinking about? 15.9d1 looks bad after 15...012+, so 15.9d2 £s? 16.0d4 £d4 17.9d3, but here Black can play suddenly 17...£141 18.ef Alf6 and now White is on the verge of resignation. All is not so simple in the diagrammed position. Instead of the natural 15.9de?

White should play the original and unexpected move 15.£drll/Now 15. £e7 leads to an endgame similar to that one after 16.£ve4 Eve4 17. £e8 be 18.€ve2. From the annotations to the previous move. If Black is not happy with this, he must try the altogether risky: 15...€r2+ 16.⊈ve2 £ve7 17. £e8 be 18.€vc3 €vn1 19.8ft!



White has the advantage.

Finally I would like to mention that mistakes are possible, even unavoidable in sharp variations like these. Our aim is to show the reader that Black should be constantly on the alert

in the Gruenfeld defence. White has the opportunity to prepare difficult strategical, tactical and theoretical problems at home, at leisure, while the Black player should be ready to solve all those problems on the board.

## The Opening Repertoire for Black

The chess players are guided by different principles when they chose the opening repertoire for Black, in comparison with the principles we have been dealing with up to now. Some players are oriented towards some very aggressive tactics with the idea to seize the initiative after the first few moves, disregarding White's right to start the game. Some others keep to more moderate lines with the idea to obtain a lively and interesting position. The third group is trying in fact only to equalize at first, accepting sometimes to play inferior positions without any chances to win, positions that they can try to hold when the advantage of the opponent is minimal. You have to chose your openings considering what you are striving for. Naturally, the degree of risk is much greater for the players of the first group in comparison with those of the third group, accordingly their chance for success or a failure increases. Very good results in the opening preparation are obtained by players that take into account the class of the opponent, his situation in the tournament and even his state of health.

Players that play both 1.e4 and 1.04 create much greater problems for the players that are preparing to play with Black, but usually players like that are rare, and they are not so well experienced in all the openings, and if they really are, they surely belong to the chess elite. It is not possible to know everything after all.

I belong to the second group in this conventional classification, and more or less I teach my pupils accordingly. In answer to 1.e4 I am trying to include in the opening repertoire of my students the Ruy Lopez, particularly the Chigorin system, as well as all the other openings you have to know, after1.e4 e5, and also the French Defence. In answer to 1.d4 we work predominantly on the Nimzo-indian defence, the Queen's Indian defence, the Bogoliubov system and the Ragozin defence. When I am choosing the opening repertoire of my students I intend first of all to enable them to obtain after the opening a decent position with complex strategical contents and if possible to avoid getting drowned in the enormous flow of opening information. In this way my students will save enough time to improve in the other stages of the chess game. Generally, my approach to the opening preparation for Black is not much different than that with White, the emphasis lies heavily upon the basics, I would like to clarify this.

If we want to play with White some line in the King's Indian defence we can as a rule obtain several types of position: an aggressive one, a little bit risky though, or a calmer one with less chances to get an advantage. The chess player can opt for the more aggressive one, but he must have one as a reserve.

If the chess player plays in a tournament, and suddenly his main weapon gets refuted he can easily find something different without changing his general opening approach. Usually, it is not easy to radically change with Black the evaluation of some very popular line, but if you really manage to do that, the system that you have chosen is indeed a dangerous one. If you have analyzed it well, and if you have tested it in training games, that system can be played with a good chance of success and it is going to exploit the effect of surprise. Well, in this case it will be more difficult to use the

"reserve" line. Still you have to be prepared for the extreme case of complete failure if your main line needs a sudden repairs. Let's try to express all this with some chess language.

In the Chigorin system of the Ruy Lopez, there is a variation which was named: Keres counterattack. After 1.44 e5 2.273 \( \)

15...d5.



The next few moves are

16.e5. In the game Petrushin – Shereshevsky, Kaliningrad 1973, White played 16.ed?!, but after 16...\$.d5 the pin on the "a" file was rather unpleasant for White, who lost subsequently.

16... De4 17.f3 the most principled answer. I was playing in a

 Đe6 20.Đ: e6 Δ:e6 21.f4 Bac8 22.Δd3 d4 23.f5 and considers the position unclear. The game was annotated in the "Chess Informant" 29. I don't know if White played well or not, but I don't like Black's position after 17...⊅g5, so I have no desire to analyze it since I don't believe in it. I am interested in another continuation − 17....Δc5 (Now 17....Bc5 18.6 Δc5 19.Δe3 de doesn't work because of 20.⊅i3.)



What should White do now?

18.fe looks forced. In the game
M. Zeitlin – Shereshevsky, Riga
19.£e3 2c4 20.£:e4 2:e3

21.20:e3 8::d4 22:#3 8b8

23.½h1 &e6 24.£/5 4.f5

25.£:f5 g6 26.£c2 8d2

27.£ac1 8f2 28.‱e4 25.7

ng 32.Δ:b7 g3 33.Δ:a6 Δe3 34.Ēce1 Ēd5 35.Ē:f2 gf 36.Ēf1 Ēe5 37.94 Δd4 38.Ēg2 Ēg7 39.Ēg3 ੴt6 40.Ēg3 ⑤t5 41.Δb7 Ēe3-42.⑤g2 ⑤th 43.Δh Ē Ēe3 44.5 £ 63.4 £ 53.Ēt5 45.3 Ēb3 46.a4 ba 47.Ēa1 f1 董+ 48.Ē:f1 Ē:b2+ 49.Ēh1 Ēg3 White resigned. Well, White's play was far from perfect, but you must have in mind the effect of surprise and the time-trouble that White was in, during the second part of this game. After almost 20 years I saw the same position in the game Hellers −Zs. Polgar, World Junior Championship Adelaide 1988. The Swedish player was luckier and after 18.fe de 19.Δe3 ᡚc4 20.Δ:e4 ᡚe3 21.ᡚe3 Ēcd 42.Ēt3 Ēb8 23.Ēth Δb7 24.ᡚ6 Δcd5 25.Ācf5 Ēd8 26.Āb3 Ēd3 27.Ēt5 ģ6 28.Ēb4 Ē3 42.Ēt3 Ēd8 20.Āb3 Ēd3 27.Ēt5 ģ6 28.Ēb4 Ē3 42.Ēt3 Ēdme and pointed out that Ēlack could have played □...Δb7I, instead of 19...Qc4, threatening 20...£c6.

20...≝b6, 20...©c4 and White would have grave problems to solve

Instead of 18.fe?!, White has a very interesting move in the diagrammed position - 18.b4! It is bad for Black now to play 18... 4:d4+? 19.世:d4 世:c2 20.ba, and because of that Black has to take the pawn. So, 18 ... 4:b4 19.fe. The arising position is extremely complicated. I am going to show you some analyses that are indeed rather old, but the position after White's 19th move hasn't been played in the games of my pupils and the author. It is highly probable that these analyses might be mistaken somewhere, since the tournament practice has not put them to the test. Black has to choose between 19...de and 19... #:e5. For a long time we considered that the move 19...de was losing, because of: 20.8:e4 4f5 21.40:f5 8:d1 22.4:d1 #c3 23.8b1 4c5+ 24.4e3 皆d3 25.2h6+ ah 26.8a4+ 自h8 27.4:c5 皆:b1 28.4e7 #g6 29. #g6 or 29.4f6+ and White has a decisive advantage in the endgame. Yet, someone asked me once whether Black could play 25...⊈h8, in answer to 25. 2h6+?



The situation has suddenly changed. Black has given up the "f7" pawn with check, assuring a square for the king to retreat. After 26.2√17+ "±0β 27.2√16+ the knight can be captured already. We couldn't find a direct refutation of the move 25... "±18, but it was not easy to guarantee anything in a position that most of the pieces of

# both sides were hanging.

We didn't analyze this position too thoroughly, because we studied this variation from the point of view of Black, and sometimes you tend to accept what you desire to be a part of

reality. The reader has of course his rights to make a thorough and objective analysis.

Let's have a look now at the other move 19... 些.e5. White has two obvious answers — 20.后e2 and 20... 40.2. In the first case Black has the advantage: 20.后e2 4c5 21.4e3 de 22.后e2 4c4 23.5c6 后:d2! 24.5c6 5):e3!.



The right move for White is  $20.\Delta b2!$  The play can continue:  $20...\Delta b7$  21.ed 21.e. 21.e.  $1.\Delta c.$   $1.\Delta$ 



Now, the situation is much more real, since White finally has some advantage. To keep this advantage however, White should make a lot of moves that are not easy to find, in a situation when the time for thinking is limited, and only grandmasters of extra-class are capable to do that. We can stop here. After all, this variation is

very rare and the move 13 £0f1 will hardly be ventured by many players, so we are still not going to play with superplayers and we can be sure that the basis is set. Well, if the next tournament game refutes our line we shall have to give it up. The practice however, tends to prove just the opposite. Generally the players with White are trying to avoid entering the principled positions and in this way the student is freely

Generally the players with White are trying to avoid entering the principled positions and in this way the student is freely educated in the fine points of the Ruy Lopez, and the strategical plans. Even if we suppose that our basis is wrong, it can serve us for a long time before we have to change for something different on the side, acceptable even without any particular novelty.

After we have found something interesting in the most principled line of the variation we can start movino back from

the top downwards, analysing at first the ways for White to

avoid our position immediately before entering it and then work on the other ways for White to run away from it. The possibility for Black to meet with difficulties after 13.d5 is much higher, than for example in the exchange variation, or in the line with 5.d4 in the Ruy Lopez.

This approach to the study of the openings concerns first of all the choice of the opening variation and the method of explanation follows the opposite logics. First of all, you study the "second rate" openings like: the Ponziani, the King's gambit, the Evans gambit and the similar ones and then you

explanation follows the opposite logics. First of all, you study the "second rate" openings like: the Ponziani, the King's gambit, the Evans gambit and the similar ones and then you study conscientiously the Ruy Lopez.

This book is not an opening monograph, so we are going to study the Ruy Lopez, some of the second rate openings, as well as the Tarrash variation in the French defence. I am going to deal with as much material, as I treat in my teamwork lessons with my pupils.

# The Ruy Lopez

1.e4 e5 2. ②f3 ②c6 3...b5 a6 4...â:c6 dc 5. ○0. We are going to deal with this move mainly, since it is the most principled in a theoretical aspect, while the methods of playing, and the basic plans if White plays something different on move 5 comprise a part of our, with Mr. L. Slutskij, work-"Endgame Contours".

In case of 5.2c3 the character of the endgame struggle is very similar to the positions arising after 5. 0-0 f6. With 5.0-0 White creates immediate opening problems. I will show you one of the games of E. Raisky, a student of mine, who managed to outplay completely his opponent in the following game:

## B. Georgiev – Raisky Veliko Tarnovo 1991

5.0c3 f6 6.d4 ed 7.0cd4 c5 8.0cd2 %rd1+ 9.0cd1 Δe6 f0.d4 0-0-0 11.0cd c4 12.8dd 14.0c5 13.8dd8 14.0dl 4.0c.0 10.0cd 15.8dd1+ 0cd 16.0cd Δd7 17.0dd5 0cf5 18.0c15 8e8 19.8e1 g6 20.0cg 5 21.4e3 Δd6 22.d3 b4 23.c3 a5 24.0cf 36.5 2.dd2 8d8 26.0c2 8d3 27.8c1 a4 28.a3 ba 29.ba Δd6 30.8a1 Δe6 31.8a2 h5 32.0cf 15 33.ed Δcf5 34.h3 8d5 35.0cd 3dd3 36.0cd 18b5 37.Δc1 8b1 38.0cd 244 39.8b2 Δc3 40.3cd 36.0cd 18b5 37.Δc1 8b1 38.0cd 244 39.8b2 Δc3 44 39.8b2 Δc3 44 38.8cd 36.0cd 8c3 40.0cd 8c3 40

5...f6 6.d4 ed 7.2.04 c5 8.2b3 ±:d1 9.£:d1 Åg4. It is useful for Black to force the white pawn to "3" before going to "e6" with the bishop. Until 1966 this order of moves was considered non-obligatory for Black who used to play 9...Δd6, but in the game Fischer − Portisch, Havana 1966, the American grandmaster played 10.2a5! and it became evident that Black was in a serious trouble. This game was thoroughly dealt with in the book "Endgame Contours". 10...13 .4e6 11.2c3 .4d6 12.24a.3. White tried 12.a4 immediately in

the game Maljutin — Alexandrov, Sofia 1989 without any success. The game continued: 12...6e7 13.&e3 &:b3 14.cb 0-66 15.0d5 0-0-0 16.8dc1 0-04 17...6c4 od 18.0d2 66 19.0b6+ 0c7 20.a5 Bines 21.0c4 &c5 22.8dd 103+ 23.3e115 24.e5 14 25.0d2 8e6 26.94 8in6 27.8in1 &t4+ 28.0d1 8in3 29.8a4 c5 30.0d2 8e8 31.8in4 cb 32.0c4 8in3 33.0d2 8d8 and after several more moves White resigned.

12...b6 13.a4.



13...a5/ Black has no need to enter the complications arising efter 13...0-0-0 14.a5 ≜b7 15.e5, and he should not fear the exchange of the bishop. The line 14.€b5 0-0-0 15.€xd6+ od and then 16..€b7 and 17...d5 leads to a good endgame for Black. The game Sedina — Zavac, Piatigorsk 1987 had a

14.8d2 0-0-0 15.8ad1 △h6! White created the threat 16.2b5 Åe7 17.2a7+ but Black neutralized it cold-bloodedly. The exchange 16.Δ.h6 ph enables White to make good use of the advantage of the two bishops, while the weaknesses of the pawn structure on the king side are immaterial.

The game Bus — Shereshevsky, Bydgoszz 1990 continued 16.0b5 0/7 17.0c1 Åe7 18.8:08+ 8:d8 19.8:d8+ 9:d8 20.0e2 8 21.444 06 22.0bc3 Ål6 23.002 8 20.4c5 Åb2 30.004 16 23.002 8 24.6c 5 Åb2 30.044 Af7 31.0b3 Ål6 32.0e3 0.0c 30.6c3 Åb3 Åb3 30.6c5 0.0c5 0.0c5 0.0c5 30.6c5 4b3 34.4c4 Ål8 39.0c4 35.0b3 Åe5 36.0c5 0.0c5 0.0c5 0.0c5 42.0c5 8b5 43.0c4 4.6c3 34.4c7 43.0c5 Åb6 36.0c5 0.0c5 0.0c5

After the opening Black had an excellent position but I didn't want to engage in any forced variations. The move 25...55 was hardly necessary, and was not prepared well. White missed to refule his opponents play with 34...£481, instead of 34...£47, and if 34...£04.35.041, but the Polish player was in a grave time-trouble. White made the decisive mistake on the 51st move when he had to play 51...£02.3 (instead of 51...£012) with some chances to draw.

Let's deal now with 1.e4 e5 2.ᡚſ3 ᡚc6 3.∆b5 a6 4.∆a4 ᡚſ5 0.00 Some players used to play 5.d3 as well. In this case I recommend the following scheme: 5.u6 6.c3 g6 7.0-0 ∆g⁄7 8.ᡚbd2 0-0 9.Ձe1 ᡚɗ/1? Black has to bring this knight to 'e6' in order to prepare the pawn advance 17 − 15. If 10.ᡚſ1 ∪C5 11.∆c6 bc 12.d4 ed 13.cd ᡚe6 14.d5 and it was dangerous for Black to play 14...ᡚc5, because of 15.∆g5! f6 (15...⊞6 16.e5! de 17.3£c1) 16.∆e3 ᡚe4 17.dc, as V. Wantchuk pointed out in his comments in "New in Chess" №11 for 1988, to his game with G. Serper, from the Championship of the Armed Forces, 1988 in Frunze. Instead of all this, Nantchuk suggested 14...cd 15.e4 ②c5. Now after 16.∆g5 Black plays 16...≌d7 with a good position. For example: 17.£e7 ﷺ 5.cr 17.b4 ᡚa4. Instead of 14...50 White can play 14...£0 and Black should better play 14...£08 15. ±d2 Be8l With the idea to play 16...c5l, which would have been too early on move 15 because of 16.d5l £:b2 17. ±c1. In the game Serper – Ivantchuk White abstained from the exchange on "c6" and retreated instead with the bishop 11...£c2, but Black seized the initiative and won after 11....£c6 ± 12..£c9 ± 18.1 3...£c5 ± 14.ef gf 15.dc 4 16..£d2 £er 17..£ce7 ±:er 18.d5 £f4 19..£f1? ±g5 20..£g3 £e5 21..£c3 ±g8 22..£h1 ±h4 23..£g1 £d7 24.£f1 €tg2 25..£g2 ±g2 25.£g12 ±g2 25.£g12 ±g2 25..£g12 ±g2

G. Sagaltchik, who is a student of mine played a very interesting game in this variation.

Shlyahtin – Sagaltchik Podolsk 1990

The first twelve moves the opponents repeated the game Serper – Ivantchuk, but instead of 13. ②d5 I. Shlyahtin preferred 13.h3.



13...f5. Black starts the offence. The retro-analysis showed that Black had better delay the start of the initiative for a move and play 13...Bb8! instead. Well, such a strange looking move with the rook can be done on the basis of some superintuition, or if you are somehow able to anticioate the following

course of the game after 13...15. 14.ef gf 15.d4 e4 16.d5 ef 17.de? This was a mistake. White had to capture the other knight. After 17.dc fg 18.处15 bc 19.堂h5 堂h6 20.鱼e3 处4 The position was simplified with an approximate equality. In all these lines the position of the Black rook on "b6" was just wonderful. 17...&16 18.堂:f3 265f 19.堂h5 Af7! Both sides are dreaming about the occupation of the "f4" square with a



23...Bae8? Until now Black played perfectly and got a decisive advantage. Sagatlchik made his last move just out of common sense, but it turned out to be a serious mistake and the fight started anew. Black could sacrifice a piece with 23...£g4! 24.hg 20;4125;fg 326;ff 325;47 %h1 \$134 28.\$c1 \$134

winning immediately.

24. Eadl £96 25. £e11 Be71 26. Eb4 c5 27. £:g61 Èrg6 28. Ee4 White played several excellent "only" moses in a row and equalized. 28. £:d7 29. Bd5?! Well, this happens rather often — White overcame the difficulties and started played carelessly. The exchange of the rooks on "e8" was a must. 29. £:e4 30. £:e4 d5 31. £:d3? 04 32. Bd2 04! Black seizes the initiative once again bringing the game to victory. 33. cd7! 244 34. 64 45. Ad4 25. Ad4 26. Ad5 36. Eb1 £67 (Black could still lose after 36. ... c3?? 37. £. d4+ £g8 38. £in6 Mate.) 37. £:b8 White resigners.

Black has to be well prepared against the move 5.d4, instead of 5.d3. The game can develop in the following way: 5...ed 6. 0-0 Δe7 7.Ee1. White prepares the advance of the "e" pawn and takes under control the "e4" square. The immediate 7.e5 doesn't promise too much after 7....€e4 8.€.1d 0-0 9.€15 d5 10.4.c6 (10.ed 4.f5 11.de €.2F) is forwurshle for Black 10 h. 11. €.2F4 W-71.2 Be1 Be8t with

the idea to play 13...&d6 in answer to 13.6. Let's go back now to 7.8ef. Black must react precisely since the line 7....00 8.e5 £e8 9.c3 gives White a very serious initiative for the sacrificed pawn. Therefore 7....b5 8.e5. In case of 8.4b3 d6 9.4b5 £vd5 10.ed £e5 11.£vd4 0-0 12.£vd3 (12.4f4 £g4f 13.8fd £vd-4) Black should be careful indeed, but the advantage of the two bishops gives him excellent chances in the future middle-game. Black should control the '62 h 13' diagonal with the light square bishop, while the dark square bishop can retreat to "18", after the previous 12...£e8. The move 8.e5 requires from Black some exact knowledge. 8.2vs 9.gr.5 ff 6.10 £e4 fa.



White can recapture the pawn with 11.⊕:d4, or can try to play for an initiative with 11... £g5. We are going to deal with these moves one by one.

endgame, while after 17.1%:a4 Bab8 Black has a strong initiative. The game Zhikman — Zayac, Primorsko 1988, continued for 13 more moves and White was crushed: 18.03 Bb4 19.1%:a3 204 20.33 Bb6 21.14 186 22.811 Be4 23.63 Be2 24.1%:5 187 25.0a3 0e3 26.1%:a3 8.63 27.16 18.33 25.1% 18.63 29.0c2 8.63 30.8ad1 8.60 White resigned.

White managed somehow to take back the sacrificed material but fell behind in development. Black can choose between 15...£65, or even 15...£68 with an initiative in all these lines.

We have to pay attention now to the move 11.4g5. While threatens to compromise the pawn chain of the opponent exchanging on 16°. 11...0-0 12.1862 h6! A very important move, which you are going to understand a bit later. 13.4h4. The line 13.18:e7 hg doesn't promise White anything. 13...4e6 14.2c44 18d7 15.4c3. The capture of the second pawn leads to an inferior endgame for White after 15.5c.6 fe 16. 18:e6+ 18:e6 17.8c6 187 18.8e2 g5! (mind the move 12...h6) 19.4g3 2d5 with a strong pressure on White's queen side. 15..a3/I It is necessary to deprive the white knight from its pawn-defence to be able in answer to 16.b3 to have the tactical stroke 16...2d5. Black has a good game since 17.6c.15 4c.h4 18.2c6 fe 19.18:e6+ 18:e6 20.2c.17 doesn't work because of 20...4.12+ ( Here, you can see one more reason to play 12...h6).

Let's continue to study: 5. 0-0 Ae7 6.8e1. Besides that move White can try 6. 1.00 d as well and now White has the choice between 7.03 and 7.2:e5. In the first case the game Huebner — Smyslov, Palma de Majorka 1970 can be very instructive: 6.100 f ac. 100 f ac. 1970 can be very instructive: 6.100 f ac. 100 f ac. 1970 can be very instructive. 6.100 f ac. 100 f ac. 1970 can be very factor of the state of t

The other move 7. De5 is connected with a trap. If Black plays 7... De4 8 且e1 €16 (8... 1404 is dangerous after 9 £13 1114 ± 10.1211 threatening 11.04 and 12 £1e3) 9. 11e2 £1e6 (9...007 10.£106) 10.d3 0-02

Now, White can win a pawn with 11. £771. Sometime ago the late Lithuanian master E. Chukaev told me a rather amusing story. He used to play blitz-games with E. Gufeld, to spend his free time, for 50 kopeeks a game. They reached the position on the diagram rather often.



E. Gufeld played always the move 11.0c3, after which Black usually took the initiative. And now in their tournament game the unsuspecting Chukaev played the same line again. Gufeld played now 11.0c771 and exclaimed "This is to repay you for all the 50 kopeeks-coins!" The game. nevertheless ended

## in a draw...

The easiest way for Black to achieve a good position is to retreat with the knight to "d6" on move 8. The game Yuferov — Shereshevsky, Minsk 1973 went on: 8. Be1 2\text{0}d6 9.2\text{0}c3 0-0 10.d3 f6 11.\text{0}13 \text{dg4 12.h3 \text{dh5 13.\text{dh4 \text{2}07 14.\text{dh2} 26 13.\text{dh4 \text{2}07 14.\text{dh2} 26 13.\text{dh2 dh3 13.\text{dh2 dh3 13.\text{dh2} dh3 18.\text{dh2 dh3 13.\text{dh2} dh3 18.\text{dh2 dh3 13.\text{dh2 dh3 3} \text{dh2 40 19.g4 36 25.\text{dh2 93 \text{dh2 40 16.\text{2} 26 20.\text{dh2 92 25.\text{dh2 93 \text{dh2 40 16.\text{dh2 40 29.\text{dh2 40 16.\text{dh2 40

#### We are going to study now:

1.e4 e5 2 2/3 2c6 3.4.b5 a6 4.4.a4 2/6 5. 0-0 4e7 6.8e1 b5 7.4.b3 d6 8.c3. Sometimes White plays here 8.a4. This is what happened in the game V. Kupreitchik — Shereshevsky, Melboume 1988. 8...4d7 9.c3 0-0 10.d4 h6 11.2bd2 8e8 12.2h1 4/8 13.2h3 2h3 14.4c2 c5 15.h3?! 8c7 16.2h4? d6

17.cd ed 18.ab ab 19. $\Omega$ hf5 d5 20. $\Omega$ cd4 and here Black blundered with 20...de? and White took the initiative and won. Instead of 20...de? Black could have played 20... $\Delta$ c5! (a move found by V. Ivantchuk) with an almost decisive advantage.

8... Do 9.h3. Lately White plays much more often 9.d4, without being afraid of the pin 9... Ag4. Unfortunately some of the recommendations that my pupils used to follow were reevaluated by the contemporary theory, so I would omit hem. 9... Da5 10.Ac2 c5 11.d4 thr 712. Dbd 2 thr Mould mithem. 9... Da5 10.Ac2 c5 11.d4 thr 712. Dbd 2 thr Mould mithem 9... Da5 10.Ac2 to 11.d thr official position. As I have already mentioned White plays 13.011 very rarely and usually prefers to block the centre with 13.d5. Besides that White sometimes plays the timid 13.a3, or 13.b3 against which Black should better exchange twice on "d4", which leads to one of the typical positions of the Chigorin variation and the position of Black's rook on "d8" might come very handy.

The move 13.d5 leads to one of the standard positions of the Ruy Lopez in which the plans for actions of both sides are almost exhausted in theory and practice. A. Rubinstein, back in 1925 in the tournament in Baden-Baden found a very deep strategical plan for defence. He was Black against Thomas and the game continued: 1.e4 e5 2.013 0.c6 3.Δb5 a6 4.Δa4 0.l6 5. 0-0 Δe7 6.Be1 b5 7.Δb3 d6 8.c3 0-0 9.l3 0.a5 10.Δc2 c5 11.d4 Wc7 12.0bd2 0.c6 13.d5 0.d8 14.011 0.e8 15.a4 Bb8 16.ab ab 17.94 g6 18.0g3 0.g7 19.0h1 f6 20.Bg1 1.07 21 Wf1 4.d7 22 Ba3 Ba3 0.g7 19.0h1 f6 20.Bg1

Bogoljubov - Rubinstein

14.a4 월b8 15.c4 b4 16.b3 ହିe8 17.g4 g6 18.ជh1 ହିg7 19.ឨg1 h5 20.ହh1 hg 21.hg f6 22.ହe3 ହh7 23.ହh4 ହh8 24.f4 ef 25.ହe15 ହh5 26.gf q5.

In both games Black obtained a satisfactory position. Nowadays, Rubinstein's plan is considered to be insufficient for equality. White is not in a hurry to push the "g" pawn, but tries instead to reach the following pawn structure:



The integral part of White's plan will be to prepare 12 – 14. After the exchange e5:14 the White pieces will have an access to the "d4" square, while if Black doesn't exchange White can push 14 – 15. I have seen a lot of games like that. One of the most instructive is Karpov – Unzicker, Nice 1974. I am going

to include it here without any comments, since we are studying this variation from the point of view of Black, but if the reader wants to get some explanations to the logical and beautiful play of White, this game can be found in the collection of Karpov's games, commented by the world champion Nb 12.

1.e4 e5 2.£73 £06 3.£05 a6 4.£a4 £16 5. 0-0 £e7 6.£e1 b5 7.£b3 d6 8.c3 0-0 9.n3 £a5 10.£c2 c5 11.64 £07 12.£042 £06 13.d5 £08 14.a4 £08 15.ab ah 16.b4 £07 17.£h1 £d7 18.£e3 £a8 19.±d2 £i68 20.£d3 g6 21.£g3 £i8 22.£a2 c4 23.£b1 ±1d8 24.£a7 £e8 25.£c2 £07 26.£ea1 ±e7 27.£b1 £e8 28.£e2 £08 29.£h2 £g7 30.£t6 31.f5 g5 32.£c2 £77 33.£g3 £07 34.£d1 h6 35.£h5 ±e8 36.±d1 £04 37.£a3 ±18 38.£1a2 ±g8 39.£g41 ±18 40.£e3 ±g8 41.£i7+ £17 42.±h5 £048 43.±g6 ±18 44.£h5 £la6k resioned.

B. Spassky tried to use Rubinstein's system against Karpov in the championship of USSR 1973, but failed to equalize. The opening and the early middle game were played like this:

12. ②bd2 ②c6 13.d5 ②d8 14.a4 £b8 15.ab. Probably White should not be in a hurry to open the "a" file. 15.b4 looks better.

15...ab 16.b4 c4 17. $\odot$ f1  $\odot$ e8 18. $\odot$ 3h2 f6 19.f4  $\odot$ f7 20. $\odot$ f3 g6 21.f5  $\odot$ g7 22.g4  $\Delta$ d7 23. $\Delta$ e3  $\Xi$ a8 24. $\Xi$ d2  $\Xi$ b7 25. $\Xi$ ac1  $\Xi$ a2 26. $\odot$ g3  $\Xi$ fa8 27.h4 Black's position is cramped.

In our case Black's rook is already on "d8", so Rubinstein's plan is out of the question. Black must find some other ways to get counterplay, and the only place to look for that is the queen side.

13...c4!



have had the move b3 – b4 restricting the opponent on the queen side. Therefore Black should try to push as quickly as possible the pawns "a" and "b", and to try to bring the knight to "c5". Our analysis of the position looked approximately like that:

If now the "b" pawn had been on the "b3" square, White would

14. 2f1. In case of 14.g4 Black had the standard counterstroke -14...h5!

14.... 2p7 15.23h2. In this moment 15.g4 is much more sensible, but Black can play 15...h5 anyhow. Now if 16.23h2 hg 17.hg 2h7 followed by 18....4g5, and if 16.gh 4.:h3 17.23h2 in the game Akopian – Alexandrov, Dimitrovgrad 1988, Black played 17...g6 18.2g3 2c5?, overlooking the surprising manoeuvre №d1 – d2! – h6. Instead of 18...2c5? Black had to play 18...2g0 7 with a good position.

15...a5 16.f4 White threatens to push the "f" pawn even further, so Black should try some counter-measures.

16...Øc5/ 17.f5.



somehow to clarify who was better in this position, so I asked my pupils to play training games with quicker then usual time-control in the position after move 20. All the games ended with a win for Black.

Grandmaster Yusupov sacrificed once a piece almost analogous to this, since I had shown him this interesting piece-sacrifice before.

# Kinderman – Yusupov Hamburg 1991

13.d5 c4 14. $\Omega$ f1  $\Omega$ b7 15. $\Omega$ g3 a5 16. $\Omega$ h2  $\Omega$ c5 17.f4 b4 18. $\Omega$ f3  $\Xi$ b8 19.cb ab 20.b3 c3 21.f5  $\Omega$ a6 22. $\Omega$ h1  $\Xi$ dc8 23. $\Omega$ f2  $\Xi$ a7 24.q4



24... Qr. e41 25. A. e4 Qr. e4 26. Er. e4 c2 27. Ee1 Ee5 28. a3 Er. e5 29. ab Ab7 30. Ee3 Add 31. Ed3 Ee6 32. b5 Er. b5 33. Ed2 Ab6 36. Ef1 Eg2+ 37. Ee1 Eg1+ 38. Ee2 Ag2 39. Ed3 d5 40. Eg3 e4 41. Ee5 Eb2 White resigned. In conclusion I will offer the reader some of my pupils games, which were abundant with a very tense and complex fight. I am not going to annotate them, since it would be very difficult and time-consuming to analyse such complicated games full of intense struggle. I think that it would be useful for the reader to have some feeling for the rhythm of the fight in this variation, and although the examples that I am going to show you are probably full of imprecisions and mistakes for both sides, Black can be more than happy with the final results.

In one of the games the then – world -champion Maya Chiburdanicze lost against the not so familiar master-candidate (now – a master) Talyana Zagorskaya. Elena Zayac was close to a victory against the present world champion – the Chinese Xie Jun, and the games of Oleg Romanov and Alexander Zazhogine are very instructive for the tendencies of this variation.

## Chiburdanidze – Zagorskaya Moscow 1981

## Xie Jun – Zayac Adelaide 1988

13.d5 4414.전11 원가 15.203 a5 16.2012 원c5 17.월1 b4 18.4 b3 19.ab c 20.2b.h1 a4 21.월13 월18 22.일h1 407 23.4e3 월a6 24.월12 월c8 25.월a3 48 26.월13 4b5 27.Ձe1 ef 28.4.14 4.d3 29.4.43 원c3 30.월11 원c5 31.월12 월a8 22.Ձea1 월a6 33.월12 원c7 34.4e3 9c5 35.월11 원ed7

36. å.c.5 ఏ.c.5 37. år3 g6 38. Ådr1 Åg7 39. Ån2 år4 40. år1 20:e4 åre.4 42. år17+ årh8 43. år57 åre2 44. år6 år.b.4 58. år4 åre5 år.b.4 58. år4 åre5 år.b.4 58. år4 åre5 år.b.4 58. år4 åre5 år.b.4 åre5 år.b.4 år.b

## Shilov – Romanov Volgograd 1988

13.d5 c4 14.©11 %D7 15.g4 %D5 16.©g3 h5 17.©h2 h4 18.Ф15 %h7 19.14 ef 20.Ф.14 4.f5 21.gf Åg5 22.世g4 Åf6 23.G13 8e6 24.ቴ/m1 b4 25.8E3 bc 26.8g1 ቴ/e7 27.©h4 %D3 28.Φ.43 cd 29.Δh6 Åg5 30.Φ.g5 ቴ/g5 31.bc ቴ/g4 32.hg %D6 33.8d3 The opponents agreed to a draw. Black seems to be slightly better though.

## Pereligin – Romanov Beltzv 1988

1.e4 e5 2.Φ/3 Φc6 3.Δb5 a6 4.Δa4 Φ/6 5. O-0 Δe7 6.≌e2 b5 7.Δb5 O-0 8.c3 09.h3 Φ/a5 10.Δe2 c5 11.40 d\*C7 12.e5 13.Δe3 Φ/7 14.Φbd2 Φ/65 15.Φ/2 a5 16.l4 Bb8 17.f5 b4 18.g4 bc 19.bc Bb2 20.₩d1 Δd7 21.g5 Ec2 22.₩c2 Δa4 23.₩b1 Bb8 24.₩b1 Φ/e4 27.f6 Δf8 26.Φe4 Φ/e4 27.f6 Δg7 28.Φg4 Δc2 29.Φf6 ₩f8 30.Bc1 Δd3 31.Bf ₩f5 32.₩f6 3g6 Bg3 434.\pm 1 \pm c5 35.\pm g1 \pm \frac{1}{2} \pm \frac{1}

## G. Gurevic – Romanov Minsk 1991

1.e4 e5 2.013 0:06 3.4b5 a6 4.4b4 0:16 5, 0-0 4bc7 6.8c1 b5 7.4b3 d6 8:c3 0-0 9:n3 0:b6 1:0.4bc2 c5 11.d4 8bc7 12:a3 8bc8 13:d6 41.4bc2 0:5 71.5c0 ft 0:b6 16:093 a5 17.8f1 4bc9 18:b63 8bc8 19:0b12 b4 20:ab ab 21:44 0:d3 22.4bc3 cd 23.fe de 24.0g4 0:g4 25.8bc9 4.6c8 26.8bc9 16 27.8ca8 8:a6 28.0h5 bc 29:bc 8a6 0.4bc9 8bc 31.8bc9 13.bc9 13

35.營:d3 ▲a6 36.營d5 營:d5 37.ed ▲:f1 38.包:f1 畠a1. White resigned.

## Berzinsh – Zazhogine Minsk 1988

13.d5 c4 14.Q1f Qb7 15.Q3h2 Qc5 16.增3 a5 17.Qg4 b4 18.Qg3 b3 19.ab cb 20.Δb1 Qg4 21.ng a4 22.Q15 Δt8 23.g3 a2 48.a3 28.a3 25.ba Qa4 26.dc2 발c5 27.업g2 Qb2 28.c4 발:a3 29.발c3 Δtf5 30.gf Ec8 31.Δc1 Qa4 32.발a5 b2 33.Δtb2 발:b2 34.발:a4 발c3 35.발d1 발:c4 36.国h1 且b4 37.шh5 h6 38.g44 ⊈h7 39.f6 g6 40.世d7 업명 41.발d8 발d2 42.발c5 Bb2 43.B1 발c2 44.발c1 h5 45.gq1 h4 46.Δd3 발f3 47.발d1 발f6 48.gh 발:h4. Black had the advantage, but failed to turn it into a whole point and the game ended in a draw on move 73.

# The Scottish Gambit

I don't think that such an opening can be the object of any serious theoretical discussions. Black should have one well-prepared scheme, which should not be necessarily top-fashion, but it should be unpleasant for the opponent at least psycholocially. I will two full fustrate this with an example:

## Joric – Shereshevsky Valievo 1991

1.e4 e5 2. 2/3 206 3.d4 ed 4.c3 2/61/? This move has been rejected by the contemporary theory, but it is much better than its reputation might tell. Black can reach this position via the Ponziani opening as well. 5.e5 2e4 6.2/2 17.ef d8 8.2/c4 2/c4 9.cd Δ/b4+10.Δd2 Δ/d2+11.2/c42 0-0



I analysed this position a long time ago and I couldn't find any clear advantage for White although the diagrammed position looked rather dangerous for Black. It is possible that White should better play 13.0-0-0 £:e4 14.2°c2 2°f.6 15.4°d3 £:d4 16.4°c.17+ 2°f.8 with an unclear share position. The Yugoslavian

player tried something different: 13. **0-0-0 2:e4** 14.**255 66** 15.**25** 5. After 15.17+ **2**g7 16.18**2** + **2**:18 17.**2**:45 **2**14+ 18.**2**51 1.6 or 18...**4**15 Black has the initiative. **15....451** Avery strong move, which threatens 16...**2**g4, and if 16.13 **2**66 17.34 - then the simple 17...**2**:16.



Finally, a four-rook endgame has been reached in which black is better because his rooks occupy the open "e" file, and additionally Black has the better pawn distribution on the queen side. While had at that moment less than half an hour for the 20 moves, necessary to reach the time control.

21.8d2? The activity of the pieces is very important in the rook endgames. White chooses to play passively relying on the unassailability of his position. 21.8b3!? b5 22.8c1 was necessary, to try to create weak points in Black's pawn chain on the queen side.

21... āde8 22. \$\pmu c2 \pm f7 23. \$\pm f6 34. \$\pm df2 \pm e7 25. \$\pm d2

£3d6 26.g3 b6. Black's plan becomes clear. He intends to prepare the pawn advance c7 − c5, and after the exchange dc − bc to push forward the "a" pawn. White will be forced to play a2 − a3, when the black pawn reaches the "a4" square and then the white "b2" pawn will become weak. Black is going to combine the pressure on the "b2" pawn with a pawn advance in the centre which is going to give him a decisive positional advantage.

27. 2df 8e3 28.2d2 a5 29.f4 a4 30.g4/ White begins to play better. He understands that the passive play will lead to an unavoidable loss, so he tries to create some counterplay on the king side.

30...≘3e4 31. ≙d3 c5 32.dc+ bc 33. ≙d2 c4 34.a3 £b8 35. ≙c2 d4 36.f5i d3+? The black pawns in the centre lose their mobility with this clumsy move. It was much better to take on "d4" immediately.

37. £c1 £:g4 38.f6 £e4 39.f7 £f8 40.£d2 £e7 41.£c3 As a consequence of Black's mistake, the white king has an excellent square on "c3" which combined with the strong "f7" pawn gives White a serious counterplay.

41... 호d5 42.8f4 8e41 43.81f2. It was not possible to take the pawn – 43.8:e4 호:e4 44.호c4, because of 44...d2 45.호c3 합e3.

#### 43 Ce5 44 84f3



Now I thought for some time and played 44...g5I? with the idea to play 614 next. 45.5f5+ 2e6 46.5f6+ 2e7 47.5c6. The key position. What should Black do now? I intended at fixt 47...5b8, since the tactical trick 48.18 2e+ £18. 49.8c7+ didn't work because of 49...266. and

the white rook on "c7" was hanging. On the other hand 47...當b8 threatens 48...當b3+, as a tactical threat, and - 48.萬:c4 and after 48...萬b3+ 49.堂d2 萬:b2+ 50.堂:d3 萬:f2 51. 直:e4+ 位:f7 52. 直:a4 直:h2 and I thought that Black should win, Well, I had been probably right, but instead of 52.2:a4?. White could play the strong 52.h4!, and the game should end in a draw. The next move that I was thinking over was -47 首e2 White should answer with 48 首:e2 de 49 むd2 むf7 50.2:c4. The game might continue like this: 50...2b8 51.2c2 Be8 52.De1 Be4 (52...Be3!?). I didn't like this position because White can play 53.2c3 and 54.b3 and White should be able to draw. I had to find a third opportunity - 47...\$d81 48.8:c4. There was nothing better, because of the positional threat 48...\$f8. 48...\$;c4+ 49.\$;c4 \$f81. Of course not 49 d22 50 f8\* + with a draw

50.8d2. The only move. The king and pawn endgame after 50.0c3? d2! 51.8d2 8i.d2 52.0c3 0c3 ft? was lost for White i.e. 53.0c3 ft 5 54.bd ab 55.0c3 ft.50 (55.ad 0c7) 7 55...gd 56.0c3 ft.57.0c3 g3 58.hg h3 and Black's pawn queens. 50...h5/f. That was another only move. Black has no time to capture the "f7" pawn, since White would play 51.bd1 making a draw. 51.bd ab 52.0c3 g4 53.0c2/f. White loses a tempo in the time-trouble and enables Black to win effortlessly. (It was necessary to play 53.ad/ h4 54.a5 0c7. Black should lose some time to capture the pawn, since 54...g3 55.hg hg 56.a6 g2? doesn't work because of 57.8.g2 threatening to check on "g8".



Black kept excellent chances to realize his tiny material advantage, because the white king was far from the enemy pawns, but nevertheless White should have played exactly this) Now the game ended in the following way:

53...h4 54.a4 2:f7. The black king comes to help the pawns.

55.a5 호e6 56.호c3 호e5 57.ãd1 호e4 58.호d2 호f3 59.ãf1+ 호g2 60.âf4 g3 61.hg h3 62.ãh4 h2 63.a6 h1 월 64.ã:h1 호:h1 65.64 호g2 66.65 호f3. White resigned.

# The French Defence

After the moves 1.e4 e6 2.d4 d5 White has two principled continuations 3. $\triangle$ c3 and 3. $\triangle$ c4. In the first case my pupils tend to play the rare variation MacKetchon, although they have in reserve a scheme with the move 3... $\triangle$ b4.

I am not going to deal extensively with these sharp opening variations. I would like just to mention that the last evaluation of the theory in these lines hasn't been done yet, besides Black has always the option to try to find something new a little bit away from the fous of the theoretical interest.

In the line 1.e4 e6 2.d4 d5 3.&dz, Black can choose between 3..&d6, 3...&e7 and 3...c5. We prefer the last opportunity since in positions of this type — with an isolated "d5" pawn, the outcome of the game is determined not so much by the theoretical knowledge, as by the deep understanding of the strategical problems and the practical

strength of playing. In this chapter we are going to deal only with games of P. Korzubov, who has mastered very well positions of this type, as well as of games of the author of the book

#### So, 1.e4 e6 2.d4 d5 3. 2 d2 c5 4.ed ed.



White has the option in the diagrammed position to play either 5.4b5+, or 5.6/13. We are going to start with the bishop check – 5.4b5+ Ad7. The exchange of the light square bishop, the most passive black piece in positions with an isolated "d5" pawn, represents one of the important stratecical

ideas for Black. White, in turn should strive for the exchange of the dark square bishops. In the line  $5.\Delta$ 05+ 206 6.203  $\Delta$ 06 7.0-20 208 2

Kasparov – Korzubov Tashkent 1978 11. Å:d7 ∜b:d7 12. 0-0 ∜cc5 13.£ad1 ≝c7!?



The opening stage is almost over. Both sides have accomplished their development and are about to enter the middle game. White has somewhat better pawn structure, but Black pieces are better coordinated and seem to be more active. In general the chances for both sides are

#### about equal.

14.②c5 点c5 15.②d4 器e4! In positions of this type, particularly when there are four knights on the board, Black should not occupy the "e" file with a knight on "e4". Two knights can not occupy one square — "e4" simultaneously! With his last move Korzubov created the threat 16..②g4, which can not be parried with 16.13?, since after 16..②g4, 17.1g Bae8 Black recaptures the sacrificed piece with an advantage. 16.13 Bae8 17.2d 3②h5! The Black knight has the option for two tactical strokes — ②g3 and ②14.18.2d 3②g3 Black had also some other interesting moves like B...世份 or 18...②41. In the last case such a position may arise. 18...②44 1 the last case such a position may arise. 18...②44 19.8fe1 1867 20.2d 195 1945 21.4.14 A.12 + 22.2d 12 1945 23.8.e48.e4 24.8.ed 5 1944 + with an eventual draw.

19.**届61 267 20.a3**. (20...**Δ**b4 was threatening.) **20...g6 21.公**h2 **4.4. 21...Δ**d6? was bad because of 22.fg **3.3.3.3 3 16.3 3 16.3 24. 316.3 3 16.3 24. 316.3 3 16.3 24. 316.3 3 16.3 24. 316.3 3 16.3 25. 2013 3 16.3 3 17.3 3 17.3 3 17.3 1** 



Korzubov decided to force a draw now and played 22...£rd4. Black could have retreated simply with the knight to "15" and then White would have the choice between 23.£rd5 €.le3, with a draw, or 23.£re4 de 24.£c1 with a position which could be played on, but Black was not worse. G. Kasparov

was playing very impressively at the time, so Black decided to avoid the risk and tried to find a sure way to reach the draw − 23.8:d4 €/f5 24.8:d5 8:d7 + 25.891 8:d2 26.8:d7 €)e3 27.8561 This was rather unexpected for Korzubov who had calculated only 27.8:e3 8:c1+, or 27.fe 8d2!

27... 當d2? Black was disappointed with his mistake and failed to find the right move. The draw was reached easily with 27... 是61 White has nothing better than 28.世64 ± 位 7.29. 当d4+, but then Black interposes with the rook 29... 温f6! and after 30.觉 e3 当b2 the draw is inevitable. Now Black is left with a pawn down in a queen endgame. 28.Ee3 是63 29.fe h5 30.5h2 5e27 Black loses the control over the "d6" square and deprives himself from the move h5 — h4. It was necessary to push the "h" pawn immediately 31.b4 5p7. The rest of the game was played in a time-trouble 32.a4 g5 33.b5 ab 34.ab h4 35.世64+ 公96 36.b6 5e1 37.世66+ Black resigned.

## Kuporosov – Korzubov Sochi 1980

The opponents repeated the first 13 moves from the previous game.



14.h3 Kasparov preferred 14.5c5. 14... 2a4 The knight exerts strong pressure on the queen side from this square, while the "e4" outpost remains vacant for the other knight or the rook. 15.c3 Bad8 16.0bd4 2e4 17.5c2 2b6 18.2f5 Af6



Black has nothing to complain about. He has already some initiative. 22.8e2 g6 23.2n6+ 2g7 24.2g4 n5 25.2n2 2f6 Korzubov is threatening once again the "52" pawn with this move, setting up a subtle trap in the process. 26.250 (26.2504? was losing dater 26.251) 26.250.250

27.≝:b6 ②:b6 28.②:e2 Be8 29.≌f1 ②c4 30.b3 ②e5. White has some problems already. 31. ②f4 Bd8 32.c4/? ∨.



Kuporosov makes the right decision to clarify the position by some tactical means, otherwise Black can increase his positional advantage at leisure. 32...d4 33.⊘f3 ⊘:r3 34.of.

White has a lot of pawn weaknesses now on the king side and the enemy isolated

pawn has become a passed one. White is ready to try to win this pawn with 35. \$\Delta 2\$ d3 36. \$\Delta 4\$ Korzubov finds a way to neutralize his opponent's threats.

34.... **②h7!** The knight is heading for the "e6" square via "g5", with tempo.

35. එe2 එg5 36. E:d4 E:d4 37. එ:d4 එ:h3 38.c5 එf4 39.c6 bc 40. එ:c6 එd5.



Black's advantage is out of the question, but White can still manage to hold the position because of the reduced material. Kuporosov managed to exchange the pawns on the queen side (two for one) and drew the knight endgame with pawns only on the king side.

# Kapengut – Shereshevsky Minsk 1976



The absence of the light square bishops can bring only joy to the Black player. The position of the white king on the queen side is hardly safer than on the king side and we are oning to verify this very soon.

13. 2fd4?! It would have been better to occupy the "d4"

square with the other knight, since the position of �b3 gives Black some additional options for active counterplay.

13... ②ce4!? 14. ②f5 a5!? Now, this manoeuvre has become standard, but then I thought a long time to find it. The weakening of the "b5" square is amply compensated by Black's initiative.

**15. ②bd4.** In case of 15. **②**:e7+ **□**:e7, Black threatened not only to march forward with the "a" pawn, but also 16... **②**:f2.

15...a4 16.a3 Bac8/ Black must play tactically, creating threats in positions with an isolated pawn. The rook move aims at the increase of pressure on the queen side, and if White plays 17.255, Black can suddenly make a blow on the other side with 17...2941 17.137. White wanted to consolidate somehow, but made a serious mistake.



28.始5 &c5 27.始7 &c77 Draw, by repetition of moves. Black had very little time, so I rejected the natural move 27... 168. because of the following variation which seemed forced: 28.始2 168.2 29.始84. 29.7 30.增93 + 20.8 31.世64. 公图 32.1861 16.3 33.世65+ 16.6 34.18.6 35.40.45 and I thought that the variation with 34...16.3 35.40.45 and I thought that the position was unclear. I had missed completely the fact that the "C3" pawn had vanished from the board, accordingly after 34....16.4 White had a hopeless position. We are going to study now games in which White played 6. \$\mathbb{m} e2+\$ but later refrained from the exchange of the light square bishops.

## Short – Korzubov Sas van Gent 1978

1.e4 e6 2.d4 dt 3 2.d2 c5 4.ed ed 5.Δb5+ Δd7 6.12e2+ Δe7 7.dc 2f6 8.2gf3 0-0 9.2b3 3e8 10.Δe3 a6 11.Δd3 Δa4/ Black must get rid of the light square bishop. 12.2fd4 2.bd7 13.0+0. There are some games in which White castled queen side here. We are going to deal with them later. 13...2:c5?! This is inconsequential. It was necessary to exchange beforehand on 103°. Black had an excellent position in the game A. Ivanov. – Shereshevsky, Minsk 1985 after 13....2b3 14.ab Δc5 15.c3 Δcd4 16.cd 2b81 17.12f3 h6, and Black's knights are not worse than the White's bishops, while white's pawn structure is evidently compromised. The move chosen by Korzubov didn't cause any problems for Black either. The game continued: 14.2bc5 Δc5 15.113 Δd7 16.c3 1bc7 17.h3 2e4 18.16f1 1bc.



19...발:f4 20.û:f4 û:d4 21.cd h6/? 22.f3 Øg5 23.û:g5 hg 24.धf2 f6 25.ûg6 £:e1

26.E:e1 ⊈f8 27.Ec1 Ec8 28.E:c8+ Δ:c8 29.⊈g3. Draw.

#### A. Ivanov – Korzubov Kiev 1983

White preferred to castle queen side on move 13 – 13. 0-0-0. The game continued. 13...4:b3 14. ②:b3 a5 15.a3 a4 16. ②:d4 4:c5.



and White's position became hopeless in the first game, while Yakovich played 18. 26 mm 3 26 mm 19. 26 mm 1 21 世h42 d4l 22 かf5 かd3 + 23 章d3 世c5 24 かd4 章e4 and White could doubtlessly resign. Lets go back to the game lvanov - Korzubov. 17... #b6 18.Ehe1 a6 19.c3 Ee7 20.4:b7?/ White doesn't have enough space, but he has two bishops and some control over the "b5" square. White didn't need however, to give up his two advantages voluntarily. Now Black obtains the chance to get an indisputable control over the white squares on the gueen side, 20. #c2!? was not good because of 20... a:e3! 21.fe A:e4, but still to exchange the light square bishop was definitely bad. 20... 2:d7 21. #f3 Ee4/ Black is better. 22. ②c2 ②e5 23.4:c5 単:c5 24. 単g3. If 24.增f6 星e8 25.章:e4 de 26.章d8 章:d8 27.章:d8+ 空q7 Black is clearly better. 24... 2e8 25. 2b4 2c4 The consequences of the unfavourable exchange of the bishop are obvious now. 26.E:e4 de 27.Ed5 #b6 28.Ed4 e3! It is probable that Ivanov failed to take into account this wonderful tactical resource. 29.£:c4 loses now after 29...ef. **29.**fe ②:e**3 30.**£f**2 29.**fe **31.**£**b1 297.** Ivanov was once again in his habitual time-trouble. **32.**②:c**2** ②:c**4 33.**£f**4 b5 34.**£d**1 25.**€**1 35.**£:e**5 8**:e**5**.



If somehow we can manage to weigh each one of the last 15 moves in some imaginary way, each Black's move was heavier than its White counterpart. Korzubov has a definite positional advantage in the endgame now. 36.024 f5 37.8c1 266 38.8c2 g5 39.h37

are going to be valueless after this bad move. 39.£f2 was to be preferred. 39..f41 40.8f2 @d6l 41.2c2 @f5! The material is equal now, but still the rook endgame is easily winning for Black.

42.8d2. If 42.5d3 8d5 43.5d2, Black plays 43...0e3+ 44.8c1 0c4. 42...0e41 43.cd 8e3 44.d5 0c4 45.d5 46.d6 46.d7 47.h5 8e6 48.8d5 8e2+ 49.2d3 8:g2 50.8:b5 f3. White resigned. A good example of an excellent endogame technique.

#### Holmov – Korzubov Tallin 1983

1.e4 e6 2.d4 d5 3.⊕d2 c5 4.ed ed 5.£b5+ £d7 6.≝e2+ &e77.dc ⊕f6 8.⊕gf3 0-0 9.0-0. White is playing the opening rather timidly and is not trying to protect the "c5" pawn. 9...£c5 10.£d7 ⊕d7 11.⊕b3 #e8 12.≝d3.



Black managed to win a tempo in the opening, playing without the move a7 – a6. The retreat of the bishop to "56", to a very active position looked tempting. It would have been very difficult for White to exchange the dark square bishops, since the "20" square was controlled by \$Ee8.

12...≝b6?/. This is an interesting decision. Korzubov is trying to seize the initiative immediately allowing the exchange of his bishop. 13.c3 ⊙le4. Black is consistent. 14.⊙c5 ⊙dc5 15...≝c2. White couldn't capture the "d5" pawn because of 15...≣ad8 and 16...⊙12!

15...196 16..0e3 R. Holmov defended against his opponent's attack calmly and obtained a minimal positional advantage, which by the way should not have bothered Black too much. 16..0e 17.8ad1 Bad8 18.0d4 Bd7 19.8fe1. 19.9c2? would have been a blunder because of 119...0c3.

19... **2d6 20. 2e2 2c4 21. ∆c1**. White avoids the exchange on "g6", to prevent Black to position the pawns on the squares "f6", "g6" and "g5".



# 21...E:e2 22. #:e2 #e4 23.b3

White has a slight positional advantage in the endgame as before but he is far from converting it into a win. 25... De6 26.072 f6 27.074 0.74 0.74 0.76 0.81 0.812 0.815 31.02 0.816

32. \( \text{\text{\$\d\$}}\) d1. White brought the king to the queen side but this does not help him in any way to win the game.

32...g5! 33.Ag3 h5 34.h3 h4 35.Ah2 @g6 36.@c2?! @f5 37.a4 @e7 38.8d4 @c6.



39.Eg4? White has no advantage anymore and trying to change somehow the course of the game Holmov sets himself on the road to danger. Well, he achieves what he is aiming at, the character of the play is soon going to change, but nevertheless now White has to put up a heroic effort to save

the game. The move 39.**8**Q4 reminds me of the old funny joke about some of the Latin-American dictators who tried everything to get rid of the deprivations of his people, and when there weren't any, he did everything possible to first create some.

39...867 40.2df ½06 41.44. The only move to avoid the threat 41...5. 41...8e41 42.b4 a6 43..4g1 b5 44.ab ab 45.2d2 2545 46..2e3 gf 47...4f2. The game was adjourned here. Black has a definite positional advantage but strangely enough we failed to find a sure win, although we analysed the position thoroughly. White has a tiny but sure path to the draw, and by the way the analysis of both opponents coincided completely.

47...2e5 48.8:n4 204+ 49.2d3 f3 50.8h5+ 2g6 51.8:d5 82 52.gf 8d2+. Black is going to a forced line with the hope that White will fail to find the best defence. It was possible to risk with 52...8:f2, but the position after 53.8:b5 looked to us very unclear. 53.2±6 8:f2 54.8:b5 2d6+ 55.2±3 2b5 56.2±2 20:c5



57. № e11 The only move leading to a draw. We saw all that in our analysis but we couldn't find any other way for Black with a real chance for a win.

57...�b5 58.\( \text{2d2} \) \@d4 59.\( \text{2d3} \) \@2.\( \text{2f3} \) \@60.b5 \@65+ 61.\( \text{2e4} \) \@4 \@4 \@4 \@4 \\ \text{2d7} \) \@5.\( \text{2f4} \) \\$ f5 63.\( \text{4d4} \) \\ \\ \text{Holmov was considered to be}

one of the best masters of defence in the world in his prime years quite deservedly though. White has overcome the difficulties already and the road to the draw is already easy. There followed:

63... ජුf6 64. ජුප3 ජූප5 65.h5 f4+ 66. ජුf2 විf6 67.b6 වි4+ 68.ජුg2 විd6 69.h6 ජූf6. Draw.

Lets have a look now at the position arising after the exchange of the light square bishops:

1.e4 e6 2.d4 d5 3.\( \text{2}\)d2 c5 4.ed ed 5.\( \Delta\)b5+ \( \Delta\)d7 6.\( \Delta\):d7+ \( \Delta\):d7 7.\( \Delta\)gf3 \( \Delta\)f6 8. 0-0 \( \Delta\)e7 9.dc \( \Delta\):c5.



Nowadays grandmasters E. Bareev and E. Rozentalia succeeding the excellent specialists of playing this position for Black, but nevertheless we are going to continue to study Korzubov's games.

#### Ehlvest – Korzubov Tallin 1978

10.203. A. Sokolov played 10.204 against Korzubov in the same tournament. The game continued 10...0-0 11.205. Be8 12.20.27 25.03. Now Black made a mistake with 13...Bac69. The game ended in a draw indeed, but White half a serious advantage. The right move was 13...Bac8 to fortify the "d5" pawn with the idea to put then the kright on "6" to "e4", and the kright on "65" to head for "a4" or "e6" if necessarv. with an approximately equal position.

10...0-0?! Black has to be ready to defend a position with

an isolated pawn having a dark square bishop against a knight. White can force the exchange of two pairs of light pieces with 11. 2:c5 4:c5 12. 4 a5 and 4:f6 next. The same situation arose in one of the games of the 1974 match Karpov - Kortchnoi, where Kortchnoi managed to hold, but still it was not easy and appealing for Black to voluntarily play a position without any real chances for a win, while the opponent had a long lasting initiative. In his game with D. Kavumov, Kiev 1983 Korzubov played 10...@ce4. The move 10...@a4?! was also tried in the game Motwani - Korzubov, Sas van Gent 1978. Motwani won the world championship of the "cadets" and he managed to find a convincing refutation of the wing manoeuvre of the black knight, being in excellent form then. After 11.曾d4! 包b6 (11...曾d7? 12.包e5 曾b5 13.2 q4 0-0 14.4 h6) 12.4 q5 0-0 13.2 fe1 2e8 14.2 e2 the Scottish player offered a draw which was accepted, but objectively White had clear positional advantage.

Lets go back to the game Kayumov – Korzubov. In answer to 10...£ce4 White played 11.£/1d4. In the majority of the contemporary games Black plays here 11...#d7 12.#f3 0-0 13.£/15 &d8 with an approximately equal position, but Korzubov played here 11...£d6. There followed: 12.£ef 0-0

Lets continue our analysis of the game Ehlvest – Korzubov. 17. △e3. Ehlvest avoids the aforementioned exchange of the minor pieces. 11... ⊘a4 12.8b1 ≝c7 13. ⊘id4 △d6 14.33 ≝d7 15. ∰13. △e5 16.8id1 ≝le8 17.c3. The White position is preferable. The Black kindin or "a4" is misplaced.



17...g6 In case of 17....2b6 Black has to reckon with the enemy knight assaults like enemy knight assaults like 18.2c5 and 19.2f5. 18.2e2. The knight manoeuvre to "b4" via the "c2" square deserved a serious attention. 18....2b6 19.2:b6 ab 20.a3. The pawn structure of Black on the queen side lost its elasticity. White now

 the board and not in his calculations, so he decided to offer a draw which was accepted. The final position is rather complicated. In answer to 28,94 Black can try to bing the knight to "f4" via e4 - c5- e6 - f4, and the bishop from "c5" should retreat to "f8" meanwhile, yet objectively White's chances are clearly better.

We are going to have a look now at another approach to this position when White refrains from the bishop check and plays 5.0g/3 instead after 1.e4 e6 2.d4 d5 3.0d2 c5 4.ed ed 5.0g/3. Now Black has 5..0c6, which leads after 6..0c5 Δc6 7. 0-0 to positions with a knight on "e7"; 5...0f6 as well as 5...a6. Black prevents cardinally the enemy bishop manoeuvre to "b5" intending to save a tempo with the bishop in case of 6.dc Δc5 and if 7.0b3 the bishop has a choice to retreat either to "b6" or to "e7". Positions of this type with a bishop on "b6" are perfectly treated by the grandmasters A. Dreev and V. Eingom. Meanwhile the move 5..a6 is played with the idea to push forward the "c" pawn if White continues to develop his pieces.

6. Ae2 c4.



This position is very interesting. White has already developed three pieces white Black has pushed only pawns up to now. Black has gained space and the pawns on "d5" and "c4" restrict the scope of the kriight on "d2". If Black manages to compensate the lack of development, his space

development, his space advantage is bound to play a significant role in the course of the game. I am going to offer you some of my games.

#### Litvinov – Shereshevsky Minsk 1981

7.03 05 The last move is possible now because of the "a6" pawn. 8.44 Δb7. Naturally Black should not push the pawn to "c3" conceding the "d3" square to White. 9.0-0 Δd6. 9...62? wouldn't work because of 10.8e1 cd?? 11.Δb5 mate. 10.bc bc 11.Δa3? This is a characteristic positional mistake. To bc 11.Δa3? This is a characteristic positional mistake in the pawn structure in the centre is definitely mistaken in this position. White leaves the opponent with a "bad" bishop on "b7" which however has excellent perspectives on the diagonal "h3 — c8", while the "good" bishop of White is severely restricted by the pawn chain d5 — c4 and its severely restricted by the pawn chain d5 — c4 and its perspectives are very meagre. If White tries something more energetic like 11.8e1 2e7 12.Δ:c4 after the famous game Geller — Dreev, New York 1990 Black can defend tactically with 12...dc 13.5:c4 Δbd 14.03 Δd5!

11... 2e7 12. ≝c1 2bc6 13. £:d6 ≝:d6 14. £e1 0-0. Black's position is already definitely better, because of the space advantage and the better piece position. 15.c3?! White shouldn't voluntarily weaken the "b3" square, but he tried somehow to bring his "good" bishop into play. 15... £c8

16. Δd1 f6 17. ⊇f1 Δd7! Black is far from being interested in the exchange of the bishops after 17... Δf5 18. Δc2.

# 18. De3 Eab8 19. Ac2 Da5.



20. 233? It is not easy for White to find a sensible course of actions, yet he should have definitely avoided simplifying into an endgame. The possibilities for an active counterplay for White in the endgame are minimal while Black can improve his position at leisure. 20. 21. 21. 23.

\$\tilde{\pi}7 22.\tilde{\pi}22.\tilde{\pi}22 \tilde{\pi}22 \tilde{\pi}22 \tilde{\pi}22 \tilde{\pi}22 \tilde{\pi}22 \tilde{\pi}22 \tilde{\pi}23 \tilde{\pi}23 \tilde{\pi}22 \tilde{\pi}23 \tilde{\pi}23 \tilde{\pi}22 \tilde{\pi}30.\tilde{\pi}37 \tilde{\pi}36 \tilde{\pi}30 \tilde{\pi}37 \tilde{\pi}36 \tilde{\pi}3

31...2:d5 32.£e4+ №6 33.£157 E.157 34.©e4 ED2 35.Ec27. 35.£05+ was more stubborn. 35...Eb1+ 36.Ec1 Ec1+ 37.2:c1 €05+ 38.2:b2 £c6 The fight is practically over now. There still followed: 39.£153 ob 40.€c5+ 2:d6 41.04 €06 42.2:b3 €0:c4 42.0:b4. White resigned.

# Dimitrov - Shereshevsky Primorsko 1988

1.e4 e6 2.d4 d5 3.d22 c5 4.ed ed 5.⊕g/3 a6 6.∆e2 c4 7. 0-0 ∆d6 8.b3 b5 9.Ee1. The reader can get accupianted with the lines after the move 9.a4 in the chapter "Analysis of Actual Games" in the annotations to the game Geller — Shereshevsky 9...∠0-7 10.a4 ∆b7 11.c3 0-0. It is time for making some opening otherwations now. Black has almost finished the development having a definite space advantage. His perspectives are not worse to say the least. 12.4a3? The already familiar mistake. 12...4:a3 13.8:a3 2d6 14.8a1



16.a5 to be able to block the queen side lately with b3 – b4 reducing Black's scope of action. 16..ab 71.Ab £:a1 18.8:a1 £aa £aa €ardually White's position is deteriorating because of the mistake two moves ago. It is evident that you can find some improvements on the following moves of the Bulgarian player, but White's position is already difficult 19.8:b2 £b6 £0.£a1 £ad Black should not exchange the rooks since it might be useful on the open "e" file. 21.2c1 £b7 £g6 £2.g3 £d7 23.2ff £e8 £4.2df 15. Black starts a king-side advance.



29... L'ad3/ Black occupied a lot of space on the whole board and starts the final assault to press his big positional advantage home. The game now follows an almost forced line

30.≝:d3 cd 31.4:a4 ba 32.2\d2 2\end{align\* def 1.2 de the king-side would have been a mistake as you can see in the further course of the game. 32...a3? 133.0b3 Δa4 wouldn't bring anything substantial for Black after 34.0fd2. 33.0b7. If 33.0t1 0bf 34.0e5 Black obtained a decisive advantage with 34...Δb5 35.0e1 a3 36.0b3 2bd.6.

33... 2f5 34. 2f1 2d6 35. 2e5 4e8! 36. 2:d3 4g6! 37. 2e2 f3+! The "f" pawn played its decisive role. White resigned.

# Closed Openings

The majority of my pupils stick to a white square strategy with Black in the closed opening systems they usually choose i.e. the Nimzoviich defence, the Bogoljubov defence if White plays 3.2c13, or the more risky Ragozin defence. Naturally Black should be ready for the Catalan opening if White strass with 1.c4 or 1.2c13 but still the Nimzovitch defence is the main weapon, the cornerstone of the opening strategy of the player for Black. I have treated thoroughly the problem of the formation of the opening repertoire by now and as you know already the purpose of this book is not to duplicate the already existing opening monographs. We are going to study some lines of the Nimzovitch defence in our treatment of the closed openings.

White has the choice of the line against the Nirrao, but still the further course of actions is determined by Black since this opening is so rich in possibilities for both sides that very often some of the lines can lead to a great number of different types of positions. The Nirraovitch defence passed successfully the test of time and White constantly failed to achieve any advantage playing slow unpretentious lines. The systems characterized by an early aggression are getting fashionable lately. A lot of new possibilities for White have been found in

the 4. ac2 system, in the Leningrad variation with 4. ac5, as well as in the lines 4. 2f3 c5 5.g3 or 4.f3. All these lines have been tested, checked and rechecked in the world championship match in 1986 and in the final challengers match in 1990. Black has to solve new problems already but still he usually has the choice to enter an analytical dispute risking finding himself in an unfamiliar situation with a chance to seize the initiative. The other course of action is to avoid pinpoint theoretical discussions opting for some worse but reliable defence with an endgame tendency. We prefer the first approach but we strive for finding something new, still away from the main flow of the information avalanche to avoid being overly dependent on it. Lets start with the line 1.d4 2f6 2.c4 e6 3. ac3 ab4 4. ac2. It was not long ago that this line was considered to be harmless for Black since he had several reliable ways to fight for counterplay with 4...d5, 4...c5 as well as 4...0-0. White managed to find some improvements in all these lines which made Black's life far from easy. The time of the famous games of the type of Keres - Botvinnik, Leningrad 1941 in which after 4...d5 5.cd ed 6. Ag5 h6 7. Ah4 c5 8. O-O-0? 쇼:c3! 9.世:c3 g5 10.쇼g3 cd! 11.世:d4 夕c6 12.발a4 쇼f5 13.e3 Ec8 14.Ad3 #d7 15.@b1 A:d3+ 16.#:d3 #f5 17.e4 @:e4 18.\$a1 0-0 19.8d1 b5 20.\$:b5 @d4 21.\$d3 @c2+ 22. \$\dip b1 \@b4 \text{ and White resigned, has long passed.} Nowadays instead of castling long White plays 8.dc! and although the position is far from clear. White has scored some impressive wins in the games Glek - Yuferov, Moscow 1989 and Kasparov - Kortchnoi, Tilburg 1989. The problems facing Black became obvious The line 4.世c2 c5 often transposes into the Queen's

gambit — the system with early ∆64, which is developing intensely lately with a lot of new ideas.

Therefore we made our choice upon the move 4...0-0. White usually plays 5.a3 and after 5...4:c3+ 6.些:c3 b6 White

tended earlier to play this position in a peaceful manner. The play usually continuer: 7.2/13 Δb7 8.e3 d6 9.Δe2 2bd7 10.

-0.2e4 11.5/e2 f5 and Black had nothing to complain about. The second game of the semiflinal match of the challengers Karpov – Yusupov, London 1989 is a nice illustration of the Black's counterchances in this line. Grandmaster A. Yusupov failed to win this game only due to his time-trouble by the way. You can find this game in the "Chess Informant" 48.

White usually prefers now another course of action starting with 7.495. After 7....467 White plays the aggressive 8.7317. The contemporary opening discussions now revolve around the line 8...h6 9.46h 4 d5. We prefer another line for Black: 8.65 9.6 h 10.3 506.



18...d5 It would be White who is going to have problems, but instead of 16.Δ.c52, 16. 0-0-0 is possible and the arising position would be similar to the one analysed further on. White was far from successful after winning the "g7" pawn. The game continued: 12...2:g7 13.Δ.c8 Ba:d8 14.Δ.c4 d5 15.cd ed 16.Δc2 Efe8 17.272 d4 18.e4 c4 and Black had more than sufficient compensation for the scorticed pawn. After 19.2h3 2a5 20.2h4 Δc6 21.g4 Eb8 22.Efb1 2b3 23.Δ.b3 Eb3 24.2e2 Ed8 25.2c1 Eb6 26.04 Δa4 27.Ea2 Eh6 28.2c1 c3 29.2d3 23.8ct Eb3 21.8bb x won.

Let us check whether Black can try the same idea in answer to 11.£03. To be able to do that Black has first to displace the bishop from "g5" with 11..06 and to 12.Δ14 (White can hardly rely on an advantage after 12.Δ16 ±16 13.±16 g1. The game Onishtuk – Alexandrov, Yurmala 1991 tested this evaluation and ended in a draw.) 12...264 13.4.268 (Now to take the "g7 pawn is utterly enseless.) 13...263 14...467 £168 15.40 €24 16.53 €06 17.0-0.0



I spent some time back in 1889 analysing this position with grandmaster B. Gelfand. Black pieces are concentrated on the queen-side and if Black manages to prepare the move d7 - d5, or exchanges the enemy dark square bishop he will have a satisfactory game otherwise he might get

# cramped.

Analysing with Gelfand I tried to fight the enemy dark square bishop with the help of the manoeuvre 17 – 16 and  $2 \cdot 6$ . do .46 · 17, but all this proved to be rather slow. I failed to find sufficient counterplay for Black. Lately I came to the conclusion that the fight against the dark square bishop on '66' should be successfully done in another way i.e. using the 'b7' square. This fine point involves some tactical play on Black's part. 17... $2 \cdot a \cdot 5 \mid 18...2 \cdot b \mid 2...6 \mid 5 \mid 18...2 \cdot b \mid 1$ 

©c8, d5 etc. If White retreats the bishop to "g3" − 20. £g3 Black plays 20...d5 solving all his problems. I analysed this position with A. Alexandrov and I wanted to prove that Black can try to induce the a3 − a4 pawn move by White, by means of 20...a57! leaving 20...d5 for better times. Here are some of the lines we have been analysing: 21.e4 (21.a4?! d5!) 21...a4 22.24 db 23.a3 a3 + 24.621.



24... 144 (24... a2? 25.c5!)
25.Ec1 1.03 26.c5 d6 27.c6
4.44 28.1.46 14.c6 29.b5 245
30.1.46 20.54 31.1.42 2.cc+
32.Ec1 1.65 33.1.07 Ea7
34.Ec7 1.64+ 35.1.21 e5. After
36... 146 next Black has excellent chances for a win.

Besides this line we have an entirely different scheme in

reserve. The game Kasparov – Hjartarson was played in 1988 in Reykiavik. The opening stage of this game was played in the following way: 4.5c2 0-0 5.a3 \(\delta\):c3+ 6.25:c3 \(\delta\):c3+ 6.25:c3+ 6.25:c3 \(\delta\):c3+ 6.25:c3



The grandmaster from cleand played in this position 12...a6?! and after 13...4.d3 h6 14...4.l4 %e7 15. 0-0 the world-champion won convincingly. Annotating this game in the "Chess Informant" 46 G. Kasparov mentioned that in case of 12...h6 13...4.14 %e7 he would have castled long with

the idea of a later king-side advance g4 – g5. It came to my mind that Black should probably play in the diagrammed position the retural move 12...Be6. Black threatens to take the "d5" pawn and after 13.0-Q0 off promises some initiative. Black should hardly be afraid of moves like 13.8.£1, 13...£40 at 13...£2. In the first case 13....66 is possible, in the second case 13....66 is the answer, while in the third case 13...£23 th. 0-0 Δa6!? should suffice. Evidently the lotelandic GM was afraid of 13...£61? and decided to prevent it with 12...a6. In fact White now threatens to take on "d7" or "f6" and after 13...£35 –14..£b3. £67 15..£45 seems to be very dangerous at first sight. Black has however a nice tactical solution: 15...£95! 16..£35 c4 17..£31 203 18..£71 £...£51 59.ed.



Now Black can win opponent's queen at the expense of a rook and a piece. After 19... 2e1 + 20.1±:e1 €2:e1 21.8±e1 €3 the material advantage is on White's advantage is on White's Black can refrain from capturing the queen playing 21... 18±c5 with a seemingly qood compensation

for the sacrificed piece. This position requires however some additional analytical work.

White can play 14. \(\begin{array}{c}\)d2 instead of 14. \(\begin{array}{c}\)b3. Black is forced to retreat with the queen − 14...\(\begin{array}{c}\)6.8. The play can continue with 15. 0-0-0 \(\theta\)c7 16.4.c7 \(\beta\)c47 17.\(\beta\)c6 266 18.\(\beta\)6 be 619.\(\beta\)hd 16 with an approximately equal ending.

The next variation that we are going to deal with, treats the line starting with  $4.\Delta g s$ . The most logical move of Black is 4..h f. White retreats  $5.\Delta h f$ . After  $5.\Delta h f$ 6 Black should better play  $5...\Delta h c 3 + recommended$  by Alekhine in his

commentaries to some game, since White can play 6.£c1 in answer to 5....\(\frac{1}{2}\):f.6. \(\frac{5}{2}\)...\(\frac{6}{5}\). This is the logical continuation. The white bishop has lost the control over the diagonal "c1 - h6" and Black starts his counter-play on this diagonal accordingly. \(\frac{6}{3}\). Bos 55?. Now Black's play in the spirit of the Bluemenfeld gambit is more than well grounded.



White has the choice now between 7.de and 7.e4. We are going to start with the first possibility. 7.de fe 8.cb d5 9.e3 0-0

10.≙d3. The move 10.♠f3 vanished from the tournament practice after the famous game Spassky – Tal, Tallin 1973. I am going to include it here without

comments, since the reader can find it annotated in the book "in the Heat of Attack" about M. Tal's brilliant chess legacy.

10...\$\tilde{a}\$5 11.\tilde{\tilde{a}}\$16 \tilde{a}\$16 12.\tilde{a}\$272 and 13.ba \$\tilde{c}\$\tilde{c}\$06 14.\tilde{a}\$26 41 5.ed \$\tilde{a}\$13 16.\tilde{a}\$13 cd 17. 0-0 dc 18.bc \$\tilde{a}\$\tilde{c}\$3 19.\tilde{a}\$16 \tilde{a}\$26 20.\tilde{a}\$16 \tilde{a}\$14 21.\tilde{a}\$16 \tilde{a}\$16 22.\tilde{a}\$16 \tilde{a}\$16 25.\tilde{a}\$28.\tilde{a}\$16 24.\tilde{a}\$15 \tilde{a}\$26 26.\tilde{a}\$16 \tilde{a}\$17 27 \tilde{a}\$18 \tilde{a}\$28.\tilde{a}\$13 \tilde{c}\$27 288.\tilde{a}\$13.\tilde{c}\$18 \tilde{a}\$13.\tilde{c}\$18 \tilde{a}\$13.\tilde{c}\$18 \tilde{a}\$13.\tilde{c}\$18 \tilde{a}\$13.\tilde{c}\$18 \tilde{a}\$13.\tilde{c}\$18 \tilde{a}\$13.\tilde{c}\$18 \tilde{a}\$13 \tilde{c}\$18 \tilde{a}\$18 \tilde{a}\$13 \tilde{c}\$18 \tilde{a}\$18 \tilde{a}\$18

So 10.a.d3 after all. I met this move first in my game against A. Yuneev at the Championship of the Armed Forces in 1981 in Odessa. I played 10...a6. The immediate 10...d4 deserved some merit as well. 11.ba?! White was afraid of the move 11...c4 regaining the sacrificed pawn but still 11.Ωe2 was preferable.

11...d4l 12.ed cd 13.a3 dcl 14.ab cb 15.8b1 A:a6 16 A:a6 #:d1+ 17 @:d1 A:a6



As a consequence of an almost forced mass annihilation the game turned into an endgame which is a bit unpleasant for White. In this position White played 18.8:b2 and...a draw was agreed?! The point was that this game was played in the last round and the outcome of this dame was

immaterial to my tournament performance. The move 18.8:b2 was imprecise by the way. White should have better played 18.£.b6 of 19.£b2. Black could in this case recapture his pawn with 19.£.bb8 with an eventual draw despite the slight edge, or play 19.-€c7f? 20.£b1 €b5 keeping up the tension. Anyway, White had to fight for the draw in both cases. The game Yuneev – Shereshevsky found a reliable follower in my student – Olea Romanov.

### Mozhinsky – Romanov Minsk 1988

18.B:b2?! �d5 19.b5 �c5 20.�e2 Ea1+ 21.�c1 �d3 22.Bc2 �5b4 23.Bc7 �a2 24.£e7 E:f2 25.£a3 �a:c1 26.£:c1



Black showed an excellent attacking performance up to now and could easily finish off the game with 26...Baa2! White has nothing better than 27.b6, but 27...Bfe2 comes next. Now White has the pathetic choice between losing immediately with 28.Bf1 Be1+1 or losing a piece

after 28.♠63 8:e3 29.b7 €/2+ 30.₾c1 8b3. Romanov played instead 26...8bf? but nevertheless managed to win the technical endgame arising after 27.g3 8:b5 28.8c2 8d5 29.♠63 €65+30.©cf 8f3 3f.8c2 €04 32.8hc1 e5.



The seemingly insecure position of the black king is the first thing to notice in the diagrammed position. If we try to envisage the future development we can see that White will hardly be able to organize an attack while Black's position has a lot of merits to its credit; an extra pawn, a big if

not decisive advantage of the pawn structure on the queenside and most of all the complete lack of coordination of the White pieces and particularly the impossibility of the rook on "h1" to successfully participate in the action due to the poor position of the king. After 14.8ct Black should avoid returning with the queen to "f6", but he should play instead 14...#b21 in complete harmory with the famous by now advices of Znosko — Borovskii. Now 15.8:c5? d6 16.8:c8 fails because of 16.8:c9.5+ and in case of 15.8:b1 Black now retreats to "f6" i.e. 15...16 gaining a tempo for the further development of the bishop to "f5". I played this position with White way back in 1967 in some school competition against Sergey Makary-tchev and since then I prefer to play it with Black.

I think we should better finish with the Leningrad variation for now and turn our attention to the main line starting with the move 4.63. This is going to help us find the most important point of Black's strategy in the Nimzovitch defence which is the comerstone of our understanding of the closed openings.

#### Dydyshko – Korzubov Minsk 1983

1.d4 2f6 2.c4 e6 3.2f3 d5 4.2c3  $\Delta$ b4 5.e3 c5 6. $\Delta$ d3  $\Delta$ c6 7. 0-0 0-0 8.e3  $\Delta$ :c3 9.bc  $\cong$ c7. This looks like the famous, almost banal "tabia". We prefer however to play immediately 9... $\cong$ c7 (instead of the usual 9...dc first) restriction the choice of the opponent.

10.cd ed 11. 2h4.



recommendations but this modification of the Botvinnik system (with a knight on "h4" instead of on "e2") seems to be rather artificial.

White follows the theoretical

11... <u>#a51?</u> This is the result of some teamwork opening preparation of the author and P. Korzubov. Black tries to dis

coordinate the enemy pieces and entice them to unfavourable squares while defending the "c3" pawn.

12...b2 (As for the move 12...bd2 – look at the next game.)
12...c4 13...bc2 Be8 14...be1 De71. The strategical fight is pro
and con the White plan including the pawn advances 12 – 13
and e3 – e4. Korzubov intended to meet 15.f3 with a pawn
attack at the enemy knight 15...g5. There could follow –
16...bc3 h 61.74 De 15...bc3 d 419.bc4 if 53 d 49...bc4 if 5...bc4



Black gained some space and disorganized the enemy central breakthrough but weakened his own king position and lost some piece coordination. White should have played this principled continuation though, with the idde to exploit Black's positional defects with 20.13. I strongly

recommend the reader to analyse this position extensively.

V. Dydyshko decided to fulfil his plan with all the convenience and played 15.h3? to control the "g4" square but missed an important counter-measure. 15...#671 Black noortols the "d3" souare seizing the initiative permanently.

16. ≝b1 △d7 17. Be1 ②e4! White lost the opening dispute. The only thing he was left with was to patiently observe how the opponent was gradually increasing the pressure.

18.8e2 a5! Excellently played. The rook from "a8" will join the king-side action along the 6th rank.

19.⊕f3 ⊕g6 20.≌h1 ≦a6 21.≝g1 ≝c8 22.≝h2 ≦f6. It looks like storm clouds are gathering over the head of the White monarch. 23.£:e4 de 24.⊕g1 ⊕h4 25.≦f1 8h6.



26.f4. Black's strategical initiative graduated into a direct king-side attack. White makes a desperate try to get out of the squeeze but suffers a tactical refutation.

26...ef 27.gf ②g6! 28.\(\delta\)g2 \(\delta\):h3+! 29.\(\delta\):h3 \(\delta\):h3 \(\delta\):h3 \(\delta\)f4+ 31.ef \(\delta\):e2+ 32.\(\delta\)g3 \(\delta\):h3+ 33.\(\delta\):h3 \(\delta\):b2 The

tactical phase of the game is over. The arising rook endgame, with an extra pawn for Black, is rather prosaic. Korzubov wins it easily:

34.Ee1 2/8 35.a4 Ec2 36.Ee3 Ea2 37.2/94 E:a4 38.2/15 Ea2 39.2/e5 Eg2 40.2/d5 a4 41.2/:c4 a3 White resigned. An excellent example of a creative endeavour by Korzubov!

# A. Schneider – Shereshevsky Budapest 1991

The first eleven moves were repeated after the previous game, but now the Hungarian player tried 12.4d2 instead of 12.4b2. There followed 12...0e4 13.4e1. 13.4:e4 de 14.c4 was not to be recommended after 14. #d8.



#### 13...c4 14. Ab1.

14... £'d8! Just like in the previous game, the retreat of the black queen is very effective. 15.93. 15.13 wouldn't work after 15... £0:c3, while 15. £h5 would be met simply by 5... £e8. 15... £h3 16.0g2 f5. Black has successfully

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prevented the pawn advance e3 - e4 and starts to concentrate his forces in the centre.

17.≦a2 ≝d7 18.f3 ᡚf6 19.Eaf2 ≦fe8 20.止d2 ≦e7 21.≦fe1 £:g2 22. ⊈:g2 ≦ae8 23. £c2 ᡚd8 24. ≝b1 g6.



25.8fe2?! This move seems to be rather mechanical and allows the opponent to easily accomplish the right piece dislocation. 25.8fb4 was a must to prevent the manoeuvre 20d8 – 17- d6, although Black would have better chances anyway.

25... 2f7 26. 2b4 2d6. All black pieces are concentrated

upon the "e4" square. Black in fact intends to occupy it after the pawn advance g6 - g5 - g4. Accordingly White plays 27.147, but this instead of being a remedy turns out to be a hara-kiri. 27...f4! Black exploits the newly created king-side weaknesses immediately and sacrificing a pawn develops a winning king-side attack.



30...2g7! The saying goes that the threat looks even more dangerous than its execution. Sometimes while attacking it is useful to make a pause when you don't possess any direct threats to let the opponent play something. Black look away his king from the eventual checks

along the diagonal "a2 – g8" keeping up all the advantages of his position putting up some additional sting to the threats ₺f6 or ₺f5. The game continued for only two more moves.

31.當f2? 增h3! 32.增:d6 增h2+ White resigned because the mate after 33.增e3 直:e4+ 34.fe 增g3# is unavoidable.

# "One-Game Openings"

Every chess player knows that sometimes when you play a tournament there arises a situation when you are White in the next game and you have to play for a win, that win for you is a must but the opening repertoire of the opponent is worked out in some variation to a pinpoint precision. You get frightened that right after the opening the position might not be favourable for you or what is worse it might be so "wild" that you can hardly rely on a successful outcome. Some other situations are possible as well. For example, you are convinced that you are superior to your opponent in almost all components of our favourite complex game but you don't want to make the next round a futile competition of memory and knowledge about some sharp forced variation. You would like somehow to accentuate the focus of the fight on the other stages of the game and not necessarily on the opening. For emergency cases like that it might be very handy if you have an opening variation or a system fitting the task before you up your sleeve.

We are going now to have a close look at systems like that which we are going to call "one-game openings". Why "one-game"...? I would like to prevent you from thinking to set on the road that looks easy and alluring but is in fact a very hard one. You must have your own concepts and evaluations in all these lines, sometimes they might include a lot of forced

moves though, different from the established common knowledge theory. Otherwise this approach would not be helpful at all. The work you have to put in all this to be able to play these "one-game" systems is incomparably less that the one needed for your general opening preparation. Thus your results might improve substantially. The young player might be tempted sometimes by the relatively easy and quick success playing systems like this. The coach should be however more far-sighted. He should try to explain to his pupil that the opponents might get used to this opening approach, in case the young player sticks only to these systems setting

aside the opening preparation on the basic repertoire. Besides, this includes the risk to sometimes go astray in the opening stage for long (remember the "Sveshnikov-case" we discussed some pages before). The work, the analyses you make on a variation like this will be very useful for the enlargement of your opening enudition and might be extremely useful for one or two games in a tournament where the outcome of them will be of paramount importance to you. Well, indeed you might not get an opening advantage every time you play an "one-game" opening but it certainly will develop a finer sense of opening feeling. The "one-game" openings can appear in multiple forms. Sometimes they can be systems that you play for the other side i.e. you might try to make good use of the extra tempo. In fact what you are striving for, by playing "one-game" openings, psychological effect. For example your opponent plays with White only 1.e4, while with Black in answer to 1.d4 he plays only the King's Indian defence. Now, you can start the game in the following way: 1.d4 2f6 2.2f3 a6 3.4f4 4a7 4.e3 0-0 5. Le2 d6 6.h3. You are playing the Reti opening with colours reversed and an extra tempo. Your opponent is sure that he is playing the King's Indian defence. The play might continue like this: 6... 2bd7 (6...b6 would have been more flexible) 7. 00 **增e8** Black is stubbornly trying to push the "e" pawn. **8.a4!** e5 9.**点**h2 **增e7 10.a5!** and Black is already under pressure.



Black's queen-side is not developed at all in comparison with the Reti opening, in which White has by now managed to develop the bishop on "b2", besides White succeeded to save a tempo for the c2 – c3 move (c7 – c6 with Black) and can push forward the "c" pawn two squares forward

immediately followed by development of the knight to "c3" next. The chances of White in the diagrammed position are definitely preferable.

We are going to study now the opening 1.d4 2f6 2.4g5.

Sometime ago I spent a lot of my free time on writing the book "Endgame Strategy". Doing this I was working as a coach and I played sometimes in tournaments as well. I had practically no time left to study and analyse the current opening information nevertheless I was working hard on classics and I preferred to read the books treating the chess legacy of the old masters, instead of studying the current "Chess Informant". Therefore I made a decision to give up with White temporarily the move 2.c4 after 1.d4 2-fi6 and started playing only 2.6/13 or 2.4/25 relying much more on the middle game and the endgame. Little by little that led me to forming "my own" opening theory, white my practical results strangely enough improved. After all that, when my work on "Endgame strategy" was over, I fell back on 2.c4.

So 1.d4 2f6 2.4g5. Black is faced with a real strategical problem on move two already. White intends to capture on

"f6" and then, depending on which pawn Black captures with, to choose the further course of actions.

Black has at his disposal a lot of options to choose from, but he must decide first whether to allow the exchange on "16" or not. If Black decides to prevent the exchange he can play 2...2e4 or 2...e6, while if he is not afraid of the exchange — 2...d5 or 2...c5. Lets start with variations including White's chopping off the knight on "16".

1.d4 ②f6 2.4g5 c571 think that this move has much more drawbacks than merits. Thus Black must take on "16" with the "g" pawn and I happen to be rather skeptical to a decision of this sort. 3.4cf6. The most logical continuation, although moves like 3.d5 or 3.9cc3 are also possible. I will offer the reader a really "wild" came of mine acainst V. Zhelyandinov:

### Shereshevsky - Zhelyandinov Lvov 1977

1.d4 名)6 2.众g5 c5 3.d5 智rb6 4.名c3 智rb2 5.允d2 智rb6 6.e4 d6 7.14 e6 8.起b1 智d8 9.允b5+ 允d7 10.de fe 11.e5 de 12.fe 2d5 13.允d3 Δc6 14.智g4 2b4 15.2ge2 2d34 16.0d 2d3 16.17.智e6+ 智67 18.智h3 2c7 19. 0-0 智e6 20 智g3 0-0-0 21.显be1 Δe7 22.名l4 智d7 23.智rg7 昌内县 24.智rh7 副各 25.智7 国际8 26.智7 30.智1 25.智7 国际8 24.智元4 30.党h1 章:h2+ 31.党;h2 国际8 32.党h3 and Black lost on time



3...gf. In case of 3...ef 4... co Slack is going to have some problems with the "d" pawn. 4.d5!

White seems to be forced to keep the pawn structure in the centre on the dark squares, after the exchange of the dark square bishop, to be able to restrict the enemy bishop. Here however, it is much more important to occupy space and to put in a wedge in the opponent's position to hamper the coordination between his pieces on both wings, 4... #b6 This is how the game Shereshevsky - Kapengut, Minsk 1981 continued: 5.#c1 protected. 7... \$\alpha a7 8. \Dc3 f5 9. \Dae2. The capture 3...af took away the pawn protection of the "h5" square. The White knight intends to embed there. 9...h5 10.h4. Naturally White does not intend to allow that pawn to move any further. Now, in place of a weak square. Black has a weak pawn. 10...e5. What Black has to do now to coordinate his pieces of the queen-side and the king-side? A. Kapengut is trying to vacate the sixth rank but as A. Nimzovitch mentioned goodhumouredly - you can compare the weakness of the doubled pawns with the limping of a person sitting down. You can't tell he is a cripple, while he remains stationary. Whenever the pawns are pushed forward weaknesses become abundant. Now the "f5" pawn becomes very vulnerable.

11. �g3 ≝g6.



How should White continue now? 12.a3 d6 13.\(\frac{4}{15}\)C2 looks very strong, followed by castling long. White can try further to induce the move e5 – e4 and to use the "f4" outpost. White has something much more decisive however.

12.d6!! A really powerful blow. The "d6" pawn is cutting

Black's position as if in two parts, which are impossible to connect once again until the pawn remains intact. Now the fight revolves around the "d6" pawn and a hard one at that.



Black has finally found a way to displace the enemy knight from "b5". He is ready now to retreat with the knight to the initial square to be able to play a7 – a6 next. White should play energetically, otherwise the realization of his advantage might get complicated. 22/3/1 It is necessary to open the

position. 22.♠e2 is weaker and too routine at that. 22..♠b8. The capture of the pawn 22...ef 23.gf ♣.f3 24.♠e2 is practically hopeless for Black. Kapengut playing his last move is trying to comblicate the matters at all costs.



In my happy old days when I was a child I knew only the basics of the chess science and I could have never thought that chess was going to become my life-long occupation, so I was getting much greater pleasure in the process of playing then. I remember that sometimes I managed to accomplish a

knight-fork simultaneously on the king and the queen, at other times being luckier the fork was even triple i.e. the king, the queen and some rook were attacked, but unfortunately I had never managed to capture everything. I had never succeeded however "to fork" at the same time all the four major pieces of the opponent. Now I was playing a tournament game with a strong master at that, and for the first and much rather a last time in my life, I managed to accomplish this. Well, now Black could resign immediately, but he dragged on with: 35... \$\text{\text{\text{\text{cys}}} 7 36.\text{\

39... 2/6 40. 2:e7 ⊈:e5 41.8:d7 8/6 42.8d2 ⊈e4 43. 2d5 8/1+ 44.⊈c2 and here Black finally resigned.

Lets turn our attention now to the most solid continuation – 2...d5 3.4.f6 ef. The game Shereshevsky – A. Donchenko, Lvov 1977 put to the test the other capture – 3...gf.

After 4.g3 c5 5.e3 ±b6 6.⊕c3 e6 7.±b1 ⊕c6 8.⊕f3 ∆d7 9.∆g2 cd 10.ed Black played here 10...±a6. There arose now a peculiar psychological situation. In positions of this type, when the "h5" square has been weakened, the knight manoeuvre from "c3" to "f4" looks rather tempting. 11.a3 seems very natural followed by 12.⊕e2, 13. 0-0, 14.⊌14 next. I tried to involve myself deeply in the strategical aspects of the

11....2a5 12...2a7 3b5 13.a3/? This was an interesting pawn sacrifice. Surely 13.aa1 was simple enough, as well as 13.0.0, but the move in the game looked to me much more promising. 13....2a3 14.2a3 Ae7. White would have an excellent positional compensation for the sacrificed pawn after 14....2b4 15.0.0 Ac3 16 bc.

15. 0-0 b4 16. ②e2.



Time to make some opening conclusions. White has finished his development and is ready to fight for the initiative in the centre and the king-side. Black's position has to its credit an extra pawn and the pair of bishops. The black king however is stuck in the middle of the board and will find no

safe haven on either wings and that is bound to bring Black a lot of troubles. It is not easy to evaluate this position precisely but in a practical game over the board is much easier to play with White and usually more rewarding.

16... 208?!. Donchenko intends to bring the knight to "d6" but this manoeuvre seems to be too lavish in the aspect of time. Well, as I already mentioned, to play this position with Black is much harder than with White. 17.8fe1 ②b7 18.8°e3! White's queen is headed for the "h6" square adding to the pressure on the "e" file on the road. 18...h57 11.9.24 ②d6 20.②d2! The squares for any type of aggression on the part of the black knight are well protected beforehand. The threat now is 21.6.3°t 24.5 2.9.4°c.

20...Bc8 21.Ba1. Only about five moves have passed and the position has turned from unclear into a winning one for White. 21...Bb5 22.Ba7 f5. In case of 22...Bc2 the knight-serifice on "efi" would have been decision.

23.Δff ±b8?! 24.8ea1 ≥b5 25.87a5 ±68 26.€b3 Δf6?
Black has prepared an evacuation for his king to "g7" but he has weakened the "c5" square in the process. The final assault by White is picturesque:

27. ②c5 Ae8 28. A:b5 A:b5 29. ②c:e6+! fe 30. 营:e6 启h6 31. E:b5. Black resigned.

We are going now to look at the capture on "16" with the other pawn 3..ef. Now this position can be treated in a more or less schematic way. White usually tries to develop his pieces in a way like: e2 – e3, &d3, &d2, &d13, or 11173, &e2 followed by c2 – c4. Black usually reacts with a pawnarrangement on "66" and "15" and then bringing the kinglik &b8 – d7 – f6 – e4. In answer to the move c2 – c4 Black exchanges on "c4" and obtains a comfortable counterplay on the white squares "d5" and "e4" in the centre. I mentioned before that in the eighties I put away the "Chess Informants" and turned my attention to good old classics. I found a very amusing concept in A. Alekhine's comments to some game –I guess it was from the tournament book about Bled 1931, which I had borrowed for several days. I don't even remember the anams of the players. In positions of this tyne the World.

Champion No. 4 considered it a necessity to prepare the pawn advance c2-c4 with c2-c5 beforehand, to be able to take on "c4" with a pawn if Black exchanges on "c4", otherwise White can push the "c" pawn to "c5" and start the pawn advance on queen-side with b3-b4, a2-a4, b4-b5. Now comes the question what would be the most rational piece allocation to realize the aforementioned plan?

piece airocation to retailze the airocrementioned pian? It is not quite clear whether White needs his bishop on "d3" then. May be it is more sensible to develop it on "g2". If Black exchanges d5:c4 – b3:c4 the position of the white bishop on "g2" would be unconditionally favourable for White because the "b7" pawn will come under attack. On the other hand if Black refrains from taking on "c4",  $\Delta$ g2 will have mainly defensive functions particularly if the "c" pawn goes to "c5". The position is of a closed type indeed, so the bishop will have plenty of time to be brought to the "f1 – a6" diagonal to prepare the pawn breakthrough b3 – b4 – b5 on the queenside. To be able to find the optimal disposition of pieces, however I needed a lot of tournament practice which was exactly what I was short of .

Some positions after the pawn exchange do — bc I managed to try in practice indeed, but positions in which Black avoided to exchange I had only to analyse. We are going to have a look now at some games after the exchange and after that some basic lines of my analyses the pawn exchange notwithstanding.

### Shereshevsky – Ilinsky Moscow 1979

1.d4 ᡚf6 2.fg5 d5 3.f.:f6 ef 4.e3 fe7 5.g3 0-0 6.fg2 c6 7.ᡚd2 fe6 8.ᡚe2 ᡚd7 9. 0-0 ge8 10.b3 f5 11.c4 ᡚf6 12.a3 dc?



Black's play in the opening stage of this game left a lot to be desired. The development of the bishop to "er" was dubious, the early castling was without too much sense, but all this could be called a trifle. Black's last move however, the pawn exchange is a grave positional blunder which orants White an

almost decisive positional advantage.

13.bc <u>#a57!</u> 14.<u>#c2</u> <u>Bad8</u> 15.<u>Bfb1</u> <u>Ac8</u> 16.c5! Black has nothing to put against the opponents pressure on the queenside. The bishops are temporarily jobless and the "d5" outpost can serve only as a spiritual consolation.



White is an exchange up with a better position. The realization of the advantage does not require too hard an effort. The game continued:

40.E:e1 些:e1+ 41. 世f1. Black resigned.

#### Shereshevsky – Litvinov Minsk 1989

1.d4 f5 2.\$a5. The magic bishop move to "q5" is possible against the Dutch defence as well. Its tactical validity lies in the following line: 2...h6 3.4h4 a5 4.4a3 f4? 5.e3 e5 6.ef ef 7.4:f4 qf 8.堂h5+ 堂e7 9.堂e5+. 2... ②f6?! Now this move is a mistake. In comparison with the position where the other black pawn is on "f7" instead of "f6", Black is deprived from the knight manoeuvre 2b8 - d7 - f6 - e4. The right answer to the bishop move is 2...d5. 3.4:f6 ef 4.e3 c6 5. 2d2. Black's last move seems to be a real provocation. White could push the "c" pawn now without any preparation, but after 5.c4 d5 it would have been premature to play 6.c5 because of 6...b6, while playing 6.b3 would lead to weaknesses on the gueenside and I decided to sidestep the studying of the consequences of this move for the time-being. White decided to keep up to the text of the song memorized before: 5...d5 6.g3 Ad6 7.Ag2 Ae6 8. De2 Dd7 9.b3.



White was reluctant to castle king-side before his opponent, learing some attack on the "h" line. Therefore I was following A. Alekhine's recommended plan leaving temporarily the king in the centre. 9....206 10.25cf 11.a3 Ec8 12. 0-0 I decided now that my actions on the oueen-side would be much

more effective than the eventual counter-measures of my opponent on the other side and it was time to castle.

12...g5 13.c4 Δb8 14.a4 dc. After this exchange White adds to his positional pluses, but what could the good advice for Black be? After 14...h5 15.a5 公a8 16.cd cd 17.增b2 White

was much ahead of his opponent in the development of his initiative. 15.bc ±17 16.c5 2d5 17. ±102 15 18.±101 ±17 19.£3 45 7.V. Litvinov intends to oppose the onslaught with a mechanical barrier, i.e. pawn on "a5" and knight on "b4", but his plan is blown by a tactical mine. It was worth to consider 19...h4 to get some practical counter-chances. 20.2e4 €1f47! Black relied on this having played his previous move. There was some merit in the desperation counter-attack starting with 20...f4?, but to do this Black should have foreseen that 20...£04 turned his position hopeless. 21.ef 4.c4.



22.d5! This positional pawn sacrifice enables White to suddenly include all his pieces in a king-side attack. Black's attention was turned almost entirely to the queen-side, and there he was more than successful, but the king-side has been left utterly defenseless.

have to mention though that by playing 2.4g2 White was constantly obliged to look up and find a lot of non-standard, creative decisions.

22...gf?! The sudden change of the character of the position affected Litvinov badly and he suffered from despair and time-trouble at the same time. He lost in fact in several moves only. Black would have hardly managed to save the game after 22...Δ.d5 23.Δ.d5 42.40.d4, but this line would give Black more chances after all.

23.d6! Now the dark square bishop is out of play and the white rooks get an outpost on the "e7" square.

23... ♠a7 24. ♠:f4 ₾f8. 24... ♠:c5 is also hopeless for Black after 25 Be1+ and 26 Be7

25.后83 后88 26.后:e8+ 性:e8 27.世:f6+ 位g8 28.世:f5. Black resigned.

### Shereshevsky – Barkovsky Minsk 1981

1.d4 ⊕f6 2.£q5 d5 3.£.f6 ef 4.e3 £f5 5.£d3. Black developed his bishop a little bit too early, so White was delighted to deprive Black of his two bishops advantage immediately.

5... Ag6 6. De2 Ad6 7. 0-0 Dc6?!



Now White gets his chance to compromise the pawn structure of the opponent on the other side as well. 8.405/ In positions in which the opponent has the two bishops advantage it is very important to exchange his knight, i.e. leave him with two bishops only, without any knights. You could have been

convinced of this if you have studied well the game Shereshevsky – Beliavsky from the chapter about the Nimzovitch defence. If we make for example the following moves:



1.d4 & f6 2.\$\textit{2.\$\textit{4.6}}\$ 5 d5 3.\$\textit{4.6}\$: 66 5.g3 f5 6.\$\textit{4.6}\$ 2 \$\textit{4.6}\$ 67 .\$\textit{6.6}\$ 0-0 8. 0-0 \$\textit{0.6}\$ 0-0 8. 0-0 8. 0-0 \$\textit{0.6}\$ 0-0 8. 0-0 8. 0-0 \$\textit{0.6}\$ 0-0 8. 0-0 8. 0-0 8. 0-0 8. 0-0 8. 0-0 8. 0-0 8. 0-0 8. 0-0 8. 0-0 8. 0-0 8. 0-0 8. 0-

Now, it would be a grave positional blunder for Black in the diagrammed position to exchange the knights with 11...⊕:d2? 12.≝:d2. White will easily handle the opponents attack on the "e" file, protecting the "e3" pawn. It is quite enough for this to bring the king to "t2" and the rook to "e1" if necessary. White will be able to pinpoint the defects of the exchange of the knights with the move f3 — f4! at some moment and this will make the Black's pair of bishops useless. The drawback of the move f3 — f4 is the weakening of the "e4" square, but Black will be left with nothing to exploit with. He doesn't have a knight, does he? White is going to continue his queen-side advance bringing the "c" pawn to "c5" and the rest is already familiar. As for the game we are dealing with:

8...0-0 9.4:c6 bc 10.⊘c3 £b8 11.b3 ☎c8 12.②f4. Now White is firm in his intention to exchange one of the bishops.

12....68 13...04 255 14. © 196 hg 15. 2631 255 16.64?

This seems to go a little bit too far, but still it is the right way to defend from getting mated. White is weakening the "e3" pawn as well as the "e4" square, but the opponent has no knight to make any use out of it. Additionally White has some other possibilities of play connected with the manoeuvre £11 – 13 – h3. On the other hand the natural move 16.93 would enable Black to get an initiative on the king-side following the scheme: g6 – g5 – q4 g7 – g6, 2g7, 2h8 etc. 16....5e8 White will meet 16....5 with 17.265.

17.Ef3 Ee7? Black fails to understand what the opponent is about and weakens the last rank hampering the scope of his own bishop at that.

18.Eh3. It was highly probable that the immediate 18.c4!? was better to answer 18...dc 19.bc Bb4 20.c5 E:a4 with 21.Bb3. Black would have to play 20...Ee8 21.cd E:a4, but after 22.dc White would have all the chances for a quick win.

18... **世명4 19.c4 dc 20.bc Eb4 21.a3.** Now already 21.c5 **Be8 22.cd B**:a4 23.dc doesn't look so convincing at least because of 23... 世d7

23... 2:c4 24. 2b1 발e6. An only move. 25. 발g3! g5 White threatened to mate after 26. 自b8+ &f8 27. 自h8+ 합:h8 28. 直:f8+ 합h7 29. 발h4#.

26. #33! With another mating threat. 26...g6 27.Æ9 #45 28.Ee6+ ½97 29.Ebb8 gf? Black was in a grave time trouble and failed to find the "only" defence. After the correct 29...£c1+ 30.½12 #32+ 31.½62 #52+ 32.½:62 \$3.1g f6 White would have all his charces to win with an extra exchange, but still he would have a long way to go. Now all ends with a mate – 30.Eg8+ ½h6 31.Eh8+ ½g5 32.h4+ ½g4 33.#h3#.

Lets study now positions arising after Black avoids the exchange of the white bishop for the knight for "f6".

3.Δh g5. The most principled answer. Sometimes Black plays here 3...c5, 3...d5 and even 3...c6. After 3...c5 White should better play 4.f3. 4.6/21 is also possible as in the game from this book – Shereshevsky – Mordasov. The right answer to 4.0/21 is 4...d5! with a good game for Black. After 4.f3, in the game Shereshevsky – Gufeld, Daugavpits 1978, Black played 4...0/61? If we compare this position with that one after 1.d 4.0/6 2.Δg5 c5 White has now a bishoon 'h4' and a pawn on 'f3'. Now the exchange 5.Δ.f6, contrary to 3.Δ.f6, is unfavourable for White since Black can answer 5...ef! with impurity, as for the other exchange 6.dc Δ.c5 now or afterwards, it is totally outside of the dotor's prescriptions,

because of the gaping holes along the diagonal "31-a7". In my game with E. Gufeld the position looked more or less like some strange Sicilian defence after  $5.2c_3$  od 6.12:44  $2c_66$  7.2d  $2c_6$   $2c_6$  2



White has in the diagrammed position a seemingly good compensation for the sacrificed pawn but still it needs a practical test. If White is not apt to play so sharply and sacrifice a pawn he can try the move 5.c3. The play might continue 5...1256 6.1212 d5 7.c3 \text{ \text{ AS } 6.24 \text{ \text{ AG } 6.95e2} \text{ \text{ } 9.44 \text{ \text{ } 6.95e2} \text{ } 9.96e2

with a rather interesting and complicated position. Well, such a method of development requires practice too.

Instead of 3...c5, another possibility is 3...d5 4.f3 2d6. This was played in the games Shereshevsky – Kupreichik, Minsk 1979 and Shereshevsky – Tukmakov, Moscow 1981. In the first game after 5.2c3 Black played imprecisely 5...c6 6.e4 ½%6 7.8b1 g6 8.4k2 obtained a very bad position and lost. Tukmakov played much more energetically – 5...c5! 6.dc 2√5 7.4k2 d4! with more than sufficient compensation for the pawn. The game ended with a convincing win for Black. White's fifth move was unsatisfactory. Instead of 5.2c3?! White should play 5.c3!. Now the move 5...c5 6.dc 2√5 7.4k2.

is not strong at all, since White controls the "d4" square. On the other hand White has a lead in development with a good chances to seize the initiative.

Finally, the move 3...c6 is connected with a trap. Black intends with 4... \$\mathbb{2}a5+\$ and 5... \$\mathbb{2}h5\$ to compromise the pawn structure of the opponent. Now 4.c3 is the simplest solution although there might be some other moves too.

Lets go back to the move 3...g5. The game can proceed with: 4.f3 gh 5.fe c5 6.e3.



The diagrammed position is very peculiar with its nonstandard pawn structure for both sides. There is no theory here like in the good old Ruy Lopez, or the Queen's Gambit. There is an old game Bondarevsky — Bolesłavsky, Moscow 1945, which is included in all the theoretical books and it

is the reason that this position has been evaluated in favour of Black. After 6...Δh 6 7.\(\text{m}\)2 \\ \text{\sigma}\)2 \\ \text{\colorable}\)2 \\ \text{\colorable}\)4 \\ \text{\colorable}\)3 \\ \text{\colorable}\)6 \\ \text{\colorable}\)3 \\ \text{\colorable}\)6 \\ \text{\colorable}\)4 \\ \text{\colorable}\)5 \\ \text{\colorable}\)5 \\ \text{\colorable}\)6 \\ \text{\colorable}\)6 \\ \text{\colorable}\)6 \\ \text{\colorable}\)7 \\ \text{\colorable}\)7 \\ \text{\colorable}\)6 \\ \text{\colorable}\)7 \\\ \text{\colorable}\)7 \\ \text{\colorable}\)7 \\ \text{\colorable}\)7 \\ \text{\colorable}\)7 \\ \text{\colorable}\)7 \\ \text{\colorable}\)7 \\ \text{\colorable}\)7 \\\ \text{\colorable}\)7 \\\ \text{\colorable}\)7 \\\ \text{\colorable}\)7 \\\ \text{\colorable}\)7 \\\ \text{\colorable}



It is possible that Black would have excellent perspectives after this as well, but the struggle will be much more interesting in this case, while the move 12.©13? left White in shambles.

The diagrammed position after White's sixth move is very interesting. The powerful pawns

in the white's centre are really impressing. The powerful pawns in the white's centre are really impressive, particularly if White manages to keep them as they are and where they are. Black's doubled pawns on the side are an evident weakness which can be easily exploited in the endgame. I think that the main strategical aim for White should be to play for an endgame, but White should be ready in this position to enter complications at any moment. Now I am going to offer you some of my agmes in which I managed to reach an endgame.

### Shereshevsky – Maryasin Minsk 1978

6... **当b6 7. ②c3 cd** In case of 7...e6 8.**②**f3 **当**:b2 White can try to grab the initiative with for example: 9.**②**b5 **当**b4+ 10.**当**f2! **当**a5 11.**③**e5 d6 12.**③**c4 and 13.dc.

8.ed 2c6 9.2f3 ∆g7? Black refrained from taking the "b2" pawn for several moves in a row being afraid from the opponents initiative. B. Maryasin provoked an endgame with his last move which I willingly obliged. 9...e6 was preferable.

10.ᡚd5 발a5+? 11.발d2! 발:d2+ 12.⊈:d2 0-0 13.c3 e6 14.ᡚe3.



in quantity. White has an extra pawn and the further course of action is just to press this advantage home.

19...h3 20.ghl This is typical for positions like this. You should better avoid leaving an enemy pawn too advanced in your position.

20.... **∆e6.** The capture 20... **∆**:h3 wouldn't matter much for the outcome of the game.

21. **②f4 ∆b6** 22. **②:e6 fe** 23. **4**:**c6 bc** 24. **2e2 2 ad8 25. 2ad1**. The position has been clarified more or less. The rest is just a matter of a simple technique.

25...e5 26.8hf1 €f6 27.d7 €f7 28.£05 ≦f.d7 29.£:d7 £:d7. Black managed even to capture the enemy best pawn, but still his four pawn "cripples" leave him with no practical chances to save the game. Black's position is "totally" lost.

**30. Eff.!** It is very useful for White to control the sixth rank to be able to force the enemy bishop to go to "d8" in order to have  $\mathfrak{D}g5$  – e6 as a tempo move.

30... Eg7 31.h4 Eg6. The ending with minor pieces is as hopeless for Black as the rook ending.

32.8:96+ hg 33.2f3 2g7 34.2g4 Δe3 35.2e4 2fh6 36.b3 Δb6 37.c4 Δd4 38.2g5 a6 39.2e4 Δg1 40.h3 Δd4 41.2g3 Δf2 42.2e4. The game was adjourned now but Black resigned without resuming play. White wins easily pushing the "h" pawn to "h5" gaining the outpost on "f5" for the king and then wins the "e5" pawn.

#### Shereshevsky – Yuferov Minsk 1985

6...∆h6 7.₺/2 This is better than 7.世/3. 7....℃6. There are some other moves in this position like 7...e6 and 7...d, but they usually lead by transposition to one and the same position. The move 7....⊉6 is not precise at all, since White plays 8.₺c3 threatening 9.₺a4, while 8...dc presents White with an additional choice — 9.₺\*a/4. Lets investigate the consequences of the moves 7...e6 and 7...d. Black starts to put a piece pressure on the enemy centre playing 7..d., threatening to take the "b2" pawn. White plays however 8.ed €c6 9.₺/3 ₺b6 10.₺c3 ₺bc2 11.₺0.b5 ₺d8 12.₺b1 ₺a2.d.51 and Black's queen will be trapped. For example: 13...₺b8 14.₺d4 ₺bc2+ 15.₺c2 ₺g8 16.₺b2. After 7...e6 8.₺c3 ₺c6 9.₺/3 cd 10.ed ₺b6 Black is doing something much more sensible. In fact the same position can arise in the previous variation if Black plays 10...e6 instead of 10...₺b2?



The move 11. £b5 deserves a serious attention in the diagrammed position because White would like to capture the nermy knight at some moment to be able to lessen the pressure on the central "d4" pawn. White has an even more enterprising but risky manoeuvre i.e. 11. £b51? The

Canadian players in ice-hockey used to slide the puck in the enemy half and then all the players rushed skating after it to press the opponents in their zone. Here this analogy with ice-

hockey seems to be rather well-grounded. White intends to place the knight deep into the enemy position and support it with pawns. Black's defence is very difficult. For example if 11...6e7 then 12.c4! and if 12...66 13.04 and White will have the matters to his choice.

Lets go back to the game Shereshevsky — Yuferov. White answered 7... 2c6 with 8.d5. Sometimes earlier I played with the same opponent in 1979 and I tried 8.c3. (8.2c3?? would be a blunder because of 8... 2c3+). The game continued: 8... 2c4 by 1.2c4 at 1.

Evidently S. Yuferov found an improvement somewhere, so I decided to deviate first, moreover I thought that the position from the game in 1979 was rather unclear. This is enough to explain the move 8.d5. I decided to analyse this position seriously after the game and to try to find the best move for White. It didn't take me long to find 8.thfb! Black has nothing better now than 8... tho but White plays 9.thc.50 with a clear endgame advantage after 9...thc.10.dc, as well as after 9...thc.10.dc, as well as after 9...thc.10.dc, as well as for the second of the reader might like to follow the struggle in our endoame.



So 8.d5 @e5 9.2h5 d6 10.1b5+! 1d7 11.0f3! 1g7 12.a4.

White played energetically and managed to exploit the defects of the Black's strategy and seized the initiative. Black's two bishop advantage doesn't matter much. his doubled

pawns are subjected to an attack and the white queen is excellently posted on the weak "h5" square. Yuferov could snatch a pawn with 12...£13 13.gf £.b2 14.8a2 £46, but after 15.14 the advantage of White is huge. Black preferred to play an endgame, but now White has an extra pawn. The fate of the game is decided already – 12...0-0 13.£:d7 £:d7 14.£:h4 £1g4 15.£:g4 £:g47 £:g47 £3.£:d5 £95+ 17.£:e2 £g6 18.£:g5 £96 £9.£:d2 £0.63 6.



White has an extra pawn and now is the time to decide the plan for its realization. It would be very naive now to immediately start a pawn advance on the king-side in order to create a passed pawn. Black will be able to get a lot of the board. White should better

clarify the situation on the queen-side first trying to create some weaknesses there and after that start a combined play on both wings.

21.831 Thus White liquidates the threat b6 – b5 preparing b2 – b4. 21...8ab8 22.23d 3.65 23.h3. White should not be in a hurry at all. There is no need to let Black's rook to seize the "h" file with a tempo. Besides, in positions like this, it can be useful sometimes to let the opponent have some opportunities to show an activity. 23...2g7 24.8b1 2fc8 25.2f3. I continued with the same policy, but it wouldn't be easy for me now to realize why I refrained from the move 25.h4. 25...8c7 26.b4 c4 Now White has an excellent outpost on "d4", but evidently the opening up of the position would have been even more disastrous for Black. 27.2c2 28b8 28.8aa1 8cc8 29.b5 a5. White should prepare now the

manoeuvre 40f3 - d4 - c6. White should be careful however. since Black can obtain some counterplay with - \$h4. Besides White should try to avoid, after the exchange 2d4 - 4d4 cd, the eventual possibilities for Black's activity on the queenside in the rook ending. White should try to paralyze the opponent's actions setting up a pressure on the "f" file. 30.2f1

Eh5 31.Ead1 Ed8?! 32.Ed2 \$2e5. Black is trying to do

something against the pressure of White on the "f" file, but allows White an excellent opportunity to play - 33. 2d4! Just on time. Black can not push the "f" pawn. 33...Eh4 34.Edf2 Af6 35. 2c6 Ef8 36. Ef4. This wraps it up. The knight managed to occupy the "c6" square and the "c4" pawn became vulnerable now. There followed: 36... \$25 37.8:h4 £:h438.e5 Ee8 39.Ef4 £g5 40.Ee4 f5 41.ef+ ⊈:f6 42.⊈d2 e6 43.h4 £h6 44.q4 q5 45.h5 e5 46.£;c4 e4 47. 2 d4 Black

resigned. We have to analyse now some moves that lead to transpositions in the opening, connected with some original lines. For example Black can play 6... 2c6, so that after 7. 2c3 Ah6 White doesn't have 8.⊈f2 because of 8... A:e3+. White can play now 8.d5! 4b8 9.e5 4:e3 10.4c4 with a crushing initiative for the pawn. Sometimes Black plays 6...cd 7.ed e5.

Now 8. 4c4!? seems to me to give White excellent attacking chances, but the position requires a thorough analysis. I am not trying at all to prove that White gets an advantage playing 2.4g5 on move two. Had it been so, the bishop move would have been played every second game in the World Championship matches. But the reader should be convinced by now, after having played over the previous games, that one imprecise move can often lead Black to insurmountable

troubles, besides White should not try to complicate too much and can safely play for a comfortable endgame advantage. I would like the reader to try to form his own theory, different

from the established book theory in this variation, which of course will be the subject of further clarifications.

We are going to study now the move 2... 65. White should play 3.e4 otherwise the bishop move becomes senseless. 3...h6. Sometime ago I analysed the move 3...c5 and failed to find anything convincing for White after 4.e5 h6. I decided to play like this with Black against grandmaster S. Lputian at the Championship of the Armed Forces in 1984.

### Lputian – Shereshevsky Minsk 1984

1.d4 ②f6 2.4g5 e6 3.e4 c5 4.d5l fe 6.4.r6 €.7c3 e57! 8.a4 b6 9.4.d3 d6 10. ②d2. White obtained a clear positional advantage playing "simple chess". Black's position is very difficult already, nearly lost. White has a clear way to develop a strong initiative on the queen-side, while black's counterplay on the king-side is far too slow. 10...g6 11.0-0.4.a7 12.②c4 ②d7.



13. Lib1! White opens files on the queen-side. The original queen move is much stronger than the routine 14.201. If Black decides to exchange pawns the white queen will have an excellent attacking outpost on "b4". 13... 0-0 14.b4 Eb8 15. Lib2 Ee8. Black does not ween think about anything

active. His main task is to defend his position on the queenside. The rock move enables the black bishop to have the "8" square. 16.8ab1 Δf3 17.bc bc 18.2b3 2b.01 19.2b1 195 20.a5. Lputian is methodically increasing the pressure on the queen-side not paying any attention to opponent's counterplay. 20...2'f6. Well, I wanted very much to play 20...15, but I understood that this pseudo-activity is going to probably lead me to disaster after 21.18'a4. 21.8'a7.18'n4 22.18'a3.2\nd 52.8.18's. White manoeuvered the queen in the centre to be able to control the situation on the king-side and to continue to play actively on the queen-side. 23...8'd8. Well, it is sad to have to make such a move but I couldn't find anything better. 24.2\nd 66 8'c7 25.888 8'd8!? This is an introduction to a hidden counterplay.



26.2c82/ Black is utterly helpless and White can improve his position as he pleases. 26.93 looks very impressive. Instead of this Lputlan, being in a time-trouble decided to force the issue – 26...#b71. White failed to anticipate this. 27.£:46 #254 & £:d6. Black's queen ran away

from the trap at the expense of only a pawn. White now is in lack of an exit square for the king. If he had played somewhere before a move like g2-g3, he could have played now 30.2b5 c4 31.4c4 thc4 thc4 32.2cd6, but all this was impossible because of 32...tho lack position remained very bad, but still began to see the light of hope for a more favourable outcome.

30.Δff 18:a5 31.2b5 Δf8 32.h3 2f6 33.44? I didn't know why White was so much in a hurry. The 'f' pawn push had to be prepared with g2 – g3 first, white now 33.2a3 was very sensible to bring the knight to "c4", taking advantage of the fact 33...2:e4 was impossible because of 34.2c4. 33...12a1 34.067.2a7 White's play in the time-trouble is really not easy to comment on 35f a5 36 h4 db 37.472.18df 38.8\*h4

A.:d6 39.#::h6 Ae7 40.04 #294. We are witnessing a miracle. Black couldn't even dream about a position like this fifteen moves ago. White can not win anymore. Moreover he must be careful not to lose the game if he fails to oppose Black's counterplay on the dark squares. The game ended after six moves:

41.tea 1.des 4.des 42.tea 1.des 43.€ca 1.des 44.cea 1.des 45.cea 1.des 45.tea 1.des 1.



The position was somehow similar to this one. White has a powerful pawn centre, but Black has the two bishops advantage and a sound and dynamic pawn structure. It is not easy for White to develop any initiative. Alekhine recommends — to retreat with the knight to "et", pawn two souares

forward and then go back with the knight to "13" after which the attacking potential of White will increase considerably. You not only have to study the games that belong to classics, but you should try to creatively implement the ideas behind them in the contemporary chess. White should spent three tempi to build this set-up, while in the fine we are working on White can try to push the "1" pawn first and then bring the knight to "15". I haven't played yet any games on this theme, but if White plays 5. £0.3 df 6. £d2.1 followed by 12 – 14 and £15, the White's perspectives look very optimistic. I managed to play a lot of games like this with

White in the Pirc – Ufimcev defence affected by Alekhin's ideas. Here are some examples:

#### Shereshevsky – Malysov Minsk 1985

8.€73 ∆g471. There was absolute no need to play this. Black evidently does not intend to exchange on "13", so why does he provoke the move h2 – h37 9.0-0-0 0-0. White was thinking already whether to play 10.e5. 10.h3 ∆e6. I don't intend to criticize Black's moves one by one, since Black's strategy as a whole is dubious. 11.g4.



You don't need to be a chess expert to be able to understand that White's attack is much quicker than Black's counterplay.

11...≝a5 12.a3 b5 13.f5/ Δc4 14.≝e3 Δg7 15.g5/ h5 16.⊉h4. White is about to begin a crushing king-side attack, while Black is too far from the

start of any active actions yet. The rest is spectacular:

16...2d7 17.fg fg 18.2:g6 Ee8 19.e5l de 20.de &c7 21.4:c4+ bc 22.Bhe1 Eab8 23. &e4 2b6 24.2f4 2d5 25.2e6l &b6 26.E:d5 &:b2+ 27.&d2 Eb3 28.2d1 Black resigned.

# Shereshevsky – Azmaiparashvily Volgograd 1985

1.d4 d6 2.e4 g6 3.2c3 \(\textit{Lg7}\) 4.\(\textit{Lg5}\). In positions in which Black's knight is on '\(\textit{Si}'\), the bishop move is not so effective but is still possible. It was tempting to put to the test this aggressive scheme with Z. Azmaiparashvily -\textit{himself}', who had been playing the Ufimcev defence all his life and had managed recently to beat with Black the world champion A. Karpov in a spectacular game.

4...c6 5.世位2 世a5 6.f4 h6. Black is playing the opening very precisely. The move of the "h"pawn should precede the development of the knight to "f6".

7. £h4 £f6 8.£f3 £g4 9. £e2. In the game Dreev – Azmaiparashvity, Moscow 1988 White allowed Black to double the pawns on the "f" file and won a beautiful game subsequently.

9...b5 10.Δ:f6l? 10.e5 would be followed by 10...b4
Therefore White exchanges the bishop for the knight to avoid the threat on the "e4" pawn.

10....4:f6 11. 0-0 當的6 12.星ad1 427 The move 12...e5 would have been a mistake after 13.fe de 14.公:e5! 4.:e2 15.星:f6 (15.營:e2 4.:e5 16.營/2 is also good)



White's position is clearly better with the space advantage and the attacking chances on the king-side. Had Black played 16...b4 on the previous move he would have had still a lot a problems after 17.2a41 255 18.b3. Azmaiparashvily offered me a draw in this moment which accepted after some hesitation

having in mind that it was a team-competition and besides, our team was doing well on the other boards. White had a very strong move 17.e0! compromising the pawn structure of the opponent on the king-side with the idea to meet 17...de with 18.404.

### Shereshevsky – Peev Primorsko 1989

1.d4 g6 2.e4  $\Delta$ g7 3. $\triangle$ c3 d6 4. $\Delta$ g5 c6 5. $\cong$ d2 b5 6.f4  $\triangle$ d7 7. $\triangle$ f3  $\triangle$ b6 8.a4. White has several active schemes at his disposal. I decided first to clarify the situation on the queenside.

8. b4 9. 0d1 a5 10. 0e3 0f6.



11. \( \alpha:\)f61? White loses no time to defend the "e4" pawn and parts with the dark square bishop without giving it a second thought.

11... A:f6 12. Ad3 Ag7
13.c4!? White's centre is really beautiful, but it is not easy at all to find something decisive.

Black has a very flexible pawn structure, the two bishops advantage and the option to castle either side. Had the king been on "g8", White could have tried some direct "violence" with 12 – h4 and if h7 – h5 – then 14 – 15, but with the king still on "e8" in the centre, such an approach would be rather rough. The move in the game aims at the enlargement of the space advantage and the restriction of the actions of the opponent on the queen-side.

13...c5. Black tries to clarify the pawn structure. 14.dc dc 15.e5 Δb7 16. 0-0 0-0 17. 2c2 2c7 18.b3! White prepares the exchange of the light- squared bishops, which would fail if done immediately with 18. Δe4 b3!.

18...f57/ P. Peev is trying to prevent the fulfillment of the opponent's plan, but his actions are overly straightforward. Indeed, Black's position is worse, but the text move induces complications that are favourable for White.



19. £151 This piece sacrifice is easy to find and it leads to a quick demolition of the pawn shield of the enemy king.

19...gf 20.4:f5 E:f5! The best practical chance.

21.世:f5 目f8 22.世e6+ 堂n8 23.②g5 h6f The endgame after 23...世c6? 24.世:c6 Δ:c6 25.和e6 leaves Black without

any chance.

24. £f7+ £h7 25. £f5+! £g8 26.e6 £c6! 27. £g6 £e4 28.f5 £d4+ 29. £h1 £f6 30. £h6+ £g8 31. £f7+ £g8 32. £ae7. The exchange on "f6" here is not so clear since the pawn structure has been changed and Black's bishops have become active again.

32...68 33...664 :::h8 34...674 :::gg 35...64 :::r17. The Bulgarian player is defending heroically creating maximum difficulties for the opponent to realize his advantage. 36...64 :::#7 37...194/ It is not the time now for White to go into an endoame.

37... ②d6 38.h4 ⊴h8 39.≣e6 ـ ∆f6 40.h5 ±g7? Peev made a decisive mistake on the last move of the time-control. After 40... Δc8 there was a lot of fight left.



41.82g7 White can sacrifice the exchange in this position forcing an easy win in the endgame. 41...52g7 42.8g4+ £47...42g7 42.8d7 43.8.f6f and 44.h6. 43.8.fd6 £46.ff £47. 42g6 £46.ff £46.ff £47. 47.8.fd £48.47...£42 was not enough to

save the game because of the line:  $48.\bar{a}d8 \triangle:b3 49.f8 \stackrel{..}{B} \triangle:f8 50.\bar{a}:f8 \triangle:c4 (a4) 51.\bar{a}c8 (a8) b3 52.\bar{a}:c5 b2 53.\bar{a}:c7+ and 54.\bar{a}b7.$ 

48.∄a6 ஜg7. 48...Δc2 wouldn't help here either after 49.∄:a5 Δ:b3 50.∄a8 업q7 51.h6+.

49.8:a5 ⊈:f7 50.8a7+ ⊈f6 51.a5 ⊈g5 52.8f7! Δh6 53.8e7. Black resigned.

#### Shereshevsky - Danailov Primorsko 1990

1.d4 d6 2.e4 ♠ f6 3.♠c3 g6 4.£g5 c6 5.#d2 #a57! 6.f4 £g7 7.♠f3 £g4 8.£e2 1 think that White has a better position. It is not quite clear what kind of role the black queen on "a5" is performing. White needs only to castle, finishing off the development with a strong attacking position. Black needs to be on a constant watch for the central pawn breakthrough e4 — e5. 8.♠bd7 9.e5/f2 de. 9.♠of5 was not good herause of  $10.\math{?}.d2$ ! ds:d2+ (10...td:d5 11.c4) 11. $\math{?}.d2$ ! and the black bishop on "g4" is hanging and 11... $\math{$\Delta$}.e2$  will be met by 12. $\math{?}.c7$ +.

10.fe ⊕h5.



Black's knight is a poor sight at the edge of the board. It is not hard to presume that S. Danailov is going to try to free it with 17 − 16 sometimes soon. Therefore White makes a prophylactic move with the bishop − 11.Δh4! threatening 12.h3. Black's answer is forced. 11...f6 12.ef ②hif.6. 12...ef will

be met by 13.h3 ♣;f3 14.世e3+.

13. 0-0. White's position is better, no doubt about that. The development of the pieces has been completed and White can try to prepare some pressure on the weak "a"?" pawn. 13...#h51? Black is trying to complicate realizing that the strategical battle has been already lost. 14..dg51? I didn't mind the enemy pawns on the king-side to go forward, since I thought that my better piece position allowed me to enter complications with a favourable end. The calmer move 14..dg3 was also enough to preserve the advantage. 14...h6. This was necessary to neutralize the threat 15.h3. 15..df4 g5 16..dg3 0-0 17.h3 .Δ:h3 lb..df3 g4 19.hg 0.tg4 20..add1 A very strong move. The "d4" pawn needs some extra defence to assure the completion of the knight manoeuvre to "e2".

20...c5! The only move that allows Black to remain in the ring.

21. 발e2! 쇼:d4+ 22.Ē:d4 cd 23.발e6+ 호h8 24.발:d7 dc.



We are right in the heat of the tactical battle. Both opponents should be very precise in the calculation of the variations. Luckily for me Danailov was in a terrible time-trouble, so I decided to make use of it playing a little bit non-standard. The prosaic 25.4.gq was going to lead to an easy

win i.e. 25...直:f1+ 26.空:f1 cb (26...查h1 27.空f2 or 26...直f8+ 27.堂e2 wouldn't change much.) 27.4:h5 b1世+ 28.4d1 宣f8+ 29. ±g1 ±b6+ 30. ±h2. Instead of this I played 25. ±d4+? ±g8 26. 當:c3?!. Now, the capture of the knight 26. 4:g4 wouldn't be so strong because of 26... 章:f1+ 27.章:f1cb (27... 費b5+ 28.望q1 cb? 29.4e6+) 28.4:h5 b1营+ and in comparison with the previous variation the white gueen is not placed so favourably on "d4" as on "d7", but still White has an excellent chance for a win. I was rather persistent, though. The capture of the "c3" pawn was rather surprising for Black and my opponent lost a lot of his last remaining seconds to succeed to find 26... Fac8/ White responded quickly with 27. #b3+ ## 27. This was a terrible blunder. My approach to the opponent's time-trouble was thus justified, but had Black played the right move 27...\$\preceq 7, the game might well have ended in a draw, had Black been able to make all the moves to the time control. White wouldn't have anything better then 28.堂b4. There could follow next 28...堂c5+ 29.堂:c5 章:c5 and here the capture of the knight 30. 4:q4? wouldn't work after 30...\$:f1+ 31.\$:f1 \$q5! Therefore I would have had to play 30.萬e1. but after 30...与f6 31.萬·e7+ 萬f7 32.萬e2 the draw would have been the most probable outcome. Now everything was over in a flash:

28.点:g4 当:g4 29.요e5+ 空h7 30.届行+ 空g6 31.届g7+ and Black's flag fell.

You can use as an "one-game" opening the knight move on "3" after 1.d4 &16. Well, nowadays almost everybody plays so and this move order leads very seldom to unusual positions and most often it is just a matter of transposition of moves. The knight move on "13" however can bring a surprising opening results if you know the opening preferences of your opponent. In fact it can be used as an original opening system mainly against players that tend to play with Black the Volga gambit, the Benoni defence and the King's Indian defence. Lets try to make a schematic analysis of the position arising after 1.04 &16 2.073 5.3 ds b55?!



Black started some flank operations a little bit too early on move three... White should react, according to the sound principles of the chess strategy, with central actions. Yet, how should White push e2 — e4? The knight can not be developed to "c3" because it would be attacked by the black

> 1) 4...g6. After this move it is highly probable that we can reach an endgame of such a type:



You think I am telling you some fairy-tales, don't you? You are going to have to be convinced soon that although presently there are thirty two pieces on the board to go quickly into an endgame in this position does not necessarily mean that my imagination has gone beyond control.

So, 4....g6 5.4.:f6 ef 6.e4. White should be able to secure the "c4" square for his pieces. 6...a6 7.a4 b4 8.2\*fd2. This knight and not the other one? This is necessary to avoid the exchange of the Black light-squared bishop for the knight. 8....4g7 9.©c4 d6 10.4e2. 10.a5!? was worth considering, but suppose that White does not want to go astray from the abovementioned scheme.

10...15 11.ef Δ:f5 12. 0-0 0-0 13.Δg4. Now it is not so difficult already to foresee what is going to happen next. After the exchange of the bishops 13...Δ:g4 14.8:g4 the exchange of the knights is going to follow. Afterwards the presence of a single open file will lead to the exchange of all the rooks and we are going to have an endgame similar to that one on the diagrammed position. Besides that White will have the option to avoid this course of actions if he likes to and try to follow some other path more interesting, for example to prevent the move 6 – 15 with the help of a bishop on "d3" and Black will he forced all the time to follow suit

▶ II) 4...264 5.AhA. Now the essence of the matter is the knight on "e4". If White manages to displace or exchange it and to organize the pawn advance e2 – e4. Black will be subjected to strategical difficulties. Therefore Black should try to prevent the move 6.2bd2 and try to attack the "d5" pawn beforehand. 5...Δb7 seves this ournose best. 6.44 We are not going to lose our time on extravagant variations like 6.143 1365+7.c3 f5. White needs to secure a permanent control on the "c4" square. After some calm development like 6.e3 Black will have plenty of time to get rid of the cramping "d5" pawn by means of, lets say 6...1245+7.c3 e6 with an unclear position.

After the move 6.a4! - 6...ba looks very ugly for Black at least because of 7.8:a4, 6...b4 is not any better because of 7.e3 followed by 8.4c4 and 9.5bd2. Therefore Black is left with the choice to either play 6... #a5+ or 6...a6. In case of 6... #a5+, the timid 7.c3 leads to an unclear position after 7...e6. White should play actively 7. \( \Dbd2! \) leaving the pawn "d5" en prise. Black has a choice, but a rather unpleasant one: to capture the "d5" pawn immediately, to exchange on "d2" and then capture it, or to play 7...ba. The last move is evidently wrong, at least because of 8.c4, therefore we should check the lines in which Black captures on "d5". 7... 4:d5 8.ab 當b6 (8...當b5 9.c4 is bad for Black as well as 8...當b4 9.c4! A:c4 10.Ba4; 9...Ab7 doesn't help much after 10.Bc2 and 11.8a4), and White has the pleasant choice between the calm. 9.e3 and the much more active 9.£:e4 4:e4 10.£d2 4b7 11.e4 with a much better position in both lines. The exchange of the knights 7... €:d2 8. €:d2 4:d5 would not turn around the evaluation of the position. After 9.ab Black can not capture the "b5" pawn (9...曾:b5 10.e4) so the gueen has to retreat and White has a clear advantage.

We have to deal now with the move 6...a6. White can simply play 7.e3 and Black answers suppose 7...#b6. Black starts now to attack the advanced enemy pawns with 8.ab ab 9.8:a8 0.28 10.23 cd 11.804. Black should try to cause some complications, since the endgame will bring him only troubles because of the pawns on "b5" and "c4". Therefore 11...#a54 12.63 b4.



Black is trying to change the course of actions with just a fragment of his forces, but White is much better developed and should come out of the complications favourably: 13.0:c4 #a1+ 14.0:e2 bc 15.2:e4 cb 16.0:fd2. The "b2" pawn has been stopped and slack is accordingly losing.



We made something like an analysis after 3...b5 and came to the logical conclusion that White should be better I don't

think it is necessary to make a thorough analysis of this position, since the oncoming tournament practice is going to clarify the matters for certain.

As you have seen, by playing 2.£13 White can avoid the Volga gambit. Besides that, it is not very favourable for Black to play the Benoni defence too. White has a freedom of choice, since the all-important "c4" square is not occupied by a pawn yet. For example: 1.04 €/6 2.€/3 c5 3.45 e6. The move 3...g6 seems to be better, but then White can reach some position from the Pirc-Ufimcev defence playing 4.€c3. Karpov and Kortchnoi reached such a position in the 34th game of their match in Bagio 1978, which happened to decide the match after all. After 3...e6 White does not need to play "c4", but can develop the knight instead. 4.€c3. Now if Black exchanges 4...e4 5.£v35 there arises a position from the Reti opening: 1.€/3 d5 2.c4 d4 3.e3 €/c6 4.ed €/xd4 and the difference is that White has developed one more piece – the knight on 152.

The game Shereshevsky – Gusev, Lvov 1977 ended in a quick demolition for Black after 4.0c3 ed?1 5.0±5 5.d5 5.d5 6.8±65 26.7 7.4g51 0c6 8.a3 0-0 9.0-0-0 888? 10.e3 b11..ad3 c4 12.4.5h74 and Black resigned. Naturally, the move 11...c4 was a blunder, but Black was lost anyway. After 11...h6 − 12.4.5h6 gh 13.8°T5 wins and 11...g6 was hopeless after 12.4.h6 8.e8 13.0-05. Instead of the preparatory move 9...8b8 V. Gusev had to play 9...b5 immediately, to be able to answer 10.e3 with 110...c41?. White could accept the pawn sacrifice with 11.9±5 c3 12.bc 4.a3+ 13.9d2 and then develop the bishop to 'd3' and the king to 'e2". This game of course should not be taken too seriously, but still it illustrates well the difficulties Black can meet playing an opening with colours reversed, unsuspection at that.

In answer to the King's Indian set-ups after 1.44  $\bigcirc$ 16 2. $\bigcirc$ 13 g6, besides the aforementioned modifications of the Reti opening with colours reversed, I noticed the original character of some schemes beginning with the move 3. $\bigcirc$ 63. Once again we have to refer to the classics.

The famous game Capablanca – Yates, New York 1924 has become a masterpiece of illustration of the endgame super-precision of the Third World Champion of the history of chess. Its opening stage is rather interesting as well. 3...d5.

This move is practically forced if Black wants to avoid playing the Ufimeev defence. Well, a lot of King's Indian players will be put off by the position of the black pawn on "d5", but usually most of them are even more skeptical towards the Ufimeev defence, since they are used to fight against it with White. As we have already discussed, we are after the psychological effect rather often. 4.24 4.27 5.83 0-0 6.h3 c5 7.dc #35 8.2d2 #:c5 9.2b3 #36 10.4e5 e6 11.2b5 2e8 12.4:g7 2eg7 and White achieved some positional advantage. I included the lesson, I learned from this game, in my armour and I exploited Capablanca's scheme against grandmaster V. Savon.

### Shereshevsky – Savon Minsk 1980

We followed the path of the previous game up to move ten. but when I played 10. \$\textit{\$\Delta}\$e5 - 10... \$\Delta\$bd7! was played by Black. It turns out now that 11. 2:d5 2:d5 12. 4:g7 2:e3 does not bring White anything, neither 11.4:f6 42:f6 12.42:d5 42:d5 13.堂:d5 ▲:b2 is very favourable. I pondered over this position a lot and then I retreated with the bishop to "h2". The game continued: 11.4h2 a5 12.a4 Ac5 13.A:c5 #:c5 14.#d4 #:d4 15.ed Af5 16. 0-0-0 De4 17. D:e4 A:e4 18. Af4 Hac8 and the opponents agreed to a draw. Capablanca's idea to exchange the dark- squared bishops can be implemented in a much simpler way. Instead of 5.e3 it is sufficient to play 5.#d2 and if 5...0-0 - 6.4h6. Here now 6...c5 is not satisfactory. In my game with the master-candidate A. Belousenko from Minsk I played 7.4:g7 2:g7 8.dc 2a5 9.e4! and obtained an extra pawn and won easily. Therefore Black should play either 6...c6 or 6...@e4. After 6...c6 White can exchange the bishops 7.4:a7 \$:a7 and then occupy the "e5" square with 8.2e5 having in mind a subsequent King-side attack.

The knight manoeuvre to "e4" in somewhat different situation was tried against me by A. Kapengut.

#### Shereshevsky – Kapengut Minsk 1977

1.d4 € f6 2.€73 g6 3.€c3 d5 4.£44 £g7 5.±d2 c6 6.h3 € 4.72.e4 de 8.€e5 £e6 9.e3 0-0 10.£e2 f6 11.2€e4 ±e8 £e7 16.16 5.€e5 £e7 16.26 ±e8 € 6.6 £e5 £e7 16.£e5 € 6.7 17.£h2 ±f7 18.b3 c5 19.£e41 cd 20.±:d4 £f68 21.£d2 ±f6 £e7 € 6.76 € 23.£e74 and White's position is almost winning. You can play over this game with annotations in the chapter: "Analyses of Garmes".

Naturally, by playing 1.d4, 2.£13, and 3.£03, it is really naive to rely on a substantial opening advantage, but generally speaking it is very difficult to get any opening advantage against a well prepared opponent in the contemporary chess. If you remember, we were talking about "one-game" openings to be able to achieve a position that suits our preferences, a position which should be unpleasant or unexpected for the opponent.

≣h8 followed by h7 – h6 with an approximate equality. Black wouldn't be saved by the move 22... 22g 6 (instead of 22... 22g because of the beautiful queen-sacrifice 23.4.g/18 24.4.f6 £!h1 25.£h1 with a decisive advantage for White. Something similar happened in the jolly game Rogers – Canfell. The first seven moves were repeated after the previous game, but Black played 8...65 instead of 8...61.4.b. The game didn't tast very long: 9.16 5.047 10.ng hg 1.14.b. €2:e57 12.de €1h5 13.£:h5! gh 14.½:h5 f5 15.ef £:f6 16. 0-0 e6 17.4.g5 £f5 18.4 £f6 19.£h1 £:g5 20.fg £f5 21.£ff £f7 22.£ff ±7h8 23.£f5 7 and Black resigned.

My pupil Oleg Romanov managed to achieve something of the sort in his game against Tzarenkov, Minsk 1989. Black played 8...h6?! 9.h5 g5 10.4:g5l hg 11.h6 4h8 12.h7+ 2g7. 12...€:h7 will be met by 13.8:h7 2:h7 14.4:d3+ and 15.2h5.

13.∆d3 e6 14.213 ⊙e4 15.215 £16 16. O-O. 16.13 developed attention because after 16...⊙g3 17.2112 €25 18.⊙g4 ±196 19.215€5 €6 20.515€6 ∆c8 21.515 c5 €2.2153 White was better. 16...c5? It was necessary to vacate the "16" square for the king. 17.61 €23 18.2194 €211 19.19 £172 20.2155. Black resioned.

I can recommend to you some more recent examples of "power-play" in this variation, i.e. the game Blatny — Goryatchkin, Bad Worishofen 1991, published in the "Chess Informant" 51. Sometimes the play in this variation can be very calm however. I will offer you a game of another of my pupils Alexander Zazhogine who outplayed his opponent easily:

### Zazhoghine – Schulman Kobrin 1989

1.d4 �f6 2.�f3 g6 3.�c3 d5 4.£f4 c6 5.e3 £g7 6.£e2 �bd7 7.�e5 �f8 8.h4 h5 9.£d3 �g4 10.�:g4 £:g4 11.f3 £d7 12 #d2 b5 13.�e2 �e6 14.a4 �rf4 15 �rf4 a6 16 #f2 White made an exemplary refutation of the pseudo-active move 12...b5? The manoeuvre 27. $\Delta$ f1! followed by 29. $\Delta$ d3! discoordinating Black's pieces deserves mentioning.

We are going to finish now with the move 2.ᡚf3 and deal with the last "one-game" opening in this book, starting with 1.e4 c5.2.d3.

How did I come to the idea to start the game in this way? At the end of the seventies and at the beginning of the eighties Peter Korzubov, a very talented pupil of mine, had excellent practical results in a lot of competitions. For example in 1978 he won a qualification tournament for the World Championship for "cadets" fighting for this with players like A. Sokolov, Y. Ehlvest and I. Novikov. He took the fourth place there after N. Short was third. Korzubov fulfilled two norms for the IM - title, but he played only twenty two games, while FIDE required at least twenty four. There was no doubt that Korzubov was going to become an IM in his next tournament. Later however, there happened something unpredictable. Suddenly his health deteriorated rapidly and he was dismissed from the Soviet army before the term. Now he participates in tournaments now and then, but he is far from his previous form unfortunately. I had to tell this sad story. since Korzubov preferred to play 1.e4 instead of 1.d4, but he avoided sharp variations in the Sicilian defence and tried to choose lines with quiet strategical play, but he obtained a lot of times positions without good perspectives. I happened to tell him a lot of times jokingly: "Petva, this sight makes me laugh when I look at you how you retreat with the knight to

"b3" and then you are pondering over the way to manoeuvre it back to "f3"." We were talking about the Naidorf variation in the Sicilian defence. Korzubov was an experienced master when he played in the First Liga of the Championship of the USSR and it was not easy to change his opening repertoire in a fortnight at his level. Therefore it came to my mind that it was worth for him to avoid the habitual theory in the Sicilian defence for sometime. I had to remember once again the openings with colours reversed. We used to work a lot on the following order of moves in the English opening: 1.c4 d6 2.d4 e5. Now Black is not disturbed at all from the exchange of the queens, since the knight hasn't been developed yet to "f6", and after 3.de de 4.\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$}}}:d8+\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$}}:d8} 5.\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$}}}\$} Black can play simply 5...f6 which is not like in the line 1.d4 ♠f6 2.c4 d6 3.♠c3 e5. 4.de de 5.\daggerad :d8+ \daggerad :d8 6.\Orangerad f3 \Orangerad Orangerad of the control of t good plan in this position connected with pushing forward the "g" pawn. Besides that we had played over some game of B. Larsen in which the Danish grandmaster played with Black something very interesting, i.e. the following plan: 1.c4 d6 2.d4 e5 3.4\f3 e4 4.4\f2 d2 f5 5.4\f2 4\f6 6 e3 c6 7.f3 d5 8 \f2 h3 Δe7 9.Δe2 0-0 10.fe fe 11.cd cd 12.€):e4 €):e4 13.€):e4 €)c6 with a good compensation for the sacrificed pawn. I don't remember whether Larsen did sacrifice the pawn or just recommended it, but it came to my mind that it was possible to play like this with colours reversed.

I tried to check this line in the championship of Bjelorussia in 1983 against E. Motchalov.

## Shereshevsky – Motchalov Minsk 1983

1.e4 c5 2.d3 @c6 3.f4 d5 4.4e2 The most exact order of moves for White in this variation. 4...@f6 5.e5 @d7 6.@f3 e6 7 c3 f6 8 d4 #h6 9 0.0



We reached the position I was thinking about. Sometimes White can obtain the same position from the French defence, but to do that White has to find an order of moves in order to lose a tempo (the pawn push d2 – d3 – d4 is done in two moves and not immediately).

9... △e7. Motchalov refrains to accept the sacrificed pawn. The principal line 9...fe will be dealt with in the next game. In ೨೯ № 11. № 3. Black failed to get the counterplay against the white king, which is typical for analogous positions from the French defence, and now White's advantage due to the excess of space is evident.

11...cd 12.cd ≝d8 13.ᡚc2 ᡚ6 14.eff The moment Black's knight lost control over the "f6" square was the time to change the pawn structure.

 24...de 25.⊕e5 \$\(\delta\)ec 8.0.\(\delta\)ec 6? A nightmarish move. After 26.\(\delta\)fis, with the idea to bring the knight on "a" in the attack, the game would have been over in a flash. 26...bc 27.\(\delta\)c5? e5! I had completely overlooked this move.

28.f5 ed 29. ②c4 ≦h8. Look what I have done to my completely winning position. Fortunately I put myself together and I managed to organize a winning attack in the mutual time-trouble.



30.增g5 ad5 31. ②d6l aee5 31...富:d6 did not work because of 32. Δ:d6 增:d6 33.f6 Δf8 34.f7 and 35.增g8#.

32.2b5! #d7 (if 32...cb 33.46) 33.4:d4 £:b5 34.4:e5 £:e5. 35.£cd1 £d5 36.£:d5 #:d5 37.#e7! #g8 38.f6 4f8 39.#:e4 #e6 40.#d4 c5? The

and a blunder at that. After 40... #f7 White would need to show some good technique in order to win the game.

41.발명8 발명8 42.f7+ 발명7 43.발명5+ and Black resigned. After 43...발명6 44.발e5+ 발h6 45 발e8 wins.

While we were preparing together with the team of Bjelorussia for the Spartakiada of the People of the USSR in 1983 I showed the system with 2.d3 to grandmaster V. Kupreichik who managed to use it several times successfully.

# Kupreichik – Ehlvest Moscow 1983

1.e4 c5 2.d3 e6 3.f4 d5 4. $\triangle$ e2  $\triangle$ c6 5. $\triangle$ f3  $\triangle$ f6 6.e5  $\triangle$ d7 7.c3 f6 8.d4  $\cong$ b6 9. 0-0 cd 10.cd fe 11.fe  $\triangle$ d:e5 12. $\triangle$ :e5  $\triangle$ :e5. Y. Ehivest accepts the challenge.

13. Øc3 Ad7 14. Ad5 Øc6.



The position on the diagram seems to be very attractive for White, but it is far from easy to find the right way to develop some initiative. Kupreichik failed to solve this problem in this game. 15.4b57. It was necessary to use this bishop in another direction. After another direction. After 15.4b54. 6 15.4h54.

17. ½h1 Åe7 18. ½f7+ ½d8 19. Å:e7+ ½:e7 20. Åe2 Black has two extra pawns, but the king is stuck in the centre and will be subjected to a ferce attack. There could follow for example such a line: 20...a6 (20...½f5 21. Åb5) 21. 且ad1 營e5 22. Åg4 2b15 23. Å:f5 gf 24. 且ae11 (24. 处:d57! ed 25. 且e1 營e6 26. 且 26 18 2 7. ½g7 型b45 28. ②h45 ½g7 29. 益s 4£ 63 30. 且g1 49 24. ш²d6 25. Ѯf6+ ½c7 26. 心:d5+! ed 27. 且c1+ 營c6 (27... Åc6 28. 且e7+) 28. 且e6+) 28. 且e7+) 28. 且e7+) 28. 且e6+) 29. ②e6+5+ ②b7 30. Ѯg7 with a winning nosition for White.

Kupreichik is having the original idea to continue the attack in the endgame. This idea succeeds only due to a mistake by Black. 15...#cd+ 16.#cd €.bd4 17.2.d7+ 2:d7 18.#7+ 2:e8? Now everything is OK for White. He recaptures one of the sacrificed pawns keeping a strong attack. Black would fare better with 16...2c6! which might bring success, because of the extra material. The position is abundant with tactical possibilities, but we failed to find a clear draw for White. Maybe the reader will manage to do this. The game continued: 19.8:107 in 20.0:005 lng 17.0:27+ 20.7 22.20e+ 25.8

 35.⊈h3 .0d6 36.£b3+ ⊈xa8 37.£c6 .0c5 38.g4 £d5 39.£a6+ .0a7 40.£c6 £d7 41.£e5 £d5 42.£e7. Black residned.

The pawn sacrifice was tested once again in the game Korzubov – Oil, 7alin 1983. Black tried to change the order of moves in the opening. 1.4 cf 5.2.d3 e6 3.4 df 5.4.2€ ∑f6 5.e5 ∑fd7 6.c3 ∑c6 7.∑f3 f6 8.d4 ≝b6 9. 0-0 cd 10.cd fe 11.fe ∑d1e5 12.∑e5 ∑re5 13.∑e3. Here Black played 13...⊇c6? White is forced now to put the bishop on "b5", but it comes with a vengeance, since the move is almost winning. 14.∆b5 ∆d7 15.∆c6l bc 16.∆g5 e57 L. Olfs decision to provoke an immediate crisis turns into a disaster for him, but Black's position is more or less hoceless.



17. €a4. P. Korzubov chooses a quiet positional line and effective at that. Instead of this he could try a combination that was going to wipe Black out in a spectacular fashion. After 17. ½th5+ g6 there could follow the exchange sacrifice 18.8.f6+1. Black can not capture now this rook with the king,

because of 19.\pm6+ \pm27 20.\pm14+ \pm38 (20...\pm4f5 21.\pm15+ gf 22.\pm6+ \pm38 23.\pm6+ 21.\pm4f6, therefore Black has to play 18.\pm36.\pm36+ \pm36 23.\pm6+ 21.\pm36+ 21.

Alexander Riskin found a wonderful idea in this line in an international tournament in active chess in Poland.

# Riskin – Kuczyinski Opole 1991

The opponents repeated the first twelve moves after the games Kupreichik – Ehlvest and Korzubov – Oll, but instead of 13.0c3 Riskin played 13.0c5 There followed: 13...g6 14.2h1 0c6. In case of 14...2h7 such a line might happen: 15.2h3 2hc7 16.0c3 gh 17.0b5 2hd7 18.2h5 with the terrible threat 19.8h7.

17. 当f7+ 空d8 18. 瓜g4 空c7 19. ②c3 트af8 20. 瓜:f8 三:f8 21. 宣:h7 宣:b2 22. 旨fc1 with a winning position for White.

21.些:h7 些:b2 22.超fc1 with a winning position for White.

Lets see some more games played in this variation.

### Korzubov – Dvoiris Vilnus 1984

1.e4 c5 2.d3 e6. In the game Korzubov — Glok, Minsk 1983 Black played 2... 2c6 3.l4 d5 4.Δe2 2044 5.2d3 2ce2 6.Btcs e6 7.ed 8td5 8.2c3 8td8 9.2e3 2cf6 10.d4 8td5 11.0-0-0 and Black didn't find anything better than the pawn sacrifice — 11...d. After 12.8td 4.2d 13.8tb5 4.0d7 14.8tb3 6.5 15.2d2 2c6 16.8th1 2c3 17.2tc3 2c4 18.2d2 2d5 19.b3 55 20.2e3 f6 21.2c9 Black's activity annihilated and White won with his extra pawn.



3.f4 d5 4.£e2 2c6 5.c3 2f6 6.e5 2d7 7.2f3 b5 8.2a3 2b8 9.2c2 b4 10.d4 bc 11.bc £e7 12.0-0.0-0.

The type of position resembles a lot the French defence. Black has opened a file on the queen-side so he can try following A. Nimzovitch's

advice to try to undermine White's pawn chain at its base. White has a lot of trump cards however. The space advantage and the advanced "e5" pawn are reliable prerequisites for a king-side attack. The central outposts of White are long-term, besides White has an excellent piece coordination. So, the position looks about equal and we are to expect an intense fight. Look now how Korzubov outplays his opponent with an admirable ease, moreover Black didn't commit a single blunder.

13.4021 A nice prophylactic move solidifying the "C3" pawn first. 13... 206 14.093 2a5 15.403 2ac4 16.892 4d7. Black's manoeuvres seem to be quite natural, still the final outcome was unfavourable for him. Maybe having in mind what happened next it was worth to exchange first 16...04 didn't find any obvious mistakes on the part of Dvoiris, when we analysed this game with Korzubov and to do a thorough analysis now is definitely outside of the scone of this book.

17.②:c4! ②:c4 18.Δ:c4 dc 19.Δe3 皆a5 20.dc Δ:c5 21.Δ:c5 皆:c5+ 22.居f2 Δ:c6 23.②:d4.



31.Ead11 ∆a4 32. De4 Ec7 33.Ef1 ∆c6 34. Dd6 f6? Black's play in the last ten moves could be improved here and there. The character of the position hasn't been changed a lot.

Dvoiris was in time- trouble now and he decided to try to change the developments radically with his last move. But as it sometimes happens, the medicine didn't cure the illimits, but killed the patient instead. Black had to play 34...h5 in order to decrease the quantity of pawns on the king-side and stick to a passive defence.

35.94 £18 36.£171 Korzubov once again finds a crystally pure move to increase his positional pressure. 36...£47 37.95 fe? Black should never open this position. He was obviously out of control and played the rest of the game as a pigeon. By the way even after 37...f5 Black to sociation was very officult to hold.

38.fe Bc5 39.E:f8 ⊈:f8 40.ᡚe4 Bc7 41.ᡚf6 쇼a4 42.Bd8+ ⊈g7 43.Eg8+ ⊈f7 44.Bh8 Black resigned.

There can be found a striking similarity in the game Korzubov - Petrushin, Tallin 1983 which I am going to include here without annotations. Black played the opening originally and industriously and managed to achieve an excellent position. Further on in the middle-game Korzubov outmanoeuvered his opponent convincingly starting with 24. Le3! - 1.e4 c5 2.d3 Dc6 3.f4 Df6 4. Df3 d5 5.e5 Dg4 6. Le2 f6 7.h3 \$\times \text{h6 8. 0-0 fe 9.fe a6 10.c3 d4 11. \$\text{tb3 } \text{La7}\$ 12. Dbd2 b6 13. De4 Da5 14. #c2 dc 15.bc 0-0 16. Aq5 Ab7 17. Od6 Ac6 18. #d2 Of5 19. O:f5 8:f5 20. Ah6 #c7 21.d4 cd 22.cd Ad5 23.8ac1 #d7 24.Ae3 8af8 25.#c2 85f7 26.gh2 e6 27.gd2 g:f1 28.f:f1 Ab7 29.gb2 gd5 30.gc7 #d8 31.#c1 #f5 32.0f3 Af8 33.Ad3 #f7 34.#:f7 \$:f7 35.⊕g5+ ₾g8 36.⊕:e6 ₾d5 37.⊕f4 ₾:a2 38.£b1 ₾f7 39.e6 #e7 40. Aa2 中格 41.d5 単d6. Black sealed the last move, but afterwards resigned without resuming play at adjournment. To illustrate the possible course of action without gueens, here is a game in which White managed to easily prove the advantage of the "e4" pawn over that one on "c5".

#### Kupreichik – Magerramov Moscow 1983

1.e4 c5 2.d3  $\odot$ c6 3.f4 d5 4. $\Delta$ e2 de 5.de  $\pm$ :d1+ 6. $\Delta$ :d1  $\odot$ f6 7. $\odot$ c3 e6 8. $\Delta$ e3  $\Delta$ d7 9. $\odot$ f3 0-0-0 f0. $\Delta$ e2  $\Delta$ e7 f1. 0-0-0 49.4 12. $\Delta$ f1 f5 13.h3  $\odot$ h6 f14.e7  $\odot$ f5 f5. $\odot$ e4  $\pm$ hf8 f6.c3  $\odot$ hf 17. $\odot$ hf4  $\pm$ 14 f8. $\odot$ d6+  $\Delta$ :d6 f9.g3  $\pm$ 14 20.gh  $\Delta$ f4+ 21. $\Delta$ c2 b6 22. $\Delta$ f12 e5 23. $\Delta$ f24  $\Delta$ :g4 24. $\pm$ 16\*  $\odot$ 168 25.hg  $\Delta$ :hf2 26. $\pm$ 162  $\Delta$ 77 29. $\Delta$ 94 Black resioned.

I managed once to test another modification of the line starting with 2.d3.

### Shereshevsky – Yurtaev Gomel 1983

1.e4 c5 2.d3 d5 3.ed \$1.e45 4.€/3 ♠c6 5.♠c3. In a similar situation in the same opening, but with colours reversed, Black often avoids to attack the queen immediately with the knight, but fianchettoes the bishop first and then develops the knight on "c5". I decided however that having an extra tempo it was worth attacking the queen straight on "c6".

5... ##d8. Once again there is a small difference in comparison with the analogous position with colours reversed. White often retreats — ##d4 — 20 with the idea to develop the bishop on "b2" on the long diagonal next. Here however such an approach would be a little bit too much, because of the big delay of development.

6.93 ⊙16 7..dg2 e6. Too modest but forced. The pawn on re5" will be a subject of an attack. 8. O-0 ∆e7 9..b3f White should have in mind the preparation of the pawn advance d3 – d4. After the opening of the position the flanchettoed bishops will obt maximal activity.

9...0-0 10. Ab2 當c7 11. 當e2 自d8.



12.Ead1. Black needs to bring the bishop from 68 to 48 to be able to finish off the development and coordinate his pieces. The move 12...&d7 is closing off the "d" file and allows White to play 13.d4. Black will have to suffer now from the excellent scope of action of the white bishops and particularly

that Catalan  $\triangle g2$  will be a very dangerous one. Black had to play like this anyway. Yurtaev hesitated for half an hour and changed the pawn structure instead.

12... 2d4?! 13. 2:d4 cd 14. 2b5 #b6 15.a4 ... 2c5. Now it was my turn to think about the position seriously. I had to find a way to prevent Black to finish off the development at any rate.

16. 增e5! The pawn on "d4" is attacked as well as the "c7" square.

16... **2d7** 17. **±g5** f6 18. **±h4 2f8**. Black is about to finish his development and to equalize. I had to look for a tactical solution once again.

19.b4! A:b4 20.A:d4 Ac5 21.A:c5 #:c5.



White is getting some advantage, but still Black threatens 22...a6 which creates the optical illusion that Black is going to offer a serious resistance. White's next move however arranges the puzzle.

22.世c4!! It is a pleasure to make moves like that Some

times this is more effective than a brilliant combination.

22...#:c4?!. This is the line in which Black will put up the least resistance. Now White's endgame advantage will be overwhelming although the other moves by Black wouldn't change much.

23.dc E:d1 24.E:d1 267 25.c5. White is not in a hurry to win a pawn with 25.€\(\text{2}\)d6+ and continues to improve the position calmly.

To dissuade the reader that I may be trying to convince him that playing 2.d3 will lead White to an automatic advantage, here is the opening of the game Korzubov — Danallov. Pernik 1984 in which Black solved the opening problems nice and easy.

1.e4 c5 2.d3 2c6 3.f4 g6 4.€f3 Ag7 5.c3 d6 6.£e2 e6 7. 0-0 2ge7 8.£e3 f5 9.2bd2 0-0 10.2g5 h6 f1.£03 b6 12.£f3 £b7 13.±e2 ±d7 14.£f2? £ee8 and it is White already who has to seriously think about equalizing. The game ended in a draw, although Black had an advantage throughout the game.

In conclusion I would like to emphasize once again that it is my opinion that systems like that should be included in the armour of every good chess player. But the title of the chapter must remind you that you should never have them as your main weapon, but just play them from time to time, otherwise sooner or later your opening preparation will come to a dead end.

I would like now to add something to this chapter. I wrote it sometime in the summer of 1991 and then I played some more games that I think will be a good addition to the material we had up to now.

# Shereshevsky – Apicella Budapest 1991

1.d4 ᡚf6 2.Δg5 ᡚe4 3.Δh4 c5 4.f3 g5 5.fe gh 6.e3 #b6?! As we already know 6...Δh6 is more precise to force the white king to the "f2" square.

8. ②d5! 增d8. The French player is readily admitting his mistake. It was interesting to sacrifice a rook with 8... #g6. After 9.②c7+7 堂d8 10.②a6 增24 Black would have had an excellent compensation, but White would have played simply 9.增13 with the idea to bring the knight from "g1" to "f4". It is worth mentioning though 8...增a5+ 9.c3 e6 wouldn't work because of 10.增h5! ed? 11.增e5+.

9. 當h5 Aq7 10. 當:h4 cd 11. 當q3 當f8.



to attack with equal material instead of defending having the material advantage.

**12... Δ:d4 13. 0-0-0 Eg8 14. 些h4.** In case of 14. **世**c7 **Δ**b6 15. **២**f4 e6 16. **♠**f6 Black had 16... **ட**e3+

14... Dc6 15. Df3 Ag7 16. Dg5.



16...h6? This was a decisive mistake in a bad position. The last move of Black ignores the tactical threats of the opponent and is too optimistic. 16...£e5 was a must.

17. ②:f7! ②:f7 18. 当h5+ 当f8 19. **Ac4.** The attack of the white rook is irresistible. There followed:

19...**∆**:b2+ 20.⊈:b2 ⊈g7 21.ᡚc7! ≦f8 22.≦hf1! Black resigned.

### Shereshevsky – Hazai Budapest 1991

1.d4 g6 2.e4 Δg7 3. ②c3 d6 4.Δg5 c6 5. ≝d2 b5 6.f4 b4. White is concentrating forces in the centre, while Black is doing something on the gueen-side.

7. එd1 발b6 8.c3 a5?! 9. එe3 쇼a6 10. 쇼:a6 එ:a6 11. එe2 원f6 12. එg3.



You don't need to be a strategical genius to be able to see that White has a clear positional advantage. White needs to castle, then bring the queen's rook to "at" and then to shatter the enemy position in the centre by means of the pawn thrust e4 - e5.

12...h5. L. Hazai tries to alter

the unfavourable developments with a king-side divert action.

13.e5/ As we have already mentioned White should be always on the alert to play actively and sometimes decisively in this opening system.

13... 心h7 14.edf f6. The tactical motivation of White looked like: In case of 14...心实5 15.fg ed 16.心公 增27 17.增e3 black wouldn't have the move 17...增e7 because of 18.心d6+ and after 17...常f3 18.0-0 Black's position would be pathetic.

15. 営d3! 空f7 16.de! Another blow.

**16...Ehe8.** The continuation 16...fg 17.fg would have presented White a crushing attack.

17. 0-0 章:e7 18. ②c4 增d8.



19. De5+?/ White played excellently up to now and obtained a winning position, but now this move is a little bit away form the main strategical idea in this position. We remember that Capablanca used to teach that the most beautiful way to win a game is the simplest one- most of the times. Having this in mind

of the times. Having this in mind the not so spectacular move 19.**△**h4! would be much more effective. 19.**⊘**e5+ is still not failing to win, though.

19.£:e5 20.£:f6 £e3 21.±:e3 ⊙:f6 22.f5 g57/. It is understandable that the opening of the "f" file was far from being attractive for the Hungarian player, but still to give up a third pawn was hardly advisable. 22 ±:g5 ±:82 4.2\*g6+ ±78 25.8±0 €0.7.25. ±10 6 was hopeless after 26.8±6.

26. ②e4 ②:e4 27. 章:e4 增h6 28. 增g3. After the prosaic 28. 增:h6 点:h6 29. 章h4 Black would have to suffer a lot as well, but the text move wins even faster.

28... ≦e8 29.f6! . . :f6 30. #d6+ Black resigned.

### Shereshevsky – Raicevic Doiran 1992

1.d4 ②f6 2.åg5 e6 3.e4 h6 4.å±f6 발f6 5.②c3 Δb4 6.≝d2 c5/? This in an intersetting decision. Black is trying to attack the enemy centre immediately not to allow the move 12 −14 . 7.e5 ≝67 8.a3 Δa5 . After 8...cd 9.ab dc 10.堂:c3 0-0 11.b5 White is much better.





9.b4I White needs to play energetically, otherwise Black will destroy the enemy centre remaining with the strong bishop pair. 9...cd. if 9...cb then 10.&15 2c6 11.ab &:164 12.c3.

10.2b5 Ab6 11.2d6+ 2d8 12.2f3 2c6 13.Ab5 f6 14.A:c6 bc 15.2:d4.

15... 並でア Up to now both opponents played well, but now Black had to snatch the "e5" pawn cold-bloodedly. After 15...fe 16...を17...を17 18.世64 位か 19...を26 4 位か 19...を26 4 位か 19...を26 4 位か 19...を26 4 位か 19...を27 19...を2



This position is crucial for the evaluation of the previous actions of the opponents. It will need a lot of analyses, but I definitely prefer White. Lets go back to the game.

**16. ②f3 fe 17. 0-0-0 Ef8 18. ②**:**e5 E**:**f2 19. ≅c3?** I was sticking to the principle "don't hurry". I saw that after 19. **②**:c8

호:c8 20.탑c3 it would be impossible for Black to defend the "d7" square, but I was thinking abstractly and decided that after 19.탑c3 White is increasing the pressure preserving all the threats. I missed however a hidden counterplay. 19...萬e2/ 20.ይ/b1. It was impossible to take on "c8" because of 20...법5+.

20... ≦e3. Now 20... g5 would be followed by 21. de8+.

21. ±02 \_4.6. Black's inventiveness was sufficient to avoid the immediate catastrophe. 22.55? The reason behind this mistake was my bad calculation of variations. 22.04.04! was not so difficult to find after which the line 22...4.c4 23.8.d7+8d7 24.0.d7 #ard 75.8.d97+8c8 26.8d1 4.d5 27.8f1 was leading White to an easy win.

22...£b8? The Yugoslavian grandmaster was in a time-trouble so he made a decisive mistake. It was necessary to play 22...cb 23.2/15 ef 24.8/17+ 16:17 25.2/17 16:17 26.18/11 Ac8! We missed this opportunity both of us. The game would turn into lines very favourable for Black. Now White obtains a material advantage and wins effortlessly. The game ended in the following way: 23.2/15 ef 24.E/17+ 16:17 25.0/17 76:17 26.18/17+ 16:00 27.18/16+ 16:00 27.8/16+ 16:00 27.8/16+ 16:00 27.8/16+ 16:00 27.8/16+ 16:00 27.8/16+ 16:00 27.8/16+ 16:00 28.18/

I am not trying to convince you that it is sufficient for White to play 2. Ag5 to win the game, so now you are going to see a game in which the final outcome was favourable for Black.

### Shereshevsky – Bogdanovski Doiran 1992

1.d4 ᡚf6 2.£q5 d5 3.£:f6 ef 4.e3 £e6 5.ᡚd2 c6 6.£d3 ♣46. White decided to develop the bishop to "d3", while Black

intended to bring the knight to "f6" immediately after the advance of the "f" pawn to avoid the necessity to protect the "f5" pawn with q7 - q6. Black allows White to push forward the "e3" pawn. 7. De2. Now, as well as on the next move, White could have played e3 - e4, but that would lead to an entirely different position. 7... 2007 8.b3 f5 9.c4 20f6 10. 20c2 20e4. Black managed to build his position without the move q7 - q6.

11. 0-0 0-0 12 c5 Ac7 13.b4





White is keeping to the main strategical line. Black should try to look for a counterplay on some other part of the board. 13... Ad7 14.a4 Ee8 15. Of3 Ee6 16.b5 £b6. Black threatens to sacrifice the bishop, which forces White to weaken his king-side. 17.g3 #e7 18.bc bc

19 Bab1 Ac8 20.a5? It is not easy to imitate T. Petrosian, White does not anticipate the forthcoming danger and continues to play on the queen-side in a state of oblivion. My last move can be associated with the ancient Japanese ritual of "hara-kiri". I was in a very bad form then and I was calculating only variations (cooperative though) of the type 20...Δ:a5? 21.@44 Δc7 22.Δa6 and the White's initiative on the queen-side was increasing. It was necessary to turn to some prophylactics on the king-side like: h2 – h4, 32g. 8h1 and then think about activities on the queen-side.

20...g5" This is right on the spot. Black prepares to open the position with 16 – 14 and 21 £ffet would not prevent this, because Black takes the "a5" pearw with tempo. White failed to cope with the king-side attack of the opponent in this game and lost without any fight actually. The time-trouble was hardly the cause of all that.

21.a6 f4 22.ef gf 23. ±c1 Åg4 24.  $\bigcirc$ e5 Å:e5 25.de Å:e2 26.  $\triangle$ :e2 ±:e5 27.B7 ±f6 28. ±b2 ±:b2 29. ±b2 f3 30. Åd1  $\bigcirc$ c5 31. £a2 ±b8 32. £a5 ±b5 33. £a3  $\bigcirc$ e4 34. £e1 ±b1 35. £d3 ±a1 36. £f1e3  $\bigcirc$ c3. White resigned.

# Studying the clasics

There is a well known universal truth that anybody who would like to envisage the future should be well acquainted with the past first. If we try to stick to this maxima in the field of chess we have to expect that the young man can have the chance to introduce something new in chess and to become a really good player only if he is very well familiar with the games of the chess masters of the past. I am not quite sure though that this assumption is necessarily true about chess and I don't think that the contemporary player should waste a lot of time to study the games of Philidor, Labourdonaix, Anderssen and even Morphy. I emphasize that is only my humble opinion. Yet, we can not talk about anything like chess erudition if the chess player hasn't played over and over again the games of Rubinstein, Nilmoviotich, Capablanca,

Alekhine and this list can be added to with a lot of other names as well. Unfortunately, the study of the legacy of the classics is usually done in a chaotic way. Most of the times the coaches themselves are not very well familiar with the matter, and exercises today on Alekhine's games, tomorrow Rubinstein's and then Lasker's and so on, would not bring anything substantial to the aspiring student to enable him to get a clear picture of the development of the chess history. On the other hand instructions like: "Here you have a book. Study Lasker's games and you will become a very good defender." are not appropriate either and will not bring any improvement to the young player. Therefore, you have to be much more systematic when you study the chess classics. Unfortunately, I failed, just like most of the players who attended the Palace of Pioneers as well as the children and junior chess-courses, to get a proper education in this aspect. so I had to fill this gap later after I had become a master. When I started to work as a coach I was repeatingly asking

myself "Were we educated properly after all?". Most often the right answer was negative. Little by little, I studied and taught about dassics and I managed to find the way to the right course which is as necessary as it is useful to the young player. I would like to emphasize, however that I am looking upon this course from the point of view of a professional coach, while it is intended to be helpful to the competitive player.

The chess players that I have been teaching usually staff.

The chess players that I have been teaching usually start with the theory of Steinitz. This theory marks the beginning of the period of the contemporary chess.

We have read a lot about the games and the concepts of the first official World-Champion. I usually advise my pupils to start with the chapter "Positional play" from "Textbook of Chess" of Lasker and the paragraph devoted to Steinitz in the "Chess Lectures" of M. Euwe. In his "Textbook of Chess"

- Lasker gave an excellent philosophical explanation of the Steinitz's theory. Lam going to offer you some excerptions:
- "... Willhelm Steinitz postulated some principles of the chess strategy.

Those principles may sound too abstract, but more or less they are basically connected with real life itself. There are a lot of thoughts brilliant and attractive at first sight, but far away from real life in comparison with the majority of basic sound truths. To be able to separate the true principles from the false ones, Steinlitz had laboriously and carefully come to the essence of the art of Morphy. He came to the roots of the matter and he told the wordt: 'This is the idea of chess, that one which caused chess to be invented after all, thousand years ago. You just watch and don't be in a hurry to make conclusions, since this is something great and I can't cope up with it.

The world was ignorant though and laughed at that contemptuously. "This bearded man thinks that he has invented something great, does he? Well, he may play well this game, so what? He is a very good practical player, so chess is something like billiards, or the dice-games – you exercise a lot – you play well. But can some player teach so serious things? The chairs of the university professors are usually occupied by adults after all, and not by easy-going, game-playing children."

The world was not perceptive enough in this case. In fact just the opposite was true. Steintz was a thinker well up to the level of a university and even above. On the contrary, he was not a genius player. He was too profound for that. He was beaten by a real player and died without being appreciated deservedly by his contemporaries. I, as his conqueror, think I ought to pay a tribute to what he has done and to give the rightful evaluation of his legacy.

The concepts of Steinitz derived from the principle that every chess plan should be based on something substantial. The mankind has long been informed that everything in this world should have its due reason. A lot of thick books had been written on "matters of reason" like the famous book of Schopenhauer "About the Four Square-root of the Law of Enough Reasoning". Nevertheless, all that abundant literature does not treat the problem of the foundation of the plan. The foundation of the plan is not the reason stipulating the need of the change, just like to light up a match causes the, not existing before, flame to appear. This is not the cause of knowledge, because plan itself is neither knowledge, nor the motive of action. We are not interested why X chooses some peculiar plan, it is much more important for us to know why this particular plan in this particular position yields better results than some other.

Until Steinitz, nobody had a clear idea about the essence of chess-reasoning. Steinitz felt that the plan, necessarily as a rule, should be based on something different, than what was considered before, to accomplish successful results in competitive play. He thought that the assumption that the plan should be the brainchild of the genius of the player and the creative inventiveness of the chess master is a priori wrong. Steinitz felt that the basis for the formation of a successful plan should not lay in the personality or the perceptions of the player, but instead should be a consequence of the existing state of affairs present on the chess board. He considered proper to look for it,not in a form of some combination, but instead in something entirely different, i.e. in the objective evaluation of the position. This is the crux of the matter of what Steinitz thought and this led him to the creation of the theory he offered to the chess world."

"The world failed to understand the genius of Steinitz and the chess players followed suit. Yet, his thinking was as a revolution, it could be applied not only in chess, because what is chess after all? – but in all kinds of reasonable human activities aimed at the achievement of a certain goal."

"This basic principle can be formulated briefly in the following way: the basis of the planning of the master should be the evaluation of the position.

To evaluate means to discuss critically, to weigh. The creation of this plan should be based on the knowledge derived from the evaluation and not on some forced lines. If for example, the master considers the rook to be stronger than a knight with some pawns- in a certain position, he decides to play for a win and accordingly he tries to restrict the enemy king. The process of evaluation is similar to the weighing of something heavy – pharmacist's scales are the most precise and in comparison to them our feeling is imperfect. Still, our approximate evaluation should suffice, since it is the best that we can rely on. The chess game offers as a try for perfection -only the field of combination play and only partially at that."

"It is highly probable that Sleinitz had a heartbeat when he perceived that it is fruitless to look for a winning combination if you don't have any substantial advantage. Still he was probably afraid to give publicity to all this, since he was living at times when it was considered a matter of honour to look for a winning combination without having a second thought at the critical evaluation of any nostitional aspects."

"Steinliz was, however a profound thinker and he didn't leave it at that, since it was not part of his nature to stop only at principles with a restricted practical use. Therefore, his theory was formulated with a scope going outside of the mere aim to improve the competitive play. Why? He was not understood by anybody, yet he had his own deep reasoning. Steinitz established the concept of "Balance of Position" and many times it apoided to situations away from dress. Poor old dress couldn't even appreciate that, since principles like that apply to life as well as philosophy.

To understand the concept of compensation is very useful for the practical player. When some of the advantages at the disposal of my opponent are compensated by some advantages at my disposal- the position is "balanced".

In cases like this, – Steinitz formulated a principle, – you should refrain from attacking if you want to win, since equal positions, after proper play from both sides, usually lead to equality. Only if something in the position is disbalanced, the side that has the advantage should strive for an attack with the intention to win. Here Steinitz was up to the level of a true philosopher, since he affirmed that he who has the advantage should attack, otherwise he might lose the advantage.

This "should" happens to be something like a law of ethics which is not easy to follow.

- ... Entirely opposite to the aforementioned strategy of attack is the Steinizt's-formulated strategy of defence. He, whose position is worse, should intend to defend and readily so going sometimes to further compromises. Yet, he should apply the principles of economy make only forced, partial and minute concessions and nothing more. This comprises the principle of defence in its inner ethics.
- M. Euwe's formula is much more punctual. He is formulating Steinitz's principles one by one. Here are some of his considerations: "The basic principle of Steinitz is: "Make a plan according to the evaluation of the position." These words are clearly reflecting the Steinitz's opinion about the attacking style of his contemporaries. You should attack only if some positional factors motivate the attack. This is the logic which led Steinitz to the theory of accumulation, according to which you should start an attack only if you have piled up enough small advantages. Steinitz emphasises the importance of

these small advantages like, for example better bishop, occupation of the centre, better piece mobility etc.

Advantages like this should be classified in two groups: I) Temporary II) Long-lasting (sound). For example the initial advantage in development dissolves later on in the game. On the contrary, the better pawn structure (the opponent has some doubled pawns) is not so easy to liquidate or compensate.

We can number the following main aspects of positional evaluation:

- 1. Advantage in piece-development (temporary).
- 2. Better piece mobility (temporary as well as longlasting sometimes).
- 3. Occupation of the centre (temporary and longlasting).
  - 4. Exposed enemy king (temporary and long-lasting).
- 5. Weak squares in the enemy position (temporary and longlasting).
  - . 6. Better pawn structure (long-lasting).
  - 7. Pawn majority on the gueen-side (long-lasting).
  - Possession of open files (long-lasting).
- 9. Possession of two bishops against a bishop and a knight or against two knights. (long-lasting)

It becomes obvious now that the efforts of the opponents should be aimed at the accumulation of long-tasting small advantages and at the same time the conversion of the temporary advantages into long-tasting ones.

The main lesson we can derive from the Steinitz's theory is the following: the chess game should be played according to a plan which is an objective consequence of the proper evaluation of the position.

The theory should be constantly in touch with the competitive practice. The games of Steinitz, however are not

experiments and fell the victim to a plenty of mistakes. Tarrash's games are much more appropriate for that as well as his brilliant book "The Contemporary Chess Game" and A. Rubinstein's games necessarily too. The course of chess classics can be extended and simplified as well. If we settle on a short course, the theory of Steinitz can be divided into the following parts: the chapter "Positional Play" from the Lasker's book and the games of Rubinstein from the book of Rasuvaev and Murahvery "Akiba Rubinstein". The first five games I recommend to be just played over, while starting with the sixth, you should try to play the opening and further to cover Rubinstein's moves with something, and try to find each move yourselves if you can. After the game it would be useful to mention your impressions in a special notebook with one or two phrases. For example:

## Vidmar – Rubinstein Prague 1908.



Black refrained from the development of his knight to "c6" on move 5, and now by means of 12....\(\text{Dtd7}\) he tried to prove the advantage of the knight on "b6" over the knight on "c3" in a symmetrical endoame.

It is not very probable though, that the young player,

even after having read the aforementioned literature, is ever going to get a proper picture of the Steinitz's theory without the helping hand of the coach along the way. The main lesson, I emphasise, should be that the plan is the logical consequence of the evaluation of the position. Nowadays the

whole concept of positional evaluation tends to get overlooked more or less. The young players are playing over a huge amount of contemporary games in certain openings, pay attention to similar ideas and schemes and fail to even notice why one side or the other is playing according to a definite plan which has long become standard. Such a player sometimes might easily find himself in an unfamiliar situation in which he will fail to find the habitual path, so his only lighthouse will be the calculation of the variations. Well, it is impossible to play chess without calculations of variations, yet the main difference between the human player and the computer is that man has faculties much more profound, rational and variable.

It is my opinion that the best book illustrating the originality and complexity of the process of thinking during the era of Steinitz is the book of E. Znosko - Borovsky "The Middle Game in Chess". Unfortunately, this book was published in the USSR in 1925 and nowadays it is a bibliographical rarity. I have to quote some rather large parts of it, since it would be impractical for me to recommend to you to look for it in the library. Besides, you can't omit any words from the text of a song. Here is the opinion of A. Alekhine about this book: "... He was about to finish at that time the brilliantly conceived book "The Middle Game of Chess". I am saving - conceived. because the method of the development of the theme and some of the concepts of the author differ from some of my views. But the fact itself, that the author is trying to proclaim and support the necessity to attribute to the analytical approach to the structure of the chess fight- a second-place importance is admirable. He wants to stress that the importance of finding of universal laws of generalization should be given first priority, possible to comply with the then familiar semi-scholastical "science" - this idea is already a

very nice asset to the treasury of the chess history. To create

is difficult, is it not? A. Znosko – Borovsky is no doubt one of the most eminent contemporary chess minds." This acclamatory characteristics, given by Alekhin, should tell us a lot. Once we started treating history, we have to talk a little bit about Evgeny Alexandrovitch Znosko – Borovsky. In the magazine "Shakhmati in USSR" No. 11 for 1990 we can find the material "Pieces of Broken Kaleidoscope" by S. Voronkov. We learn from it that Znosko – Borovsky was not only a chess player, but he was a gifted theatre, literature and music critic as well. He used to write essays on Blok, Ahmatova, Andrey Bel, Gumijov and was the second of the latter in his duel with Voloshin.

"... We just start to realize what "Evgeny A..." represented. Naturally, it is still too early to make any definite conclusions about him, but it seems to me that the apologists of our "chess socialist — realizm" should feel at least a little embarrassed" — Voronkov wrote... The Russian player died in December 1954 and this sad occasion was mentioned by all the newspapers and magazines in the world. This is a part of the New York — published "New Russian Word". In a sanatorium near Paris —E. A. Znosko — Borovskii died after a prolonged illness. He was a famous chess-master and theoretician. Not long agot the French Chess-Federation celebrated his seventieth birthday.

It is hardly worth mentioning that the Soviet press failed to acknowledge his death, just like as in the beginning of the thirties – it remained impartial to his jubilee."

We have to start our study of the book "The Middle Game in Chess" and we will put our emphasis on the evaluation of the position.

W. Steinitz established that the chess game is played in three dimensions: time, space and forces. Everything is clear with space and forces (the material on the board), while time has always been evaluated in an artificial way, while somehow approximately, it can be compared with the accumulation of the advantage of the development of pieces. For example, after the moves: 1.04 원(6 2.45 원-64 3.404 ይ). 4.8.402 원:d2 5.12 d2 d.6.원(3 원:d6 7.원:d4 발16 8.0-0-0 원:d4 9.12 d4 발:d4 10.8.d4 we come to a position from the game Shereshevshy—Mordasov. Rostov on Don. 1977.



If we try to calculate the useful moves of the pieces from the initial position we are going to notice that White has four moves: 0-0, 8d4, 4g5, 4h4 while Black has none. Accordingly White should have an advantage of time, lets assume three moves. The contemporary chess-player.

without having a second thought, will say that White has a small advantage due to the better development and he will be far from making a precise calculation of moves. Later, though, White won playing 92-94,  $\Delta 92$  with a strong pressure on the opponent's queen-side, but this was due to the bad play of the opponent and not so much to the tiny advantage in development.

In his book Znosko – Borovsky tried to evaluate a lot of different positions and to formulate the plans on the basis of the ratio between the aforementioned three elements. He did not neglect the role of intuition: "What is the data upon which we can make a reliable qualitative evaluation? Is it some unexplainable feeling impossible to define, something mystical, or we can rely on some objectively existing data?

No doubt this feeling plays a vital role and its importance is embodied in the evaluation of the position, as well in the formation and the execution of the plan. Its importance

increases when the position becomes inferior, its characteristics are deeper inside, and the superiority of this feeling in the different players becomes less noticeable.

It is possible to say that one of the obvious effects of this particular feeling is to able to perceive the peculiarities of the position, before they have become evident. Sometimes, when the player is not so gifted, he will fail even to consciously acknowledge all that and later, when the consequences will be irreparable, there will be nothing left to be done.

Therefore this feeling will help us to find the right plan, which will be even more dangerous for the opponent, because the latter, if he fails to understand all the peculiarities of the position, will not consider this plan to be "threatenina".

Further, Znosko-Borovsky makes a comment that we are going to deal with again later after we finish studying his work: "We don't have to lessen the role of the objective factors: since no doubt chess is a very objective game and we will fall if we try to explain it with subjective perceptions and effects. We don't have to generalize however that, since we feel the not so obvious qualities of the position, they are not objectively real and present, i.e.existing. They haven't appeared so strikingly yet, because we need to imply a touch much more flexible and precise than the formal criteria which we have been using out to now."

The most interesting part for us in Znosko-Borovsky's book is the chapter: "The Formation and Execution of the Plan" and I am going to make several large citations from it:

"The plan is not formulated unexpectedly in a certain moment of the game in all its aspects and peculiarities. It is conceived little by little after the first move and gradually assumes its final form in the process of development of the game. It is still possible however to point to a certain moment in every game, when the further course of action can and will be predicted in a more or less definite way.

The competitive player should try from time to time to make a general evaluation of the position and put to the test-his basic approach to the game. This is of a large practical use-to be able to get away from the power of the effect of the moves you have made. In this way you go away from the chain of reasoning and you concentrate on the distant aim to win. Very often the spectators manage to notice much more of whal is hapnening in the game, than the olavers

themselves and it is a well known fact. One of the reasons for this is that the spectator is not affected by the, already made, good and bad moves and he is capable of a fresh apprehension of each new position and the forthcoming

possibilities.

It will be of course an absolute mistake to think that it is possible when you make a plan to anticipate all the possibilities, since the chess game is very fich and complex, and the human mind is incapable of that. What is important is -to set the main direction of the development of the game and to realize the opposition that the opponent is expected to offer. If the plan is the right one and if it is accomplished in the proper way-the hurdles that the opponent will put on our way should be overcome and our plan is not going to suffer, or get deviated from the rightful path.

By the way, this deflection will not necessarily be a

By the way, this deflection will not necessarily be a drawback, since it can often be caused by a new development in the game, which might cause us to reach for new goals even more substantial and rewarding than the previous ones. Finally, the chess game represents a struggle, in which you usually set yourself great tasks, yet sometimes you comply with minute achievements, having in mind only the future win and avoiding an eventual loss. As you can see every plan is based on the evaluation of the position, on its character, on its strong and weak sides. This evaluation is the

starting point of our plan- therefore you need to be extremely careful while you are making it.

It is of paramount importance to establish not only the features of the position, but clarify to yourself who is better, who has the advantage.

We know that some of the advantages can belong to either side – one of the sides can have advantages of one element or more, and the other side in another elements. It is important to be able to make a final conclusion, on the basis of the data that I mentioned earlier, since that will help you to determine the course of actions that you are going to choose.

There is nothing more ruinous than to engage into an open fight having an inferior position, or start defending when actually you have the better position.

When you realize who has advantages and what kind of, you begin to understand how you should play: actively, passively, attack, defend, exchange etc. Accordingly you determine your aim in this particular game and the stages you should nase over tohe able to accomplish it.

... Lets have a look now at a position, in which White has no reason to play actively, but still the time for a passive defence hasn't come up yet.



(This position is from a game between Lasker and Capablanca, but unfortunately in his book –Znosko-Borovsky never mentions when and where a certain game has been played.)

Each side has an equal number of pieces. As for time, White has only one extra move (

nine against eight useful moves for Black). It is curious however, that Black made three moves with pawns only, but still he managed to develop all his pieces, while White's bishop remains at the intitial position hindering the movements of the rook. This particular thing should attract the attention of the player, so he should be able to find the reason, accordingly he might be able to notice the importance of time in general, and the comparable worth of the situation for both sides.

We have to finish first the general analysis of the position. If we talk about space -Black pushed some pawns on the queen-side, while White has a pawn in the centre on the fourth rank, and at the same time Black's pawns haven't been pushed further than the thirid rank. This advantage is generally very little and it is even hardly an advantage here, because it would be unfavourable for Black, if he had a pawn on the fourth rank, because then on "d5" or "15" White could advantageously place some piece, particularly a knight, threatening the enemy position dangerously. Now, if Black plays b5 – b4 -the White knight on "c3" has nowhere to go, therefore this knight, which is placed on supposedly the best square for the knight, is in fact misplaced.

It is curious to notice additionally that although the white pawn has reached the fourth rank in the centre, while Black's pawns haven't come up any further than the third, despite that White has in the big centre (the ranks and files 3-6-c-1) one piece more than Black and controls the two central files "d" and 'e"; Black has much more squares under control in the centre — only four squares in the centre are not controlled by Black while White does not control fire squares.

Evidently, it is important not to omit to notice any of the features of this position.

In fact the piece dislocation is entirely in favour of Black. All his pieces are excellently developed on the best squares and

are interconnected. Both bishops occupy long free diagonals, and one of them is attacking White's central pawn. The knight is very well placed threatening the central pawn and in case it gets pushed forward – the knight will have a free access to the wonderful outpost on "d5". It is much better placed than its counterpart- the knight on "c3" which is threatening nothing, defends the "e4" pawn and has no place to refreat if attacked!

Black's queen occupies the important "c" file, possessing an additional scope along the long diagonal, while the white queen is only defending the pawn and does not have an open file

Black's rooks, indeed, haven't joined the action yet, but they are connected and nothing is going to prevent them to be placed on the central flies in the next two moves. At the same time, one of the White's rooks is restricted by the bishop, while the other one, although occupying an open file, is in an unnatural position on the third rank.

While has particularly badly placed: a bishop which has no good perspectives (on "e3" it deprives the central pawn from the queen protection, while the natural square "g5" is unapproachable for it, since there could follow ᡚe4, ᡚe4, 쇼.e4, 쇼.e7, 쇼.e3), as well as both knights: this one on "c3" because of the lack of any squares to retreat in the case of an eventual pawn push b5 − b4, and the other knight on "b3", which is weak because it can only go back where it originally came from. ie, via "d4" or "G2" to "f3".

Now, evidently the movements of this knight were not necessary, as well as the untimely development of the rook and there arises a question- whether the formal gain of time didn't turn out to be in fact a loss of time.

I have to turn your attention to the white pawn on "e4". It is a strong pawn, because it is doubly protected, nevertheless it tums out to be a weakness, because it has been attacked twice and Black threatens to take it after the threat b5 – b4.

Can White protect it with f2 - f3? There could follow b5 - b4, 023 - d1, a6 - a5 with the threats  $\Delta a6$  and a4, and White gets a cramped position. You don't have to forget the opening of the diagonal "a7 - g1" for Black and the "f4" square for the knight.

It is in fact this pawn which is essential for this position and determines the difference between the positions of Black and White.

Here we can see that the character of the situation requires from White to play defensively, because Black has the advantage.

First of all Black's advantage is defined by the threat to win White's central pawn on "e4" by means of the move 55 – b4; still important is the unfavourable position of the white pieces, despite that White has no real weaknesses yet.

Now White is faced with the task to save his central pawn and further to develop his pieces improving the poor squares they are occupying presently. If White continues to stick to a passive defence, Black will have time enough to improve his position and to decisively outrun the opponent in development. We already saw what consequences could a move like f2 − f3 have. Even worst will be to watch what a move like a2 − a3 (defending from b5 − b4) could bring about, since in this way White must comply with the exchange of his central pawn for a black pawn on the side (after a6 − a5, €0:3b5, 18°c7 − b6), not to talk about the weakness on "c4" where the black knight can head proudly.

Now what grounds the White's plan should be based on? Evidently White has no other option for protection of the "e4" pawn, besides pushing it forward. In this way the pawn avoids being attacked from two enemy pieces and it would not be easy for Black to concentrate on it- two new attacking pieces once again. The diagonal of the bishop on "b7" is open however, so Black threatens the "c2" pawn immediately. increasing the pressure on it by means of \$26. If While decides to protect the central pawn with 12 44 -another diagonal is opened, i.e. a7 - g1, which allows Black to get a strong attack on the king-side and shatter the central pawn set-up of While with 17 - 6 and q7 - g5.

Therefore the problem of defence for the "e4" pawn is changing into a problem of defending the "q2" pawn.

To solve the new problem White should make a good use of a piece which presently is placed not so favourably – the rook on "d3". There is a well known common sense rule that if a piece is placed badly, before you retreat with it, you should have a look whether if can be used for some combination.

So, the rook on "d3" can protect the "g2" pawn after  $\mathbb{B}g3$ . In this way, White is not only protecting the "g2" pawn, but simultaneously attacks the enemy "g7" pawn with the threat to develop the bishop with tempo:  $\Delta h6$  or even  $\Delta g5$  with the idea to exchange it. We can see now the interconnection of all the moves in a chess game: evidently when White played the rook to "d3"-he must have had in mind to put it on "g3" later.

rook to "d3"-he must have had in mind to put it on "g3" later. Now, suppose White plays e4 – e5 and there follows \(\frac{1}{2}\)for add ad3 – g3. If Black, in his stead, defends against the threat \(\frac{1}{2}\)hī find and \(\frac{1}{2}\)for add be sides the white bishop to develop favorably to his or g5 and besides the white knight might sometime utilize the excellent "f6" square. Further White is going to employ with a tempo his second undeveloped rook, playing \(\frac{1}{2}\)hī fand after the retreat of the rook \(\frac{1}{2}\)c3.5. \(\frac{1}{2}\)for add \(\frac{1}{2}\)and \(\frac{1}{2}\)and and after the retreat of the rook \(\frac{1}{2}\)c3.5. \(\frac{1}{2}\)for add \(\frac{1}{2}\)and \(\frac{1}{2}\)and \(\frac{1}{2}\) and \(\frac{1}{2}\)and \(\frac{1}{2}\) and \(\f

Therefore, Black will be forced to play  $\Omega$ d5:c3. In this way Black postpones the eventual threat to the "g7" pawn and White must capture back Bg3:c3. The black queen now will

be able to occupy the "a8 – g2" diagonal in front of the bishop on "b7", while if Black does not exchange the knights, then White will exchange, and in this way the bishop should recapture, which will lead to its being in front of the black queen on the long diagonal.

The black queen falling under attack will have to abandon the "c" file and will move to the open "d" file, threatening to attack once again the pawns on "g2" and "e5" after 增估5.

Lets make all these moves: 2nds - c3, \$\( \textit{\textit{Bg3:c3}}\), \$\( \textit{\textit{Bg7-d}}\) - d7.

Black's threats and the difficult problems for White remain just the same as before, i.e. the central pawn will not be under attack, but the white bishop will be undeveloped yet. Therefore it would be natural for White to play once again \$\textit{\textit{BG3}}\) - g3 with the same as before threats for the "g7" pawn, besides now the white queen can attack it additionally after \$\textit{\textit{Bg4}}\), because the white queen is free from the protection on the "e5" pawn, since the pawn is not attacked anymore. This leads to the conclusion that Black will not be able to avoid the move g7 - g6, but it will not be so weak to play it now, since the white knight will be exchanged and the threat \$\textit{2e4}\) eavoid to text anymore.

So, Black will retreat with the rook: \$\frac{1}{2}\$f8 - d8 (threatening \$\frac{1}{2}\$d1+) and then, after \$\frac{1}{2}\$h6, q7 - q6.

White managed to achieve something: he developed his bishop, avoided the threat to the central pawn and forced the opponent to play q7 – q6.

The development of White is still not finished yet, since the second rook is out of play presently, and what is more important the white knight is misplaced. White's next task will be to bring it to a more favourable place.

White's first choice will be to manoeuvre it via the "d2" square. But then Black in his tum, since White will have no threats, will play 星88 - c8 threatening 星c2 and after 公(3) (公e4, 鱼c4, 曾d1+ 曾e1, 曾c2) 鱼(3) 星(3) 曾d4, concentrating

all his pieces for the attack of the "e5" pawn in a moment, in which White will be unable to defend it with the bishop, and if White plays f2 – f4 the white bishop will be cut out of play entirely.

We have to remember now what we have been talking about the methods of maneuvering of misplaced pieces to better squares — it is recommended to do this threatening something -whenever possible. First of all White would like to put the knight on "c5" or "d4" and to be able to accomplish either- White should play bishop "e3" beforehand, but to do this White has to retreat with the bishop that has been developed before that.

Lets see now, whether it is so important for White to put the knight on each one of these squares?

Generally speaking, the knight on "c5" is very well placed, particularly in this position in white in t will attack the strong bishop on "b", as well as the pawn on "a6", and if White stabilizes it with b2 – b4- the knight will be a real problem for Black and mainly for the black bishop. If Black captures the knight, there will be left on the board bishops of opposite colours, which might lead to a draw, unless White tries to win this position having this strong pawn on "e5", which would allow to put the bishop on "d6" or "f6" and it will have no opponent since its countermart had been exchanged before.

The knight is going to be very well placed on "d4" as well, because it will threaten to go to "f3", or via c2 - e3 - g4 go to f6 or h6 with check.

Therefore IBlack should not allow the knight to improve its position so drastically and Black should play #d5. In this way Black might allow the white knight to go to "a5", a square that it was not able to hope for beforehand, since the black bishop on "b7" would go easily to "d5". Now, that move is unavailable for Black and the badly placed knight on b3 is going to be exchanged for the excellent bishop: #a8 - c8, &a5:b7.

增d5:b7, but anyway Black will avoid a position with bishops of opposite colours. If we have a look now at this position:



just eight moves after the previous one, we are going to see that White does not have one extra move as before. Black now has two extra moves and this is a consequence of the misplaced knight: it needed three moves to go to "b3" and afterwards two more moves to get exchanged for the

bishop on "b7", which had needed only one move to go there.

Black's advantage now is out of the question, but still White managed to do something: all White's pieces are developed, but still White might need some time to bring back into play the rook from "g3", since this position of the rook is senseless. There is no need for any protection of the "g2" pawn anymore and there are no scopes for a king-side attack.

We are going to quit now our discussion of this position, since my idea was to show you how you should reason, when you are developing a plan. There is no doubt about that, since the beginning of our analysis of this position, White should be able to envisage this position and make the important conclusion, whether it is dangerous or not. White's plan do get rid of the misplaced pieces and pawns and annihilate the excellently placed enemy bishop and knight, has been combeled successfully."

Further in his book Znosko-Borovsky makes the following comments: "... Naturally, it would be perfect if you can concentrate your pieces in the focus of the fight, but usually that is not so easy to accomplish. The chess pieces use to be developed at all parts of the board and usually you have

strong outposts at some part and weaknesses at another part. accordingly you have to attack and defend simultaneously. When you have a big advantage- you don't have to pay too much attention to the threats of the opponent at some parts of the board of a second-rate importance. If your advantage is very tiny, you should consider the threats of the opponent attentively. You should first of all understand, whether you have any advantage or not, and afterwards this will lead to the right decision how to act, i.e. if you have an advantage the majority of the pieces should be utilized in an active play, and what little is left for the defence and vice versa. To be able to vield the richest harvest from your active play, you have to use for the defence the least number of pieces, if at all. It is very often the case when only one minor piece will do the job, while the player might not be conscious of that, and he might defend with more pieces, and at the same time these pieces might not be so effective at that. Of course, the choice of these pieces is not a subject of the players will, but is caused by necessity and if you are unable to change this -you have to reconcile with it and take it for granted. (One of the axioms of the Steinitz's theory is the principle

of the most economical defence.)
Finally we are going to study the game *Pillsbury* –

Finally we are going to study the game **Pillsbury** – **Tarrasch**, the analysis of which has occupied a lot of space in the book.



Znosko-Borovsky analysed this position as a multi-experienced microbiologist. He acts as if he were looking through a microscope at each square and piece in the kaleidoscope of the position. The author, after a thorough investigation, reaches the right

diagnose and derives from the information he has collected, the right plan for both sides, envisaging the slow at first, and intense later, conflict. I consider the analysis of this game to represent the most brilliant part of the book. It is an exemplary illustration of the powerful logic of one of the leading apostles of the theory of the First World Champion. We are talking about Zigbert Tarrasch, who is fighting against the giffed G. Pillsbury. – on the saddle of his famous knibt on "eS".

We can see now that, although the material is equal, White has thirteen useful moves and Black has twelve. White has a bit of a space advantage, some stronger presence in the centre, due to the pawns on "d4" and "f4", as well as to the bishop on "g5" and the knight on "e5", besides the bishop on "b1" controls the important central squares "e4" and "f5".

If we start to evaluate the position of each piece separately- it will not be difficult to observe that almost all white pieces are placed superbly. The knight on "e5" as really perfect piece, since it creates threats all over the board. The other knight on "63" is well placed too, but its movements are a little bit restricted by the black "65" pam, which renders the "e4" square unavailable for White. Furthermore, Black's queen-side pawns threaten to displace the knight from the "63" square with a tempo by the way, of their route forward. The bishop on "g5" doesn't have any particular perspectives, but still it pins the enemy knight, while the other bishop enjoys the whole lond diagonal from bit to h7.

White's rooks are not to be envied in this position. There is not an open file, since the only one, the "c" file has been occupied by a strong enemy pawn. The "e" file is closed by the pawn on "e3" which will hardly be ever pushed forward, because the pawns on "d4" and "f4" might become very weak.

The worst thing about the white rooks is that it is very difficult to anticipate their further participation in the action, since White will hardly be able to open a file. In fact, the only

way to accomplish this will be to push forward the "g" pawn and of course White will need to step aside with the king to firth." This however is a long way to go, since the black pawns on the king-side are well placed, there is not a single weakness, consequently White will manage to open files, if at all, at some rather late stage of the came.

The position of the black pieces is not so bad, but still it's a bit passive. The knight on "f6" is placed perfectly though, but it is pinned by the enemy bishop and secondly it can move only to "e4", where it will be exchanged for the passive white knight. White will have then a passed pawn on "d4", and the "e" file will be closed for Black, and the scope for the attack of the backward "e3" pawn will vanish.

The role of the knight on "f8" is evidently defensive, but it has some good possibilities to go to "e6" or "g6", and besides it paralyzes a little bit the effect of the actions of the strong enemy bishop on "b1".

Black's bishops are really well placed. Well, one of them on "b7" is restricted by the "d5" pawn, but still it protects this important pawn and indirectly controls the "e4" square, while the other one temporarily defends the knight on "f6", but it has a good open diagonal "8 – b4".

Black rooks are really well placed. One of them attacks the "e3" pawn on the open "e" file, while the other one is behind the pawns on the queen-side enabling them to go forward

easier.

This pawn situation on the board comprises the essential part of the Black's advantage, since the future movement of the pawns on the queen-side is really threatening. One of these pawns is already a passed pawn and although lis further movement is not directed against the king, but still it is very dangerous, because White has nothing to put up against it since White does not have enough nawns there after all.

On the contrary, White's extra pawn is the backward "e3" pawn and as we already mentioned, it can not go forward. It remains a juicy object for an attack on the "e" file and eventually even on the third rank as well.

Therefore, we can consider the position of both sides more or less equal: White's minor pieces are placed better and more aggressively, while Black's rooks and pawns are much better than their counterparts.

The character of further actions is clearly determined for both sides: White will strive for an attack at the enemy king, while Black will push forward his queen-side pawns with the idea to promote one of them into a queen with the additional idea to open the third rank for the attack of the backward "e3" pawn.

The tempo of future play will be determined by the approximate equality of the position, in which there are no weaknesses for both sides — therefore there is not any necessity for any slap-dash actions for both sides. The opponents should develop their future actions slowly, avoiding the creation of any weaknesses. Still the White position seems to be much more aggressive and this is because the white's piece position is more active, but even more so because the attack is aimed at the enemy king. Suppose for example-Black plays Ge6; White has now an easy forced win th Act 6. Act Act 74. The 545-4 yea E174 and E577.

Now we see that Black should be very careful about his king-side, because although he has no real weaknesses there, he has as many pieces for the defence there, as White has for the attack. It was enough for Black to touch one piece on the king-side and White prevailed in a flash. Therefore it becomes evident now that White should bring to the king-side at least one more piece to be able to overcome Black's defence there.

What piece? We will be able to give the proper answer to this question after we make the evaluation of the future Black's threat.

If Black simply starts to push forward his queen-side pawns, without any previous preparation and piece support, the best that he can hope for is to obtain a passed pawn on the sixth rank, which will become an isolated pawn there and will be easily apprehended by White, after being attacked by several pieces.

Therefore Black should prepare first the movement of his pawns and connect it with some other threats. We have been talking about one such threat, the attack against the "e3" pawn horizontally, on the third rank. Some other threats may be crealed against the white queen-side pawns, since they can not be moved forward safely, because Black will obtain then a protected passed pawn on the third rank, and besides that, after an eventual exchange White will have an isolated pawn on the third rank, which may be attacked and eventually captured by the onongent.

All Black's pieces are presently occupied with the defence of the king-side, so only the queen, the rook on "a8" and the bishop on "b7" can be of some help for the preparation of the future movement of the pawns on the queen-side. One of these pieces will be in fact hardly helpful at all, and that is the bishop on "b7", since it should protect the "d5" pawn.

What kind of pawn movements can be most dangerous for White?

Some important considerations should form the basis of this reasoning. First of all, the strongest black pawn on the queen-side is the "c4" pawn, therefore its movement to the third rank is either isolating it, or simply weakening it, not to talk about the eventuality of this pawn to entirely vanish from the board, leaving Black with two pawns on the side against the white "a2" pawn. If Black pushes forward the "b5" pawn to

the third rank, White will play simply a3 and Black will have no passed pawn any more. Additionally, Black will be able to push forward this pawn only if it is protected behind with the rock, because otherwise White will simply capture it and Black will lose all his advantage after having to take on "b3" with the "c4" pawn. That will open the "c" file for White, while Black's rocks will have no open files at all.

On the contrary, the future movement of the "a6" pawn threatens to open a file for the black rook for the attack of the "a2" pawn, and if White plays b3, Black will obtain an extremely strong passed "a" pawn.

Now, we saw what are Black's threats after all. We understand that they seem to be very distant in the aspect of time, and consist in fact- in the attack on the "a" file against the "a2" pawn, or the "b2" or "the b3" pawn. This all leads us to the conclusion that White can safety manoeuvre his pieces away from the queen-side, since this is not going to cause any catastrophe soon. Of course, if White's attack on the king-side fails, Black will evidently prevail on the queen-side.

Black has one more threat, which forces White to do something about it, and that is to play Que4, with the idea to play then -66 winning a piece. If White exchanges first the bishops on "e7", Black is going to play B.e7 and White can not win the "e4" pawn, because after the total exchange on "e4", Black is going to win the knight on "e5" with the pawn move f7 - f6.

By the way, with the move €94, Black will completely paralyze the bishop on b1, exchanging the other bishop on g5 in the process. The position of the knight in the centre will immediately bring Black the advantage, since Black will be able to displace the enemy knight on "e5" with the pawn move To -16, and besides the knight on "e4" will be on an outpost on which it can not be displaced by a pawn. There it can

perfectly support the future movement forward of the pawns of the queen-side.

So, White will be forced to exchange this knight with the bishop on "b1", since this bishop will have no perspectives anymore, while the knight on "c3" can still remain an active piece in the future middle-game.

We came to the conclusion that White will be compelled to exchange both bishops, accordingly he should need to support the attack on the king-side with one more piece. Which one? There is no one left except a knight on "c3", because to bring the rook into action will be possible only after the pawn thrust of the "c2" nawn, but all this needs a lot

of time and will be rather dangerous, because it will compromise the king-side at a time when the king-side of Black hasn't been weakened at all, yet.

The future movement of the knight on "c3" can constitute a

real danger for Black, so he should do something about it. I magine, White makes two moves in a row -like 263 - 62 - 62, now there is no doubt that the threats 2615 and 202 + 62 and 202 + 62 are all very serious. Of course, Black can defend from this with  $g^7 - g6$ , but this creates a serious weakness on the king-side and enables White to push

forward f4 – f5 with good chances for an attack. In fact the best way for Black to parry the abovementioned threats is to play 204, which leads to the exchange of several minor pieces.

Now we see that both sides at certain moment should clarify what consequences these exchanges are going to bring about.

ing about. So: 1.⊘e2 ⊘e4 2.∆:e7 ≋:e7 3.∆:e4 de 4.≝a3.



What was achieved in this way by White? The black "c4" pawn became weak now, because its natural pawn protection was removed and it will be weak even in case Black pushes forward the "b" pawn. White should not care anymore about the weakness of the "e3" nawn. since it is blocked now by

the black pawn which closes the "e" file for the Black rook. Besides White can be now proud with his passed pawn on 'd4", and although both bishops have been exchanged, the strong knight on "e5" still remains on the board and enables White to attack with his pawns on the king-side, and the position of the king on "h1", on the long diagonal of the bishop on "b7", is not dangerous at all, because the black pawn on "e4" prolects the king oerfectiv.

This same pawn can later become a nice object for an attack by White. Black will hardly be able to support it with f7 – f5, because White will get an additional opportunity for an attack with g2 – g4, accordingly the "e4" pawn looks like doomed to remain isolated. The absence of the black knight on "f6" enables White to operate with the attacking opportunity 4 – f5 – f6.

What did Black obtain as a result of these exchanges?

First of all Black annihilated the dangerous attacking enemy bishops and then having got rid of the "d5" pawn.he might use this wonderful square for the bishop on "b7" to support the queen-side pawns. Accordingly the preparation of the queen-side pawn advance.which looked to be rather difficult is getting easier now -due to the exchanges. Once again we witness an approximately equal position, in which the opponents have as before their chances on the different sides. We don't have to neglect the fact that, with the simplification of the position, Black's chances improve evidently, because White's hope is only connected with a successful king-side attack, while Black's strong queen-side pawns promise a favourable outcome.

What are the opportunities for White in this position? As I

have already mentioned, that is to play f4 – f5 threatening f6, as well as to attack the "e4" pawn. White can attack this pawn with the queen, with both knights and the rook, looks like enough, doesn't it? Does White have the necessary time for that? White needs about seven moves, in order to realize his threats (f5, <sup>2</sup> #14, <sup>2</sup> #14, <sup>2</sup> #0, <sup>2</sup> or <sup>2</sup> \*0, while Black needs five moves (f6, <sup>4</sup> 4d5, <sup>2</sup> #b7, <sup>2</sup> #ae8), that means time is enough for the protection. Had that not been so, Black would have not been able to afford the exchance.

White has some additional threats after these piece manoeuvres. For example, after 15, threatening 16, Black has to play 17 – 16 to defend and White will answer 294- with the idea 2016+ or 2016+, therefore Black will have to play 25t8. If White plays 15 and Black plays 17 – 16, White can manoeuvre with the knight to 14 and even e6 then, besides the white pawn on 15 deprives the black knight on 16 from its natural squares. All the same time that pawn is a little bit defenseless and the White's attack with the "g2" pawn will not be so effective and the eventual threats, created in this way,look aimost harmless.

We see now that the mutual advantages and disadvantages are somehow balanced. This is very peculiar and is a symptom that -when both sides play well, you can't obtain an advantage effortiessly, and you need a lot of time to get a really substantial advantage to be able to win the game.

You can come to a strange conclusion. What is the sense to attack and threaten something, if you can anticipate beforehand that the opponent will be capable of a successful defence?

We have already discussed the fact that if you don't have a plan and you don't create threats, the opponent in his stead will have his hands free for actions and will start threatening himself. You have to create threats to engage the enemy pieces in the process of defence and to restrict their freedom of action. Often you can place your pieces on the best squares, in the process of threatening something, which will enable you to realize your main idea. (In this game for White it is to push forward the "q2" pawn to bring into action the rook - that paramount extra piece which is destined to decide the fate of the attack.) Additionally, attacking prevents the opponent to realize his threats (to push forwards the queenside pawns). The opponent should be able to parry the threats in such a way that his pieces should not go to some pathetic ridiculous squares, since with keeping some relative freedom of action, these pieces can help the realization of some counter-threats defending at the same time. What is the right order of moves for Black to make these

what is the night order of moves for slack to make these series of forced moves? It is clear that he should first of all make moves threatening the opponent and making the position more flexible. For example:

4...f6 5. 294 2h8 6.f5 (with the idea £l4), 2d7 (attacking the 15" pawn), 7.2h1 2d6 (Black has at his disposal a few extra moves, but still this looks like a waste of time), 8.2h4 2d6 9.2h4 2d68 10.2c3 2d5 11.2f2 2c6. Both sides blaved a lot of more or less forced moves and we reach:



If we try to evaluate this position, we are going to see that all Black's pieces are in fact defending, while White is attacking the "e4" pawn and threatens additionally to open the "g" file, after the pawn moves from g2 to g5. Yet, White hasn't managed to bring into the action any additional piece,

since the knight on "c3" and the rook on "c1" are still on the queen-side, and it is hard to see how they can be brought into action on the king-side to participate in a successful king-side attack.

If we try to evaluate this position even more deeply, we are ground to be amazed by the fact that-against the twelve useful moves made by White, Black has eighteen moves – Black is ahead a whole lot of six moves! At the same time, in the aspect of space, Black is not deficient at all, because the pawns on the queen-side have occupied even more space than the white pawns on the king-side. We don't have to omit the fact that although Black is pieces are only defending for now, their position is almost ideal for the preparation of the successful queen-side pawn advance. Moreover, it is obvious that the white queen and one of the rooks are presently out of play and can take part in action only if White makes a breakthrough on the king-side.

All this leads to the conclusion that Black's position now is clearly superior.

What has happened that in the last eleven, seemingly excellent and correct, moves for both sides -White got his game on the downslope? Didn't it seem to us that White had hetter chances?

The right explanation for this is the fact that White had an attacking aggressive position, but only superficially, while Black's opportunities were somehow in a latent hidden form. White's threats were not substantial enough to engage Black's pieces in defence only. Well, Black hasn't organized any advance yet, and all that he is left with is- to create threats. Lets see what kind of threats Black has at his disposal. We don't have to forget though, that White has almost everything ready for the king-side breakthrough, and if White manages to bring just one more additional extra piece—the king-side attack may become overwhelming. Well, indeed Black's bishop is very useful for the defence, but we have already mentioned that, for the successful queen-side pawn advance, Black should need some piece preparation as well, since pawns only would not get the job done.

We have been treating this position for so long, because it is so typical and useful for an instruction. It is hardly possible to find any better to consequently evaluate a position, to follow a plan formation and its successful execution. I will venture a guess that had White anticipated the arising situation eight moves ago (and he surely idd...), but evidently evaluated it wrong, although he had objective dats; he might have tried to change the course of the game in some other direction. Now it becomes evident that it will be an useful habit from time to time- to test yourself in the evaluation of the position. Once you have chosen a plan, and its main features are clear to you, the plan is bound to be connected with an uncompromising logic and the rest is almost mechanical-move by move.

Anyway, presently Black seizes the initiative. Lets see what Black can do after the "mechanical" move 12. Ef1, which follows White's previous idea.

The position of the knight on "c3" predestines the first move: 12...b4. After the retreat 13. 2e2, if Black starts to push

lose all his advantage, for example: 13...c3 14.bc (if White plays 14.b3 the game will develop more or less like in the line that follows as a main one) 14...bc 15.Ød1 c2 16.Øc3 Ac4 (with the idea to play Ec1, winning the "c2" pawn next). 17.d5! ∆:d5 18. ac1 capturing the "c2" pawn. We witnessed the exchange of the strong black active "c4" pawn for the presently passive white "d4" pawn. It is evident now that White needs one additional piece on the king-side -just like Black wouldn't mind having one extra on the gueen-side.

Black is in trouble however, since all his pieces should defend the king-side. The white knight on "c3" has retreated, so there

forward immediately his pawns - he might be endangered to

is not an attack for the "e4" pawn (White can threaten it again of course on the next move with 2g3). Therefore Black can afford to take away one piece from the defence of this particular pawn, but only temporarily, since he may need to defend it once again on the next move. It is best to do this of course, threatening something on the way. The only piece capable to do the job is the queen, accordingly the move 13... #a4 attacking not only the White "a2" pawn, but threatening to go to "c2", attacking the "b2"

pawn, as well as going to "d3" - with the eye on the white pawn on "e3". If White protects the "a2" pawn with \$\Omega\$c1, that same move does not parry the second threat. Therefore, White should

look for some other defence. Now we have a perfect example of attack and defence

combined: Black's queen quit the "c6" square, stopped defending not only the "e4" pawn, but the "f6" pawn as well. Consequently, White can attack this same pawn immediately and since the king-side attacks are always filled with danger.

since the object of the attack is His Majesty the King, therefore Black can not afford to remain a passive spectator.

Indeed, if White plays **14**.  $\bigcirc$ **g4**, that is going to bring about  $\bigcirc$ :f6, f;  $\oplus$ :f6+,  $\oplus$ g7,  $\oplus$ g4,  $\oplus$ d7,  $\bigcirc$ 14 with a win. Black should defend the "f6" pawn immediately, and to avoid the retreat of the queen – the only move to do this is **14**... $\bigcirc$ d7.

Now we can see the first consequence of Black's attack: he should immediately find defensive moves that do not compromise the position too much. The knight on '8" was protecting the "h7" and "g6" squares, while now it should take care of the '16" pawn. You can see that the so called fist-flight is full of danger when attack is combined with defence!

The purpose of While was not only this, but he managed at the same time to defend his queen-side successfully. He maneuvered the knight away from "12", that same square became available for the rook (15.8¼ – 12), and from this square it protected the second rank, defending from the penetration of the enemy queen to "22". What about Black's queen capturing the "a2" pawn? Oh, no, not at ali. The rook retreated from "4" and presented this square for the knight, so \$1:a2 would be met by £14 – threatening the bishop on "d5", as well as a knight check on "96" winning the exchange. Black will have to play £17, but then £196+, £196, fg, h6, €2-th6 of £16 winning easily.

Black had enough pieces on the king-side to defend, but to take only one piece away from this sector- enabled White to follow with brilliant sacrifices winning the game! Therefore, Black should make some defensive move first, before taking on "a2", to avoid the threat £14 – g6+ and that is the move £15...\$g8. After this move £14 is not dangerous at all, and White should do something about the defence of the queenside. Neither a3, nor b3 can be of any help and £a1 looks really dictious, so White has only 16.2cf. Now that is the piece to which White should delegate the all-important task of defending the queen-side, while all the rest should gather as voltures on the enemy kino-side. Now we can see that the

White's attack can become really serious and Black should be very careful with his defence and his counter-attack. Meanwhile the only piece, that can help the king-side attack and assure its success the kinght, is presently paralyzed. White should therefore open a file and use the rook.

As we can see the final outcome of this game is near. The opportunities for both sides are getting narrow and the missing knight will fail to create any threats. White is left now with his main attacking line.

We have to additionally bring your attention to the last White manoeuvre, i.e.he defended the queen-side by means of a threat on the king-side, and that illustrates the ideal order of moves. First the attacking knight retreated, then the other knight made an attacking move, enabling the rook to move, then the rook made a move which seemed to be defensive, but liberated a square for the knight, where it headed with a decisive threat, and finally the knight went to another defensive square, wrapping up the defence altogether. If now Black continues the offence with 16...of − c3, White plays 17.0.2 − b3 and Black must retreat with the queen − 17....#5c6. Why here? Because White threatens to play \$\mathbf{x}\_3\$ and afterwards \$\mathbf{x}\_3\$ h6+, and penetrate the enemy position with \$\mathbf{x}\_3\$ f6. Lets compare the new position with the previous one:



We see now that the quantity of the moves made by Black remained the same – 18, on the contrary White made good use of the last several moves and now the quantity of their useful moves almost equals Black's – 16. Did Black's position get any worse? Not at all. Now, Black's advantage of time transformed into an advantage of space, because Black managed to push forward the pawns on the queen-side and one of them reached the sixth rank. White didn't in fact obtain anything substantial.

Although Black increased his space advantage, his offence just like White's, reached almost a dead end. To be able to continue with the attack, Black should open a file on the queen-side, since only the rook can improve the attacking chances.

Which file? It is evident that only the "a" file will do. So, just like White should push the "g2" pawn, Black should push the "a" pawn. What should be the purpose of tha? Black would like to open this file, occupy it with a rook, attack the "b3" pawn, which will be utterly defenseless, and then capture it, getting two connected passed pawns.

It is easy to calculate the number of moves that is going to require: two pawn moves (we don't calculate the exchange, since White is going to lose a move just the same), then two rook moves, so on his fifth move Black will be able to win a pawn. Naturally, White can also defend this pawn in five moves with the queen, but then White should give up the idea for an attack on the king-side altogether. Black, in his turn, can strengthen the attack on the queen-side with the rest of the pieces, is. the second rook, bring the knight and put the queen together with the bishop, but not on the diagonal "c6 – [3" like now, but on the other diagonal "17 – b3" to attack the white pawn.

Therefore White should continue to attack, which is only possible with the pushing forward of the "g2" pawn. How many moves would this operation require? White should retreat with the knight from "g4" and that is two moves, then two moves with the "g2" pawn, and then on his fourth move White will threaten to exchange the pawn on "f6".

Accordingly, White manages to forestall Black's threats by one move, so to be able to determine, which one of the opponents should start these combinations, we have to weigh the quality of these threats, although it is quite clear that both sides are practically forced to act in such a way. There is no way to improve the defence and each tempo, lost in hesitation, allows the opponent to realize his threats first.

So: 18.h3 a5 19.2h2 a4 20.g4 (it is clear that White can not take ba, since Black will effortlessly win the "a4" pawn with "a4 and c2, or Ba8, B.a4 and c2). Now Black is faced with a decisive question: if he wants to continue with his offence, he should play 20..ab, ab and Ba8. If he wants to defend his king-side first temporarily, he should not exchange the pawns, since White will occupy the open file with Ba2.

If Black decides to defend first, he should try to prevent the move 94 – 95 with h6. Now White is forced to play ±93, with the idea to play h4, but now Black can play £08, and after h4 €h7. Now this knight defends not only the "65" pawn, but the "95" square as well. Nevertheless, if White plays 95, Black takes hg and after £0,49 h, ±h4 £95 threatening £03, and after £12 Black can play ±18 allowing the bishop to defend the "98" square. Accordingly, even if White sacrifices a pawn, he fails to increase the attack with the rook, and even if he does, the rook does not pose any substantial threats on the "75" file

This is a logical conclusion – all Black's pieces are defending the king-side and he has no weaknesses there consequently – he should be able to cope up with the defence

Can Black, in his turn continue with his offence? In this case the position may really become dangerous for him. If he exchanges immediately the pawns – 20...ab Ea8.



now White can push 22.g5. Lets check how dangerous White's threats are. If Black exchanges the pawns fg, White takes \$2.95, threatening f6 and ff, after the exchange, Black plays \$2.96 the pawns fg, after which goes with the queen to g2 and plays \$2.94 afterwards, and Black is defenseless against f6 and

②e5. If, after the exchange of the pawns, Black plays ②f6, instead of 當f6-White still plays ③g4 and Black can not capture this knight, because of 電·e7 (well, even if Black could do that, it would not help much, since White would have hg 當f6 當f4 and g5), and White will threaten not only 寫g2 and ∿fffer or ②hf5+ but ②e5 as well.

Therefore, Black can not take on g5 and has to allow White to take on f6 himself. In this case Black can continue his attack with 22... Ba3.

If White simply takes on f6, that will not do anything, since Black can answer gf, as well as 堂:f6, 堂g3 h5- denying the white knight the "q4" square.

White should play 23.094 first, sacrificing the "b3" pawn, threatening to exchange on "f6". We have come in fact to the decisive moment of the game, which should be calculated precisely by both opponents, and each one of them should have been able to anticipate perfectly what is going to follow.



Now. White has nineteen moves and Black only seventeen, so Black has lost two moves somewhere. White pushed forward the pawns on the king-side. gained space, in fact he equaled Black's queen-side space advantage. Well, now Black wins a pawn, so his advantage

was first in tempi, then transformed into a space advantage, and finally into a material advantage.

Yet, all this advantage amounts to, is just one pawn, indeed Black has now two passed pawns, but they are on the queen-side and can decide the outcome of the game, only if While's king-side attack fails. Besides, to be able to win this pawn - Black had to play with the rook and Black had to exchange the strong bishop for the passive while knight, and consequently Black's defence on the king-side was seriously undermined.

White can, in his turn, finally have one extra piece on the king-side and the main attacking plan looks like realized for the first time in the game. Now we come to the crucial question – was White right to rely that the king-side attack, with one extra piece, will bring a favourable outcome of the game.

After Black's move 23...2.b3, White does not capture this biand with the knight yet, since Black's rook will take on b3 and will threaten to go to b2 attacking White's rook. White does not take gf, because this would allow Black to play gf, and then bring his rook into the action with \$g7. White plays first 24.8g2 and Black can not answer fg, since White will take \$2.55. which will render Black helpless against the threat

(6, so Black should play 24...±n8. Then: 25.gf gf (if 0.f6, then 0g4 - e5 - g6+), and then 26.0±b3 (taking away the defender of the crucial squares [7 and g8]), 26...±b3 27.0±6 (threatening §g8#, and if §e8 0f7#, and if §c8 or §a8, then §g3 with a mate in two moves) 27...£g7 (forced!) 28.£;g7 ±5:g7.

This position deserves a serious attention, since not a single black piece is defending the king-sidel The rook is out of play, the gueen is on the Black's sixth rank, the knight defends the f6 pawn as well as the "f6" square, but all the other squares and the open files are not defended by Black, while White has now the knight, the queen and can bring the rook as well, against Black's bare king! White had to make a lot of preparatory moves to be able to accomplish this!

Now White has to finish off the attack against the open king, taking advantage of the absence of the bishop, which defended before the white squares that were attacked by the White's knight.

For example: 29.293+, and the king can not retreat to h8, or to f8, since White plays 298 and in the first case this will be a mate, while in the other case White is going to capture the rook on b3 (the wonderful bishop, that defended f7 and g8 is gone now!), so Black has to take the knight – 29...2:h6. Now, White can not play 214, threatening 214+, since now Black's rook enters the play giving checks on the first and the second rank, and the White's king can not avoid the checks, since when it goes to the "d" file- Black is going to play 62+ promoting the pawn into a queen!

Suddenly, in some of the lines- the advantages, that Black achieved on the queen-side, finally tell, as well as the material advantage.

33.直g4 or: 30.並n1 **当d5 31.周1 当5 32** 当**h4+** 当**h5 33** 当**f4+** 当**g5 34**.**三g5 fg 35** 当**d6+ 全h5 36**.当**:d7** threatening mate on the next move **世h**7#

Therefore, White's idea was correct after all: the open files and the attack, with one additional piece, really decides the outcome of the game. So, Black's plan was not correct, since Black did what he was aiming at, i.e.he won a pawn on the uenen-side and obtained two connected passed pawns there.

We know now that Black had the opportunity not to hurny too much, but to improve the defence on the king-side first. The queen-side offensive could be successful only if Black used all his pieces to bring about, but the price he had to pay for that was rather high, accordingly he couldn't afford it.

The real problem was that if White didn't think beforehand to sacrifice a pawn on the side he was defending, and then the kright on the side he was attacking. White would have failed in his attack. So, couldn't Black in his turn try to use the same manoeuvre? Couldn't he take the "b3" pawn with the cook, instead with the bishop? Formally, this can be termed as a sacrifice, but in this particular position the bishop is stronger then the rook, since the bishop defends the "T" and "g" sources, and Black was losing, in the variations we have seen, due to the insufficient defence on the king-side. If Black had managed to defend from the White's combination, the two connected passed pawns, one of which had reached the sixth rank, would have brought an easy victory for Black, no matter whether the pawns would have been supported by the rook or by the bishop.

To properly asses this combination, we should mention that White can not defend against the advance of these pawns, since after Black's moves £b3, £b3, £b3, ft White plays £b1, Black responds with c2 immediately. In this way White's combination would fail and there would be no necessify for Black to retreat with the king to h8. Black can now oppose the

white rook with his rook on 97, and then retreat with the king to 18, enjoying the defensive capabilities of the bishop on b3 along the diagonal to the "95" square. Besides, if White plays 1802 before the pawn exchange on 18, Black will have a choice between 188 and 18h, but not 19, since after 189.5 188, 189. 189 18

The conclusion is that if Black had preserved the bishophe could have defended his king-side successfully. So, the exchange-sacrifice would have been absolutely correct.

All that makes this game an excellent example about the conflict between ideas, that are correct and executed in the right way, in which all this started from an approximately equal position. The changes that occurred were a perfect illustration of the transformation of one element into another, and all this showed the complexity of the formation and the execution of the plans we had discussed before.

We saw in this example the accumulation of different advantages in the stage of the formation of the plan and its successful execution. We saw how the concentration of the certain pieces on the different sides helped the attack and the defence, and we came to the conclusion that - the right order of actions was something the player should have been able to anticipate beforehand. At the same time we saw that the plan, without going astay, should always stick to the main idea, although it should improve the proper treatment of some parts of it, which were aimed at different purposes, but all these were in connection with the main plan, facilitating the main plan and creating difficulties for the opponent's plan at the same time. We found out that very often - one element transformed into another, which led often to modifications of different advantages.

This final conclusion must be mentioned and remembered particularly, since the advantage in one of the elements can

rarely increase indefinitely – there always comes a moment you can not gain anymore place or time. In cases like this, it is advisable to try to preserve the status quo, up to the appearance of some new possibilities. Most of the times however, the advantage that you have obtained tends to fly away, if you can't transform it into an advantage in some other element. This is very often playing a decisive role in the chess game. We saw in the previous example that Black lost the game due to the fact that he transformed the advantage of space and time into a material gain. On the contrary, if he had sacrificed the exchange, i.e. if the advantage of material had been transformed into an advantage of time, he could have won the game."

abstract. Still, they impress us since they are profound and sometimes may even be new to us (do not forget the old proverb that, all that is new tends to be something that was familiar, but well forgotten).

First of all he talks about the advantage of material in its contemporary interpretation — the realization of material.

The next part of the book is devoted to better, worse and equal positions. In this part of the book Znosko-Borovsky ventures some observations which often seem to be rather

Znosko-Borovsky writes:

"... Now we are going to deal with several cases, in which

the material advantage is accompanied by some defects in the other elements, but despite that it is more substantial than them, and determines the general advantage on top of that. We are not going to deal extensively with cases like that, since they are relatively simple and if you are a good player you will not meet a lot of difficulties to press home your advantage of an extra pawn or a piece. The difficulties consist of making the right decision whether to simplify, attack, or amoneuvre etc. but you are going to make the right decision

after the proper evaluation of the position and we have been dealing with that extensively.

... Lets take for example this position:



#### Blackburn - Lasker Black is to move

Black has an extra pawn, but

White has a compensation of three extra moves and a nice centre. Indeed, the "e4" pawn is a little bit weak and the knights are not placed too well, but the knight on e3 threatens to occupy an excellent square on

the next move, enabling the white rook to attack the enemy queen, which is not placed too well either, and can not safely retreat and take a better position. Besides, White threatens to organize a king-side attack in the next several moves, based on the good central pawns, the active rook position and the two knights that can be manoeuvered there soon.

What can Black offer against that? It is evident that he should rely mostly upon his extra pawn, since presently he has no other advantages. That means that Black should try to prevent, or slow down, the manoeuvres of the White's pieces to the king-side (particularly Black should retreat with a queen against the threats of the enemy rook). Afterwards, Black must try to simplify to be able to neutralize White's advantage, and to try to win in the endgame. He mist have in mind to try to reach a favourable endgame, since the extra pawn is doubled and Black can not not be totally sure, if he reaches a rook endgame that the extra pawn will be enough to win.

Black has to exploit the weakness of the "e4" pawn, because if the white pawn gets away from the "e" file, Black

will obtain a protected, passed extra pawn, Accordingly Black plays: 1... #d4. pinning both knights and avoiding the future threats of the rook on "f3". We have to mention that 1...40d4 would only put the Black gueen into a stalemate situation, in which White's move \$93 would be rather dangerous. The next 2.41 46 is natural with the idea to exchange the

bishops. If White tries to avoid this, he shall have to retreat with the bishop to e2 or f1, i.e. lose a move and switch off the bishop from the attack, and Black will take advantage of that to play f7 - f5 immediately. If White exchanges the bishops (A:e6), after fe Black will prevent the White knights to go to d5 or f5, since these squares will be controlled by the pawn, and besides the "f" file will be opened and that will make the "f4" pawn rather weak. White's attack will completely fail then, and Black will solidify the centre supporting his extra pawn.

White must play now 3.Ec1 4:c4 4.E:c4. Now, Black is faced with the problem where to retreat the gueen to? If it goes to f6. White will play e5, threatening ∆e4 or f5. So. Black must play 4... 增b2, attacking the "a2" pawn. White will not like to give up a second pawn, since the attack is not so strong to compensate that, besides after #:a2 Black will threaten to go to d4 with the knight, attacking the rook on f3 and the pawn on b3, cutting off the rook on c4. Accordingly, White attacks the gueen 5.Ec2 #f6. There is no other move left. Now this move becomes possible, since Black's queen will meet e5 with 性h4, and f5 is not so dangerous anymore, because there is no rook on c4. In his turn Black threatens now to win the exchange with 40d4. White chooses another line of attack:

6. ②g4 当g6 7. 里g3. If Black retreats now with the gueen to e6, there would follow f4 - f5 - f6, and if the gueen goes to h5, it will be lost immediately after @f6+. So, the gueen will have to remain there, but Black has to impede the future movement of the White "f" pawn, Therefore Black plays 7...f5. White can

not capture this pawn, since Black will play 4:f5, attacking the rook on g3. so White must play 8.එe5 #e6 9.එ:c6 එ:c6.

Now Black's advantage is evident: the number of moves for both sides has been equaled completely. Black does not lack space either and the extra pawn is still present. Two minor pieces have been exchanged and White has no more attacking chances, besides White's central pawns are under attack; if White takes now ef, after 2:f5 it is not easy to see how White is going to protect the "f4" pawn, exposed to an

attack on the open file, where soon the second black rook is going to join the attack. Meanwhile, Black threatens to take fe. which will open the attack against the "f4" pawn. White is forced to push forward the attacked pawn: 10.e5 \( \tilde{2} \) b4 with the threats to win the "a2" pawn, attacking the rook on "c2", as well as Ød5 and Ød3. 11. ac4 de, intending to meet a:c5 with ef, and the rook on q3 does not have a good square to retreat to. 12. 增a1, defending the "a2" pawn, attacking the "e5" pawn, and if it moves forward, threatening mate on g7. 12... #d7. Black defends against the mating threat and attacks the knight on d2. 13. 2f3 ef 14. 2e5 #e7 15. £:f4 £e8 16. 2c4

世e1+ 17.月ff 世:a1 18.月:a1 公:a2. So. Black has three extra pawns now, almost all pieces

had been exchanged and White has no attacking chances left. The game will be won effortlessly by Black.

We have to find the lesson in this example. White lost some more pawns, since he wanted to compensate Black's material advantage with an advantage of time. If White loses this advantage, Black will simply remain with an extra pawn. Therefore Black's plan was to paralyze White's pieces and exchange them, neutralizing White's advantage of time. Black attacked the only weakness of White - the pawn on "e4". connecting this attack with the defence of his own gueen. Black could calmly defend with an extra pawn, since every move was solidifying the position and the material advantage

was getting more important with every move. White couldn't calmly turn to defence, since that wouldn't have hampered the opponent to realize his material advantage. All this leads us to the conclusion that we had made when we treated the problem of the creation of plans: the realization of the material advantage should be the distant, the final aim, on the road to which there are some other elements as well. When you achieve these aims one by one, finally you come to the realization of your main goal.

If we try not to pay attention to Black's extra pawn, or if simply there is no extra pawn the position will be entirely different. This extra pawn did not take part in the game, but it determined the course of actions in the game, affecting the play of both opponents. We have been dealing only with the proper play of the side that had the advantage, and we didn't analyse the play of the other side. Lets take a look at another position similar to the previous one:

## Marshall - Capablanca White is to move



Black has now an extra pawn, while White has an extra move, at a time when two of Black's pieces are almost out of action on the queen-side, and While has an attack against the almost defenseless king-side. The game continued: 1.-2/15 g6

Black can not capture this pawn, because the rook on c1 is hanging. Black can defend in another way – 2... #e6, just because he has an extra pawn.

Imagine now Black didn't have an extra pawn. White could play then simply \sugma g4: e6, fe, € f6+ compromising the enemy

pawns and keeping the strong passed pawn on d6. Therefore. the extra, although passive pawn, allows the side possessing it to contemplate some riskier play. The conclusion that the side having the material advantage should play much more carefully is in fact entirely wrong. There is a saying that the surprising events usually favour the weaker side, therefore the player often undertakes risky attacks with the hope to compensate his weaknesses with complicated combinations. We have to take into account that the weak side is practically forced into such a line of playing, since the peaceful developments will rarely be favourable for it, while the stronger side can play, having a freedom of choice. The latter is definitely to be preferred. White is a pawn down and therefore he chooses to attack: 3.世g5 堂h8. Black can not take the pawn once again, since after the exchange of the rooks and the move 增h6. Black loses the queen. 4. 全f6 星:d6 5.8:d6 #:d6.

Now we can see that Black has won a second pawn and after several moves White will be forced to give up his bishop. in fact all these developments are a consequence of the effect of the extra pawn, which allows the defending side to eniov the freedom of action in difficult situations. You don't have to think however, that when you have a material advantage you have to keep it at any rate, trying to improve your position. Sometimes you have to give back the material. if it allows your attack to become energetic and effective. A lot of examples, suitable to illustrate this, can be found in a plenty of gambit lines. I have to mention to you that the material won, i.e. pawns or pieces, is something real. therefore you can give it up only when you exchange this advantage for something real in the other elements, or when you are pressed to do that by your opponent. This last case is either a proof that you have not played well enough, or it is a logical consequence of the fact that the compensation for the

material was so large that it was more than sufficient for the sacrifices. If you are not forced to give back pawns or pieces, and you do it without getting back anything really substantial for that, but just to free your game – this means that you have played not enregitically enough, and your wish to win hasn't been strong enough. Chess is a game in which your efforts should never be in vain and you should not give up easily what you have acquired before."

Znosko-Borovsky finishes off the chapter "Material Advantage" with these comments.

In the next chapter "Advantage of Time", he shows the world-famous game Nimzovitch – Capablanca, Petersburg, 1914



After 1...Efe8 Znosko-Borovsky writes: "Now we have a very curious situation: Black attacks a pawn, which White can protect with the queen. White is in a hurry to do this, thinking that improves the position and gains time: 2.thd3? (the evaluation of the move and the italkics next are out by the

author). In this way White is not attacking the "c6" pawn anymore and the enemy queen is free now to attack, while was pinned beforehand! You don't have, particularly if you are deficient in time, to free the opponent and to give up your own threats! It is clear that 12 – 13 was better, since White would have made this move sooner or later."

This was excellent. I advise the reader to think about it and remember this recommendation. The game Nimzovitch—Capablanca is a part of the classical chess legacy and has been guoted in a lot of chess books and magazines, but I

have only met the right evaluation of the position in the Znosko-Borovsky's book. Capablanca took advantage of the interation of his queen from the defence of the "c6" pawn and won brilliantly after: 2.... 발e6 3./3 ላ2/7 4... ል42 ላ2e5 5. 발e2 ላ2e6 6.8 abt 18a8 7.a4 ላ2v2 8. 발 42 ଅ64 9.8 d1 18eb8 10. 발e3 18b4 11. 발95 ል4d4 12... ልከተ 18ab8 13.8... d4 3v3 44 14.8... ልከ 15. h4 812 16. 발05 17.8 e1 18h5 18.8 a1 18 144 19... ይ1 15. h4 812 16. 발05 17.8 e1 18h5 18.8 a1 18 144 19... ይ1 18h5 20.a5 8a8 21.a6 발65+ 22... 2th 1 18c4 23.a7 18c5 24.e5 18c5 25.8 a4 18h5 26... ይ1 18c5 27... ልከ 18c5 28... ይ1 18c5 28...

If we return to the game Blackburn – Lasker we have to pay attention to the position arising after White's fourth move:



In this position Black played 4... 2021, with a penetration of his queen in the enemy camp, attacking the "a2" pawn. He managed to deflect one of the enemy rooks and successfully neutralized the opponent's initiative. There are a lot of examples like this. Some time ago, when we studied the

ago, when we studied the Ragozin defence after **1.d4 ⊘f6 2.c4 e6 3.⊘f3 d5 4.⊘c3 ∆b4 5.cd ed 6.∆q5** we came to the move **6...c6**.



Black has an extra pawn, but he is rather backward in development and his king-side has been compromised. 12.Bb1! This is an excellent move. White should prevent the should be able to cope up with the enemy threats with the existing forces. If Black retreats with a gueen to defend -White will have a crushing initiative without looking back. I can give you the following line as an illustration: 12...曾a3? 13.曾f3 14.堂:h6 公d7 and it seemed to us that Black's position was tenable. Suddenly, someone suggested the humble looking move 13.q3!. Unfortunately, it turned out that White could

development of the enemy bishop to f5, 12... 2g8! Black

parry easily all the enemy threats, while the chronic weaknesses of Black's king-side were sure to cause Black a lot of trouble. We gave up the line altogether. Ag7 5.e3 c5 6.dc 曾a5 7.曾b3 Black can try to prevent 8.堂b5+ with 7.... 4d7!? It looked like a nice way to meet the whole line for White successfully. How can White play now? 8.增:b7? will be met by 8... e4 with a decisive attack for Black, 8.cd wouldn't do also after 8... 2:d5, and 8. 2f3 can be met by 8... 2a6, as well as 8... 2c6. The law of limited opportunities helped us find the move 8.4e5! White plays

with the already developed forces. The threat is 9.世:d7, or 9.cd. Black is reduced to 8... 2a6 9.cd 2:c5 10. 2c4 2a6. (White threatened 11.b4). What is White supposed to do now? Black intends to play 11... \$c8 and then castle and start some action with ♠b4. We couldn't find anything good for White for some time. We had finally to resort to Znosko-Borovsky's wisdom - to develop one more piece would not do the job. You have to play with the already developed forces and play actively at that!



11.a3/ and White is ready to meet every Black's move 11...Bc8 and 11...b5 included, with 12.b4! displacing the enemy queen, forcing a favourable endgame and to finish off the development later.

Finally, in one of the the sharpest lines, the so-called "Poisoned Pawn" in the Naidorf

variation in the Sicilian defence: 1.e4 c5 2.\(\tilde{D}\)i3 d6 3.d4 cd 4.\(\tilde{D}\)i4 \(\tilde{D}\)i6 5.\(\tilde{D}\)i3 66 7.14 \(\tilde{D}\)i6 8.\(\tilde{D}\)i2 2222 2222 Black captures a pawn and the queen penetrales the enemy lines, occupying the white forces with the defence, although Black hasn't developed almost anything, yet.

Znosko-Borovsky's advices sound contemporary enough nowadays! If you have studied well the classic legacy you can come to find a lot of new creative ideas in the competitive chess of our times.

I lost a rather interesting game against master V. Zhuravijov in the Championship of the Armed Forces in Lovo, 1977: 1.e4 e6 2.d4 d5 3.€0.2 €06 4.405 £045 6.6 £.65 £06 6.£23 €04 7.≝94 g6 8.a3 £.c3+ 9.bc €0c3 10.£d3 ≝e7 11.h4 £07 12.£h3 c5 13.dc €06 14.£d2 €0e5 15.≝04 €04+ 16.£:e4 £0c4 17.£e1 €0-0-0 18.c6 £0c6 19.£d3 e5 20.≝ra7 €0c3 21.fe d4 22.£b1 ≝c7 23.e4 f5 24.e4 £:g2 25.£g3 £05 26.Ēg6 £hg8 27.€02 £:g6 28.fg e4 29.№8+ 23.₩8+ 24.€d7 30.£b5+ №7 31.∰a4 ≝h2 32.⊞ra4 ≝h1+ 33.∰g5 £lack resigned.

same breakthrough. My position was bad and I decided to complicate even further with the piece- sacrifice. The white queen on a7 and the rook on b1 exert a strong pressure on the queen-side, so it is not easy for Black to do anything there. During the game I remembered Znosko-Borovsky and was not very fond of the White's queen, which had penetrated deepty into my position and had not any intentions to retreat at all.

# Advantage in Time

Znosko-Borovsky's words:

"The material advantage can be lost only if the opponent attacks our pieces; the advantage of space is usually longlasting, while the advantage in time is very unstable and can disappear in a flash. This is because when we develop our pieces on the perfect squares we can not intermittently gain time, since time is infinite, but not so in chess. Once we have gained a space advantage, we can manage to preserve the status quo, but when we have an advantage in time we are bound to lose it, if don't turn it into some other advantages. Therefore, when you have the advantage in time you have to ask yourselves a very important question (which, by the way, is not so important when you have advantages in another elements) and that is - what should I do- not to lose the advantage acquired? We have to be careful about the opponent's threats, but still the question remains; how to increase the advantage in time, or if it is impossible to increase, how to transform it into an advantage of another element, what advantage- and of which element?

The answer to this question is crucial for the chess game, since as we already know, the transformation from one

element into another is associated with danger on the chess board. Before we derive the conclusions how to play when we have an advantage in time, we have to turn our attention to an example which can be considered a classic one in the aspect of the advantage of time.

### Tarrasch – Miezes White is to move



Indeed, this is a typical position; not only the number of the pieces is completely the same, but they are almost symmetrically placed, unless you don't consider that White overcame the opponent with three knight moves! That comprises the essential part of the White's advantage.

Having in mind what we have been discussing, While is faced with the dilemma, what to do — not to lose the given advantage of time? There are two way to lose the advantage of time: the opponent can attack quickly our developed pieces and force their retreat — accordingly time must be lost; or the opponent makes one after another important developing moves, and there are no such moves for the own side. In the given example there are not any immediate threats, since the pawn can not attack the knight on b5, it can go to d6 with check, winning a pawn; neither it can attack the knight on d4, because it will move to f5, threatening the g7 pawn, as well as a check on d6! White has plenty of opportunities for useful developion moves as well.

We have to be much more subtle than that in our investigation of the position.

The advantage of White comprises in the fact that the two knights have been developed to good squares, while one of the knights of the opponent is still on the initial square and the other one is rather misplaced. Imagine however that Black manages to play £16 and then castle and we are going to see that White's advantage will almost disappear and then Black will displace White's attacking knights.

Accordingly, the first thing White should do is to prevent Black from finishing off the development, i.e. to develop the knight and castle. So, having acquired the advantage of time we should never lay back and relax and should strive for increasing it, pressing the opponent and creating threats. White can easily prevent Black from castling short 1.8he1

and if ≥e7 the white king goes away and the knight will be pinned, and if ≥f6 the king moves with check and Black's king should go to f8 cutting off the Black rook for a long period of time.

What about Black castling long? The pawn on a7 will be hanging and the knight is going to capture it with check. Yes, but after \$200, the knight should go back to 55 and then Black will play 65 and afterwards the knight on 44 will be hanging and will be captured by the rook! Black's rook after 0-0-0 attacked one of the knights and up to now it was defended only by the other knight! Now we have seen what Black is threatening and if he accomplishes it, White is going to be deprived of all the advantage in time!

deprived or all the advantage in lump. How should White parry this threat? First of all protect the knight on d4, or retreat it. That is to play after 1.8he1 (otherwise Black is not going to castle long, but play instead \( \)6 fand \( \)0-\)0-\0.2 \( \)8 add \( \)1 c \( \)2.\( \)5. After the first move Black is going to play simply \( \)6 \( \)7 - \( \)6 and after the knight moves back, \( \)2\( \)6 comes next and Black will have no problems to finish his development. In the second case he is going to play

2...g7 - g6 and when the knight retreats Black would follow with c7 - c6 and then freely develop the ᡚ6.

Therefore White should try to do something to refute Black's castling long and that is more important than to prevent castling short.

We already find out that if White doesn't play 1. Ehe1, there may follow 2016 and 0-0. Consequently, White must prevent 0-0-0, otherwise he loses altogether his advantage in time.

Now we have come to the decisive moment of the game. White has finished off the development, but Black threatens to equalize it in the next few moves. If White doesn't find anything decisive and he ought to be able to do it, that would mean that the knight manoeuvres had been premature and White is bound to lose time for the retreat of the knights.

There is a course of action that justifies the way of development and proves that White's plan has been as profound as far-sighted. That is to play 1.8±0 1.0±0 2.0±27±256 3.2±026 and White remains with rook and two passed pawns against two knights. In this way White will have no advantage in time or space, but it will become a matter of material ratio. Therefore White transformed his advantage in time into an advantage in material. Imagine that Black's pawn was not on a7, but on b6 — the position would have been almost just the same, yet white's combination would not be correct. You have to pay attention how careful you should be to the smallest trifles in the features of the position.

Following Znosko-Borovsky's deep thoughts we can see the really narrow path White was supposed to follow to keep this initiative. White was constantly on the alert: what would be Black's next moves and threats? White was preventing these threats or decreasing their effectiveness by means of prophylactics – one of the prerogatives of A. Nimzovitch! I am not sure if we have to make any conclusions out of that, but I

still think that Nimzovitch, criticizing sometimes really sternly the partially inflexible Steinitz's theory, had surely studied the games of Tarrasch and had based his hyper-modem theory soundly. Well, I went a little bit too far. I would like to concentrate your attention that Znosko-Borovskii strongly recommended to observe the features of the position thoroughly (his last pawn transposition from a7 to b6).

Lets see a contemporary example on this theme – the impressive finish of the game **Yusupov** – **Timoshcenko**, Moscow 1982.



If we calculate tempi -White is evidently behind his opponent, still it is perfectly evident that White has the initiative, because of the unsafe position of the enemy king. White must play energetically, because if Black manages to coordinate the rooks and find a safe haven for the king. White's

pawn weaknesses on the king-side will be troublesome for White. How should White develop his initiative?

1.0d5 1.8id1 looked tempting to engage the opponent in defence along the "d" file. Black can play however, 1...3ac8 2.0e4 8.66 3.8ac1 8hc8l and this tactical defence helps him to stay away from trouble. 1...3ad8 2.8ac1 1. A. Yusupov expertly increases the pressure and does not allow the opponent to have his hands free. After 2.8id1?! 2c6f Black can sigh and relax. 2...2c7 3.2b6f 2c6 4.8fcf1 it looks like here 4.8id1, threatening 5.8:d6f and 6.3df+ is very strong, but Black can meet it with 4...g5! 4...2f5 5.2ed1 2e6 6.8d6f 2f6 7.8cd1 2c7 8.0d7 2c7 9.0df The white pieces managed to penetrate the enemy position and stay there. The

knight on d7 is endangering the Black monarch and to be able to increase his space advantage Yusupov resorts to his upeen-side pawns. 9...16 10.a4 95. G.Timoshcenko is preparing an outpost for his pieces on 14. 11.4c11 A very strong multipurpose move. White opens the "e" file for the rook, prepares to go with the bishop to a3 and simultaneously sets up a trap in which Black obligingly falls in. 11...2f47. Timoshcenko has been evidently tired from the defence of his difficult position, misses a fine tactical moment and loses a pawn. 11...Bhg8 was necessary.

12.4.:f4 4.:f4?! 13.4.:f6! Edc8 14.4.5! 4c7 15.8e1+ 4f7 16.8d7+ 4g6 17.4g7! 4d8. The only defence. After 17...8hf8 18.8e6+ 8f6 Black loses a piece after 19.8:f6+ 4gf6 20.8c7.



The tactical operations are over and we can witness a prosaic rook endgame in which White has two extra pawns. Still the win in this position is far from being automatic. The doubled pawns on the "f file do not allow the white king to march to the help of the passed pawn. so Yusunov enabled the

king to do the job by means of subtle manoeuvres, repeatingly making use of the zugzwang. 27.h3 Bit 28.Bd6 Bid 28.Bd6 Zugzwang Na.1.29...Bd3. Black is forced to let the enemy king to the first rank, since 29...Bb1 is bad after 30.14! gf 31.Be51 and 32.Bd5. 30.67ff Bd2. Snatching off the "3" pawn losse after the rook manoeuvre Be6 e = 3 - a3.

31. 201 Ec 2 32.Eb6 Ea2 33.Ed6! Zugzwang №2. Black is obliged to enable the white king to occupy the second rank because of the manoeuver 34.Ed2 and 35.Ea2. 33...Ea74 34.Ed2 Ea24 35.Ev3 Ea34 36.Ev4 Ea2 37.Ev15. Now White can pay no attention to what is happening on the king-side, since the pawn on "a6" decides the outcome of the game. 37...E12 38.Ev6 E13 33.A7 Ef6 40.Eb7 E174 41.Ea6 Ef6 42.EG6 Ef6 3.Eb7 544.4.a6E Black testioned

# Advantage in Space

"The main problem facing the player who has an advantage of some sort is always the same: first, not to lose this advantage, and then to enlarge it, so that it can assure the win. The difference between the ways to achieve this lies in the properties of the elements, the advantage consists of.

We saw that it was rather easy to lose the advantage of time, therefore the player who had that advantage should be very careful to avoid this. At the same time the advantage in time can not be preserved for a long period of the game, neither it can be enlarged so much, so it should be transformed into an advantage of another element. Both things are realized with the help of constant direct threats, which postpone the development of the opponent and permit the advantage to be increased.

The object of the play with a space advantage is entirely different. Once the opponent is cramped in the movement of his pieces, you have to not only threaten his pieces and the few squares left for them, but try as well to deprive him of these squares he can put his pieces on. It is much more difficult to lose the advantage of space, than the advantage of time, and to be able to avoid this it is usually enough not to

retreat with the pieces that are placed on outposts and important squares, but to support them there.

When you have the advantage in space you can afford to lose a lot of moves without threatening anything and even without developing your pieces to new important squares; the opponent will hardly be able to make use of this, since he has been deprived of enough squares. Accordingly, to increase of the opponent and making direct threats is not so necessary. The space advantage it is enough to slowly reduce the space of the opponent and making direct threats is not so necessary. The space advantage can be increased almost infinitely, in fact you don't have to worry about its transformation into another element, since often this happens automatically. When the opponent has no more squares to put his pieces on, and fails to find a way to free himself -he usually sacrifices something, a piece etc.

This particular moment can sometimes present serious dangers, since after the sacrifice the opponent's pieces are usually in the open and that can lead to a breakthrough, which might bring the doom for the side that had the space advantage.

That means that when you have the advantage of time, the dangerous moment is when you transform it into an advantage of another element, while when you have the advantage in space the danger comes when the opponent liberates himself with the help of material concessions."

The contemporary development of chess confirmed entirely the profound comments of Znosko-Borovsky, made more than seventy years ago. Süli, it is even harder to give an useful advice how to play positions in which you lack space. An Mimzovitch wrole that you have to seek liberation from cramped positions gradually. In his book "Fifty of My Best Games" B. Larsen commented his game with A. Nilsen, as Black in Esbera, 1953 after the moves:



in the following way: "Black is trying to prepare b7 – b5. This is a wonderful plan, but after my next move it was worth for my opponent to have remembered Nimzovitch's advice that you seek liberation, when you lack space gradually.

In these years I was studying

Nimzovitch's legacy, while the other half of my efforts was devoted to the opening theory."
12.8cf b57 The game didn't last very long now. 13.2d5f ⊕:d57 (13...⊕e8l) 14.4.2g7 ⊈:g7 15.cd ⊕e5 16.h3 ≝b6 17. ≝d4l f6 18. ≝:b6 8:b6 19.0d4 g5 20.8c7 ≅d8 21.5h2 h6 22.4c4 ≝8 23.44 ⊕f7 24.4f3l ≦b8 25.⊕e6+ 4.:e6 26.de ⊕h8 27.f5 b4 26.4b7 a5 29.e4 Black resigned.

Znosko-Borovsky's advices on this theme sound as usual rather abstract, but they are interesting and substantial-particularly when they are supported by examples, one of which I am going to quote:

"As we know the lack of space leads to the lack of good squares for the pieces, to a discoordination and the impossibility to have any initiative or threats. This allows the opponent to develop his game at ease, to place his pieces on the best squares and to narrow the space of the opponents position.

It is very difficult to defend positions like that, since you can not even think about any activity, so the best that you can do is to understand what is the weakest point of your position, and then what is the main threat of the opponent. You have to make a concrete pinpoint conclusion about this, and not

something abstract- and then to find the way to prevent the execution of this threat and look for a way to liquidate your weakness. Usually you combine those two tasks, but still you have to know about your weaknesses and the plans of your opponent- to avoid being confronted with such circumstances again. Now comes the question- how to get rid of your weakness and prevent it from getting enlarged? Lets see the following position:

#### Tarrasch – Duras White to move



This position is interesting for us. since the game is in its opening stage, in which a lot of the future possibilities are hard envisage and you can not even talk about the end of the game. It is not so difficult, however to see that the White's position is clearly worse and that is due to

the position of the bishop on d2, which has no good squares for development and hampers the rook. The bishop can not go to c3, White can not open the diagonal "c1 — h6", since after e3 — e4 Black will play  $\Omega$ d7 e5. So, the bishop is left with the e1 square and then White should push forward the pawn on f2 to be able to put the bishop to f2 or g3. If White wants to do all this- he should retreat with the queen first in a way to enable it to protect the "D2" pawn, but carefully, since Black's knight can attack this pawn in two moves:  $\Omega$ d7 — e5 — c4; accordingly, White should be careful with the "e3" pawn in this case, before pushing forward the "12" pawn. You can see that the problem of development of the bishop on d2 is very complex and the knight on th 30 eccupies a square, which is far

from perfect, but still this defect of the position is of absolutly second rate importance, relative to the first defect.

What is Black's main threat? We already mentioned it – the knight manoeuvre €\d7 – e5 – c4 attacking simultaneously the pawns on b2 and e3, as well as the bishop on d2 and the queen.

White should try to defend from this threat and it should be a combined one, but at first White should gain some time. Black threatens to attack the now defenceless b2 pawn, so White should retreat with the knight on c3 and enable the bishop to protect it from c3. If Black plays £0.5 White is going to answer with £13 and if £0.4, £0.3, threatening with something like an attack on the king- side (£0.5 also a threat). So, it is Black who should be careful not to allow the white bishop to go to c3, so Black should play b5 – b4, in this way White gained that move he needed to accomplish his manoeuvres. Black is not threatening anything with this move, so White can defend safely the "e3" pawn and then continue with the aforementioned manoeuvre of the bishop via e1.

1. De2 b4 2. Dd4 De5 3. ±e2 and this not only defends the pawn on b2, but denies the square c4 for the black knight, since the b5 pawn is gone. Black is forced now to bring new pieces to be able to prepare the manoeuvre of the knight to c4, which still constitutes Black's main threat. 3... De4 4. De1 Be8.5 Eacl. De6 6. Dd2.

We can see the desperate measures of White to disallow the penetration of the black kright to the "c4" square. 6....416 with a nice position on the long important diagonal, attacking the "b" nawn.

**7.f3.** Finally this move has become possible, opening a new diagonal for the bishop.

Now the white knight on d4 is the key piece in White's position since it closes the diagonals of the bishop and the queen, which can not retreat. Therefore - 7...2c6 8.2c6

**E:c6 9.E:c6 #:c6 10. ②b3.** White is threatening to go with the other knight to d4 and Black parries this threat with a move which simultaneously attacks the "e3" pawn.

10...256 11...22 White has accomplished his main task, the bishop has been developed well and the position have been equalled. Black can not realize his main threat. Now the game goes into an equal endgame: 11...255 12.255 2:55 33.842.

You can hardly find a better example of paralysing the threats of the opponent and liquidating your own weaknesses. Moreover it is much more typical, because White managed to equalize the game playing passively, without even a hint of an activity or an attack."

Further Znosko-Borovsky makes some interesting comments about worse positions in broader aspect: "As usual, the formation of the defensive plan should be based upon the proper assessment of the position. When you have made it and you have seen the defects of your position it would be very useful to ask yourself the following question: The advantage which belongs to the opponent, is it enough to assure the win, or it should be substantially increased if the opponent is to win the game? The right answer to this question is going to facilitate our further play in this game. because if the advantage is insufficient, the defensive task is easier; it will be enough to watch not to worsen your position more. On the contrary, if the advantage of the opponent is great, so it can cause our losing the game, you have to try to find much more complex plans and manoeuvres to avoid losina.

... When we say that the will of the weaker side is subjected to that one of the opponent, this does not necessarily mean that the moves of the weaker side are forced, so he has no choice. On the contrary, in the examples we have been treating before, we saw that the defending side could choose between one move or another, as well as between one defensive system or another. If the will of the weaker side gets paralysed completely, the only thing he will be capable of doing is to subject to what the opponent requires of him, so his position will be lost and he will not have any chances, until he finds a way to liberate himself from the power of the opponents will and acquire the freedom of choice. We have already ascertained that when you have to play forced moves, this implies that your position is critical. Therefore, it can be assumed that the main task of the defending side is to avoid the necessity to make forced "only" moves. The method to achieve this depends of course on the features of the position and particularly on what elements the opponent's advantage consists of.

If the advantage of the opponent is in space and he tries to slowly squeeze our position and to pin out pieces and paralyse our moves without any direct threats, it would be very advisable to make some diversion on the side, opposite to the side on which he is attacking us, not to allow him the freedom of action. On the contrary, if he has the advantage in time and he creates direct threats to prevent us from developing our pieces, we have to defend in such a way not to allow him to create additional threats and not to take away the little threats we have, keeping some of his pieces occupied.

The stage of defence is the most important one, in which we have to find a long and extensive defensive plan and not to comply with making one defensive move after another and to parry his different threats neglecting his main attacking plan. Since we have already determined that the actions of the weaker side are more or less forced, it is very important to understand and clarify what his real threats are.

... In the upper passages we have been talking about whether the advantage of the opponent is enough to win the

game or not. It is important to clarify in which stage of the game can this advantage cause our defences to crumble, the middlagme or the endgame and accordingly choose the type of play that is going to help us defend successfully. Therefore, you have to understand perfectly sometimes what kind of endgame you can defend comfortably and successfully and depending on that to choose one or another defect of you position. It happens very often that you can't avoid the loss of a pawn or the exchange, so you have to answer this question and to try to look for the easier to defend endgame, and eventually choose if you have to give up a pawn, which one and when to give it and how.

... Now we are faced with the following problems: when the opponent has advantages in several elements- how to prevent the defects of your position to enlarge so much that the loss might become unavoidable – how to get rid of these defects, how to defend against different plans and threats of the opponent, and how to cope up with them. Finally, what kind of plan we can formulate to try to play actively, or if you have to go into an endgame what should that endgame look like. If you have to keep playing in certain position as it is, you have to try to make the task of the opponent as difficult as possible, or as the saying goes: the opponent ought to be able to prove that he is is capable of winning.

So, we can have the following cases:

- Passive defence, of course not, always deprived of any personal initiative, is suitable only if the position is really bad.
- Counter- attack happens to be the option often in a position in which we don't have enough forces.
- Manoeuvring type of playing, which is advisable when the difference in the positional aspects is not so substantial."
- What is the importance of Steinitz's theory nowadays? If we make a comparison with the theoretical mechanics then the contemporary chess corresponds to the role of the

dynamics, while the chess of Steinitz's era should be connected with the statics. You can not understand at all cinematic and dynamics if you don't know the laws of statics.

What are the drawbacks of the theory of Steinitz? First of all he is very narrow-minded in the evaluation of the positions. There are a lot, a really great number of cases, in which the methods of the positional evaluation and the formation of the plan used at the times of Steinitz will be appropriate. Chess. however, is one of the fields of human activity in which the exceptions of the rules comprise a much larger part than in the other human activities. Therefore, most of the positions should be evaluated much more concretely. Znosko-Borovsky mentions at some place the necessity of the concrete approach in the evaluation of the position, but this is limited only to: "... So, sometimes our feeling tells us that there remain some features of the position we have been unable to grasp, but this does not mean that these features are nonexistent. They haven't appeared on the surface yet, but to be able to locate them and understand them we have to use much more flexible and profound methods than the formal criteria we have been using up to now. " Unfortunately, we haven't seen these methods in his work. I would like to illustrate my thoughts, so I'll have to take you back in time, i.e. in 1955.

It is my opinion that one of the best Soviet chess books after the War was I. Lipnitzky's "Some Problems of the Contemporary Opening Theory". Unfortunately, this book was published only in 15, 000 issues and remained a bibliographical rarily. In this book the author tried to come to the essence of the concrete approach of the positional evaluation and the analytical method of the studying of chess. Here is a small excerpt from Lipnitzky's book: "In every position there operates a complex of objectively existing principles, features, conditions and laws. Most of them,

however, haven't been investigated thoroughly, or even formulated yet. It is not quite possible to make a completely right evaluation of the position, if your opinion is based only upon the established popular beliefs and truths.

If in a certain position the most important, the definitive features are a subject to the established and popular laws, then you can make the right evaluation of this position well, being based on them. But there are a lot of positions in which the essence is determined by some features and laws that objectively exist, but we haven't formulated or even grasped them at all.

What should we do to be able to evaluate such a position?

The existing armour of positional evaluation wouldn't do the job. We have nothing else up our sleeves. We have to rety on the world famous reasoning that the truth is always concrete, while if we use the opposite connection- the concrete approach can be a reflection of some particular truth and would allow to replace the absence of a certain chess rule, or a law. Therefore it is entirely wrong to say that the concrete creative approach to the position diminishes the importance of the chess rules, or is contrary to them.

The essence of the matter is that in each particular position the denial of some laws, (or features of the position) can take part only if some other are established and confirmed.

Therefore the generalization and the concrete approach in the process of chess fight and analysis are fruitfully cooperating. You have to generalize in chess creatively and to strive always to be concrete."

Lipnitzky's thoughts are lavishly illustrated by examples. Here is one of them:



#### White is to move.

If White tries to play according to the well-known rules of playing in the opening, i.e. develop his pieces and castle: in the scheme: e2 − e3. Ad3, 0. O, such type of playing will lead White nowhere. Black will play that he whight to a5. consequently the knight to a5. consequently

win the pawn on c4 and after that the game itself, Lipnitzky mentions the interesting opportunity for White to suddenly change the whole course of action with the move 11.g4!!. Now, after 11... 4a6?, there may follow 12.gf ef 13. 4e3+!. and if 11...fg - 12.44g2 2c6 13.d5. It becomes clear now that Black has no time to do anything about the "c4" pawn. Maybe the best line for Black will be - 11...cd 12.cd 增:d2+ 13.单:d2 fg 14.2g1 h5 15.h3! gh 16.4ch3 with more than a sufficient compensation for the pawn for White. Therefore, the rules: develop your pieces in the opening as quickly as possible and then castle, don't start attacks that are not well prepared. don't weaken your position on the side etc., will be in this position of a second-rate importance. The most important feature of the position is that almost all Black's pieces are concentrated on the gueen-side, accordingly White tries to start actions on the other side with a clear superiority of forces. Therefore, it looks like as if the most important rule in this position for White should be something like: attack your opponent where his position is most vulnerable. This is essential for the position and for the right plan for White, and all the abovementioned rules are negligible. Yet, if White didn't have an object for an attack, had the Black "f5" pawn been on f7. White would have to look for another way out of

his predicament. In this case we somehow managed to define the main feature of the position using plain words, but nowadays that is not always possible, although chess laws affect even the sharpest and complex situations.

Lets go back to our study of Znosko-Borovsky's work and its qualification by A. Alekhine: "... He was about to finish the magnificent, as a concept, book "Middle Game in Chess". I am saying, as a concept, since his method of development of the theme and some of his conclusions are a little bit different with my beliefs and opinions. The fact itself that the author tries to establish the necessity of the analytical approach in the structure of the chess fight to be given a place of a second-rate importance, while considering really important some generalizing laws is interesting. These laws were the fundament of the semi-scholastic "science" and the same approach to chess ja nidea which constitutes an asset to the treasury of the chess game".

A. Alekhine was really a great player. He was able to plan his actions perfectly relying on a very precise evaluation of the position. He could find better than anybody else some hidden concrete resources in the position which enabled him to play creatively and very effectively.

### Alekhine – Rubinstein The Haque 1921

1.d4 d5 2.043 e6 3.c4 a6 4.c5 0.c6 5.044 0ge7 6.0c3 0g6 7.0e3! b6 8.cb cb 9.h4! 0d6 10.h5 0e7 11.h6 g6 12.0q5 0-0 13.0f6!



A. Alekhine comments on this position: "This is an extremely strange position after thirden moves in a Queen's Gambit! White has made in the first thirden moves- three moves with the "c" pawn, three moves with the "h" pawn and four moves with the bishop and after that White has, if not winning, a

position with a really great advantage.

In connection with the original approach to the opening of this game, a lot was said about the "hyper-modern" technique and the "neo-romantic" school etc. In reality everything was much simpler. Black played in the opening several reality poor moves. (3. a.6, 5...&e7, 6....&p6), which might give Black a decent position had the opponent reacted in a tritle way. certification in the discentification of 7.Δe3, or 9.93 instead of 9.h4. I didn't intend to impress anybody with originality when I pushed forward my "h" pawn, all I wanted to was to prevent Black to get some advantage in the centre. As a rule, this ultra-original way of playing in the opening does not suit neither my temper, nor my skyle."

I think that it is possible to evaluate the position on the diagram correctly and to plan the following actions of White, if you are based on the theory of Steinitz. Well, I think that if you stick to this theory you would hardly ever find in the same position moves like 7.4e3! and 7.h4!.

Alekhine and Znosko-Borovsky both defected from Russia and from what history tells us must have been in good relations, respecting each other warmly. Evidently this should tell us why Alekhine was so delicate "...are a little bit different than my views". Alekhine could hardly ever agree that the

analytical approach might be given a place of a second-rate importance, since most often this approach is quite enough to determine the essence of the position.

What are the main features of the analytical approach? Lipnitzky suggests the following scheme. Lets suppose that we are faced with some rather unclear position and we would like to find out which side this position is favourable for. We clarify which side is to move and try to find the best moves for both sides. We don't have to try to analyse it exhaustively "until mate". We have only to try to reach a certain position, which can easily be subjected to a correct evaluation with our knowledge, based on the laws and principles and the positional habits we have already acquired. Lipnitzly classifies positions like this act artifieft. For example:

### Averbach – Botvinnik Moscow 1955





Szabo – Barcza Stockholm 1952



# Alekhine – Zaemisch Baden-Baden 1925



In the first case we don't have to calculate any variations, or to be careful about the features of the position. Black's advantage is so evident that it is out of the guestion. In the second and the third example. White is clearly better, while in the fourth - there is a completely equal position on the board. When the chess player becomes stronger and more experienced, the number of the positions that he can term clarified increases. It is quite evident that for the aspiring chess player a lot of positions will seem unclear, while for the grandmaster there will be easily clarified. A lot of positions however are impossible to evaluate correctly using only the method of "optical" evaluation and Lipnitzky suggests such positions to be called critical. Accordingly, one of the objects of the chess analyses must be to make a transition from a critical position into a clarified one. I would like to offer the reader two examples of the analytical approach to the position, from the Lippitzky's book, commented by the author:

"I will turn the attention of the reader to the analysis of a particularly interesting position from the game *Eliskazes* – *Averbach* Stockholm 1952.



13... £76 – 75 was followed by 14..65! Let us try to evaluate this critical position. We have to start with a "rough" evaluation. The exposed position of the black queen is rather unattractive here: the queen deprives the "f" pawn from the opportunity to be pushed forward, and besides the queen

has been cut off from the queen-side which might soon be the area of important events.

White can create some threats to capture this queen, particularly if we have in mind that \$\Delta d T\$ denies the queen the road back to safety, and the weakness of the "f6" square, when the white knight is on the "e4", is quite real.

Therefore, the queen on "55" seems to be like someone who has stepped on a pile of powder and must be constantly on the alart against someone who may bring a box of matches around. Meanwhile, Black has no advantages to compensate the unfavourable position of the queen, accordingly the conclusion is that the last black's move is bad and now the whole position has become dubious.

Lets now turn to the more difficult part – the concrete approach to the position. The attacking "e4" knight is protecting the white queen, which in its turn can be attacked and has only one square to retreat to. Afterwards Black can force his queen-side offence.

Is this a good enough compensation? Averbach, playing 13...\(\frac{M}{2}\)formust have thought so, for sure. Therefore, lets try to find some concrete lines in this critical position (we are going to classify it as number one. So. 14...\(\frac{M}{2}\)fb/fb/fb/fb.6.\(\frac{M}{2}\)fa.\(\frac{M}{2}\)fa.\(\frac{M}{2}\)fb/fb/fb/fb/fb.6.\(\frac{M}{2}\)fa.\(\



Now we can see the idea behind Black's manoeuvres. He intends to displace the white bishop from b3 in order to win the central "d5" pawn and tiberate his queen at that. For example, 17.0-0 a4 18.Δd1 €2:d5 and 19.Δg4 is impossible because after 19.....tg'g4 the "f6" square is protected by the black

### knight.

Averbach must surely have had in mind this position, playing 13... 115. Was are going to call this position "critical position No 2". This position arises by force after the critical position No. 1, therefore its perfect concrete evaluation is extremely important for us. Naturally we have to have a look what happened in the game. There followed 17. 0-0 at 18.4.104 ab 19.4.106 of 20.13 g5 21.ab and White remained with an extra pawn and excellent chances to win the game. If all these moves were forced, we could say that the move 13... 115 was bad, since it led Black to a very difficult position by force. But were they really forced? Why didn't Black play 18.4.4.104.



It turned out that Averbach was convinced during the game that after 19. \$\text{\$\Delta\$} d1!\$ White would have a winning position.

Åg4 (after 19...Δe8) winning the queen. Later, however when Averbach analysed this position, he found a sufficient defence for Black with 19...h51 with lines like: 20.h3 Δe8! 21,94 ≝c8 and 22,9h is impossible because of 22....\(\mathbb{L}\) and 22,9h is impossible because of 22...\(\mathbb{L}\) and 24. White can indeed capture the enemy queen, but Black gets more than sufficient compensation for it. These lines after 19..\(\mathbb{L}\) dtl! were quoted by master Baranov in the book. "The Interzonal Tournament in Stockholm, 1952." And since the move 19..\(\mathbb{L}\) c (instead of 19..\(\mathbb{L}\) ados not give White any advantage, because of 19...\(\mathbb{L}\) each 1 allows Black to equalize.

Can we now say that the move 13...\(\frac{\pmu}{15}\) is bearable and Black's position has not been put by it on the verge of collapse. To be able to answer properly this question we have to clarify whether white couldn't play better. Lets turn our attention the critical position No 2.



We suggest for White, instead of 17. 0-0, the move 17...23 a4 (The only move. 17...236 loses after 18...£cd? 
○d3+ 19.522 ±12+1 20.52d3 cd. And Black has very dangerous attack for the piece, threatening ab, e4+ and 515+18...£cb4 19.ab ab 20.73.



Now, this position is not critical anymore, since it is darified enough and that was the purpose of our analysis. After the exchange of two minor pieces, the queen on 15 and the bishop on d7 are evidently misplaced. For example: 20...\$27 21.0-0 h5 (21...\$2.1 is rather unattractive after 22 \$2.\$21 \$4.5 \$4.5 \$1.00 \$1.0

is not to be envied.) 22.2fc1 and Black will have a hard time defending his numerous weaknesses on the queen-side. The pawns on the "b" file form a rather picturesque sight. So, While has the advantage.

Can we finally, on the basis of this analysis, condemn the move 13... \$\mathbf{2}f5!? To be able to answer affirmatively with full credit, it would be necessary to make some additional investigation of the pawn sacrifice for Black in the line: 17.a3! a4 18. \$\mathbf{L}\$ hd ab.



Now we have come to the critical position № 4. It would be insufficient for White to try to win a pawn, for example 19.6\(\text{.cd}\) 6 cd 20.\(\text{.cd}\) 6 & \(\text{BIC8}\) with the idea to penetrate with the rook to c2 or 19.\(\text{.cd}\) 6 d 20.0\(\text{.cd}\) 6 \(\text{big}\) 5! and 21. 0-0 wouldn't do, because of 21.\(\text{.cd}\) 6 recause of 21.\(\text{.cd}\) 6 to transfer the root of 22.\(\text{.cd}\) 6 to transfer the root of 22.\(\text{.cd}\)

# the enemy knight.

White can avoid the capture of the pawn with 19, 0-0! (19.f3! is also good), after which the position has clarified

more or less. White has a strong knight on e4 and the pawn on d6 is hanging. The queen on f5 is still misplaced. White threatens f3 and g4, i.e. 19... \( \Delta : \text{.0} \). \( \Delta : \text{.0} \).

Although this analysis does not aspire to exhaust the possibilities in this position completely, we can still say that after 13...1815 White has the initiative as well as the advantage too. Do we have now enough reasons to condemn the move 13...1815 as bad?

No, not at all. It is not so simple. Before all that we have to see that the move 13... 275 might have been the least of evils. It is not quite sure that the other moves were any better. If we go back to the position before 13... 275, we have to check the other possibilities.

So, 13... #e7 14.d5 (probably the best). 14... 4b4!.



This is much more active then 14...2d8. 15.22b3 The other moves by the white queen are not any better. 15..a5f
15...4f5 wouldn't do after 16.2nd6 2c2+ 17.2e2 2f.d6
18.8ac1 and White gets a material advantage. 16..2nd6 If immediately 16.a3, then 16...a4 and 17...2a6 16...2nd6 17.aa1 17...2a6 16...2nd1 17...2a6 16...2a6 16..

Instead of 13. 267, 13... 2614 is much more interesting and even stronger to be able to meet 14.d5 with 14... 455, and 14.g3 with 267.

I am not going to analyse extensively the moves 13... #e7 and 13... #h4, but it can easily be affirmed that Black has an approximately equal position after them.

Now, finally after we have made a comparison between 13...當f5 and 13...當f2 (13...當f4), we can make the final conclusion that the move 13...當f5 was bad and it was the

cause of the difficulties for Black in the aforementioned game. Now, I can show you how this analysis will look like if we use only the system of signs: 13... 2575 (13... 257 (

So, as of result of our analysis our first impression, our "rough" evaluation that the move 13...#f5 is unattractive, has been confirmed. We can only venture a guess that Averbach, applying only common sense, wouldn't have played 13...#f5. He probably made this move after some calculation of variations and it must have been mistaken, though."

This analysis shows that the process of going from a critical position into a clarifled one is a long and laborious process.

process.

In that same example we had to deal with a relatively simple analysis, in which the quantity of the different lines and variations was not so large. Very often, however we have to deal with situations in which one critical position transforms into another and all this needs a precise calculation of plenty of lines. It is not so easy then to bring the matters into clarified positions, and sometimes it is even impossible. Therefore, the chess player should be able to stop the analysis at some moment and to try to evaluate the position on the basis on his knowledge and experience.

When your evaluation is precise and profound, the probability that you are going to find the right plain increases. In the book of Lipnitzky there is a wonderful example in which he compares the process of evaluating positions and formation of plans with the approximate and the precise marking, when shooting.



"White has the initiative. How should White increase it further, particularly while Black's queen side is undeveloped? At first the strong positional move 1.265 seems tempting. A lot of factors are in favour of this move: 1) The knight is centralized and it is going to take part in the kingside attack hampering Black's

development of the queen-side. 2) The diagonal "41 – h5" is opened for the immediate participation of the white queen in the attack against the enemy king and that allows White to concentrate four pieces against it. 3) The knight on e5 will be hard to displace, since 1...16 will not do after 2.\(\mathbb{m}\)17.5 \(\text{of} 2.6.\)17.5 \(\text{of} 2.6.\)18.5 \(\text

So, applying common sense we have found a rather attractive move. But this is still a "rough evaluation". What is going to be the diagnosis of some more subtle evaluation? We can now find a strong move for Black and that is 1... da6f by means of which Black will get rid of the strong white bishop on d3. What to do now? Should White play 1.2e5 or not? Before we make a decision lets see if the move 1... da6 has no refulation.

So, 2.£:a6 ②:a6 3.≝a4! ≝c8 4.②c6 4.d6 5.£f4! and Black can not take on f4 because of ②e7+. But Black has a sufficient defence with 5 \$\mathbb{\pi}\cap{7}\$. Since Black has this move at

his disposal, it seems like White should refrain from the move 1. 으e5. We have to mention that after 5...발c7! 6.쇼:d6 발:d6 7. Bac1 ②c7 the position gets too simplified.

Well, White still has some initiative, but it is much less than in the initial position. Weighing all the pros and cons, we have to decide not to play 1.2e5, since this move does not help the effective development of our initiative. 1.#a41 is to be preferred. The white queen steps on a4 with a tempo and from this square it prevents the natural development of the enemy pieces.

It is well known that when you are shooting you use rough and precise markings. The first one gives the direction and the second one pinpoints the target. In the chess game the precise evaluation can often lead to the change of the direction itself. In this example- common sense is telling us that the queen may be well placed on h5, while the concrete analysis showed that the queen should head for the opposite direction – to 44.

The game, we are dealing with, continued with: 1...\(\Delta d6\)
2.\(\Delta g5\) forcing the not too attractive 2...\(\Delta d7\), since after 2...\(\Delta 6\)
3.\(\Delta 14\) Black's position will be in shambles. 2...\(\Delta 67\) 3.\(\Delta c7\)
2.\(\Delta 67\) 3.\(\Delta c7\)
2.\(\Delta 67\) 3.\(\Delta c7\)
2.\(\Delta 67\) 3.\(\Delta c7\)
2.\(\Delta 67\) 3.\(\Delta c7\)
4.\(\Delta c7\)
4.\(\Delta c7\)
4.\(\Delta c7\)
4.\(\Delta c7\)
4.\(\Delta c7\)
5.\(\Delta c7\)
4.\(\Delta c7\)
5.\(\Delta c7\)
6.\(\Delta c7\)
6.\(\D

3.3±2 h6 4.Δh4 ○a6. And why not 4...Δa6 the reader might like to ask? In this case after 5.Δh7+1 ⊈h8 6.Δh5 ⊈h6 f 3£c1 ⊈hc2 8.£c2 White can go into a complex endgamen which Black will have grave difficulties to further develop his pieces. For example 8...g6 9.Δh6+ (remember the check on move 5) 9...2h8 10.Δh3 €h.

After 4... ②a6 there followed 5.a3 ②c7 6. ②e5 4.:e5 7.de and White's initiative transformed into strong king-side attack."

We can see that in the first case the analysis confirmed the common sense, non-concrete reasonings, while in the second

case it refuted them. In the contemporary chess the analytical approach dominates the formation of the plan and the evaluation of unclear positions. When the competitive player analyses deeply and precisely critical opening and middlegame positions at home, he will make life really hard for his opponents over the board. When you analyse positions and you clarify to yourself the essence of them, it is easier to formulate the right plan in comparison with when you apply only common sense. It is very difficult, however to make a transition from a complex critical position into a clear one in all the lines. The game of chess is very different from the game of "Russian" checkers, because it can not be formally dismantled into small pieces and that is what makes us love it. On the other hand, although we have to analyse critical positions having constantly in mind the evaluation and planformation, we never have to underestimate the importance of positional evaluation based on common-sense principles. Well, the analysis itself is a process, in which the constantly changing chain of different positions aims at finding a position, the evaluation of which leaves us no doubt about it.

The theory of Steinitz helps us to evaluate some, or other of the elements of the position, so we can not ignore it. It forms an essential part of the classic legacy and it is necessary to apply it creatively, while remembering this theory, just all the other theories, is not void of drawbacks.

The next stage of our studying of the classics is the hypermodernism. Retti, Gruenfeld, Breyre, Tartakover and Nimzovitch are considered to be a part of this school by the chess historians. For us the study of the works and games of A. Nimzovitch are a must in the enlargement of our chess culture and erudition.

A lot has been written and said about the books "My System" and "My System in Practice" and I can hardly add

anything radically new. I would like to share with you some of my impressions from my studying of his games and I would like to give some advices to the young player who is starting to study the school of hyper-modernists. At first I would like to talk about Nimzovitch. I appreciate him yer much. I hangened to have read his books at the

beginning of the eighties, when I was already a master. I was deeply impressed with the subtlety of his views, his rich fantasy, the eloquence of his speech, which was obviously in conflict with the evaluation of his works, deeds and life, which was expressed from the Soviet press as an official opinionwith the idea to be embedded deeply in the conscience of the Soviet citizen as unfavourable. I was impressed by something else as well. It turned out that the principles of prophylactics. two weaknesses, pawn chains and pawn structures - all those principles that the young player had to find for himself. or read about in only parts of the comments of the great masters were invented, investigated and wonderfully described more than fifty years ago, in the books of Nimzovitch. At the same time some philosophical-chess terms as manoeuvring, over-defending, mysterious rook moves etc. were for me a jolt from the blue. I remember such a moment. I

Mosteribed more than fifty years ago, in the books of Nimzovitch. At the same time some philosophical-chess terms as manoeuvring, over-defending, mysterious rook moves etc. were for me a jolt from the blue. I remember such a moment. I was playing over the game Levenfish − Nimzovitch, Vilna, 1912:

1.e4 c6 2.c4 e6 3.⊕13 d5 4.ed ed 5.cd cd 6...£b5+⊕26 7. 0-0 Δd6 8.d4 ⊕27 9.Δg5 f6 10..Δh4 0-0 11..⊕bd2 Δg4 12.Δc6 €0:c6 13.™35 Δb4 14..⊕26 ⊕2:e5 15. ±:b4 ⊕d3 16.±:b7 Δe2 17..£fc1 ∃c8 18..⊕1f g5 19..£e3 f5 20..465 ⊞7 21.#a6 f4 22.£e1 ⊕:e1 23. ±:e2 0:e2 24..⊕d2 €0.65.



I noticed the explanation by Nimovorich of the retreat of the kinight from g2 to g6: "The consolidation of the position, by means of the retreat, and the regrouping of the forces is to be recommended strongly, particularly after some action with a favourable outcome, since such a result can bring

sometimes unnecessary relaxation, due to the disconcentration of forces." Nimzovitch formulated a chess maxim: "United forces – forward!". The game lasted only four more moves: 26.2ht g4 27.2d 25.d7 28.8g1 Ec2 29.h3 g3 and White resioned.

Approximately at the same time. I went to the movies and I saw the famous Soviet film "Liberation", about the War 1941-1945. There were some parts of it, devoted to the liberation of Bielorussia. Imagine yourself the victorious march of the Soviet Army, liberating every day new territories, and ready to start an overwhelming advance into the neighbouring countries. Suddenly, at this moment there happens a telephone conversation between the superior commander of the Armed forces- the great soldier- Marshal G. Zhukov and I. Stalin. The latter takes a keen interest in the way the advance is going to continue, while suddenly Zhukov answers that it is high time the army started to defend. This sounds like a jolt from the blue. Stalin is furious, but Zhukov insists on his expert opinion, explaining that the army has been exhausted. the rearguard has stalled away from the spearhead and the munitions are almost nonexistent.. Just all that- we saw in Nimzovitch's comments. Small wonder that "The Father of the Nation" was presented in this film as a not so talented commander, the same tendency we have witnessed in Zhukov's memoirs, though.

Lets go back to Nimzovitch. His maxims impress deeply and allow you to clarify to yourself a lot of universal chess truths, connecting them with real life. The weakness of the doubled pawns which is due to their impaired mobility is compared wisely by Nimzovitch with the crippleness of somebody who is sitting presently. The passive rook in the endgame (look at the game Pavlenko – Bagirov) he is presenting as a theatre star-actor who is about to blow the show. There are a lot of picturesque comparisons made by Nimzovich in his works, which I am not going to mention. The reader can get acquainted with them, himself. I would like to pay attention to some comments in the game collection about the tournament in Back-Kissingen in 1928:

"The solid moves are usually good and they have to be recommended, still all they somehow follow the way to exploited paths, therefore we expect the chess player to play just like that, to be fond of and to respect the solid moves, since these moves solidify the position and usually prevent troubles. At the same time we don't have to avoid risky moves, we don't have to stand in the way of the free imagination and fantasy, since fantasy and creativeness are really attractive and the beauty of chess comprises mainly of that!"

Capablanca – Tartakover

26.h5, threatening 27.h6 and then ∆g8 and h7, rendering the flexible bishop on b2 into an overburdened camel."



"Black has a substantial advantage, if you only compare the long range bishop with the cramped knight, or the strong "d4" pawn with the pathetic "14" pawn. Look at the queens: the white queen is squeezed in its den, while the black queen is ready to devastate the board."



"... 13...Ed8 14.d5? c6
15.6.126 The white bishop tried
to go hunting a rabbit (the
bishop on g7), but caught a
sparrow instead (the knight on
b6), 15...ab 16.1263. This move
was evidently made by Retti —
the aesthete, and not by Retti —
the strategist. He obviously
wanted to fill in the qaping hole

on e3, and at the same time to pay the tribute to the memory of the "fallen soldier", (the bishop - without any giory, though ). White had to play White 16.£(d1. 16..cd/ 17.£/d5 256 18.253. The white queen could have felt satisfied with this humble haven, as early as move thirteen, instead of dreaming about a kin/5 palace (1863)."



"The white rooks are enjoying the protection of the almighty bishop."



"11.d5? This is a mistake. and as usual it is caused by a wrong evaluation of position. Here the incorrectness of the evaluation must have been caused by psychological motives: 1) White feels that the poor position of the knight on b6 forces upon him a moral obligation to attack. prejudice. which is а

overcome yet! 2) The slow development of the combusted piece mass d2, e2, e3, f3 does not suit White, it is evident that here we have the effect of subjective sympathy and antipathy, instead of objectivity.

The right strategy comprised in the plan a2 – a3,  $\frac{1}{2}$ d1 – c2 and  $\frac{1}{2}$ ad – d1, after which the bundle of white pieces is liberated and White gets a good position.

 Black's position should already be considered preferable, although Black doesn't have a clear advantage, yet.

14.8b1 8e8 15.44? A plan not to be admired...! The black squares have been "confiscated". In fact this confiscation causes a lot of further inconveniences, in other words – a black square plaque."



parts coordinate brilliantly."

"It is highly probable that the reader might be amazed with the sound resistance the black king managed to offer. The point is that the king used a brilliant saving resource — centralization. Now, we can see the effect: the king forms the nucleus, while the bishop on f4 and the pawn on g6 comprise the protoplasm, accordingly the

Nimzovitch talks about the exchange variation (e4:d5) of the French defence in its different modifications in a very amusing way:

"Well, generally speaking the exchange variations can be officially forbidden from the tournament practice. This will lead to a form of justice, just like the tournament audience is forbidden to smoke (which is just, by the way), and the tournament players will be forbidden to "repel" the audience with exchange variations! Are we going to live long enough to withess if?" Marshall – Euwe Diagram 315

"18. 2)f3 - a5+. This move brings no aesthetic pleasure! Sometimes, when you develop pieces, as well as in defence, the non-aesthetic move can still be the best. But when you attack, the non-aesthetic move equals a bad move!

Why do we call this knightnon-aesthetic? check because the knight gives up his

option to use the double chance to go to e5 and g5. To occupy one of these two squares. White had only when the occupation- the choice led to a clear advantage. Presently neither 18.405+, nor 18.40e5 brings anything, If, for example, 18. De5 (threatening D:g6) then 18... D:e5 19.fe 4g5, or 19.de 4q7 20.f5? ef 21.8:f5 b6 with pathetic results for White. Well, White had to slow down a little bit!

I can offer you such a line: 18.b4 a6 19.ac2 ac8 20.acf2. Now, the threats 425 or 42e5 are really dangerous, besides White has an additional threat i.e. 21.g3 hg 22.\square g3 and all White's pieces are on the verge of a decisive offence."

# Tarrash - Capablanca



"29 Ch7 Was 29 Ch7 really risky? What was Capa afraid of? If 30.2b8 then 2c4, for example: 31.2:b5 2:q4 32.**g**b7+ **g**f6 33.**g**:a7 **g**:q2+ 34.\$\document{\textit{d}}\b3 \document{\textit{B}}\degree 35.\$\document{\textit{d}}\b2 \degree (maybe 35.2b4?) 35... 2g4 36.a4 2:h4 37.a5 q5! (Black wants to avoid the future checks of his king, so he prepares a safe lair for it at h5) 38.\$b3 \$a6 39.a6 \$f4 40.島b7 료f6! 41.a7 료a6 42.호c4 (threatening 료b6+) 42...호h5. Or 40.료c7 료f8 41.a7 and Black has good chances.

It is probable that the whole line can be improved somewhere, for Black particularly, but still if you don't want to catch cold the best way to avoid this is certainly not to ever go out. While, now not only the black king, but Capablanca himself seems to do exactly that! The prophylactics is no doubt something nice, it is an useful fruit of elaborate culture, but still, dear citizens, you can not live without breathing fresh air, you have to be enterprising, you have to be capable of risk and initiative!

When Capa played the humble 29...⊈h7, instead of the fresh and enterprising 29...⊈h7, we saw that the spectre of death through endless draws was giving nightmares to Capa deservedit."

Thope that the reader now has an excellent idea about the inimitable and juicy style of Nimzovitch – the writer. He lets the chess pieces breathe. The bishops sometimes suffer and then become overburdened camels, while his knights are sad and mourning and then suddenly become furious. In his introduction to the annotations of his game with Mieses, Nimzovitch writes: "... The further course of actions will become much more clear to you, if you imagine that the chess pieces are not wooden, but living creatures: the liberated "f5" pawn will be evidently eager to show the enormous amount of energy and the pale bourgeois army of White will surely succumb against it."

I would like to give some advices to the young player, before we start to study the hyper-modemists. Some words about the school itself are necessary at first. The theory arose and developed on the basis of a new approach to the chess centre. Tarrash presumed that the occupation and the building of a pawn centre is almost always useful, while the hyper-modemists preferred to control, or attack the centre

with pieces. Nimzovitch says: "Steinitz gave the beginning. What he said however, was so unnatural, because he was much above his contemporaries, that his "new principles" failed to become common knowledge.

Tarrash came next. He became a follower of Steinitz and managed to present his principles to the audience in an enjoyable popular form. We came now to our problem: as we said Steinitz was great and profound, but he was exactly that particularly in his understanding of the centre! For exampte the way in which he managed to render the strong enemy pawn on e4, in his defence in the Ruy Lopez (d7 – d6), into an evident weakness – this is one of his peaks of achievement.

He was much far away then anybody to the formal, arithmetical understanding of the centre..."

The difference in the apprehension of chess, and the different ideas led Nimzovitch and Tarrash to a mutual resentment which lasted all life long. The result of their meetings over the board was approximately equal for a long time. Up to 1920, the opponents had two wins each and two draws, but starting with 1923- Nimzovitch began to evidently prevail with three wins and two draws in a period of five years. But we don't have to forget that Tarrash was twenty four years. older than Nimzovitch, and in 1923 he was already in his seventies. Unfortunately, Nimzovitch made some, not quite exemplary in correctness, comments about his opponent. In his annotations about the opening of the game Retti -Bogoliubov, Bad-Kissingen, 1928 he wrote: "The so-called Paulsen variation. We consider Paulsen, as well as Andersen and Lasker to be German masters with a lot of creative and competitive strength. Unfortunately, the Germans didn't produce any other genius chess-thinkers besides those three giants. Tarrash didn't introduce anything new in the chess ideology, while Zaemisch, although really gifted strategically,

was not a master of a great level." Here is another case, after the rather trivial draw between Tarrash — Marshal in the same tournament, Nimzovitch wrote: "The final position can not be considered drawish at all. If were to make a decision, I would give 1/4 of a point to Marshal and a minus point to Tarrash."

Unfortunately, this lack of objectivity and even narrowmindedness mars the overall impression of Nimzovitch's works. Generally speaking, when you study the works of Nimzovitch you have to be very critical towards him in the nice sense of this word. T. Petrosian termed "My System in Practice" as his not so much bible-book, but as a book he might like to have under his pillow, he said: "He was so much devoted to the possibility to impress upon his chess-playing readers "his" chess maxims, that Nimzovitch made a lot of mistakes under the impression that what he wanted was a part of reality.

Nimzovitch was a chess player on a really high level. extremely talented at that, and he was superior to the most of his opponents in the aspect of strength. Unfortunately, when annotating his games it was a rare occasion for him to show the strongest lines for his opponents. As a consequence there are quite a few really objective analyses in his books. As a whole. Nimzovitch was not really an analytic. He was an original and profound strategist, an excellent philosopher and propagandist, finally a strong competitive player, but hardly an analytic. Grandmaster R. Keene wrote a brilliant book devoted to A. Nimzovitch and managed to find an amazingly punctual definition of the system of Nimzovitch. He called it "explanatory hypothesis". In his remarkable "Textbook of Chess" Em. Lasker mentioned Retti's comments to the game Kolste - Retti, Baden-Baden, 1925, "The game Kolste - Retti started in the following way:

**1.e4** ②**f6 2.e5** ②**d5 3.**②**c3** ②**:c3 4.dc.** In the magazine "Kagans Neuste Schachnachrichten" (1925, № 3) Retti, as a

member of the so-called hyper-modern school, terms this move as a positional mistake. According to his opinion the game "should be a nice illustration to the fact that with the high level of the contemporary chess-technique, even a small but clear positional advantage, obtained in the opening, can easily and consequently be used to reach a favourable outcome – to win".

Favourable outcome?... This classification is wrong. It is wise to say for seizing the initiative, for obtaining chances".

Further, Lasker pinpoints the mistakes made by White and proves that after a proper play by White, Black would hardly be able to win at all. Afterwards, he continues: "On such a tiny basis it is impossible to make a reliable strategical plan. The motive shown by Retti is not enough as an argument for the formation of the whole plan, since it is almost a trifle. When he goes astray from the basis of his analysis, he tends to make too bold, too general conclusions and then his reasonings turn out to be evidently wrong." Nimzovirch tended to use rarely concrete analyses in his works, for pity. I am going to give you some examples from the tournament book of the Bad-Kissingen tournament, which is a bibliographical rarily though, and enable the reader who is studying the classics to have the opportunity to be critical towards the examples from "My System" and "My System" in Practice".

# Capablanca-Tartakover



In this position Tartakover played 22...£04 and after 23.93 £:04 24.h4 b5 25.£92 a5 26.h5 lost the game. Here are Nimzovitch's comments to the move 22...£04. "This wins a pawn, but loses a lot of precious time. It seems to me that 22...£02 is much more natural. The immediate 22...£5 per

sented certain chances for example 22...55 23.c. b 5 24.g3 c4 25.h4 c3 26.l4 8d2 27.8f2? c2! 28.£.c2 £d4 and Black wins; or 25.l4! (instead of 25.h4) 25...£d2 25.l5 \$d8 and White evidently can not win. After 23...b5 24.cb c5 it is of course possible to push the "P pawn immediately, but in this case Black will still have some resources, for example 24.l4 (instead of g3) 24.-d 25.l5 £d2 26.g3 (if 26.l6? then £d4+followed by £.f6) 26...\$d8 etc.

So, the realization of Black's pawn advantage looks as if leading to a draw!"

Lets have a look at this analysis. After 22...b5 23.cb c5 24.g3 c4 25.h4? c3? White should not play 26.f4? at all. The simple line 26.£e1 £d2 27.£e6 and 28.£c6 finishes off the game easily.

On the other hand why should Black be in a hurry with the move 25...c3?, and why not 25...£d2? Therefore, White in his stead 25.h4?, should better play 25.£e1! and if 25...£d2, then 26.⊈f1 and 27.£e2 with an easy win:



Retti played 10....\(\hat{Q}\_g4\) and the game soon ended in a draw after 11.\(\hat{Z}\_g4\) & \(\hat{Z}\_g4\) & \(\hat{Z}\_g4\) & \(\hat{Z}\_g4\) indicates occasion Nimzovitch made the following comments: "Now, utilihough I respect very much "the contemporary level of chess technique", and having a clear picture of the principally unattainable dream of creating complications, desoite the will of

the opponent, I shall have to suggest with a tremor in my voice 10...&c5. After 11.&g5, there would follow simply 11...h6 12.&h4 g5 13.&g3 \(\frac{1}{2}\)er7 etc., end after 11.0-0 we "crabbing the rifle" are going to attack the

enemy with: 11...公g4 12.h3 h5 13.hg hg 14.g3 量h3 15.堂g2 堂f6 16.堂e2 堂h8 17.簋fg1 簋:g3+! and Black mates.

If White does not accept the sacrifice there might follow: 13. 包包 (instead of hg) 13.... 當h4 14. 營e2 營g3 15. ᢓi3 and now we are going to play the consolidating 15...fel Afterwards White can try to bother the displaced queen with 16. Δd2 (threatening Δe1 and 貸由1 next), but Black prevents the full etchnical poison" intentions of the enemy, liquidating everything altogether: 16... Δb5 17.c4 ②:f2 18. 戛:f2 管:f2+19. 暨:f2 Δ:c4 and the position lets Black enjoy a tiny material advantage in a solid position. The conclusion is: the suggested lines are either wrong, or...forgive me the sacrilege: the high level of contemporary technique — must be a myth!"

We are witnessing once again a jolly example of the genre of literature. What about the chess aspects of all this? Lets try to make a small investigation. After the moves:

10...Δc5 11. 0-0 2g4 12.h3 h5 13.hg hg 14.g3 £h3 15...2g 2ff6 it is quite strange why White didn't play 16...Δe3, instead of 16.ffe2. White threatens to seize the "h" file and White should try to continue with his now failing attack with some "heroica" measures like:



The position is really worth of a diagram. Black has sacrificed a rook and a knight, the bishop on "c5" is hanging, but the line 19.Δ.c5 0-0-0 20.Δe7 line 21.Δh4 line 24.2h g3 is not dangerous for Black, although it leads to nothing more than a draw. Still, we shall not witness

any "fairy tales" chess. Besides, White has the strong move 19.8±65 instead of 19.4.c5. Now. 19...4.c3 would be met with the check 20.25c5, and in case of 19... 0-0-0 20.5c5 the white queen controls the "h8" square and the material advantage decides the outcome of the game.

Some of the common sense reasonings of Nimzovitch are discussible, though, For example, he thinks that the pawn chain of the opponent should be undermined at the base. He derives his examples mostly from the French defence in which the move f7 - f6 for Black (against the pawn spearhead "e5") can lead to a serious weakening of the king. while the breakthrough c7 - c5 helps the organization of Black's counter-play on the gueen-side. If we have a look, however at the pawn chains in the King's Indian defence on the squares d5, d6, e4, and e5 the situation is not so clearcut. The move c7 - c6 in order to undermine the pawn-chain, without having to play f7 - f5 beforehand, is much more probable in the aspect of percentages, than f7 - f6, without the move c7 - c5 in the French defence. This wonderful observation was first made by the Moldavian master V. Chebanenko in his interesting article: "Has Nimzovitch Always Been Right?" in the magazine "Shakhmati in the USSR" № 5. 1988 A lot of other chess-players have made interesting

comments about Nimzovitch.

Here is an interesting excerpt from the dialogue between

Enosko-Borovsky and Capablanca:

Znosko-Borovsky: "Well, if we have to trust Retti, you are to be responsible for the whole theory of hyper-modernism?"

Capablanca: "Oh, no, not at all! In the game, he is referring to, I made a small tactical combination to get a tiny positional advantage. To build up a whole system upon this narrow basis is simply indiculous! Naturally, my style must have made

a strong impression upon the young generation before the War, but if I am not mistaken, you had written your first book about me, in which you somehow placed me in the "sphere of time" necessarily, and not in the "sphere of space", while you were treating the subject of the dynamics in chess. I do not trust the radical and awkward thesis of the hyper-modernists and prefer the simple and straightforward play of the classics."

Now, here is a part of the interview of Euwe, given to Znosko-Borovsky:

Znosko-Borovsky: "What are you going to say about the hyper-modemism?"

Euwe: "Oh, it is all over with that. There was something worthy of merit in this theory and we have taken use of it in the sense of understanding the position and the chess technique in general. But it hardly exists anymore as a wholesome theory anymore." August, 1931. Jouched from the magazine "Shakhmati in the USSR" No 2, 1991.

The contemporary chess players avoid to be so radical in the evaluation of the hyper-modernism. The ideas of Nimzovitch were worked over creatively and out of the "fairy tales", a lot of rational ideas were implemented in the tense competitive chess reality, nowadays, Sometime ago, I discussed with Artur Yusupov, a grandmaster who is more than familiar with prophylactics, over-defending, and the principle of two weaknesses, about what his opinion was of "My System" and "My System in Practice". He said that when he analyses the aforementioned books he begins to have the feeling that everything should be refuted altogether, but Nimzovitch's ideas are still useful and fruitful. In fact the most successful player in the implementation of the Nimzovitch's ideas in practice was T. V. Petrosian. Some of his wonderful games on the theme of prophylactics in the King's Indian defence, the reader has already seen in this book, and here I

am going to quote two other examples of his chess legacy on another theme, with the comments of the ninth World Champion:

## Reshevsky – Petrosian Zurich 1953



"... White has a strong pawn centre, which is going to smash Black's position to pieces, once it starts going forward. It is not clear however, whether White can ever start to move the pawns: if the "e" pawn is pushed, this will hardly be useful at all, the "d" pawn can not move, because the "d5"

square is attacked. Therefore I was happy with my position when I decided to go for it. Now, when I am having it on the board. I begin to convince myself that it is very difficult in fact. Why? Black's pieces are occupying passive, strictly defensive squares. White can prepare the advance of the "o" pawn forward to the "d6" square and displacing the enemy pieces will get a winning position. On the other hand White can push the "h" pawn all the way down to "h6". If put the black pawn on "h6" or "h5" the king-side will be weakened and White will have a strong king-side attack operating with the light square bishop, the rook from "e3", the queen and the bishop on "c1".

I understood that if I managed to put the knight on "d5", I would have changed the evaluation of the position radically—it would become very good. The movement of the white pawns would be stopped, the white bishop on "b2" would become a really bad piece. Black will be able afterwards be play b5 — b4 and obtain a passed pawn which would be

extremely strong with the support of the knight on d5 and the bishop on g6. It turned out, however, that to put the knight of d6 was far from easy. The knight can go there only via b6, c7 or e7. To bring it to b6 or c7 would require a lot of time and White will play  $\Delta g4 - 13$  and d4 - d5, with a winning position. So, it would be desirable for Black to bring the knight via e7, but how could I do that? I could go somewhere with the rook, but where exactly? Look at this line: 25...8b7 26.43 ft/treatening d5), or (instead of 26.43) 2.6e6  $\Delta e7$  and the very strong now 27.43. Further 27... $\Delta d5$  28.45  $\pm$ 3.5 29.1813. The rook is attacked, and it can go nowhere because it protects the rook on b7. If 29...fe, the simple 30.1816.5 wise easily.

I thought over this position for a long time and when I finally ound the right move I was even a little bit happy. The move is so simple that I was never in doubt about it. I had simply to overcome a psychological barrier, I had been talking about, so I left my rook to be attacked by the enemy bishop.

25...8e6. "The inventive play of Reshevsky and the iron logics of Petrosian make this game one of the pearls of the tournament." (Bronstein)

If White plays 26.4.e6 after 26...fe he can never manage to prevent the manoeuvre of the black knight to the "ds" square. The material advantage of White ia. the extra exchange is not impressive at all. All the files are closed, the white pawns are deprived of any mobility, and Black threatens to brind the knight to d5 and start his queen-side advance.

The game continued in the following way: 26.4 ©e7. Black does not fall into the enemy trap with 26...b4? There might follow then 27.05 \$2.05 28.5.26 fe 29.\$7.04 and Black position is in ruins, because the position has been opened and all white pieces exert maximum activity.

27.4:e6 fe 28.≝ff ②d5 29.≣g3 4d3. If White refrains from giving back the exchange on d3, with for example 30.≝f2,

Black is gong to have a rich compensation after b5 - b4. What is most important is that the material advantage of White is hardly ever felt, since he has only a rook against a minor piece.

Reshevsky captured on d3 – 30.6.rd3. There followed: 30..cd 31.5.rd3 b4 32.cb. White could have played here 32.c4 obtaining a mobile pawn chain in the centre, but Reshevsky played cautiously, since 32.c4 could be met with 22...2b6. Black captures the pawn on a4 with two connected passed pawns to push forward. In this way the position would be very sharp and Reshevsky decided to avoid such developments. The game ended in a draw after: 32...ab 33.35 888 34.84 15 65 35.Ac1 15 73 6.85 15 6 37.Ad2 b3 38.5c4 16 33.ns 12 40.85 11 25 8 41.Act 1 500.85

The next example illustrates the creativity of Petrosian in his application of the theory of Nimzovitch. He enlarged the concepts of his teacher in the aspects of prophylactics and blocade, anticipating not only the immediate threats and the forecoming dangers on the part of the opponent, but the initiative that might transform into a strong attack, just like the contemporary apparatuses forecast the forecoming furious hurricane at the sight of a small grey cloud.

## Tal – Petrosian Riga 1958



Petrosian's words "White has a big positional advantage. In fact the "d5" pawn is a protected passed extra pawn. It doesn't act any particular role presently, since it can be blocked easily on d6, as well as on d7, and even on the eighth rank, i.e. it poses black no danger at the moment.

In the process of the chess fight, however the endgame stage is an integral part, and then the defended passed pawn plays a decisive role. How should Black defend here? There are no threats yet, so Black can play ♣d6, then ♠d7, f7 – f6, ₤f7, the other rook to f8, be content with a passive position and wait for White to do something. Yet, sooner or later, if White plays well Black will be in great difficulties.

The experienced players know that when you are playing cramped positions- one of the main causes of trouble is that the rooks are in a much less favourable situation than the enemy rooks. For example, if White pushes forward the pawns on king-side, he would enjoy having long-range pieces, i.e. rooks on f1 and g2, while Black's rooks would have only the seventh and the eighth rank, waiting the position to get opened.

I managed to find a very interesting plan for a defence, which I liked very much then, I like it very much now, as well, and I think that it would be very instructive for every chess player.

Tal played 25.±78 and I answered with 25..±66. This move seems to be rather strange at first sight. According to the laws of chess strategy the strongest piece is least suitable for such a blocking square and so on. If for example the queen occupies such a square it should be forced to vacate it after being attacked by any piece, while the rook will have to do that after being attacked by a minor piece. I had an entirely different idea however.

26.♠b3 ♠d7 27.Baa1 Bg6. This was the idea that I happened to like a lot. I anticipated that my rooks would be very passive and immobile, so Black exposes one of them the same purpose).

33... ②e5 34. 世:f4. It looks to me that White shouldn't have done that move. 34.世e2 was possible. Then Black could play

34...g5 or 34...\(\frac{a}{2}\) ha. It is not so easy to evaluate the arising positions, but White's extra-exchange would have hardly affected the game very much. Tal understood that the tables were turning and entered complications.

34... ②:c4 35.e5 ②:e5 36. ②e4. White made several counter-sacrifices to open files for his long-range pieces – the rooks. Now Black has more than sufficient counter-chances.

36...h6 37.Eae1 ∆b8 38.Ed1 c4. White has a problem now – Black threatens 39...∆a7+ and then ᡚd3 with making threats. Besides, after the appearance of the knight on d3, the

threats. Besides, after the appearance of the knight on d3, the rook does not protect the d5 pawn. Tal tries to find some additional resources to save the game.

39.46 243 40.894 4.074 1.271 15 (the sealed move).

The line 42.2.15 a.15 43.2 43.2 44.2 117 3 (11.4 44.2 11.5 a.15 45.2 4 is rather unpleasant for White. Still, the move 42.2 f6+ came to be a lucky find. The knight can not be captured, because of the check on c4. Now started a whole series of factical strokes.

42... 堂内各 43.世;c4 包:b2 44.世;a6 包:d1 45.世;a7 世;d6 46.世d7 堂;f6 47.世;d1 且b8. Black had excellent chances to win, but I failed to press my advantage home and the game ended in a draw."

Nimzovitch's ideas, modernized are often implemented by Anatoly Karpov.

## Huebner – Karpov Tilbura 1977



In this position the World Champion № 12 played 12... 2a6/ His annotations to the move he made are really amusing: "The knight goes to the edge of the board!... A lot of people might quote Z. Tarrash, who asserted that the knight

was always bad at the edge of the board. There are no rules without exceptions. In this particular position the knight is placed on a6 much better than in the centre on d7. This knight is really busy: first, it over-defends the pawn on c5, against the breakthrough b2 – b4, secondly it does not stand in the way of the other pieces on the "c" file, and finally it is ready to join the additional defence of the important d5 square."

Be careful, Karpov talks about over-defending of the pawn on c5 and the knight on d5, which according to Nimzovitch on to occupy particularly strong squares. Nimzovitch presumed that it was worth to control and over-defend only strong outposts and squares, for example the 'd4' square, while nowadays the concept of over-defending and prophylactics acquired a much broader treatment. 13.42:d5 4:d5 It wouldn't have been possible to take on d5 with a pawn because of 14.b4.

14. Ac3 f6! 15.a3 Øe7 16. 0-0.



16...Ehc8l Karpov makes no comments on this move. In this position the majority of players will put the rooks on d8 and c8, without giving it a second thought. What was Black after with his last move? Maybe the over-defence of the c5 pawn, so the mysterious rook move must be some kind of an elaborate

form of prophylactics, or maybe a brink in the chain of some complex plan. A little bit of all that. To be able to increase his space advantage, it will be enough to have a pawn on e5, and bring the knight to e6 or b5. Black is conscious, however that White is going to certainly react to that, so the only counterplay will be the b2 – b4 breakthrough. If lines are

opered on the queen-side the black rook on a8 will be rather happy, while if Black manages to occupy space and squeeze the opponent's position in the manner of the Maroszy scheme, Black can afford to lose some time to improve the position of the rooks.

## Karpov – Timman, Montreal 1979



In the limelight of the discussions between Nimzovitch and Tarrash the white pawn on 65 was treated much rather as weakness then as strength. The essence of Karpov's strategy in this game is the over-defence of this pawn! The ex-world champion lakes the floor.

23.2f3 Ee7. 23...2c5 wouldn't do because of 24.e5. Black had to think seriously about 23...c5. Well, the Black knight on a6 might have felt a bit stupid then.

24.4.72. One of the last prophylactic moves. On the eve of the decisive offence, White is trying to place his pieces in the most harmonious way and... over-defends the central outpost on e4 once again! 24.83 was premature after 24...4c8.

24...4e8. This is a mistake of a lactical sort. Black's

finishes off the game. Black is helpless due to his queen-side weaknesses. 26... 2c7 27.8:a5 £d7 28.b4 2e6 29.4c3. The position is completely winning for White, but still the play requires some precision. After 29 ±d2 d5l? Black can obtain something like a counterplay: 30.e5 2e4 31.2c4 de 32.2d4 c5 with some complications. 29...c5 30.f5 2d6 37.b5. To reach the state of happy oblivion, White should play only c3 − c4, and acquire a total domination. 31...ch8 32.4c4 25 3.8c4 ±b8 34.c4. Most of the job has been done. White should deliver now the final "coup de grace". 34...8a7 35.8c4 ₹8.a7 36.8c4 \$8.3c.65 Black resioned."

words about the books from this period, which belong to the classics and deserve some attention. It would be useful for the reader to have a look at the "Contemporary Textbook of the Chess Game" and particularly "New Ideas in Chess" of Richard Retti. These books illustrate the approach towards chess in the period of the hyper-modemism.

We have to make some conclusions now. At first some

So, as a result of the discussion, between the classics and the hyper-modernists, chess improved a lot. The next stage of the studying of classics is particularly important. It can be marked by two great names: Capablanca and Alekhine. They were not subjected to any pressure from anybody, they played in an entirely different way, but they did it

magnificently. Their games are considered masterpieces up to the present day.

Why is it so important for us to study Capablanca and Alekhine? Lets think about how the contemporary chess looks from the side. Suppose, two approximately equal opponents are playing, for example Andersson and Huebner, One of them makes an active plan, the other one anticipates this plan and tries to prevent it. As a result of the plan and the counterplan. White achieves a small advantage. Now a new plan is formed and accordingly a new counter-plan against it. Finally. the opponents fall into a time-trouble and the situation on the board gets messy. The logical development of the fight has been changed, and everything becomes unpredictable. It would be very difficult for the master to understand what had been going on, while the inexperienced player will evidently fail completely. But if, for example Capablanca plays Yanovsky or Alekhine plays Tartakover, the class of the third and the fourth World Champions was so higher than their opponents that the plans were executed flawlessly. Yanovsky probably had failed to even understand what was going on, so he had hardly ever reacted at all. You can see then, the whole plan in its purest form. You can never have the same picture against the contemporary grandmasters like Gelfand, Salov Timman and even some others weaker than these, since their canability of resistance is much higher. Still, the young player should take his lessons in the stage of the formation of the plan from Capablanca and Alekhine, best of all, because their style was very harmonious and was not subjected to the radical views of Steinitz or Nimzovitch. By the way, Nimzovitch's "system" didn't help him too much in his games with Alekhine; and against Capablanca it turned out to be completely useless. Four loses and six draws - that is the balance of the games between Nimzovitch and Capablanca.

I do not intend to tell you the biographies of those two eminent champions and I am going to quote only one game. This long and strenuous job, to study the classical legacy, the chess player should perform himself. I would like to give you some advices that might be very helpful in your studying of the games of Alekhine and Capablanca, First about Capablanca. The chess player, while studying the classics, should try to find and read all the books by him and about him, because they are so few. Secondly, when you play over Capablanca's games, reading the book "My Chess Career" the student beginning with the match with Marshall, should try to work in the same way, which was recommended, when we had been dealing with Rubinstein. You have to try to guess every move by Capablanca, right after the opening and at the end of the game try to summarize your impressions in several sentences and possibly with a diagram, paying attention to the most interesting, from your point of view, moments of the game. Do not be afraid to fall under the impression of meeting with a ruthless "chess-machine". The understanding of Capablanca is very useful for every chess-player, while canonizing had been done by people with the intention to make a mess between chess and politics. The most objective and witty book about Canablanca was written by Euwe and Prins, Its name was "Caissa's Favourites" and it would be a must, when you study Capablanca's legacy. It would help you notice some tiny dark spots on the brilliant sun, but it would not mar your overall admiration of the Cuban genius. Besides, it would be easier for you to grasp some problems of philosophy, and not chess, that are treated there, for example during the analysis of Capablanca's endgame with I. Kan in the international tournament in Moscow 1936

Finally, I would like to pay attention to the characteristics of Capablanca made by the future World Champion R. Fischer in 1964. The original and somehow paradoxical opinion of

would be very good to get acquainted with it "Capablanca became the champion of Cuba when he was twelve years old like a precious pearl of the chess world. From then on, until he died in 1942, he enjoyed quite undeservedly (just like Petrosian now) the reputation of the greatest master of the endgame for all times. I remember his game with Vera Menchik in which he made three blunders. This example, although not so typical, proves that Capablanca didn't know even the simplest rook endgames well. They say that in his life he must have played more than a thousand rook endgames but I can hardly believe that.

Fischer about Capablanca you can share or not, but still it

Capablanca belongs to the circle of the greatest players, but not because of his endgame technique. His strong point was to piay the openings simply and then to be brilliant in the middle game, so that the outcome of the game was predestined (although his opponents couldn't always understand that) before the endgame.

Capablanca had never devoted himself entirely to chess and he seldom prepared for tournaments. The simplicity of his style, attributed to him, is completely mythical. Capablanca lacked almost completely any sound theoretical knowledge, so he was forced to invest tremendous efforts to achieve the maximum of every position. His every move had to be with a pinpoint precision and sharpness, since he had to do something out of nothing. All that put the stamp of a great tension on the style of Capablanca. He put much more efforts than anybody else in the flat list.

had always been very unfavourable.

Capablanca matured very early, so he played his best games in the age between his twenties and thirties. He was the only one of the players from Latin America who had ever appeared on the world chess scene."

It would be best to study Alekhine's legacy after the book "Three Hundred Chosen Games of Alekhin". The first fifty three games from the chapters 'Early Games by Alekhine' and 'Alekhine – The Strongest Russian Player' you can play over without trying to find his moves, and starting with chapter "Alekhine on the Road to the World Champion Title' you have to start your serious work, analogous to that one studying Rubinstein and Capablanca.

My long-term experience as a coach shows that every chess player improves a lot in his development after having studied Alekhine's games, maybe because his games comprise the final part of the classics and when the chess player comes to the moment to make his conclusions – the improvement appears as the prize for the efforts, invested in the studying.

Finally I would like to include here some subjective observations about Alekhine. As a person, he was not much to be admired, because of his racist views, shared with the public during the Second World War. The reader can read these articles by Alekhine in the "64 - Shakhmatnoe Obozrenie" No 18 and No 19, 1991, We are interested. however in Alekhine - the chess player and not in Alekhine as a person. As a chess player, Alekhine was a genius, You can learn everything from him: developing initiative, attacking, formation of plans, playing endgames, but maybe you have to pay a particular attention to his realization of advantages. If I had to choose just one of his games from the three hundred in the book, the game that impressed me most, I would not deal with the numerous games with spectacular attacks and combinations. I will choose the game with the American grandmaster R. Fine from the tournament in Kemery, 1937. The comments of Alekhine, I am going to guote without any changes, and just abbreviate a little his annotations to the opening, which are a little bit outdated.

### Alekhine – Fine Kemery 1937

1.d4 d5 2.c4 dc 3.全f3 全f6 4.营a4+ 营d7 5.营:c4 营c6 6.全a3 营:c4 7.全:c4 e6 8.a3 The check on b4 must be prevented.

8...c5? This is a dogmatic move which enables White to achieve a clear positional advantage. Black is in a hurry to counter- attack in the centre and forgets about the importance of the "d6" square. It would be brave and not at all anti-positional to play 8...a5 (preventing b2 – b4), and if 9.Δt4, then 9...b5 with Δd6 next. After all, White wouldn't have managed to obtain so easily the two bishops-advantage.

9.464 2c6. 9... 2bd7 would have been somewhat better. 10.6d64 4c.d6 11.4cd6 2e4 12.4c7 b6 with 4b7 next, still the dark squares would have been weak under any circumstances. 10.4c 4c.c5 11.b4 4e7 12.b5 2b8 13.2d64 4c.d6 14.4c.d6 2e4 15.4c7!. Presently, this bishop is White's only chance to win the game and I had to play extremely carefully to avoid its exchange! 15.4b4 a5 16.ba 2e6 or 15.4d4 16 and then 6d – 65 would lead to an approximately equal game.

15... 2d7 16.2d4/ Once again an important move, the purpose of which is to build a pawn chain e4, f3, g2. It was not so easy to find, because White had 16.e3 as well as 16.g3 which were also interesting.

16... №6 17.43 ②d5 18.4a5 ②f6. Another important line here was: 18... ②d6 19.e4 (but not 19.0c2 because of 19... ②d4) 19... ②d5 19... ③d5 19... ④d5 19... ④

19... £d7 20.e4 £c8. This intermediate move is not dangerous, since the displaced black pieces are not capable of causing any trouble to the white king on d2.

21. \( \triangle \triangle 21 \) \( \triangle \triangle 6 \) 22. \( \triangle a \) 0-0 23. \( a 4! \) Much stronger than the routine 23. \( \triangle 4 \) d3, which would enable Black to make the liberating manoeuvre \( \triangle 6 \) 6 - a4 - c5.

25.Ehc1 Δe6 26.E:c8 E:c8 27.Δb4. White prevents the enemy king to be centralized and threatens to play eventually Δd6.

27... 2e8 28.a5 2d7 29. 2d5! This move needed a precise calculation, because the passed pawn after the exchange on d5 might become a little weak. Black has to capture now the knicht. because of the threat 30.2e7+.

29...4:d5 30.ed 全c5. Black starts a "small combination" which gets refuted convincingly by White's 32nd move. What did Black have to do? The recommendation in the tournament book – 30...g6 would be hopeless for Black after 31.d6 f5 32...4b11 gar 33..4a2 gf6 (or....2ef6 34.le1) 34...4d5.



32.2/c3/ This beautiful move liquidates both Black's threats: 32...2/b3+ 32...2/d5+, the latter because of 33.2/c4! White has an overwhelming space advantage which should decide

the game in a few moves. 32...b6. Or 32... ⊙d7 33... ♠e7 and White wins. 33.ab ab 34... £c5f The bishop played an extremely important role in this game and now it was not necessary anymore, because the passed pawn was to be stopped only at the cost of grave losses. 34... bc 35.b6 ⊙d6 36... £d7l E:d7. Instead of resigning... 37... £a8+ with a mate in two.

This game possibly was my best purely positional achievement in the last two years."

Watch this, if this game was purely positional, what would Alekhine's combinational games look like! The game with Fine brilliantly demonstrates the manner of realization of advantages by Alekhine. The majority of the players, some of them strong indeed, after having acquired an advantage are intentionally avoiding complications, being afraid of giving the opponent some additional chances. That usually brings about the opposite effect of the desired one, and only prolongs and complicates the road to victory. Alekhine was not one of them. When he got the advantage, he not only didn't avoid complications, but was causing them intentionally with an endless faith in his strength and his good position. This manner of realization of advantages lacks the easiness and the aesthetic feeling of Capablanca, but implies an unlimited force.

The present World Champion Garry Kasparov tends to act in the same way regularly.

Alekhine was a great analytic and commentator. If you need some additional chess-tuctoring, open the bournament books of New York 1924 and 1927, Bled 1931, Nottingham 1936 and probably you are going to find the answers to a lot of problems of the chess strategy, as well as the causes for some reasonings about opening systems that have been forcotten presently.

The study of the games of Alekhine should be the end of your work upon the classics, which is extremely necessary for the young player as a basis for his further improvement. Besides the classics we had already dealt with, nowadays we have two still living chess classics, Mikhail Botvinnik and Vasily Smislov, the World Champions No. 6 and 7 in the history of chess. It is unthinkable for the chess player to enrich his chess culture, without having to play their games over and study them extensively.

As I have mentioned earlier, Botvinnik left an enormous

chess legacy, but I recommend you to start studying it, after you have become an experienced master. I am an experienced coach and I think that the profoundness of Botvinnik's play would be very difficult to be grasped by a positionally non-experienced player and that would lead to a hard labour, rather fruitless though. Botyinnik should be best studied in the different openings, one by one. If you are interested in the Nimzovitch defence, or the French defence, the English opening or the Caro-Kan defence, the King's Indian defence or the Pirc-Ufimcev, you should better look at all Botvinnik's games, in the opening you are going to study, from the three-volume work "The Chess Games of Botvinnik" or the four-volume work "Analytical and Critical Works". You are surely going to understand clearly the problems that face both sides in the stage of transition between the opening and the middlegame. You are going to be acquainted with the different plans for both sides and develop some feeling of mistake-prevention. Nowadays, the chess players are trying to invent some new move in a well familiar position. Botyinnik used to invent new plans, new systems, new schemes. If you want to avoid to have to invent the bicycle all over again, you should better get acquainted with what Botvinnik did in the same opening. You are going to have plenty of opportunities to get yourself convinced of that, when you study the chapters

devoted to the Queen's Gambit and the Queen's Gambit Accepted.

Now, about Smysley. I was advised by my coach grandmaster Boleslavsky, to study to complete exhaustion the games of the World Champion No 7 in the history of chess. I had problems with the technical realization of advantages and similar problems face a lot of players, particularly the young ones. At that time Isaak Efremovitch recommended to me to study the book of Smislov's best games and to try to guess his moves right after the opening stage. Boleslavsky noticed that Smislov hardly ever had problems with the realization of advantages. Before I share with you my impressions. I would like to tell you a story which I heard first from grandmaster Genadi Kuzmin, back in 1971. We were talking about the international tournament "Capablanca - In Memoriam" in 1967, in which Smyslov participated, as well as Kuzmin and Savon, Vladimir Savon had a clear advantage in one of the games of this tournament, I don't remember which, and the game complicated a lot in the time-scramble and got adjourned in an unclear position. After the game Sayon and Kuzmin analysed the adjourned position, trying to find the way to win and suddenly Smyslov happened to walk over. The dialogue, between Savon (who admired Smyslov very much at that time, their conflict for the place into interzonal happened much later) and Smyslov looked like that (I quote Kuzmin): Smyslov: "How are you doing. Volodia? Sayon: "Well, Vasily Vasilievich, we are trying to find a win, but presently we still fail to." Smyslov looked at the position and after approximately two minutes said: "You missed the win and now your position is worse, so you have to fight for the draw. You can draw in the following way: you put the rook here, the knight there, and the bishop over there... " Having said what he could say. Smyslov went for a walk. Sayon and Kuzmin couldn't believe that and analysed the position for

hours. Their extensive concrete analysis confirmed Smyslov's diagnosis. White was really worse, so he had to draw with the Smyslov's construction of piece-disposition. Savon and Kuzmin were very good chess players at that time, after all. Savon became the champion of the Soviet Union in 1971 and Kuzmin was considered to be one of the most talented young Soviet masters.

The chess players have told plenty of similar stories about Smyslov and his strikingly punctual and quick evaluation of positions, as well as his outstanding abilities to make the proper plan of actions. Smyslov was an excellent tactician as well. His "small combinations" haven't been praised by chess

well. His "small combinations" haven't been praised by chess historians, as Capablanca's, but I don't think that they are any inferior to those of the great Cuban.

I was most amazed however, when I studied Smyslov's

I was most amazed nowever, when I studied smyslovs games by his rhythm of playing. He easily outplayed chess giants like Keres, Reschevsky, Boleslavsky, Bronstein and it looked like the process of amassing advantages with purely positional means would continue to the end of the game. You watch precise positional maneuvres move by move and trying to guess his moves you feel somehow, that you are tuning to his brainwaves. Suddenly, quite unexpectedly, Smyslov makes a complete turnover and enters tactical complications. It looks like the moment for this decision has been chosen inappropriately and prematurely, still the tactical operations favour Smyslov always, so he wins in the quickest possible way. I wouldn't like to try to convince you of that without any examples, so here are some of his games. I am not going to analyse them profoundly, I am going only to turn the attention of the reader to some particular moments.

#### Smyslov - Letelie

## Venice 1950

1.e4 e6 2.d4 d5 3.2c3  $\pm$ b4 4.e5 c5 5.a3  $\pm$ :c3+ 6.bc  $\pm$ e7 7.a4  $\pm$ a5 8. $\pm$ d2  $\pm$ c6 9. $\pm$ 03 cd 10.cd  $\pm$ :d2+ 11. $\pm$ :d2  $\pm$ 15. $\pm$ 12. $\pm$ c3  $\pm$ d7 13. $\pm$ d3  $\pm$ c8 14. $\pm$ d2 0-0 15.a5  $\pm$ c7 16. $\pm$ he1 f6?



White was much better and with his last prophylactic move Smyslov prevented the advance of the black "f" pawn. Black failed to understand the positional idea of his opponent and his position deteriorated immediately. 17.4.:f5! ef 18.ef 81.61 91.8ab1 his 20.8b1 4.e6 21.8ab1 487 22.2e1 14 23.13

g5 24. ∅d3 ⊈h7 25.∄e1 ∄f6 26.∄c5 ∄c8.



White has consistently squeezed the position of the opponent and prepared a surprising tactical operation. 27.0041 0:04. In case of 27...004 there would follow the beautiful combination stroke 28.0:u51 0:05.29.2eel 2.05.00.2016 0:03.31.8d6 and White

regains the piece with a winning

#### position.

28.£:e6/ £:e6 29.£:c8 ②c6 30.a6/ ba 31.£c7+ \$\tilde{2}g6\$
32.£d7. White's combination is over and the win of the "d5" pawn guarantees an easy win. 32...②e7 33.\$\tilde{2}b4 \$\tilde{2}f5\$ 34.£:d5

ହାର 35.8d8 ହି:g2 36.d5 8b6 37.໓c5 8b7 38.8c8l ହିh4 39.ଝe2 ହିf5 40.8c6+ ଝh5 41.d6 8d7 42.8c7 Black resigned.

### Smyslov – Lublinsky Moscow 1949

1.e4e5 2.�f3 �c6 3.�b5 a6 4.�a4 d6 5.c3 �d7 6.d4 �f6 7.�bd2 �e7 8. �� �� �� 9.ಔe1 �e8 10.�b3 �d7 11.�f1 �f6 12.�e3 �e7 13.�g4 �g6 14.g3 �e7 15.h4 �f6 16.�g5 h6 17.�16+ �.f6



As a result of the rather timid play of his opponent, Smyslov managed to achieve an active position. Try to guess his moves and you will see how calm positional moves are combined with tactical operations. Not many of his opponents had managed to neutralize the effect of such inflammable "Molotov

#### Cocktail".

18.增h5/ 公h8 19.de de 20.4e3 增e7. "It would be dangerous to accept the sacrifice of the knight. After 20...hg 21.hg g6 22.增h4 鱼g7 23.增g2 4c6 24.8h1 温e6 25.增h7+ 位相 26.4c5+ 星e7 27.增h8+! 4.h8 28.8.h8+ 堂g7 29.8:d8 8:d8 30.4c97 White wins." (Smyslov).

21.2d5! White forces the enemy pawn to c6 to deny this square for the bishop in the future.

21...c6 22.4b3 4d7 23.Ead1 Ead8 24.Ed2 4c8 25.Eed1 E:d2 26.E:d2 25.Ed2 Ed7. Black threatens once again 27...hg 28.hg

g6. 27. ♠c51 Ed8. In case of 27...♠e7 White wins a pawn with 28.♠:e7 \$\frac{\psi}{2}\$:e7 29.♠13 \$\frac{\psi}{2}\$:e8 30.\$\frac{\psi}{2}\$:e5 \$\frac{\psi}{2}\$:e5 \$\frac{\psi}{2}\$:e5 32.**ad8**+ **a**h7 33.**a**:c8 and 33...**a**:e4 is imposible due to 34.**a**c2. **28.a**:**d8**+ **a**:**d8** 



29. ②:f7! ②:f7 30. **4** b6! 曾d7. If 30...曾:b6 — 31.曾:f7+ 曾h7 32. h5.

31.4:d8 එh7 32.4:f7 පී:d8 33.4g6+ Black resigned.

Smyslov – Koenig, Radio-match, USSR – Great Britain, 1946

23. 2f1 2b3 24. Eb1 2d4 25. #g4 Efd8 26. 21g3 2f8.



27.g6l? The game gets rather lively after this pawn sacrifice.

 27...4:g6. "27...fg was worth considering- to protect the weak spot "97" of the Black castle position. There might follow 28.&c4+ ½h8 29.£e3 ½d7 30.½g2
 ½fe6
 31.£h1 or

30.∆de6 ∆e2 with a complex and unclear position. It would be hardly possible to make a thorough analyses of the arising sharp position." (Smyslov)

28. Δc4! ∆c2?! After the pawn sacrifice Smyslov improves the position of his pieces, as if nothing has really happened, so his opponent loses his balance. Smyslov thinks 28... ∆de6 was to be preferred, and he intended to play 29.b3.

28\_BH Ba7. Smyslov affirms that it would be losing for black to take the second pawn after: 29....\$\(\frac{1}{2}\):12 \(\frac{1}{2}\):12 \(\frac{1}{2}\):12 \(\frac{1}{2}\):12 \(\frac{1}{2}\):13 \(\frac{1}{2}\):12 \(\frac{1}{2}\):13 \(\frac{1}{2}\):15 \(\frac{1}{2}\):15 \(\frac{1}{2}\):15 \(\frac{1}{2}\):15 \(\frac{1}{2}\):16 \(\frac{1}{2}\):16 \(\frac{1}{2}\):16 \(\frac{1}{2}\):17 \(\frac{1}{2}\):17 \(\frac{1}{2}\):17 \(\frac{1}{2}\):18 \(\frac{

30. Ag5 ∄d7.



31. 2:g7/ "The increasing tension in the game culminates here. The position of the pieces on the "g" file is picturesque indeed. Now Black could have taken the sacrificed knight, but his position would remain difficult. For example, 31...2:g7 32.2·015+ Δ:15 (32...3:g8 33.Δ·16 β.16.3 42.0·16++ ch7, 35.5 th4

£:f6 36.ᡚq4+ ⊈q8 37.ᡚ:f6+ ⊈q7 38.ᡚe8+ And White wins.) 33.ef ≜d4 (33... Dg6 34.世h5!) 34.f6+! ⊈h7 35. Lf4! De6 (35...公a6 36.堂h5+ 堂a8 37.堂;a6+) 36.堂h5+ 堂a8 37.堂h2! and White has an irresistible attack.

Black tries to find counter- chances and decides to meet the sacrifice with a counter-sacrifice. That brings no change in the situation; nothing can stop White's attack," (Smysloy)

31...4:f2+ 32.8:f2 #:c4 33.0e8 @h7 34.0f6+ #a7?. Black could have continued to fight only with 34... 2:f6

35. A:f6 自d6 36. 當h4 自:f6 37. 當:f6. 35. ♠h6+! ₾h8 36. ②:d7 增d4 37. ②:e5 Black resigned.

I talked over my feelings, about the rhythm of playing of Smyslov, with grandmaster Yuri Balashov and he said about Smyslov that this is a natural quality of his and told me that Boris Spasky was very much impressed with the manner of driving a car by Smyslov. Spasky said that Smyslov usually drove very carefully and seldom went over forty-fifty

kilometres per hour, vet suddenly he used to press the accelerator in the curves. The absolute feeling of rhythm, the excellent tactics and the magnificent positional understanding enabled Smyslov to set a world record of chess longevity and he participated in the final of the candidates matches in his seventies, although I think that Smyslov played his best games before 1958, and I recommend the young players to read first his book "Selected Games" published in 1952, and then "Seeking Harmony". We are finishing now with our course of the classics. Our contemporaries do not play any worse at all of course, but it would be much harder to understand the dynamic and ruthless chess of today if you haven't studied profoundly the chess legacy of the past.

# Studying of the Endgame

The studying of the endgame should better be started simultaneously with the formation of the opening repertoire of the young player, or right after the end of it. The endgame technique is something very complex and the chess players need a lot of time and experience to master it, still this process can be accelerated by a well planned preparation. In my work "Endgame Strategy" I made a thorough exposition of the main principles of the endgame and the chess players I was coaching used to study this book extensively. Still my work as a coach showed that the understanding and the theoretical knowledge of the most important endgame principles comprise only half of the work, they have to be thoroughly tested in practice. You have to strive to play endgames, as often as possible to be able to learn to play it well. I think that the greatest effect can be achieved if you study some endgame principle in several examples from the book "Endgame Strategy" and then play for a while some other endgames on this theme against an opponent with an approximately equal strength. In this way the pupil can compare his playing with that one of the great players and he can easily see his mistakes and accumulate faster the desired knowledge. I would like to show you some examples of my work as a coach in Bulgaria - with the Champion of Bulgaria for women in 1991, the International Master Rumyana Gocheva and the bronze medalist of the World Championship for girls in 1991 Maya Koen. The two players sat down to play the endgame between Fischer and Reshevsky, USA 1963.



White's positional advantage leaves no doubt. Lets see first the method of its realization demonstrated by the World Champion №11.

harmony with the principle "Do not hurry", because Black has no counter-play and is forced to watch the developments passively.

2...Eaf8 3...£a3 Ec8 4.b4. White's pressure increases. Black has to reckon with b4 − b5, as well as with the simple improvement of the position of his opponent in the scheme №2 - d3, b2 − b3, c3 − c4 etc. Therefore S. Reshevsky tries to block the position on the queen-side mechanically, but this leads to the appearance of new weakness in the Black's position – the pawn on a6.

4...b5 5.Edd1! Black has now backward pawns at the edge of the board and another one on d6. To attack simultaneously three weaknesses is a little bit too much and R. Fischer allows Black to get rid of one of them, attacking one by one the pawns on h7 and a6.

5... de6 6.Ea1 Ec6 7.Eh3!. White tries to attack the weaknesses of the opponent to be able to disrupt the already pathetic state of the "lines of communication" (Nimzovitch's alleadory) of the opponent.

7...Δf8 8. Bah1 Bc7.



Black has been outplayed completely and it is time for White to reap the harvest. Fischer finds an exquisite concrete solution.

9.Eh4! Zugzwang! White provokes the move d5, because Black's rook can not exploit the seventh rank because of 10.Ea1. The ravine between the

two weaknesses was getting deeper with every move and small wonder that Black goes to the bottom quickly. 9...d5 10.8a17 The Black rook should be forced to occupy the sixth rank. 10...8c6 11.edv £:d5 12.8df ±:266 13.8d8. When the Black rook is on c6 the move 13...Δg7 is unavailable for Black. 13...2f5 14.8a8 8a6 15.8h37 The threat 813+ enables Fischer to force the win of a pawn. The rest of the moves made by Reshvesky can be attributed probably to inertia. The game ended after: 15...Δg7 16.8:h8 4:h8 17.8:h7 8a6 18.817+ 2g4 19.13 2g3 20.2d3 e4+ 21.fe 8d8+ 22.4d4 2g4 23.811 4.65 24.2g3 4.07 25.8g1+ £:dh 26.2f3 8d7 25.8617+ 28.2f4 8d5 29.66 4d8 30.4f6 4:f6 31.gf £:f6 32.2d5 8d2 33.8e1. Black resigned. This is a magnificent example of an excuisite endgame technique!

Lets see now what the two women did:

# Koen - Gocheva

1.g5 △e7 2.8d37! White tries to "seize the bull by the horns" immediately, with the idea to win the weak "h7" pawn, disregarding the centralization of the king and the improvement of the position of the rest of the pieces. In a few words - White is in a hurry. 2...8af8 3.8dh3 8f7 4.8h6 8g7 5.Δe3 Δd8. M. Koen forced the opponent's rooks to defend the pawns on g6 and h7 and it was high time now the king's

position was improved with the move 6.\$e2. Instead of this, White is attacking immediately with − 6.#4?, which enables us to conclude that our students have learned the principles like "Do not hurry", "Centralize the king" only theoretically, but they are far from their application in practice. There will come a time when the chess player will like to improve the position of all his pieces and under the tic-tacking of the chess clock, the hand will reach for the king, with the idea to play \$e2, and then b3 − b4, c3 − c4 and b2 − b3. This desire for improvement of the position first, and then the start of the active actions will become as natural as the wish to breathe fresh air, to feed, to drink, to sleep etc. Only then we can talk about the mastering of the elements of the chess technique.

6... \(\textit{sign} c47 \). \(\textit{ab6}\)? Black makes a mistake in his turn as well. The move 7...\(\textit{ae8}\)! would have punished the opponent severely for the disregarding of the centralization of the king.

severely of the disequently of the centralization of the Ning.

8. Δd2 Eff8 9.Fe de? Now 9...Ee8l was once again to be most seriously considered. 10.Eth7 Eff77 The final mistake. Black's position becomes suddenly very difficult after be exchange of one pair of rooks. It was necessary to retreat with the rook -10...Eg/8 with counterplay. If then White tries to force the exchange of a pair of rooks with 11.Eth; after 11...Eth1 + 12.Eth1 Δd4 Black gets suddenly very active, since the exchange of the bishops 13.Δc3 Δc3 14.bc Ef8+ and 15...Eth4 enables Black to hope for a draw in the arising rook endgame. We could witness then a typical mistake in the solution of the problem of exchange.

11.E:g7 E:g7 12.b4! Now, everything is over. The game continued:

12... Ad4 13.b3 Ee7 14.Eh6 Ee6 15.Eh7 Ab2 16.Eg7 Ad4 17. de2 Ab2 18. Ae3 Ac3 19.b5+ ab 20.cb+ d:b5 21.E:b7+ de6 22.Ef7 Black resigned.

In the process of my work with the players I have mentioned, they had to increase their knowledge in the endgame studying the book "600 endgames" by L. Portisch and B. Sharkozi, as well as the chapter "Rook and a Pawn Against a Rook" from the book "The Theory of the Rook Endgames" by G. Levenfish and V. Smyslov. I wouldn't advise you to study continuously multi-volume works on the endgame, since I consider such a work useless. The chess player should have a starting basis of precise knowledge in the different types of endgames and should have some idea of the methods of reaching the aim in the theoretical positions.

Besides that, the rook endgames require particular attention. They occur in practical games very often and abide to some laws which are sometimes different from the other endgames. The chess player should be excellently prepared with an exact knowledge about the endgame - rook and a pawn against rook, to be able to operate constantly with it in case of simplification of the position. He should have an idea about the rook attack from behind, the frontal attack with the rook, as well as cutting off the enemy king on the rank etc. Besides, the chess player should master some common principles of the rook endgame such as: the king should support the own pawns in sharp endgames, while the rook should take care of the enemy pawns and not vice-versa. If you have the opportunity to compromize the monolithic pawn mass of the opponent, or to win some separate pawn on the

to choose between a passive defence, or a pawn sacrifice to activate the rook, you should much more often prefer the latter etc. Some of these rules the chess players can find in the "Endgame Strategy" in the chapters "The Problem of Exchange" and "Think in Schemes", but unfortunately my concepts there were not necessarily concentrated on playing exactly rook endgames, so I will try to compensate this omission quoting some examples from "Endgame Strategy"

side, you should better work on the pawn mass, or if you have

accentuating on the interpretation of the principles in the rook endgames.

We are going to begin the study of practical rook endgames with an endgame of this type:



The chess player should understand that if the White pawn is pushed forward one squere, i.e. 1.12a8 2th6 2.a7? we are going to have a "dead" draw on the board, so the only acceptable try to play a win for White will be to sacrifice one of the pawns on the king-side with the idea to free the rook and

enable the advance of the king towards the passed pawn. In cases like that, in general, all ends in an endgame of the type: king and a rook for the stronger side against king and a pawn for the weak side. Here is something like an analysis of this endgame: 1.273 ½76 2.263 266 3.244. White king should abandon his pawns, since there is no other way to play actively. The line 3.14 2.34 2.35 6.265 ½94 and Black achieves an easy draw.



Black can play of course 1...Ba2 and draw, still the better way to do this will be: 1...Bb6! 2.263 Be6! and it turns out that the white king can not pass the "e" file and the rook is stuck to defend the "a6" pawn.



If White tries to shatter the enemy position on the king-side with the advance of the "T" pawn, Black should better make a mechanical blockade. For example: 3.292 298 4.14 651 and White has nothing left to do except push the "a" pawn forward, but after 5.884 297 6.47 886, the position will be

completely drawish.

White can try something different, **4.f3** is possible instead of 4.f4. Now 4...\$e2+ and 5...\$e2 looks good for Black, but suppose Black decides to adhere to the aforementioned defensive line: **4...\$q7** 5.\$\text{ch}3 \text{Bib 6.6,4 hg+ 7.\$\text{ch}g4}.



White threatens to play 8.h5 and this will lead to an endgame rather unpleasant for Black with "I" pawns and an outside passed "a6" pawn. The theoretical books affirm that this endgame should be a draw, but after a precise defence by Black. Therefore, after the exchange of a pair of pawns,

Black should better go immediately behind the enemy passed pawn with the manoeuvre £b6 – b4+ – a4 with an easy draw. You might try to object against the necessity of the last example. Why should Black try to look for some new ways to make a draw, if in the position on the penultimate diagram he can easily solve the problem with 1..£a2;

Naturally, you don't ever try to improve on something that is good enough, and the manoeuvre \$\mathbb{B}b2 - b6 - e6\$ is not

quoted here for the sake of the art (there are cases when the chess player analyses a position and he finds three ways to reach the goal, still this doesn't preclude him from looking for a fourth way and I don't see anything wrong with this approach). In this case I was guided strictly by practical considerations. The white king has a long road to go to help the passed pawn on the "a" flie in this case, but suppose we move the passed pawn one file to the right:



going to be very helpful for Black, while the other way to draw 1...B227 will lead him only to difficulties, since the route of the white king from the one side to the other has been evidently shortened. Further, the chess player must understand that the the king-side for both sides will weak side to reach the draw,

Here the move 1...\$c6! is

Dagram 338

Further, the chess player my degrater number of pawns on the king-side for both sides will complicate the task of the weak side to reach the draw, because to organize counterplay, on the road to reach the endgame of king and pawn against king and rook, will be much more difficult. A lot depends here on the pawn structure on the king-side. Some details, not so evident at first sight, play a decisive role in the right evaluation of the position and enable the player to win or draw. Here are some examples.



The game Shereshevsky – Hasin, Vilnus 1974 reached this position. The situation of Black is utterfy hopeless, because White has a large space advantage on the king-side and Black can not create any counterplay after capturing the "g3" pawn. The white king is

free to go calmly to the queenside: **1.2e2 2:23 2.2c7 2a3 3.a7** and Black is helpless against the march of the white king to the "b7" square.



This interesting example was taken from the game Spassky – Torre, Hamburg 1982. Presently, it is not easy to say whether this endgame is winning for White or not. The game continued: 1...8d+ 2.cm2 h5 3.44 8d2 4.dcg3 8.d3+ 5.f3 8d2 6.8a3+ 5.f3 8d2 6.8a3+ 5.f4 decisive mistake



It would not be easy to explain immediately the harsh evaluation of the last Black's move. You think seriously about this position and try to find a schematic forced win for White and I will help you a little bit with the remark to pay attention to the difference of the position of

the black "f" pawn, on "f6" or "f7".

Now, lets' see the solution demonstrated by B. Spassky. I congratulate you, if you have managed to find it yourselves. If not-don't be cross. The majority of the players I had been coaching, who became subsequently Soviet masters and International Masters failed to solve the same problem.

9.86 2/g6 10.87/ We meet here an entirely different plan to win. In an analogy, with the previous examples, White must put the rook on "a", lay a "Dan with the idea 2/g1, and if Black plays \$\mathbb{B}a1\$, push the pawn to "g3" and start the march of the king to the "a6" pawn on the first and the second rank, scartificing one of the pawns on the king-side. Black will have counterplay on the king-side preserving the chances to make a draw. The reader should be able to make an analysis of such developments independently. Spassky's move seems paradoxical at first sight. We saw that when both sides have three pawns on the king-side – to push the pawn to the seventh rank would be a blunder leading to an immediate draw. To be able to understand the profound idea of the exworld champion we must have a look at the following positions:





In the first case White can win easily pushing the "f" pawn without the help of the king. When the white pawn is on "15", the move 15" – 16+ decides, even if Black can control this pawn "two-handedly" (king on g7 and rook on a6). It is impossible to capture the pawn with the king because of £18+, as well as to capture it with the rook, because the white rook plays a move on the eighth rank; and if the king retreats £17" – £18 wins.

In the second case the "g" pawn can not deprive the enemy king from the squares g7 and h7, therefore despite the two extra pawns the position is a draw. These positions should be perfectly understood and remembered by the chess player studying the rook endgames.

Now back to the game Spassky - Torre. Spassky noticed that Black can not prevent the advance of the white pawn on the "f" file, after the preparatory move q2 - q3, accordingly he pushed his passed pawn to a7. This pawn advance wouldn't have been dangerous for Black, had the black "f" nawn been on its initial square. Black would simply exchange the pawns on "f4" then and make the move q7 - q6 after which the possibility of White to create a passed pawn on the ranks "e" or "f" would be completely out of the question. E. Torre had played 8...f6? however, and now he could not exchange pawns on "f4", since White would easily win the game without the help of the king, with the creation of a passed pawn on the "e" file. Black should therefore remain passive, after the move f3 - f4 and allow White after the exchange on "e5" to create a weakness for Black on "e5". The next stage of the White plan is to win the "e5" pawn with the help of the king and the zugzwang. The described scheme of actions enables us to predict the helplessness of Black and an easy win for White. The game continued:

10...  $ghtide{shifted}
10... 
ghtide{shifted}
10... 
ghtide{shifted$ 

15.2:f6. After the text move with the king to g6 the White's plan develops easily to the end.

14.f4! <u>\$\delta\$7</u> 15.fe fe 16.\frac{\delta}{1} \text{ Ba1 17. \delta}{2} \delta\$6 18.\delta\$d2 \text{ Ba4 19.\delta}{c3} \text{ Ba1 20.\delta}{4} \delta\$7 21.\delta\$d5 \text{ Ba5+ 22.\delta}{d6}.



Spassky intended to reach an identical position with a black king on "h7", when he made the move 10.a7! Black is completely paralyzed. His rook is stuck to the "a7" pawn, white Black's king has some squares, it is soon going to be deprived from. So, 22...5g6 23.566 8a1. Black makes a move which

equals resignation.

The line 23... ሷከ7 24. ሷf5 g6+ 25. ሷf6 led to the same result. There followed: 24. ሷ:e5 ሷf7 25. ሷf5 ይa5+ 26.e5 g6+ 27. ሷe4 Black resigned.

The method to win this endgame, shown by Spassky, is very instructive and you should always have it in mind.



This is a position from the game Polugaevsky — Vasyukov, Tiflis 1957. White is to move. The reader may think, after the previous example, that White wins easily pushing the "b" pawn all the way forward to the "b7" square and then winning the enemy "e5" pawn with the help of the king.

Indeed, it looks like Black can not do anything against such a plan. If you try to think more deeply about this position, you

will be able to notice that this same plan would not be so effective with a position of the black pawn on "h5".



Despite the two extra pawns, White can hardly create a passed pawn on the "f" file, and as we know passed pawns on the "g" and "h" files wouldn't do anything. Therefore the game should end in a draw. Our logical analysis shows the right solution and the move is 1.h5! Kow. Black is forced to take the

pawn, because the move 1...g5 would not prevent the creation of a passed pawn in the aforementioned events, while after 1...gh White already has a passed "F pawn, under the condition that the black "e5" pawn disappears. In the game White played 1...657 and Black answered with the routine 1...667 (1...165) after which L. Polugaevsky came to the right plan with 2.h51. There followed: 2...gh 3.b6 h4+4.633 2h7 5.b7 2g7 6.293 e4. The passive waiting play wouldn't change anything. After 6...2h7 7.243 2g7 8.263 2b1 9.264 2b2 10.2d5 the pawn on "e5" would disappear from the board, since 10...2b5+ would be followed by 11.2c6 and 12.8c6

7. 274 257 8. 265 297 9. 245 £b2. The pawn on "e4" was doomed. In case of 9...257 White was winning after 10. 255 £b2 11. 255 £b2 15. 256 £b1 13.44 £c1+ 14. 253 £b1 15.55 £b5 61.66 € Black resioned.

It will be fair to mention that 3.\(\text{that}\)3 was better than 3.66, and Black missed his chance to save the game with 3..\(\text{that}\)5 4.13 e4l, but this possibility was more or less accidental and presents no methodical interest. After White's omission on

move 1, if Black had played 1...h5l, Polugaevsky would have to adhere to the plan to push the pawn to b6, play the rook to b7 and advance with the king. Black has a serious chance to draw then, after he takes one of the White pawns on the king-side creating counterplay there.

## Pavlenko – Bagirov Baku 1964



The endgame presently is far from drawish, because of the presence of the bishops. Black's positional advantage is evident, because of the difference between the activity of the rooks. It can be predicted that White will fall to preserve the material equality and will have to give up the "a" pawn to

activate the rook and exchange the bishops. In this case the experienced player should immediately concentrate his attention to the king-side and try to occupy some space, because the fate of the game will be decided there, since there will be nothing unpredictable in the developments on the other side. Black is to move now and V. Bagirov played 1...g5f, paralyzing the pawn structure of the opponent 2.5ff 16. This is a useful move. but 2...a5 seemed more lookal.

3. De1 Ec2?! The white king tries to approach the kingside and Bagirov anticipates the intentions of his opponent. Still, 3...Bb3! was better to continue with the attack of the "a3" pawn.

4..ûe4. In case of 4.Bd1 Black will play 4...Ba2 5.Bd3 .ûc4 6.Bc3 Be2+. 4...Bb2 5.Ec1? The International Master M. Dvoretzky pointed out that here White could have made good use of the opponent's imprecision on move 3 with 5.Bd1!. Now, if 5...Bb3 6.Bd3, and if 5...Ba2 6.Bd3 is even stronger, because the white bishop left the "g2" square and Black can not meet 8.\(\frac{a}{2}\)d1 with E:f2. 5...Bb3 6.Ea1 White falls back on passivily and this tactics leads him to surrender. While the bishops are on the board, the active move 6.Bc7 would bring no remedy because after 6...\(\frac{a}{2}\)s2.87 \(\frac{A}{2}\)e1 T \(\frac{a}{2}\)s1 + 8.\(\frac{a}{2}\)d2 a5 nothing can stop the white pawn to reach the "a2" square.



We have now a rook endgame. A. Nimzovitch described an analogous situation picturesquely in his work "My System", indeed the opponents had two pawns each on the king-side then: "It is a regular occurrence in the master's practice when one of the partners starts some long

manoeuvres, moreover applies maximum efforts to activate his rook and passivate the enemy one as a result of all this. The active rook then glamours in sincere satisfaction, just like a prima-donna, who enjoys acting the main part, while her rival is furious in her mise-en-scene appearance. We have witnessed many cases, not so surprising though, when the humiliated fival falls ill and the show gets blown."

We have read here an advice, that might be useful later. If you are faced with a choice to defend passively in a rook endgame, or sacrifice a pawn to activate the rook, you should better make the latter choice. In our case however, the pawn sacrifice – 10.8c1 8.c3 11.8c8+ \$27 12.8a8 wouldn't help White much, because Black has occupied a lot of space on the kind-side. Now we can appreciate the value of the move

1...g51, which prevented the future counterplay of the opponent there, anticipating the appearance of a rook endgame with an extra pawn. The rest of the actions follows the script written by Black.

10.44 Bb2 11. ứch Bb4 12.8a2 ứg/ 13. ứd2 h5 14. ức2 66 15. ứ/3 f5. Bagirov continues to occupy space on the king-side. 16. ứg/2 ử/6 17.h3 8e4 18.8a3 8c4 19.8a2 ứ/c7. Time for actions on the queen-side. 20.8a1 ứ/d6 21.h4. This a desperate attempt to change the course of the events. 21..aft 22.0h ứ/c5. Black pays no attention to the "h4" pawn. Her 22...B. th4?! 23.14 O. Pavlenko would have some chances for a favourable outcome. 23.f3 e5 24. ứ/g3 ử/b4 25.8d1 8c3 26. ứ/2 8c5 27.14 ef 28.ef ứ/a4 29. ứ/c3 ử/b5 30.8d8 a4 31. ứ/d ứ/b4 32.8b4 8b5 33.8c8 a3 34.8d4 ứ/b3. White resigned.

### Tukmakov – Shereshevsky, Tiflis 1980



White's advantage, due to the occupation of the only open file is out of the question. Black has now to make the plan for the defence. He has two opportunities: to wait passively allowing the White's rook to penetrate, or try to organize the breakthrough a4 – a3 with the ossition of the rook on a8. In ossition of the rook on a8. In

this case Black should be ready to part with the pawn on b6, but the rook will be free for action. In the first case White will but the rook on c7 or c6, bring the king to d3, prepare the pawn advance e3 – e4 and subject the opponent to his will. Well, indeed, it is not quite clear whether the positional advantage will be enough to win the game, but Black will

meet with a lot of difficulties then. On the other hand, the pawn-sacrifice for Black looks risky. There are five pawns on the king-side and in the centre for each opponent and as we already know this is favourable for the stronger side. There is something very peculiar in this position – the white pawns on the "g" file are doubled. Black is to move now and he takes advantage of the situation on the king-side, which may be decisive for the outcome of the game. 1...https://doi.org/10.1001/j.j.ch.2001/j.j.ch.2001/j.ch.2001



V. Tukmakov prepares the advance of the king to the centre and the pawn push 63 – 64. Black does not intend to defend passively and sacrifices a pawn to get an active counterplay. 3...41 If the white pawn on g3 had been on h3 or h2, and had White managed to play g3 – g4. Black would have

with "fingers crossed" to comply with the difficult defence in a position with an equal material. In the arising position however, Black has a "ready" counterplay on the king-side. If we try to think in schemes, we are going to notice that when the black rook attacks from behind the white passed pawn from b2, the white king will be unable to advance to the queen-side, because of the loss of the g2 pawn. Black will have then his potential passed pawn on the "h" file, which will have then his potential passed pawn on the "h" file, which will be no less dangerous than its "b" counterpart. I want to emphasize once again that the reader should always watch the king-side very attentively in similar positions. 4.572 a86. 5-d. White these to play actively, isolating and winning the central pawn of the opponent. 5..a3 6.ba 8:a3.7.ed ed 8.806 8:a2\* The white king is forced back and it becomes clear that the draw is near. 9.537 61 0.8.265 8.21.1.52.2 Bit 1.20 the 13.fb 6.83 14.03 58. The

black king heads for the "e6" square and White will not be able to remain with an extra pawn, Draw.

### Timman – Andersson Wiik-an-Zee 1981



White has the advantage because the rook penetrated the enemy position, but whether this will be enough to win is not easy to answer yet. T...h5. U. Andersson creates prerequisites for an active counterplay on the king-side. 2.9/35 h4. If 2...Bg6 3.8a7 comes. 3.8a7.



Black is faced with a difficult choice. He can play 3...a51 4.ba ba 5.8.a5 8g6 6.8.h5 8.g2 7.8.h4 sacrificing a pawn, but simplifying the position and activating the rook, and 3...b5? keeping a passive position with an equal material. The Swedish grandmaster preferred the

second option and misguessed. Indeed, the way to win demonstrated by Timman was hard to anticipate. Suppose, Black had played 3...a5 and had lost the game, the commentators would have surely put a question mark to that move and an exclamation mark to 3...55 and the author of the book would have done probably the same. Unfortunately, the attempts to find the absolute truth are very strenuous and while writing a book about methods – hardly possible. In the contemporary magazines we can meet extremely rarely

thorough, explanatory comments. As a rule only players like: the World Champion Kasparov, grandmasters Huebner, Ftacnik, I. Zaicev, as well as the coach of Yusupov and Dolmatov - M. Dvoretzky; and some earlier - the ex-world champion Fischer and grandmaster Keres tended to do that. Naturally, during the analyses of their games and some fashionable positions, plenty of players reach the essence of the matters, but still only few of them like to publish their findings. These remarks were not made with the idea to direct the reader to read only books and magazines marked with the profoundness of the exposition of material. Moreover it is my opinion that a great number of concrete lines, without any additional verbal explanation of the events in the game. sometimes depress the not so experienced player reaching an undesired effect. I would like to appeal to the reader to treat critically all chess writings, no matter what was the level of the play of their authors. If you have the feeling that you disagree with me and you think that my conclusions are based on sand, you can try to find the truth since truth has different meaning to different people.

Lets return to the events in the game:

3. h52! 4.a5 8c6 5.2d4! Andresson must have

that 5...\$c4+ 6.\(\text{d}\)6 &8.\(\text{b}\)4 will be met with 7.\(\text{d}\)6 6 8.\(\text{E}\)36 7.\(\text{e}\)4 \(\text{s}\)86.

Now we come to a new and very important principle in sharp rook endgames. What would have happened after 7...\(\text{E}\)32? 8. Jurashevic commented the game in the "Chess Informant" \(\text{N}\) 31 and gave the following line: 7...\(\text{E}\)1.29 8.\(\text{E}\)36 39.\(\text{B}\)36+ \(\text{d}\)67 10.\(\text{d}\)55 \(\text{g}\)5 12.\(\text{B}\)18 \(\text{B}\)3 (12...\(\text{g}\)4 13.\(\text{d}\)6) 13.\(\text{d}\)66 In 3 14.\(\text{b}\)5 g3 15.\(\text{D}\)7.\(\text{B}\)13 and the race ends in White's favour. The endgame was really rather sharp, but the experienced Three oldaver should be

underestimated this king- manoeuvre. It becomes clear now

able to guess that all the chances are on the White's side and the concrete lines can only confirm this.

We can formulate the following rule, concerning rook endgames with mobile passed pawns on different sides: the rook must fight with the enemy pawns and the king should support the own pawns.

This general rule is true in the majority of cases and it will enable you to find your way easier and look for some additional light-houses. Naturally, we are talking about positions in which the pawns for both sides have been advanced about equally. 8.2°c5 8e6. Black is suddenly in something like a zugzwang. The move 8...2°f8 would surrender the d7 square to the white rook and after 9.8d7 8:g2 10.8d6 8ig6 11.8:g6 fg 12.2d6 g5 (12...26e 13.2e6) 31.2d7 g4 14.e5 gh 16.e6 Black loses because of the lack of only a tempo in the king and pawn endgame. 9.8b7 Timman sets on the course of decisive actions. Now starts a sharp conflict, which meanwhile quickly ends-enabling White to force the win.

9...£:e4 10.\$\tilde{x}\$b6 £:b4 11.\$\tilde{x}\$a6 £!b2 12.\$\tilde{x}\$b6 £:g2 13.a6 £!a2 14.a7. The rest of the game is not so interesting. After 14...g5 15.\$\tilde{x}\$c5 f5 16.£!b8+ \$\tilde{x}\$f7 17.a8\tilde{x}\$ £:a8 18.£:a8 g4 19.\$\tilde{x}\$d4 gh 20.£!h8 Black resigned.

#### Timoshchenko - Shereshevsky Tiflis 1980



Black's position looks dangerous. The white pawn has advanced all the way up to d7, the black king seems vulnerable, and Black has to reckon with the attack of the white rook on the "d" file. To decrease the tension will only

be possible with the exchange of the queens.

1... #c31 2. #:c3 White had no other choice because of the threat to check from the g5 square.

2...£c3 3.8d6 8c7 4.8:g6 8ccd7 5.8:d7 5.8:d7. When Black played 1....£c3 he had to calculate the possibility of a transition to a king and pawn endgame after 6.8g7 ±2e6 7.8:d7 2cd7. In this case Black can easily draw, despite the White's protected passed pawn, after playing a7 − a6 and a march with the kind to the "d6" and "e6" sources.

6. £h6 £d2+ 7. ⊈h3.



Black has to make a choice: which pawn to attack — a4 or 13? It is easy to answer this question applying common sense. After 7...\$\(\mathbb{L}\)22? 8.\(\mathbb{L}\)17. \$\(\mathbb{L}\)6.\(\mathbb{L}\)17. \$\(\mathbb{L}\)6.\(\mathbb{L}\)17. \$\(\mathbb{L}\)6.\(\mathbb{L}\)17. \$\(\mathbb{L}\)17. \$\(\mathbb{L}\)18. \$\(\ma

enable the advance of the passed pawns and the rook will flight with the enemy pawns (the pawn on h2 is of no importance) and for Black vice-versa. Besides you have to know that the isolated, the doubled pawns are not dangerous at all in the rook endgames, whereas the connected passed pawns are really powerful. Therefore, if you can capture an isolated pawn, or disrupt a pair of pawns or a pawn mass, you should choose the second option. Black gave no second thought about it with Tr...BZT The game continued:

8.E:h5 E:f3+ 9.\$g4 Ea3 10.Eh7+ \$e6 11.E:a7 f3 12.\$g3 \$e5 13.Ee7+ \$d4 14.\$f2. (There was a threat 14...\$e3).

14 Ba2+ 15 Of3 B-h2



As a result of the forced moves, White has won a pawn but the position has simplified. Black should apply some precision though. There followed:

16.∄d7+ ⊈c5. The natural move 16...⊈e5 would be a blunder, because 17.₤d5+ and 18.₤b5.

17.e5 Eh4! The white king must be cut off from the passed pawn. 18.e6 Eh6 19.e7 Ee6 20. 214 21. Ea7 216 Draw.

This example will be the last one in this book about complicated practical rook endgames. The chess player should have noticed by now the main principles and examples to illustrate them can be found easily. As I mentioned before, you need some exact knowledge of some theoretical endgames, as well as you have to master some typical manoeuvres – all that concerning "rook and pawn against rook". These words must not seem to you a general instruction, therefore I will submit here the interesting article "Deceptive Simplicity" (with some abbreviations) published in the newspaper "Bulletine of the Central Chess Club of USSR" in 1980.

<sup>&</sup>quot;The rook endgame is considered to be an integral part of the endgame technique. I agree with that, particularly if I add that even the imperfect mastership of this incredibly complex technique is so unapproachable for the majority of the players that nowadays- there is not a single player that can be called perfect in rook endgames, the last two World Champions included."

As you know, the introduction of the six hour time-control led to the sudden decrease of the number of the adjourned games. Most of the chess experts consider that the tournament players now will be much less inclined to analyse endgames. We think this is only partly true. The players who enjoy analysing will certainly continue to do so.

Before that, you could adjourn your game after forty moves and you could start to analyse the position at home calmly. Now you have this opportunity only after you have made at least sixty moves on the board. By that time the board will be almost empty and those endgames you used to play only after a thorough concrete analyses, now you have to play in the tense time-limit of one hour for twenty minutes, after four or five hours of play before, and probably after a time-trouble at that. Therefore, we think that the importance of the independent work on endgame positions has increased. If such positions arise after approximately 50 - 60 moves, you can not, as before, use the information you had from your home analysis after the adjournment, when you could have analysed this position and even refer to some books if you could. Now you have to do everything on the board and do it auickly. The endgames that occur most often in practice are the

The endgames that occur most orten in practice are the rook endgames. In our article we are going to study such endgames with the minimum "cast" – "rook and pawn against rook". By the way all our examples will be similar in one aspect: one of the opponents (and maybe both) will make mistakes.

We are going to use concrete examples with the idea to prove that the percentage of mistakes in such, seemingly simple endgames is very high even among strong players. We are going to try to find the reasons for this. The material has been arranged in such a way, as that has been done in most of the endgame books. First of all we are going to study positions with a bishop pawn, after that with a central pawn (very similar to the latter type), afterwards with a knight pawn and finally some complicated examples with a rook pawn.

#### Positions with a bishop pawn

#### №1 Sax – Tzeshkovsky Rovinj – Zagreb, 1975



In this position Black decided his position was completely lost, so he resigned. This decision must have been made just out of common sense reasons: the king is cut off from the pawn, and the rook does not have enough space for the successful attacking of the white king on the ranks. Desoite all

that – the position is a draw! Black can save this position with attacks from the side, on the rank. The black king has occupied a place, where it should be in this method of defence, i.e. on the short side, and the rook manages to take the necessary position to attack from the long side. 1...2h77 2.77 2.68! The only move. 2...266+? loses after 3.2d7 2ff 4.2b2 for 2...2617 3.3d7 2ff 1.4.2b27 2614 5.2d8 2ff 1.1.6.11 6.3B3+2 506 7.2b09 (5.8b2 3 and 7.2b27 pext).

3.살d7 (3.살e7 월c7+ 4.살e8 월c8+ 5.살d7 월a8!) 3...월a8! and a draw, because the rook now has more than enough space for example: 4 ☆c6 분명 or 4 ☆d6 분명8

White can not achieve anything after 2.*Bg7+ ሬክ6t* (but not 2...ਖ਼ੈn8? 3.Be7 Bc6+ 4.ਖ਼ੈ15 Bc8 5.ਖ਼ੈg6) 3.*Bg8* (3.Ba7 ਖ਼ੈg6) 3.*Bc6*+ (3...ਖ਼ੈn7? 4.f7) 4.ਫ਼ੈe7 *Bc7*+ 5.ਫ਼̂d6 *Ba7* and the rook is once again "long" enough.

# №2 Capablanca – Menchik Hastings 1929



This endgame was superbly analysed by N. Grigoriev:

"You are inclined to say that White has a simple win. But in this case this evaluation is wrong: Black has a sure draw.

1... 且 62 This loses... Black had to play 1... 直 b8! After that Black was not afraid from 2. 直 e1 直 b7+ or 2. 直 e8 直 b7+ 3. □ e6 (if

3.堂f8 — 3...堂g6) 3...皇b6+! 4.堂f5 自b5+! 5.皇65 皇b1. 2.皇66 (or 2.皇d7) is harmless too, after 2...皇a8 3.堂e7 堂g8 4.f7+ 堂g7 with a draw in all lines.

2.8d7?? White does not take advantage of the mistake of the opponent and in his turn makes a terrible mistake. It is possible that Capablanca was in a time-trouble. 2.⊈f8+! was winning easily and was simple enough.

2...Ba8! now everything is OK for Black and the position is a draw. 3.Be7 Ba6? This loses once again. Black had to play 3...Bb8!

4. \(\textit{\textit{that}}\)! White finds the right way, although a little bit late. The pawn manages finally to go to "f7" and that wins.

**4... ⊈g6.** Or 4... ⊈h8 5.f7 **Ba8+** 6.**Be8 Ba7** 7.**Be1 Ba8+** 8.⊈e7 **Ba7+** 9.⊈f6.

5.f7 8a8+ 6.8e8 8a7 7.8e6+ \$\psi\h7 8.\$\psi\ext{e822}

This is just an improbable mistake for Capablanca, which can not be forgiven. Maybe he was careless, but this was also impossible to forgive. 8.2e1 was winning simply and easily. There could follow: 8...\$a8+ (if 8...\$a6 - 9.\$a8) 9.\$e7 \$a7+ (or 9...\$g7 10.f8\$+) 10.\$f6 \$a6+ 11.\$e6 \$a8 12.\$e8 \$a6+ 13.\$e5 \$a5+ 14.\$d4. After the text move the position is a draw once again.

# 8... Ra8+ 9. ©e7 Ra7+?

continuing to play this position.

It is very hard to guess what made V. Menchik (who was a really strong master) refrain from the evident move 9... \$\pm297\$, after which the draw is obvious. The position of the white rook on the sixth rank deprives White from any chances, for example 10.2a6 (to prevent the checks on the rank) 10...2h8 11.2a7 2f8 (or 11...2c8). There was not any sense in

10.26 and Black resigned. (Indeed, Black managed to lose this position single-handedly) This was a very interesting

endgame, abundant with mistakes though. There is an interesting story behind this endgame. The

right method of defence in this position was shown in the game Steinitz - Blackburn, Vienna 1898! Afterwards the game Capablanca - Menchik was a kaleidoscope of mistakes. The last one to make a mistake was the world champion for women, accordingly she lost, so the always delicate - N. Grigoriev had to put question marks twice on the moves of the Cuban genius, while annotating this game.

Many years after, in the USSR Spartakiada of the schools we met this position:

#### №3 Pekker – Ermolinsky Alma-Ata. 1974



It is not difficult to notice that the same position has arisen, just like in the previous example, only with reversed colours.

1.Ba3? Pekker makes the same mistake, as Menchik did 45 years before. After 1.Bb1! – the draw is easy.

1... #1+1. If Ermolinsky had

decided to "imitate" Capablanca, he had to play 1... \$\mathbb{\mathbb{Z}} d2??, but he wins instead.

2. \$\tilde{\psi}\$ \$ 12. 3.841 \tilde{\psi}\$ 84. 842 \$\tilde{\psi}\$ 85. \$\tilde{\psi}\$ 12. 888! (5...\$\tilde{\psi}\$ 16.841 \$\tilde{\psi}\$ 27. \$\tilde{\psi}\$ 29 with a draw) 6. \$\tilde{\psi}\$ 37. 6.862 \$\tilde{\psi}\$ 1848 \$\tilde{\psi}\$ 1849 \$\tilde{\psi}\$ 2841 \$\tilde{\psi}\$ 27. 8.843 \$\tilde{\psi}\$ 88.843 \$\tilde{\psi}\$ 884 \$\tilde{\psi}\$ 8841 \$\tilde{\psi}\$ 2841 \$\tilde{\psi}\$ 2841

# №4 Sveshnikov – G. Kuzmin, Tashkent 1980



# 1... 🖺 g8 2. 🖄 h3.

We are going to study the move 2.2e7 a little bit later.

2...호c5 3.트e7 (3.트d7 호c6 트d1 트q5! with a draw)

3...8g5? 4.8e5+ \$\text{ \$\text{cd6}}\$ 5.\$\text{\$\text{ch4}}\$ 8g1 6.8e2 (with the help of some tactics White managed to cut off the enemy king from the

#### 6... \$\d7 7.\$\dagger 5 \textit{Bg8 8.\$\dagger 6...}\$ Black resigned.

Black made a decisive mistake on his third move. 3.. \$\pmu 6\$ was leading to a draw after 4.\pm 64 \$\pm 47 \tau 5 \$\pm 4\$ \$\pm 48\$ 16.\pm 64 \$\pm 67 \tau 5 \$\pm 5\$ \$\pm 69\$ \$

So, after the move in the game 2.\(\tilde{\t

2.8e7 8f8 (2...월g5? 3.월e5+ 할c6 4.할h3 할d6 5.할h4 leads by a transposition to the same position from the game, lost for Black) 3.8e5+ 할c6 4.할g3 할d7 5. 발4 8e8.



Further, Beliavsky continues with: 6.8a5 %e7 7.8a7 %f6 %e8.8a6+ %f7 and the king managed to come in front of the pawn — draw. The commentator missed the move 6.f6, after which White wins easily, which was not so difficult to notice after all.

iter all.

So, it seems that the initial

position is winning for White and Sveshnikov made a mistake with the move 2. \$\delta\$13. No, not at all - in answer to 2.\$\delta\$67, instead of the losing move 2...\$\delta\$87, Black must play with the king immediately:

2... 살c6! 3. 살h3 살d6 4.8e1 (4.됨e6+ 살d7 5. 살h4 됨e8 with a simple draw) 4... 음g5! 5.몸e6+ 살d5! and White loses the pawn.

So, grandmasters tend to make mistakes not only when they play endgames like this, but even when they analyse

them. By the way, you are going to see from our next examples, that is far from being the only case.

#### №5 Huebner – Timman FRG 1985





7...260 2.8no 2dd (2...262 3.2f3 2e5 4.2:e5+ and a draw) 3.2f3 2c5 4.2h6+ 2d5 5.2e3 2c4 6.2d2 2b3 7.2d6 2b2 8.2d1 2c1+ 9.2d2 2c2+ 10.2d1 2c3 11.2d2 c5.



Now, White could have drawn attacking "from behind 12.8b6+ 8b3 13.8c6 8b5 14.8c3 3b5 15.8c8 and Black can not push the pawn without allowing the white king to go to the "c2" source.

The game continued with 12.8d5?? Bc4 13.2d1 (White couldn't save the game with

13.림h5 림c2+ 14.발d3 림c3+ 15.발d2 c4 16.림b5+ 림b3 17.림c5 림d3+ 18.발e2 발c3 and the white king is cut off along the file)

13...ac2! 14.ah5 c4 15.ab5+ &c3 16.ah5 ag2. Now, after 17.ac5 ag1+ 18.e2 ac1 a theoretical position arises, which is won for Black. Therefore White resigned.

Huebner's decision on move 12. was completely unexplainable, because Timman had one more way to win the game which was even shorter: 12...c4 (instead of 12...Ec4) 13.Bb5+ Bb3.

# №6 Kochiev – Smyslov Lvov, Zonal Tournament 1978



The black pawn is very far from the promotion square. The most effective method of defence in positions like this is the defence "from in front", when the rook of the weaker side checks the king in front of the pawn.

V. Kart and A. Mihalchishin annotated this game in the

tournament bulletin "The Zonal Tournament for the World Championship in Lvov". They wrote: "As you know, according to the rule of 'six", introduced by A. Sheron, if the number of the rank, on which the pawn is placed, added to the number of the flies, the pawn is away from the enemy king, is not more than six, the position is a draw. Now, we have 3+1=4. So, the draw must be the normal result in this position."

Now, we have to correct this. Sheron studied this type of endgames in the twenties, and he formulated the rule of "five" and not the rule of "six". That rule can apply, with some exceptions, in positions with central pawns and bishop pawns. Sheron tried to establish the rule of "six", concerning the knight pawn, but several years after his analyses were refuted by N. Grigoriev. You can learn a lot more about this if you study the yollumes of "Chess Enddames" by Y. Averbach.

In our case, we have a position with a bishop pawn, so the rule of "six" has nothing to do with this. For those players who start to yawn when they hear some dull scientific word like "rule", we are going to quote something from the same "Chess Endgames" as a consolation: "In endgames of this type it is much more important to understand the methods of attack and defence than to memorize some formal rule." By the way, in another work that belongs to the classics – the book "The Theory of Rook Endgames" by G. Levenfish and V. Smyslov, the authors wrote the whole book, avoiding any formal rules, when they explained the method of defence with checks from "in front".

1.9e2 Ed5 2.8g1 9b4 3.8b1+ 9a3 4.9e3 c5 5.9e4 Ed2 (5...8d4+ 6.9e3) 6.8c1 Ed4 7.9e3 9b4 8.8b1+ 9c4 9.8c1+ 9b5 10.8h1 Ed8 11.8b1+ 9c6 (threatening 12...c4) 12.8c1 8d7



This situation is typical for the method of defence from "in front". Black can not manage to push the pawn, because of the frontal checks and thes his last chance – lets the opponent to make a move. White has to find the only move 13.32e4 (13a. 264+ 14.32e3). White must

will understand why after five moves.

13. 2e2? 2b5 14. 2b1+ 2a4 15. 2c1 2b4 16. 2b1+ 2a3 17. 2c1 2d5!

Now you can understand, because if the king was on "e4", Black wouldn't have this opportunity.

18. 2e3 2b2 19. 2c4 2b3. White resigned.

№7
Marianovic – Bronstein, Vrshac 1979



Lets see first how the game proceeded.

3.8b5+ \$\tilde{x}27 4.\$\tilde{x}27! (4.d5? \$\frac{x}{2}a6!) 4...\$\tilde{x}26 (4...\$\tilde{x}26+ 5.\$\tilde{x}5.\$\tilde{x}5.\$\tilde{x}5.\$\tilde{x}6 \tilde{x}6.\$\til

This endgame was first

published in the "Chess Informant" № 28 commented by the winner. After the move 4.\(\frac{\pi}{2}\)C1 there was a mark that "White had a decisive advantage". So, from the logical point of view the position was a draw before that. Where did Black make a mistake then? Maybe on move 2? Marianovic puts a question mark to the move 2...\(\frac{\pi}{2}\)E3 and makes the following comment: "2...\(\frac{\pi}{2}\)D5 13.\(\frac{\pi}{2}\)E5 566 4.\(\frac{\pi}{2}\)E6 567 \(\frac{\pi}{2}\)E67 \(\frac{\pi}{2}\)E67 \(\frac{\pi}{2}\)Movements, whether the move 2...\(\frac{\pi}{2}\)D7 makes a draw or not, and what is the evaluation of the initial position.

Grandmaster Kovacevic annotated this endgame for the "Encyclopedia of Chess Endgames" and according to the principles of systematizing the material, the endgame has been mentioned in several chapters. Kovacevic evaluates the initial position as drawn and the move 2...Ba4? as the decisive mistake, while the move 2...Bb7! as saving the game. In answer to 2...Bb7 he looks at 3.Bc6 and 3.Bc6 proving the draw with some long lines. He includes in brackets the draw after the move suggested by Mariarrovic 3.Br6. The variation goes: 3.Bb5 Bb6 (3...Bb1 4.d5 Bg1 5.46 \$\pmu 7 6.47 \text{ winning)}. 4.\$\pmu 7 \text{ \$\text{E} 67 \text{ \$\text{\$\exititt{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\texit{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\



Lets continue this analysis with only one move. After 7.3b5+1 — curtains! The continuation 7...\$\text{car}\$ are is hopeless because the king is cut off, as well as the king and pawn endgame 7...\$\text{car}\$ 8.8.65+ 8.65 9.dc. So, where is the draw after all?

№8 Uhlman – Gulko, Nikshic 1978



1...\$\tilde{2}\tilde{7}\tilde{

as usual it was time for miracles. I forgot completely about one draw-position...".

2. 空母3 空e4 3. 空母2! After 3. 直54+? 查d3 4. 直53+ 空c2 Black

2. 堂g3 堂e4 3.堂g2! After 3.崑b4+? 堂d3 4.崑b3+ 堂c2 Black wins – White lacks one file for successful checks from the side.

3...Bg6+. After 3...Bi6 with the idea to cut off the king, White gains space for his rook to become "long" with - 4.Ba11, after which the black king and the white rook are separated by three files and the defence with checks from the side is sufficient to draw.

4.2f1 2f3 5.8b3?? White in his turn makes a fatal mistake. White forgets the simple drawing stunt 5.8b2 8a6 6.8f2+!

5... Ba6 6. Bb1 Bh6 7. \$\docume{g}1 Bg6+. White resigned.

# **№9** Tolush – Bondarevsky Leningrad 1939



- 1...章c7. White's task would have been easier after 1...e5 2.堂b4 章c6 3.萬h5 章e6 4.堂c3 with a simple draw.
- 2.ፎh1. The white rook is on the start line for the attack "from in front". The king and pawn endgame is lost: 2.ፎ.c?? 할:c? 3.발b4 발d6 4.발c4 발e5 5.발d3 발14.
- 2...2e7 3..2b67 This move creates additional difficulties on the way to the draw. 3.2b4! was leading to a theoretical position (but not 3.2e1? Bb7 and the white king is cut off from the pawn by three files) 3...268 (3...65 4.8h7+ 266 5.8c1 + 257 6.2c6 and the pawn is lost) 4.8er 2f6 6.5e1 + 257 6.8e1 ±157 7.8f1+ 2g4 8.8e1 ±88 9.2c3 e5 10.2d2 with a draw here you can see the method of defence with attack from "in front" in its purest form.

8.\$h4+ \$f3 9.\$d4 e5+ (9...\$e1 10.\$h3+) 10.\$d5 \$e1 (10...e4 11.堂e5 and after 12.宣f4+ Black loses the pawn.) 11.當h3+ 堂q4 12.當h8 e4 13.當f8 and White achieves a draw cutting off the enemy king from the pawn.

4... \$\alpha f 5. \$\alpha b 5. Now, the pawn will be pushed forward one square, but even against the attack from "in front" Black will

have: 5.월f1+ 호g5 6.월e1 호f5 7.월f1+ 호e4 8.월e1+ 월e3 and Black wins 5...e5 6. \$\times b4 \textit{Bc8}\$. We have been talking about the "rule of five", and we have formulated it (look at example № 6), now

lets make some use of it. The pawn is on the fourth rank, the king is cut off by two files: 4+2=6 and that is more than 5. So. Black's position is winning. 7.8f1+ \$\textit{2}e6 8.8e1 \$\textit{2}f5. Black wins with the help of the combined method, termed as such by N. Grigoriev. The essence of this method is: 1. The king of the stronger side is

moved forward as far as possible; generally the king manages to occupy a square next to the pawn on the diagonal. 2. The rook is placed behind the pawn and supports its movement forward 9.Ef1+ 2g4 10.Ee1 2f4 11.Ef1+ 2g3 12.Ee1 Ee8 13.2c3

Bd8+ and 15...e4) 14...Фe2 15.Bh1 Bc8+ and 16...e4. 14.Ee4 gf3 15.Eh4 Ed8! 16.Eh3+ gg4 17.Eh7 e4 18.Ef7

e3 19. ©c2 @a3 20. @f6 e2 21. @e6 @f2 22. @f6+ @e1 23. @a6. 23.8f7 was offering a stiffer resistance. Black was winning with the help of a "shelter": 23...\$c8+ 24.\$b2 \$c5. 23...Ef8. White resigned.

# №10

#### Timoshchenko – Haritonov Frunze 1988



1.274? It looks like White wins as he pleases, but this tempting move leads to a draw.

**295.** Black has enough space now for the king. The rook goes back to the long side and the draw becomes inevitable.

5. එයර 5 (5.8a6 8b1 6.එd5 8b5+ 7.එd6 ජු5 8.e6 එලි 9.e7 එෆි or 9.එd7 8b7+ with a draw) 5...8a1 6.එe6 8a7 7.8c6 එක6 8.8d6 එක5 9.8d5 එක6 10.8d7 8a6+ 11.8d6 8a7. Draw.

Lets go back to the initial position. Now, 1:2474 doesn't win, does it? 1:8b5 8a1 leads to nothing. The only way to win is 1.8g6! cutting off the king by two files from the pawn and after 1...2h5 2.8g2 8a6 3.e4 8f8+ 4.2e3 8e6 5.8g1! we have a well familiar theoretical position.



R. Fine and A. Sheron had analysed this position independently at their time. Fine considered it to be a draw, which is not true, while Sheron proved the win. Black is in zugzwang. If 5... Be7, the rook loses the necessary space for the successful attack from "in

front": 6.党d4 超d7+ 7.党c5 星e7 8.党d5 国d7+ 9.党e6. Fine thought that 5..党h4 could draw, but Sheron pointed out that White wins with 6.e5! 星·e5+ 7.堂d4. After 5..党h6 White wins with the same tactical motive: 6.堂d4 里很+ 7.党e5 星e8+ (otherwise 8.党d6 星d8+ 9.党e7) 8.党f6

If we talk about the game Timoshchenko – Haritonov, we can make the conclusion that the reason for White's troubles was that Timoshchenko had forgotten a theoretical position and he made the wrong choice of the way to cut off the king, which had to be done along the file and not on the rank.

#### Positions with a Knight Pawn

#### №11 Spiridonov – Bareev Budapest 1988



# 1. \$\pmucc2 \pmue5 = 2. \$\pmudcd d2 = Ee4 \$ 3. \$\pmu\cdot 1. \$\pmu\cdot 2. \pmu\cdot 2. \pm\cdot 2. \pm\cdo

The Bulgarian grandmaster misses the draw he could achieve with 4.29d3! g4 5.8b8! 846 7.2e3! \$63+8.2e2 296 9.8b1 and 10.8f1 (Bareev).

4...g4 5.≣f1 g3 6.⊈d3 ≣f4. White resigned.

#### №12 Simagin – Tarasov USSR 1957



The events in the game followed the already habitual script. Mistakes were made for both sides and first White

missed the win and then Black missed the draw.

1.b6? Eh6! (1...Eh8? 2.២a4 Ed8 3.E:d8 ២:d8 4.២b5 winning) 2.Eb2 Eh8? 3.b7 and Black resigned.

Meanwhile, the draw was quite near: 2...열d7 (threatening 3...연c8) 3.b7 홈a6+ 4.연b3 홈b6+ 5.연c3 홈:b2 6.연:b2 연c7 and Black takes the pawn.

#### №13



This is a position from the book "The Theory of Rook Endgames" by Levenfish and Smyslov. The solution there: 1.43a3 flag4 2.b6 8g6 3.lb2 6g8 4.b7 8b8 5.b34 bd7 6.b35 bd7 7.b36 8lb8 8.b37. In fact, all this is a repetition of the game Simagin — Tarasov with all the mistakes included at that

As you see, in this excellent book, which was reedited three times you can find "reprints"...

#### Positions with a Rook Pawn

#### № 14 Vizhmanavin – Lerner Lvov 1984



This position arose after a tiring, continuous adjoumment, in which White was defending excellently in a difficult position. It seemed that the opponents were about to agree to a draw, but Lemer was trying to find some additional chances.

1... <u>☆c5 2. ☆c2 ≅a3!</u> (The last trap) 3. **☆d2?**.

White was either too tired or over relaxed...? The only way to draw was 3.\text{\text{\text{d}}}2 \text{ After 3...\text{\text{\text{g}}}3 4.\text{\text{\text{\text{d}}}2 \text{\text{\text{d}}}5 5.\text{\text{\text{\text{d}}}2 \text{\text{\text{Ba}}} \text{(or 5.\text{\text{\text{d}}}25 6.\text{\text{\text{d}}}2 \text{\text{\text{T}}}27 \text{\text{\text{d}}}27 \text{\text{\text{d}}}27 \text{\text{\text{d}}}27 \text{\text{\text{d}}}27 \text{\text{\text{d}}}27 \text{\text{\text{d}}}27 \text{\text{\text{d}}}27 \text{\text{\text{d}}}27 \text{\text{\text{d}}}27 \text{\text{d}}27 \text{\text{\text{d}}}27 \text{\text{\text{d}}}27 \text{\text{d}}27 \text{\text{\text{d}}}27 \text{\text{\text{d}}}27 \text{\text{\text{d}}}27 \text{\text{\text{d}}}27 \text{\text{\text{d}}}27 \text{\text{\text{d}}}27 \text{\text{\text{d}}}27 \text{\text{d}}27 \text{\text{\text{d}}}27 \text{\text{\text{d}}}27 \text{\text{\text{d}}}27 \text{\text{\text{d}}}27 \text{\text{\text{d}}}27 \text{\text{\text{d}}}27 \text{\text{\text{d}}}27 \text{\text{d}}27 \t

3...h2 4. \(\delta\)e2 \(\exists a1\). White resigned.

№15
Zuckertort – Steinitz
London 1872



2... ⊈e4 3. ⊈g5?? "When you

have to die – do it quickly...". This must have been a "friendly" game. There were fourteen more years left, to their first match for the World Title.

3... #e5+. White resigned.

In the "Encyclopedia of Chess Endgames" this endgame was annotated by IM N. Minev. He puts a question mark to the move 2.Ba5+ giving the following lines: 3.Ba1 (instead of 3.\dag{5}?) 3..Be5+4.\dag{4}.a5.\dag{5}.\dag{3}(3.Be1+\dag{4}.\dag{6}.be1+\dag{6}.\dag{4}.be1+\dag{6}.\dag{6}.de1+\dag{6}.\dag{6}.de1+\dag{6}.\dag{6}.de1+\dag{6}.\dag{6}.de1+\dag{6}.\dag{6}.de1+\dag{6}.\dag{6}.de1+\dag{6}.\dag{6}.de1+\dag{6}.\dag{6}.de1+\dag{6}.\dag{6}.de1+\dag{6}.\dag{6}.de1+\dag{6}.\dag{6}.de1+\dag{6}.\dag{6}.de1+\dag{6}.\dag{6}.de1+\dag{6}.\dag{6}.de1+\dag{6}.\dag{6}.de1+\dag

All this is understandable. But why should White make the suicidal move 3.8a1?, which enables the black pawn to make the all-important step forward (3.8e5+ and 4..a5)? Why not the natural move 3.2g4, after which it is not easy to see how Black can win, if at all? For example 3.2g4 8g6+ 4.2h5, or 3...2b6 4.8a1, or 3...2d4 4.8a1 2c3 5.2f5 8b6 6.2e4 2b2 7.8a5 with a draw just like in the line with 2.8a1.

#### №16 Ksieski – Adamski Championship of Poland. 1979



1.8g8! This is a prophylactic measure against the rook checks "from behind". White wouldn't achieve anything with 1.8a7? 8e1 2.h6 8g1+ 3.⊈h7 ⊈h6 4.8g7 8h1.

1...當f5. The only chance. 1...當e7 was hopeless after 2.h6 當e1 3.h7 當g1+ 4.當f5 and Black lacks a vital tempo for the

successful attack "from behind".

2.h6?? White turned out to be very naive. 2.Be8+! was winning. White was probably afraid that the king and pawn endgame was a draw after 2.bc/7 3.bf? 0.bc8 4.0c6. White should not exchange the rooks. the Black king is cut away from the pawn by three files and White wins building a "shelter" with 3.Be4 Bff 1.4.5 Bg1+ 5.bfs Bhr1+ 6.Bh 1.

- 2... #f6+ Now the draw is unavoidable.
- 3.常g7. Black would have some more difficulties in the line: 3.常g5 Bf5+ 4.常g4 Bf7 (4...Bf1? 5.h7) 5.Bg6+ 常e5! (after 5...Bf6 6.常g5 or 5...\$\text{care} 6.Ba6 Bf1 7.h7 and White wins.) 6 Ba6 Bf1 with a draw

#### №17 Tzvetkov – Karaklaic Match Sofia – Belgrade, 1956



Black missed the moment to change the method of defence in this example. He had to switch from attacking "from behind" into attacking from the side.

1. 全g6. After 1.當f6 堂e5 2.簋a6 堂f5 it is impossible to improve the position.

**1...≅g1+ 2.☆f6!?** White is setting up a trap. It was useless to play 2.☆h7 ☆e5 3.h6 ☆e6

4.直g7 直h1.

2...眉f1+. Presently Black did not fall in — 2...直h1? 3.直e7+

2...當f1+. Presently Black did not fall in - 2... 自h1? 3.皇e7+ 曾任 4.皇e5 and White wins.

3.2 de Eth1?. Now, the game is over. Black had to place his rook for checks along the rank: 3...£a1! 4.£6 (or 4.£12 £a5 5.£h2 £a6+ with a draw) 4...£a5 5.h5 £a7 6.£g6 2H7.2.246 £a5+ 8.2g7 £a7+ 9.24h8 2H5 and the white king fails to run away from the comer.

4.8f5 8a1 5.2f6 8a8 6.8e5+ 2f4 7.h6 8h8 8.8h5 8a8 9.h7. Black resigned.

The events in the next two examples are characterized by the wrong application of the method of attack from "in front", instead of attacking "from behind".

#### Ne 18

#### E. Vladimirov - Rashkovsky Cheliabinsk 1975



This endgame arose after Vladimirrov defended perfectly a complicated rook endgame with a lot of pawns for more than thirty moves. He was not destined however to reap the fruits of his hard labour.

### 1...≦e3 2.⊈d2 ≦e7 3.≦c3?

White had to play 3.皇g8+ 堂f5 4.皇f8+ 堂g4 5.皇g8+ 堂h3 6.皇g5!

with the idea to obtain this position: White -  $\underline{\underline{}}$ d2,  $\underline{\underline{}}$ g8; Black -  $\underline{\underline{}}$ dh2,  $\underline{\underline{}}$ e7, p. p.h3. In this familiar theoretical position the draw is inevitable, since the white king is cut off by three files, which is insufficient to win (four are necessary).

# 3...h4.



4.Ee3? The decisive mistake. White could have still drawn with: 4.Ee6+ 255.Ee8! Bh7 6.Eg8+. White misjudged the position and instead of attacking "from behind", he decided to attack from "in front".

4.ERJ 5.Eg4. The white

king fails to perform his task in the line 5.월h3 월g5 6.월e2 월g4 7.월h1 h3 and later just as in

the game.

5...h3 6.Bh1 \$\delta g5 7.\$\delta 8.\$\delta f8.\$\delta g1 + \delta h4 9.\$\delta h1,

Black plays 9...\$\delta 7 followed by \$\delta a2, h2, \delta h3.

8...超7+ 9.空旬 Ba7. Now, White could have set the last trap: 10.围户 含g37 11.蜀②+1 (remember the game Uhlman — Gulko). Vladimirov resigned, quite reasonably, because he supposed that his opponent will force him in zugzwang with 10...萬a1+ 11.並位 動力.

# №19 Dvoiris – Kovalev Simferopol 1988



idea to go into the already familiar, after the previous example, position: White — 曾a7, 題d2, p.p.a6; Black — 曾e7, 題b1.

The game Dvoiris – Kovalev was annotated by IM I. Glek in the informative book "Chess in USSR", January – March 1989. He puts a question mark to the move 1...Be4, considering it to be the decisive mistake. It is soon going to become clear to you that the commentator has been misled.

2.a4 \$\textit{\$e}\$ 7 3.\$\textit{\$d}\$ 2. Glek puts a mark now "White has a decisive advantage". In fact the position is a draw!

3... **2e6?** 3... **2e**3+ is simpler – 4. **2**b4 **2e**4+ 5. **2**b5 **2e**1.



4...8d6?? This is like a reflection in the mirror of the game Vladimirov – Rashkovsky with quite the same mistake.
4...8e3+ 5.2b4 8e1 6.a6 8a1
7.2b5 8b1+ was still drawing.
We must mention that 4...8d6
was sealed.

5.Ea2! Ea6 6.₾b4 ₾d7 7.₾b5 Ea8 8.a6 ₾c7 9.Ec2+

්ත්7. As for 9... එහි8 10.ඕh2 – look at the previous example. 10.ඔh2 විහි8+ 11.එa5 විහි1 11...ඕa8 12.ඕh7+ followed by a7 and එa6.

12.a7 Ba1+ 13.gb6 Bb1+ 14.gc5 Bc1+ 15.gb4 Bc8 15...Ba1 Bh8!; 15...Bb1+ 16.ga3 Ba1+ 17.Ba2.

16.윤d2+ and Black resigned because of the line: 16...얼e7 17.효a2 효a8 18.업b5 업d7 19.업b6.

#### №20 Chiburdanidze – Levitina, Volgograd 1984



We need to tell you something here. This game was played in a World Championship Match and was adjourned in a complicated endgame with an advantage for Black. Our analysis reached the diagrammed position. One of the authors of this article was

coaching I. Levitina in this match in Volgograd and showed the draw. The only way to reach it for White was to play 1.8b8!

# Now we have the following variations:

- 1... ឨe3 2. 업f4 ឨe7 3. ឨb3 업c5 4. ឨe3! ឨa7 5. 업e4 업c4 6. ឨa3 a5 7. 업e3 업b4 8. ឨa1 업b3 9. 업d2 a4 10. ឨb1+!
- 1... 位c5 2.章c8+ 位b4 3.章b8+ 位a4 4.位f4 a5 5.位e4 章b3 6.章a8 位b4 7.位d4 a4 8.章b8+ 位a3 9.章a8.

We failed to improve Black's play at the end of our analysis of variations which lasted for 19 moves and led to positions from the endgame "rook and pawn against rook", after the adjourned position. We had to wait whether the coaching brigade of the World Champion would find the move 1.8b8! or not.

M. Chiburdanidze played very quickly the rook endgame at the adjournment, but our fears tumed out to be unfounded when in the diagrammed position she played -1.Eb1?

Now, in comparison with the line 1.重b8! 堂c7 2.重b1 a5 — White fails to draw, because of the lack of a single tempo.

1...a5 2.⊈f4 a4 3.⊈e4 ⊈c5 4.£b8 a3 5.£a8 ⊈c4 6.£a7 ⊈b3 7.£a8 £b3 8.£b8+ ⊈c2. White resigned.

Evidently the World Champion and her coaches considered the endgame to be hopeless and failed to grasp the fine points. The same mistake was repeated by all the commentators of this game, which considered While's loss in this rook endgame regular. For example master N. Popov wrote: "The white king is cut off on the third rank and fails to take part in the action." ("Shakhmati in USSR" N 12, 1984.) Master Y. Kotkov imitates him with: "This rook endgame is theoretically won for Black" and a little further "...unfortunately,

the white king has to remain a mute witness" ("64" Nº 21, 1984). They do not submit any variations. Only recently in the book "People and Chess" by V. Zak and Y. Dlugolensky, the author pointed out that the move 1.8b8! was evidently leading to a draw, but they did not support their thesis with any concrete lines.

#### Nº 21



8.a6. If 2... \$\mathbb{B}\$b3 White gradually goes with the king to a8, pushes the pawn to a7 – winning...".

The critical position. 5...\$a4 loses now after 6.\$\text{\pmc}\$c5 \$\text{\pmc}\$67.\$\text{\pmc}\$b5 \$\text{\pmc}\$a8 8.a4 \$\text{\pmc}\$c7 9.\$\text{\pmc}\$c6 \$\text{\pmc}\$a6+ 10.\$\text{\pmc}\$b7 \$\text{\pmc}\$a5 11.\$\text{\pmc}\$b6 \$\text{\pmc}\$a8 12.a5 \$\text{\pmc}\$d7 13.\$\text{\pmc}\$b7.

The black king manages to reach the corner after 5... 當6, although this may seem unbelievable. If 6.a4 當67.7.a5 當67. and if 6.當5 當67.255 图68.a4 當67.9.是62 图68 and Black plays next 图68 and draws easily.

So, the position on the last diagram is evidently a draw. It is time to make some conclusions.

You have to pay attention to the fact that even chess players with an extra-class tend to make mistakes in endgames of this type. Why? We think that the reasons are:

i) In positions like this a lot of exact knowledge is necessary. Nowadays most of the people work on the studying of the opening and the middle-game, which are closely connected and only a few players take endgame books in their hands. Plenty of exact positions are completely unfamiliar even to grandmasters. We often meet the following situation: the chess player knows some theoretical position, but after a long lasting fight, he gets tired and fails to connect his abstract knowledge with the position on the board.

In most of our examples the insufficient knowledge caused the abundance of mistakes and the most characteristic examples were the endgames: Pekker – Ermolinsky, Uhlman – Gulko, Timoshchenko – Haritonov, Vladimirov – Rashkovsky and Dvoiris – Kovalev.

II) The chess players often by to replace the exact knowledge and some typical endgame methods with the calculation of variations. Usually after 6 hours of playing (and not only then) this ends in a failure. A lot of grandmasters tend to make mistakes in their calculations, even such players who are considered to be excellent "calculators" (Sax – Tzeshkovsky, Huebner – Timman, Uhlman – Gullko etc.).

III) People often make a mess of the right method of defence and instead of the right one, they use the wrong one. The phenomenon is well illustrated by the examples: Tolush Bondarevsky, Tzvetkov – Karaklaic, Vladimirov – Rashkovskv. Dvoiris – Kovalev and example 1/21.

IV) The stronger side also makes mistakes in the method of playing to win. For example the cutting off along the rank of the opponent's king, instead of along the file, resulted in the loss of half a point in the game Timoshchenko – Haritonov.

V) Finally we have to remind you once again about something. Whenever, the board is left with only a few pieces on it, that means that a lot of fight has preceded this situation. Consequently, the probability of eventual mistakes increases considerably. Almost all of our examples confirmed this observation. The most illustrative examples were after all: Uhlman – Gulko, Vizhmanavin – Lerner and Zuckertort – Steinitz.

The reader possibly noticed the phrase at the beginning of the chapter: "To be able to learn to play the endgame well you have to try to play endgames as often as possible". The chess player should try indeed to reach endgames very often to be able to master them well, since only studying would hardly help. In order to achieve this you must sometimes go into a conflict with your own fantasy and temper. I am not trying to "dry" your style. If your game start to show an excess of a too rational approach, the coach should be able to notice this and help the pupil to preserve the active style of playing. My experience as a coach shows that the patient work on the compromizing of the enemy position and the process of acquiring small advantages in the endgame, seems to the young player a little bit dull and boring and the problem for the coach is to develop in the young player a certain interest and taste for it. Most often you find uninteresting things that you don't understand, while true beauty is approachable only to the expert, while it usually causes only amazement and frustration to the layman. To illustrate this, I will give you an example from the book "Endgame Strategy". I like this example very much but I will supply thorough explanations. since without them you will hardly be able to grasp the inner beauty of this wonderful endgame.

#### Larsen – Marianovic Bled – Portorozh, 1979



The position on the diagram looks like an easy draw. The Danish grandmaster won convincingly because he applied craftily the principle "Do not hurry". 1.2e3 Bbb7?! Larsen annotated this game in the "Chess Informant" № 27 and wrote that the right move was 1...8b5! Marianovic evidently

thought that he was going to draw the way he pleased, so he didn't think profoundly about the fine points of this position. Indeed, it looks like Black is not threatened with anything. Had the Yugoslav grandmaster tried to anticipate his opponents plan to win, he might have been able to manage to prevent it.

2.844 8e77 Black's first move was not the best, although acceptable, but the second move is a clear mistake. To get some chances to win White should try at first to weaken the enemy position. The pawns on f7 and h7 are unapproachable. There remains the "g6" square. Black's pawn there is protected twice and if White wants to attack it he should provoke first the movement of the "T or the "h" pawn. Black could have prevented White's idea with the move 2... Bb.)

3.Eh4! h6 4.£f3. Now we know what White is after. Larsen intends to push the "h" pawn to h5 and attack the king-side of the opponent. White's advantage, as before, is so minute that it can lead to success, only if Black helps somehow, or does not resist at all. Therefore Larsen disguises his plan and starts to camouflage the moves that are part of his plan in a mass of seemindly innocuous and senseless actions.

4...B01+ 5.½g2 Bb2 6.⊙c4 Bbe2 7..⊙cd2 Bd7 8.⊙b3 £de7 9.Ba4 Bb2 10.⊙bd2 Beb7 11.h3! This pawn intends to go to 15, but White avoids to push it twice not 1c frighten the opponent". 11...B204 12.Ba5 B7b5 13.Ba3 Bd5 14.Ba7. I am seriously appealing to the reader not to fall asteep, because that was exactly what the Danish grandmaster was after – to set Marianovitch napoina.

14...Bdb5 15.h4 Bb7 16.Ba6 B7b6 17.Ba3 B6b5 18.Bd3 ජාත



19.0011 Larsen evidently decided that the period of stuffing the opponent has been finished successfully and it was time for action. Marianovic was probably bored with the evidently senseless White's manoeuvres and he missed to feel the important change in the course of actions, continuing to

move carelessly with his rook all over the board, while the white knight begins to approach the critical "h5" square.

19... ⊈g7 20. ᡚe2 Ba5 21. ᡚf4 Bba4 22. ᡚb3 Ba7.



23.8d5. Larsen seems to feel perfectly the disposition and psychology of his opponents. He decides to postpone the move with the "h" pawn and realized it in the most favourable moment. At the same time, Black could have played 23...h5l himself and the horough preparation of White

would have been in vain. Larsen would have to start to look for some opportunities to try to win with the advance of the "pawn. In fact, White had to play 23.h51 although it wouldn't be easy at all after 23... $\mathbb{B}a3$  threatening to exchange the rooks with 24... $\mathbb{B}b7$ . The best line for White would be 24.hg fg (24... $\mathbb{B}b7$  25. $\mathbb{A}c5$   $\mathbb{B}d3$  26. $\mathbb{A}c5$   $\mathbb{A}d3$ ) 25. $\mathbb{A}c6$  and 26. $\mathbb{A}c5$   $\mathbb{A}c5$  be6+ and 26. $\mathbb{A}c5$   $\mathbb{A}c5$  bewinners should be admired and not criticized, though.

23...84a67 The decisive mistake. As I mentioned before, Black had to play 23...h5. 24.h5f Black is lost now. White has a strong attack on the king-side. 24...£h7 25.0d4 ½g7 26.处b5 £b7. White threatens 27.£d8 followed by €b5 − d6 − e6+. 27. 20d6 £bb67! Now comes the final attack, but even the best 27...£e7 wouldn't have saved Black. Larsen gives the following line 27...£e7 28.处c4 Ēc7 29.处e3 Ēca7 30.Æd8 Ēa8 (№3 − c4 − d6 was the threat) 31.Ēd7 Ē6a7 32.处e6+ ½g3 33.处c7 Ēc8 34.处c64 with a decisive advantage for White. 28.⊘e8+ ½f8 29.处c71 Ēa7 30.Æd8+ ½f7 31.Ēg81 Ēc6 32.处c65+ ½f6 33.kf fg 34.处c4 Ēb6 35.处fd5 Ēbb7 36.Ēg6+ ½c5 37.Ē:f6 Ēf7 38.Ēc6+ ½b5 39.Ēc2 Ēad7 40.g4 Black resigned.

If you apply well the principle "Do not hurry" you can not only disguise your plan, but change the course of the game favourably in the most suitable moment. To illustrate this we are going to see the game of my pupil Andrey Kovalev, who recently fulfilled all the necessary conditions to be awarded the titlle of International Grandmaster.

#### Kovalev – Vaiser Paris 1991

1.e4 e6 2.d4 d5 3. $\odot$ c3  $\odot$ lf6 4. $\Delta$ g5  $\Delta$ b4 5.e5 h6 6. $\Delta$ d2  $\Delta$ c3 7.bc  $\odot$ le4 8. $\Xi$ g4 g6 9. $\Delta$ d3  $\odot$ ld2 10. $\Xi$ d2 c5 11.h4  $\odot$ c6 12. $\Xi$ f4  $\Delta$ d7 13. $\odot$ l3  $\Xi$ b7 14.h5 g5 15. $\Xi$ f6  $\Xi$ f6 f16 f6 f6 4 17. $\Delta$ f1  $\odot$ 0-0. The opponents played the MacKetchon

variation of the French defence. White chose the most precise order of moves connected with 11.h4 12.\( \frac{m}{2}\) 14. The strategical idea for White in this line comprises in the manoeuvre dc followed by \( \frac{N}{2}\) 17 - 13 - d4 - b5 and \( \frac{m}{2}\) 14 next. White should force the enemy knight to c6 to be able to succeed with his plan. With 11.h4 White created the threat 12.h5 g5 13.44 and Black responded to this logically with some pressure in the centre playing 11.\( \frac{m}{2}\) 26.6 to 0.0-0 deserved attention. The next moves of the opponents are a logical consequence of the previous ones and the game soon went into an endgame favourable for White.



18.8e1 №c7 19.Фe5. White exchanges the active knight of the opponent and gains time to prepare a king-side breakthrough at ease. I will not agree with this decision without any criticism and the same applies to the move 14.h5. Black has been deprived from space and his job to place his

pieces favourably will be easier after the exchange of every piece. White could try to bring the knight on g4, although he would have to consider the counterplay b7 – b5 – b4 then.

19... ês 20.8:e5 55 21.4e2 & de 2.2g4?! Kovalev did not have to hurry with this move. The possibilities of White to make a breakthrough on a very narrow sector of the board, connected with 12 – 14 are smaller now. The attack of the g5 pawn becomes possible only by the rook from the "e5" square on the fifth rank.

22... £b8 23.a3 a5 24.£b1 .£c6 25. \$e3.

# 



Vaiser chooses the wrong line of defence. Black is playing for a draw, so he didn't have to open the position voluntarily. Moreover, Black could have blocked the position on the queen-side with 25...a4, although there was not any particular necessity to play this

move, because for White to play a3 – a4 would be to play not to win, but to lose. Instead of 26...gf Black had to play 62...Bp81 How can White improve his position now? The exchange 27.fg hg brings him nothing, because of 28...Bn6. If White plays 27.Bn1 with the idea to push forward the "hawn, after the exchange on "g5" Black is going to answer with 27...Bn7 and once again 28.fg hg 29.h6 does not promise anything after 29...Bg6. Because of that White will have to try 44 – 15, for example 26...Bbg8 27.Bn1 Bn7 28.f5 a4 29.B11 Bd8 30.fe & eand White has no real threats on the king-side, even if we suppose that he can manage to put his rooks on e5 and f5 and the bishon on o2.

27. ½:14 ...66 28. ½:93 ...407 29. ½:h4 ...6.6. White can rely to be successful only after the breakthrough g4 – g5. Black will have two lines for defence then: to build a sound defence on the king-side, or try a counter- attack with 55 – b4. If White tries the direct approach with 30., g5, after 30...hg+ 31.12.g5 3li6 32.811 Bbh8 33.897 ...488 Black is defending safely. White can try instead of 32.811, 32.Bbg1 8.:16 33.898 8.:98, but after 34....b41? 35.ab ab 36.cb ...44 the position seems to me rather unclear. If White plays 30.811 beforehand, Black can start a counter-attack with 30...b4 31.ab ab 32.cb 8.:04 and 33...c3 next. Therefore Kovalev begins some bishop manoeuvres to be able to find the most favourable situation to

try one of the plans for an active play. This tactics is rather unpleasant for Black. Vaiser should watch carefully about his every move.

30.£f3! £d7 31.£d1 £c6 32.£e2 £d7?! Black continues to move with his bishop naively, without suspecting anything and helps his opponent. 32.£h7 was preferable. 33.£f1! b4. When the black bishop is on d7 this breakthrough is not so effective anymore. Maybe Black had better play 33..£bf8, to be able to meet 34.5f by 45.8£g5 £h6 37.£g7 with the retreat 36...£e8. 34.ab ab 35.cb £:b4 36.£a1! Now, the idea of the manoeuvre with the white bishop becomes clear – 36...26 will be answered with 37.£a6+ and 38.£a6 next. 36...£c6 37.£a6 38g6 38.£a7 £b7 39.£e5. White managed to open a second front. Black's task is very hard now. 39...£b1 40.£f3 £c6?! It would have been better to retreat with the rook to h8, but Black was in a time-trouble.

41.g5 £f1 42.£a3 ≌d6 43.£g4 hg+ 44.£:g5 £h8.



It looks like Black had been frightened, but far from beaten. The white pawn on f6 is hanging, and the passed pawn on h5 is presently blocked. White's next move, however, clarifies the picture.

45.≘f3! Tactics! Now, in case of 45..≘f3 46.Δ:f3 ≘h6 White wins with the beautiful stroke

48.de+ ±:e5 49.£17 d4 50.£27+ ±:d6 51.£e6+ ±:c7 52.£g3 d3 53.cd c3 54.d4 c2 55.£c3 £:h5+ 56.±g41 A picturesque position. The game is practically over and there only followed: 56..£5:h3 57.£e:c6+ ±:d7 58.£7+ ±:c6 59.£76+ ±:d7 50.£:h3 c1± 61.£:c1 £:c1 62.£75. Black resigned.

My advice: "Try to perfect your endgame technique from the beginning of your chess studies" is not so easy to follow. My practice as a coach shows that the chess player learns some opening schemes and then puts lots of efforts in the process of the transition between the opening and the middle game and doesn't even think about the endgame. He doesn't have to be forced, though, After some time, in an year or two. his results will improve and he will have a good understanding of the problems of the opening and the middle game. It will be much more difficult to evaluate his progress in the endgame, because the number of his games in which the endgame turned out to be decisive would still be relatively low. At the same time, after his studying of the classics, his chess culture will enlarge substantially and he will acquire an individual style of playing. He will form the habit to obtain a well known scheme and, to follow familiar naths. This wish is sensible and easily understandable. The point is that with his improvement the class of his opponents will become higher as well and his familiar paths will become rather narrow. All these processes appear at the level of the practical strength of International Master. At that particular moment he will reach a dead end in some opening lines, which will lead him to some early draws in completely equal positions, so his improvement is likely to stagnate. In this case he should better play in several tournaments in a row, which are not so important as qualifications, results etc. In these tournaments he should try to accentuate not so much on the opening stage, but on the endgame. He should be striving for endgames and form the

habit to play for a win in the endgame until "bare kings" are left on the board.

To illustrate what I have been talking about, it is easy for me to show you some examples from my own games.

# Shereshevsky – Zelkind Minsk 1978

1.d € 26 2.€13 g6 3.£14 £g7 4.63 d6 5.€0.3. The White player has always a great choice how to start the game. To play €0.5 in front of the "c" pawn can be easily criticized or justified, but that is not the point. The idea of this strange move is to lead the game into unfamiliar paths and afterwards, in the middle game to fight for initiative. 5...0-6.£0.4. The same tactics as before. White intends after 6...c5 to play 7.dc dc 8.½1.d8 £1.d8 9.€0.5 e6 10.£0.62 and 11.£13 next.

6...6 7.a4 ±66 8.±d2 Δf5. The "b2" pawn is poisoned. If 8... ±b2? 9.8b1 ±a3 10.00 the black queen will be trapped. The development of the black bishop to 15 has its drawbacks, but is still acceptable. Presently, White can not use the lack of harmony in Black's development (Δf5 and pawn on g6). Still 8...a5 seemed to be safer.

9. 0-0  $\triangle$ bd7. 9...世:b2? is impossible as before due to  $10.\Delta$ b3.



The opening is over. The position is about equal.

10. ♠h4. White tries to do something to disrupt the calm development of the game. 10.a5 deserves attention. 10...♠e6 11...♠e2. The exchange on e6 was not so favourable for White. Now,

12.e4 is the threat. 11... 2\d5 12.2\:2.d5 cd 13.a5 \(\frac{\psi}{2}\)c7 14.2\(\hat{G}\)3. Finally, there is no more pawn symmetry, so White has some initiative.

**14...h6** White threatened 15.€295. **15.£fc1** £fc8 **16.a6!** This move is supposed to be the fundament of the future win.

16...ba 17.4:a6 Ecb8 18.b3 2/6 19.8:a5! Bb6 20.8317 20.h3 would have been consequent in the spirit of the previous moves. I didn't see any necessity to care about the dark square bishop – the only white piece of small importance. Moreover, the exchange of the bishop for the good knight of the opponent is favourable for White, so I decided to provoke it. If 20.h3 2e4 comes, with an eventual pawn advance of the black pawns on the king-side.

20... 2... 2... 
2... 
2... 
2... 
2... 
2... 
2... 
2... 
4... 
would have been much more sensible.

21.4g3 f5 22.8ca1 g5?! This activity is absolutely illusory. It seems to Black, he is seizing the initiative, while the text move leads to a rather unpleasant endgame. 22...4f7 was sensible, retreating with the bishop against 23.½:b6 ab? 24.4c8 and preparing e7 − e5. White should probably play 23.4e2, which can be met with 23...½c6 with an interesting position. Now Black is getting worse.



25... £: g3? Until now, Black more or less managed to solve his problems successfully, but now he makes a grave positional blunder in the solution of the problem of the problem of the problem of the with this mistake was occasional. Black had to solve throughout the whole game rather

non-typical tasks and the contours of the King's Indian defence were rather non-applicable to rely on. Secondly, the image of the dark square bishop (fellow Indians – forgive me) happens to be holy for the majority of the King's Indian players. Besides Black was in a time-trouble then.

28...##8 29.04 f4? Zelkind is getting more and more necrous with the development of the events in the game. White's threat to push the pawn to b5 and double the rooks on the "a" file was unpleasant, but Black could have defended successfully. 29...#Bb8 30.b5 &d7 was a must with chances for a stubborn resistance.

30.gf gf 31.ef \( \Delta\)g7 32.\( \textit{E}\)e1 \( \Delta\)f5 33.g31.\( \) After this strong move, it becomes clear that Black's tactical operation has failed completely. Now, the game enters the stage of White's realization of his extra pawn.

33...4:h3 34.E:d5 Eb8 35.b5 £c8 36.£f2 £b7 37.Eh5 Ef8 38.Ee2 £c8 39.f5 £b7 40.£e3 £c8 41.£d2 £b7 42.Ee3 £f6 43.E:h6 £:f3 44.Eg6+ £f7 45.Ef3 £:c4 46.£e4. Black is suffering in this endgame not so much due to the small White's material advantage, but much more because White has a great positional advantage – with rooks and bishops of opnosite colours.

46...£h8 47.£d5+ £f8 48.c4 £g7 49.£a31 £d4. 50.b6 was the threat. 50.£d3 £b6 51.£a1 £c5 52.£a1 £d8 53.£e4. The white rook is going to g4 with a mating attack. Black resigned.

# Shereshevsky – Sarbai Minsk 1978

1.d4 

for a d5 3.e3. I have already told you that achieving an opening advantage was far from White's mind.



Black played the opening very well and has the better position. He had to play simply 9..ab 10.4.:b5 e4 11.6e1 62e7 with a strong pressure on the king-side with excellent chances to punish the opponent for his treatment of the opening. Instead of this Black started some tactical operations, which

still gave him a good position, but the White's task was simplified.

17.**允:04 A:04** Black wouldn't have anything substantial after 17... 0.63. This move would lead to an approximate equality after 18.曾公 0.15 19.ab A:03 20.9f, but Black was evidently trying to achieve much more than that.

18.≝:d4 Af3 19.gf ≝g5+ 20.≦ff ②f6. It would be more logical to retreat with the knight to d6, but Black avoids the exchange of the minor pieces, having still the idea to play for

a big advantage. I didn't intend at all to play for a draw in this game, because I thought, the necessity to play defensively sometimes was part of the objective reality and comprised one more way to play for a win.

21.Ad3. It was time to show some of the trump-cards. Black's pawn on b7 is weak and White intends to attack it on the "b" file. Objectively the position is still equal, but White has now the psychological initiative. I had one and a half hour for the last twenty moves, while my opponent had only twenty five minutes.



White's position is a little better now, but still after a proper defence by Black the game must end in a draw. I intended to fight however until "bare kings" were left.

25...£a5 26.£b4 £a8 27.g5. It would be useful to create some prerequisites for an active play on the king-side.

27... 2e4 28.h4 2c3 29.4d7 b5 30.8a3 8:a4. Black had better take this pawn with the knight, but his intention to simplify the position in the time-trouble was reasonable and understandable.

playing by my opponent?". I failed to find an answer, but Sarbai managed to.

35. 2e2 d4? All kinds of actions can be good as well as bad. The drawbacks of the last move were evident and that showed that Black's spirit was rather low at that time, due to the time-trouble.

36.4 Bb87 This was another impulsive decision, which led Black to grave difficulties now. Black had played 35...d4 and now had to continue with 36...d3 → 37.2d2 2d4. White has the choice between 38.2d3 2c6 39.2a3 with a better rookendgame, but still drawish and 38.2d4!? 2f3+39.2d1 while now Black has no choice anymore.

37.4c4 Bb2+ 38.6f3 Ec2 39.4:e6l fe 40.8d7 Ec3+
41.6g4 Ec4 42.13 Ba4. This rook-endgame is very difficult for Black now. The pawn on "e6" is weak and does not allow Black to go into an endgame with four white pawns against three black on the king-side. Anyway, Black had to try even on the previous move to adjourn the game and try to save it with some active counterplay. Instead of this, my opponent continues to play defensively, allowing me to improve my position.

43.hSt gh 44.5:hS 5B4 45.g6t Now, I felt that my position was winning and asked for an envelope. The sealed move by White leaves Black with no chances to save the game. 45...hg+ 46.5:g6 5B8 47.5:d4 e5 48.5d7 588 48.8g7+ 578 50.5f8 5B8 51.8a7 586 52.8a5 5g8 53.8e5 586 54.5e6 51.6a7 586 52.8a5 5g8 53.8e5 586 54.5e6 51.6a7 586 51.8a7 586 52.8a5 5g8 53.8e5 586 54.5e6 51.6a7 58.5e6 51.6a7 58.5e6 51.6a7 58.5e6 51.6a7 58.5e6 51.6a7 58.5e6 51.6a7 58.5e6 51.6a7 58.5e7 58.6a5 58.2g1 51.6a7 58.5e6 51.6a7 50.5c7 58.6a5 58.2g1 51.6a7 58.5e6 51.6a7 50.5c7 58.6a5 58.5e7 51.6a7 51.6a8 58.8g1 51.6a7 58.5e7 51.6a7 51.6a7

## Shereshevsky – Kagan Minsk 1978

1.d4 e6 2.c4 b6 3.�c3 ـ \$\Delta \text{c3} \text{ Ab7 4.a3.}\$ This put an end to the theoretical dispute. White decides to avoid the principled move 4.e4 and prefers some calm development.

4...f5 5.d5 Øf6.



White can force now the exchange of the queens with 6.de de 7.2°:d8+ 2°:d8, but Black develops his pieces easily with 8... \$\textit{\textit{\Delta}} 6 and 9... \$\textit{\Delta} e 7\$ with a good play.

attention with the idea to reach the aforementioned disposition of pieces, since the cavalry attack with  $9.\Omega g5$  was fruitless.

9.44 2c6 10.h3 h6? Black is losing time with this strange move.

11.63 0-0 12\_be2 Be8 13 0-0-0. Black's position is not comfortable at all. His main problem is the tack of coordination between the pieces of the different sides, due to the misplaced bishop on d8 and the weakness of the central "e5" souare.

13...e5?! After this move Black's central position becomes even more vulnerable. Black had better play defensively with: a6, \$c8. and \$e7 trying to neutralize the initiative of the opponent gradually.

14.4h2 g5? This is a force activity with the idea as if to frighten the opponent.

15.b4! f4 16.Bhe1 Bc8?! Now, this move is not sensible at all. Black's position was very difficult answay.

17.ef ef 18.g3 fg 19. 4:g3 a5.



20.b5! I made this move after a long hesitation. I saw that 20.c5!? leads to a very strong attack, for example 20...ab 21.ab ∮\:b4 22.4c4+ daf8 (22...\$2a7 23.E:e8 8a: (4) 24.貸d7+) 23 章:e8+ \$:68 24.50d4 with plenty οf dangerous threats. I decided that the position on the diagram

was so good for me that there was no sense in sacrificing anything to give additional chances to the opponent. Well, of course, a lot depends on the temper of the player and his aesthetical feelings, but if we remember Capablanca's definition that the most beautiful win is the simplest, 20.55 was to be preferred than 20.c5. The game didn't last very long.

20... ②b8 21. ②e5 Ae7 22. ②b2 Ecd8 23. ②g4! This move is decisive. Black can not protect his numerous weaknesses.

23...E:d1 24.E:d1 @:g4 25.A:g4 c6 26.Af3 Af6 27.Ed6 27.28.bc A:c6 29.A:c6. Black resigned.

In the games we have just seen, White didn't try to achieve any opening advantage at all, or made just mild tries. The theoretical books do not deal with openings like that, because they are not too logical, but as I mentioned – my idea was to avoid theoretical disputes and fight in the middle game and the endgame. Of course, this approach should not be recommended, because you should not rely to outplay in this way a strong opponent, without giving him serious opening problems to solve. Still, in this way the chess player begins to

understand the chess game much better and when he starts to play in the normal contemporary way, he will be much more self-conscious with capabilities for a new approach to the majority of the problems of the opening and the middle game.

# How to Analyse and Comment Your Own Games

I think that to be able to analyse and objectively comment your games is a very important condition for work in the methods of improvement we are discussing. This enables the young player to show his personal characteristics better, acquire an individual style and master creatively the elements of the chess culture. In fact, the main drawback of this methods is that the chess player who works following it has only just a little left to reach in his chess understanding, using his own brain. His opening repertoire has been prepared for him, the program of the studying of the classics is ready too, the work upon the endgame technique has been done and thoroughly at that. Maybe only the technique of the calculation of the variations hasn't been dealt with extensively enough. The only aspect which is not present up to now is how to analyse independently.

Now, there comes a moment in which someone might object: "What kind of method is that, in which the chess player should follow only instructions, he is not going to learn to think with his head etc.?" I would like to give the answer to this question.

The talented Soviet writer Varlam Shalamov was severely repressed, quite unfairly and unlawfully at his time, and had to spend seventeen years in labour camps. He wrote his "Kolyma Stories" as if with his blood. He wrote a nice essay

"About Prose" and here is a part of it." There is a concept that the writer should not be too familiar with the material he is writing about. The writer should be able to use the language of the readers, his works are aimed at the reader, in whose name he has decided to investigate the material. This same concept states that his understanding of the problems should not go too far astray from the moral code of his readers.

So, Orpheus had to descend to hell and Pluto had to ascend to heaven.

According to this concept, if the writer knows too well his subject he is going to defect to the side of the reader. When you change your values, you change your margins. The writer will start to judge real life by new standards, which are going to worry, frustrate and frighten the reader. The author is going to lose the rapport with his readers unavoidingly.

So, the writer should pretend to be something like a tourist, a stranger and he should try to stick to the sprift of the literature, even more than necessary. You have a perfect example of such a type of writer-tourist in Hemingway, no matter – he must have really fought around Madrid. You can fight and lead an active life at the same time, and as a writer remain "inside" of the things, but still be "above" or "on the side".

I remember that Nimzovitch wrote somewhere that he thinks the right way to teach the novice is to teach him about weak squares, blockade and some other sophisticated material, instead of combinations, playing sharp openings, enterprising, anticipating simple maneuverse by the opponent and creation of plans; and I couldn't help but laugh. Nimzovitch, as far as everybody knows, didn't work a single day as a coach, and at his times there was not even an idea about coaches and all. In my discussions with a lot of grandmasters, I happened to hear that the most important thing was to teach the player to be able to think independently

and afterwards everything would be very easy for him. The same idea was shared by the world champion № 2 Em. Lasker, who was a great thinker, and he supposed that it was enough to give the capable player a small course of lessons in the aspect of the method of thinking and then the young player would soon reach the master's level of playing. The trouble is that this idea hasn't found its tactical realization yet. and I haven't seen a grandmaster to work constantly, day after day only with young players, lets say at the level of first degree. Now, a lot of schools have appeared, in which eminent grandmasters are giving lectures to young players, helping them analyse their games and find out their mistakes. This form of work is extremely useful particularly in these cases when the young player gets an advice how to improve constantly. Still, these grandmasters do not accomplish the everyday, persistent, patient job of the coach. Besides, the grandmasters are usually busy and with a small exception all of them remain more or less "inside", but still "above" or "on the side". It would be ridiculous for me to object against the method of teaching the young player to think independently. There will be no chess player without that, I am writing this book as a coach and as a tournament player and I have been preparing a lot of grandmasters and tens of International Masters and Masters of Sports of the USSR in the last fifteen years. The end of all work is the result and I think that to be able to achieve optimal results-the process of teaching the young player to be able to think independently should not be contrary to the process of "liquidating of his illiteracy", but to cooperate with it. The chessplayer who has not mastered the elements of the

The chessplayer who has not mastered the elements of the chess culture can never be free and liberated in his thinking. Now we come to the analyses and comments of your own

games. At the beginning this work is the basic, in fact the only analytical work of the chess players I am coaching. At

first, as a principle, it is not easy at all. The chess player can not divide the essential from the second- rate, he can not understand his mistakes and he can not feel the key moments. of the chess fight. Naturally, you can work together with him and in fact, do all that instead of him. That might be useful, but still his analytical capabilities, which are integrally connected with his being critical, would develop much less intensely. Therefore, I play over games with my pupils, only if they have been annotated by them beforehand. After my long experience in coaching young players. I can affirm that for the young player to annotate his own games on a decent level is the hardest thing for him. The young people, and not only the young though, like to do best what they are best capable of. so I have often seen something like a caricature of commentaries. In cases like this, you have to apply some of the methods of pedagogy on each student separately, but you have to be able to force the student to make satisfactory annotations to his own games. At first the chess player meets with a lot of difficulties in the

At first the chess player meets with a lot of difficulties in the process of evaluation of positions. He seldom comments that the position was better and became equal, or was worse and became lost or vice- versa. How can you give him useful advices in this aspect?

I recommend him to play over the game once again slowly and to try to clarify for himself the important arguable moments. Afterwards, he should start to write comments and in the moment he reaches an unclear position he should leave askife the pen and start analysing.

He should write down the analyses he made and continue further until the next arguable moment. At the same time, he should constantly watch not to miss the moments, in which the evaluation of the position changes. If the position was equal and after some moves it became better for you, you have to try to find the opponent's mistakes with the same eagemess with which you were looking for your own mistakes

During the analyses, it would be useful to make some overall conclusions about your playing and that one of the opponent, avoiding bitterness in your self-criticism.

Remember that you make this comments for yourself and the only one you can deceive is you, therefore do not try to admire your plans and ideas and be frank with yourself. You don't need to include in your comments any verbal pearls like: "This was a cold shower for the aggressor" or something of the sort.

By now, you must have come to the idea that you should better at first comment the games that you lost or drew. It is easy for me to show you some examples of my own practice. All the comments I had made long ago, I left unchanged.

#### Machulsky – Shereshevsky Cheliabinsk 1979

1.e4 e5 2.2/3 2c6 3.d4 I didn't like this move. 3...ed 4.c3. I didn't know this opening. Generally, I am not well prepared against 1.e4 e5 2. something, except the Rui Lopez. 4...2/6f/2. The opponent obviously didn't expect that and maybe the move was not so bad after all. 5.e5 2d5? This is already a mistake. After 5...5e4 6.8/e2 f5! 7.ef d5 8.5/e4 4.9.cd 4.b4+10.4d2 2.d2+11.2/e2-0-12.2/e-4.8ef the position is about equal. 6.cd .4e7? After 6...d6 Black is clearly worse after 7.4b5, but there is a lot of fight left. The text move is evidently a decisive mistake. What follows next is obviously forced, but I hadn't anticipated it before 7.7/b3. 5.0.5 ff. 7...6/b4 White should play not 8.d5 2e5 9.8442 2d5, but simply 9.8d1 or 8.a3. 8.d5 2b8. If 8...2a5 9.8d1.

13.0e5+ de 12.\(\frac{th}{2}\)ff \(\frac{4}{a}\)fi \(15.\)cb Black loses the exchange. Still, I had to play in this way, because at the end the initiative in swith Black. After 15..e4f the compensation is maybe not enough, but the character of the fight is entirely different. I didn't see anything dangerous after 10...fe, so I decided that such radical measures as an exchange sacrifice were not necessary yet.

11.de d5. 11...a5 was better. 12.a5 €O4 13.4:c4 dc 41.8:c4 ²#d6 15. 0-0 4.e6 16.²#e2! I had completely overlooked this move. Black's king temains in the centre now and will be subjected to a fearsome attack by all White's pieces. 16...€O5. 16...6.44 would be met by 17.8a4.

23.£:a7 £h3 24.£a8+ ⊈c7 25.b8 ≝+ £:b8 26.ᡚd5+ ⊈d6 Z:£c5+ ⊈e628.£a6+ ⊈f7 29.≝:e7+ ⊈g8 30.£:g6 ᡚg631.≝a7. Black resigned.

Conclusions: bad knowledge of theory, careless, effortless playing of the opening stage, *lack of concrete approach to the position*.

It was humiliating, of course, to lose in such a way, but loses like this can be very instructive and helpful. First of all I understood that I should not be so self-conceiled in my

5... De4!? instead of 5... Dd5, and I managed to do it after seventeen years in my game with Joric. The reader can find this game in the chapter "The Opening Repertoire for Black". After the chess player reaches a certain level it forms a very useful habit for him to comment thoroughly his games. A nice example to follow is the book of Gary Kasparov "Two

approach to the opening preparation after 1.e4 e5, and secondly I had the idea after this game to try sometimes

Matches", in which the author guite frankly in an amusing form, thoroughly acquaints the reader with all the important moments of his games with A. Karpov and the comments of the World Champion, in the analytical aspect, are considered by the majority of the chess players as nothing short of perfect. Real life shows that the young player never has enough free time. He has a lot of different occupations. sports, books, different amusements and recreations and he should be very practical, if he finds a way to devote enough time to chess. I don't see any danger if he comments his games not so thoroughly, but pays attention only to the key moments of the game, but only after this player has reached a certain level and has formed the habit to analyse. During the game, when you keep the score of it, it

would be very useful for you if you start taking notes on the exact time you have spent on every move, since this would enable you to notice much more easily the drawbacks of your playing. I will show you some examples of this from my practice. In my comments I am using the method of the Yugoslay "Encyclopedia of Chess Openings". The time of thinking has been noted in minutes, and the time-control was 2 and 1/2 hours for forty moves.

## Shereshevsky - Kapengut, Minsk 1977

1.d4 31	<b>⊘f6</b> 30
2. <b>⊘f3</b> 31	<b>g6</b> 30
<b>3.⊘c3</b> 31	<b>d5</b> 3
4. <b>∆f4</b> 31	<b>∆g7</b> 3
<b>5. 営d2</b> 32	c6 46
6.h3 47	<b>②e4</b> 5:
<b>7.</b> ②: <b>e4</b> 48	<b>de</b> 5
8. <b>⊘e5</b> 49	.4e6 5



The move 8. Ae6 was a loss of time. Black had better play 8...4\hd7. He made the text move in a flash just out of common sense

**∴e6** 57

9.63 53 0-0 05 10. Ae2 07 f6 20



The move 10...f6? was a positional mistake. Black thought 15 minutes over it. This was the beginning of a wrong plan based on a misjudgment of the position. 10...\Dbd7 was better and would lead to an about equal position.

The move 11. 256 was bad and it took Black another 8 minutes. Black had to play 11... €bd7 A. Kapengut hadn't seen White's 14 move which was easily explainable. The evaluation of the position leads to the conclusion that White must find a way to neutralize Black's attack against the strong position of the White's king.. It was probable that Black didn't like the seeming lack of clarification of White's plans. Nevertheless, he must have been sure that I didn't intend to castle long. Now Black could hardly develop his queen-side rook, because &d7 will be met by — €a5.

12.0-0 14 **g5** 30 13.4h2 16 **f5** 30 14.fle1 34 ...



The move 14.8fe1 is very strong. After f5 - f4 White can play ef gf and Af1 in most of the Black's lines and position dissinates. This move was made after 18 minutes thinking. 1 find didn't immediately and the other moves couldn't satisfy me. In fact. I didn't use the excellent

system to number moves – candidates first. It is curious that Black responded with b7 – b6 immediately. It was worth considering 14...±68 15.±b4 Δf6 with the idea to organize the coordination of the pieces, but Kapengut was not the man to acknowledge his mistakes easily.

14		b6	30
15.∢∂e5	41	. <b>4</b> :e5	30
16.4:e5	42	<b>⊘d7</b>	30
17. Ah2	43	<b>₫</b> 17	45



It took Kapengut 15 minutes to play 17...\(\frac{vir}{2}\)ft. This was the most difficult moment for him — the time to choose the plan. His plan was wrong however, since it was based on a superficial evaluation of the position and basically on calculations of variations. 17...\(\frac{vir}{2}\)ft. was a good move. Black creates the

positional threat  $\Delta c4$ , which was parried by White calmly. White's plan includes the idea to disrupt the enemy position on the queen-side with a2 – a4 – a5.

18.b3 46 c5 4

18...c5? was a real positional blunder. White could have only dreamed about the opening of the queen-side. Black had to play passively, i.e..€i6. £id8, £ac8 etc. It seemed to me that it was all the same to Black what he played. What he wanted seemed to be to open the game as soon as possible and to start the calculation-game.

19. Bad1 52 cd 50 20. #:d4 52 ₽fc8 58 21. Bd2 56 ₫466 N8 22. ヴ:f5 01 4):f6 08 23.#ed1 03 **⊈77** 08 15. 24 0.26



The move 24.£a6 was a mistake, mainly psychological. It was very tempting, but still not worth doing. I had to improve my position with  $\Delta$ e5, £cf1, £ce1, c2 – c4 etc. In this case the outcome of the game would hardly be in doubt.

24... 25.c4 26.b4 **Ec5** 10 16 **Eg8** 10 24 **E:c4** 22.

27. A:c4 25 £:c4 22 28. Ae5 25 **⊘d5** 22 29.8:d5 28 4:d5 22 30.8:d5 28 ⊈e6 22 31. Ab5 29 22 a6 32.E:b6+ 29 ¢2:e5 22 #d8 22

33.E:a6 29 Edd 34.Ea5+ 29. ...



The mistake 34.8a5+ misses the win. I had to play 34.93. After 34...8d1+ 35.92 8d2 36.a4 the move 36...14 wouldn't save Black because of 37.g1+ gf 38.8a5+ 9f6 39.ef e3 40.013. The sudden change of the situation had a very negative effect upon me and I made the mistake in the text without

thinking.

irikilig.				
	34		⊈ <b>7</b> 6	22
	35.g3	38	₿d1+	29
	36.⊈g2	38	∄d2	29
	37.g4	45	e6	29
	38. <i>≌</i> g3	50	f4+	31
	39.ef	50	<i>≘d</i> 3+	31
	40. ⊈g2	50	gf	31
	41.g5+	52	⊈g6	07
The sealed	move.			
	42.a4	52	₿d2	08
	43. <i>≘</i> e5	52	e3	08
	44.⊈13	52	ef	31
	45. ⊈a2	53.		

The adjourned position was a draw. White had set a trap for Black. 44...£:2+ was losing. White couldn't have achieved anything with 42.£e5 £d2 43.£:e4 because of 43...⊈f5.

Conclusions: The technique of calculation of variations is evidently bad. I am losing ground after a sudden change of the events on the board. Kapengut is not convincing at all, when there is nothing to calculate and the opponent has some initiative. He chooses a worno plan when he is not familiar with the position. Most of his time for thinking he devotes to this, but to no avail.

Presently, I consider my annotations far from perfect, but back then I wanted not only to pay attention to my playing, I wanted to find the drawbacks in the style of one of the leaders of the team of Bjetorussia – A. Kapengut. Besides, I didn't have to criticize the line 24.∆a6, since it might have lead to the win also.

I think that it would be better if you write down some notes about your impressions of the game, right after it, to be more objective when you analyse it. You should better annotate it after some period of time, when you will be impartial and you will be able to look at it objectively, from the side. I will offer you some notes like this, which I emphasize are not annotations, but just a transcript of what I have been thinking while playing. It can be useful for you during the game to use some secret sign, for example a fullpoint to mark the moves of the opponent that you hadn't seen or anticipated at all.

Geller -	Shere	shevsi	ky		
Tiflis 1980					
1.e4	35	e6	31		
2.d4	35	d5	31		
3.	35	c5	35		
4.ed	35	ed	32		
5. Øf3	35	e6	35		

I spent three minutes on 5...a6. I wanted to check the position with an isolated pawn after 5...♠f6.

6.£e2	37	c4	36
7. 0-0	39	£d6	38
8.b3	40	b5	40
9.a4	50	c3	45

Playing 9...c3, I calculated lines like: 10.≌e1 cd 11.∆b5+ ⊉f8 and 10.⊕b1 b4. I didn't even think about the piece sacrifice. I was so naive that after 10.ab I decided that E. Geller simply blundered a piece.

10.ab 50 cd 45 11.4:d2 51 **⊘f6** 23

12.c4 57 De4 24

I had seen 12...€be4 much earlier and I thought White had to play 13. £a5. I considered my task easier after the exchange on d2.

13.c5 57 **公:d2** 27 14.**当:d2** 00 **点e7** 29 15.后a5 25 **0-0** 34

As Geller mentioned after the game, 15.24 was better. After 15 moves I understood I had an inferior position, but I couldn't believe it.

I thought a long time about 18...Be8. I calculated lines like 19.ba №6 20.Bad №d 42.1.⊙:d4 Δd4 22.\@:d4 B.e2 with a counterplay. I didn't want to play 18...Δe4 19.\@e5, the same move I was afraid of, as early as move 17.

The move 22...g5 took me some time. I wanted to play 22...g6. In fact, I thought of playing 22...g6 and offering a draw.

A hard move to find, though

26. ②e3 47 ≌g7 45

26.20e3 47 22g7 45 I offered a draw after this move, but Geller refused.

27.4f3 52 世:b5 47

I made this move with the idea to go into a calculation-game in the mutual time-scramble. I thought of playing 27... Δe4.

28.♠:d5 54 **8a7** 49 29.♠:f6 55 **\$:**f6 49 30.d5 **\$\Phi\text{bd7}**.

Starting with this move we were in a time-trouble. Geller offered me a draw on move 37, but this time Lefused.

31. ≌d4+	<b>⊘e</b> 5
32.c6	<i>≌</i> 7a8
33. Ae2	£d3
34.Be1	≝c4
35. <b>≝a1</b>	<i>⊈</i> g6
36.4:d3	②:d3
37. <b>Bed1</b>	<b>⊘:b4</b>
38. <i>≘</i> d2	a5
39.d6	<b>⊘c6</b>
40.d7	<b>∄e6</b>
41.d8营	<b>⊘:d8</b>

The game was adjourned, and I had sealed my last move, but afterwards we agreed to a draw.

Now lets see the thorough comments of this game, I made for the magazine "Chess and Checkers in Bjelorussia".

1.e4 e6 2.d4 d5 3.2d2 c5 4.ed ed 5.2f3 a6/? This is an interesting line, which is not so popular lately because of the move 5..2c6, but to my opinion guite undeservedly.

6.**£e2**. Black avoids now the typical positions with an isolated "d5" pawn, but 6.dc **£**:c7 7.**£**\b3 **£e7**! enabled Black to get a satisfactory position.

6...c4 7. 0-0 Ad6 8.b3 b5 9.a4!.



This is a very strong move mainly from the psychological point of view. If 9.8e1 \$\, \text{Det} 7\$ to .a4 Black would play 10...\( \text{Los} 10\$ \text{Det} 7\$ with a complicated position. White's move 9.a4 tooks like a blunder, since after 9...c3 White doesn't have 10.8e1, because of 10...cd and after 10.0 th 2 White's nueen-

side rook and knight are cut off from the future play forever. I thought for 5 minutes and played:

11...266? A very grave and maybe decisive mistake. After the game in out analysis, the champion of the USSR said that he had played a lot of bitz-games in this position and he intended to meet 11...Δb7 with 12.c4?! ab 13.c5 with mutual chances for both sides. **12.c4 ②e4.** Black has no space, so he should try to exchange at least a pair of minor pieces. If 12...0-0 there would follow 13.c5 ♣e7 14.♣a5!?

13.c5 ⊕rd2 14.≝rd2 Δe7 15.8a5?! This move is not accurate and after the right 15.8a4! Black will hardly be able to contain the avalanche of White nawns.

**15...0-0 16. Efa1.** White threatens to play b3 – b4, b5:a6 and b4 – b5 and everything will be over. Black's only chance is to find some counterplay against the d4 outpost.

16... £f6 17.h3. 17.ba will be met by ②c6 18.≌a4 ♣q4.

17... \( \textit{\textit{\textit{L}f5}}\). The black bishop has to find a way to attack the knight on f3 at any rate.

**18.b4 Ee8! 19. E5a4.** Now you can see the consequences of the tempo-loss on move 15. If 19.ba 心c6 20.**Ea**4 心:d4 21.**公**:d4 **△**:d4 22.**世**:d4 **Ē**:e2 with a counterplay.

19...≝e7 20.£1a2. White could have tried 20.£f1 ∆e4 21.ba ∆:f3 22.gf and although Black has some counterchances on the king-side, the position favours White.

22...g5? 23.8ba2 h5 24.€h2! △g6. The unprepared activity of Black on the king-side turned out to be only a source of trouble for him.

25.241 thd71? I remember that I found this move after a hard effort. It is much more difficult sometimes to move the queen to the next square than to make a move with it "across" the whole board. Moves like that have been termed as "sneaky" in the chess literature. 25...the42! was not so good for Black after the simple 26.8d1 with AG and Qe3 next.

26. ②e3! White increases the tension preventing opponent's counterplay.

26... \(\textit{\textit{26}}\)...\(\textit{26}\) et active 26...\(\textit{26}\)et wouldn't do anything after the simple 27.\(\textit{\textit{2}}\)c2! It is worth mentioning that each opponent had about ten minutes to the rest of the time-control.

28.2/d5 Bar 29.2/t6 2/f6 3/d5/l. Geller had about 5 minutes left and 1 had just a little more. This natural pawn move simplifies considerably Black's task, since the knight manages to join in the defence, after having been jobless for 30 moves. After 30.2/b2! White threatens to push the "d" pawn as well as \$\frac{1}{2}\$ and \$\frac{1}{2}\$ be \$\frac{1}{2}\$ be \$\frac{1}{2}\$ and White must win.

30... 2d7 31. #d4+ 2e5 32.c6 Ba8 33. Le2 If 33.Ba5 or 33 d6 - #d3 comes

33...2d3. We started to play biliz here. The next few moves are difficult to comment, since they were made in a severe time-pressure. 34.£ef 12d 35.£faf 12g6 36.£cd3 €.cd3 37.8df €.bd 38.8d2 a5 39.d6 €.c6 40.d7 8e6 41.d8 ½ the time trouble was over. Black sealed the move 41.€cd87 and the opponents agreed to a draw without resuming olds?



The final position requires some clarification. I sealed t...£v8 and I thought that the Black's minimal material advantage compensates the exposed position of the king and after 42.8±48 I might find something different than 42...£v8. What I had played in fact enabled White to have

some additional chances like 42.268 with a sufficient counterplay for the pawn. The right line for Black was

41... 章:d8 42. 章:d8 43. 章:d8 世b4! One more "sneaky" move with the gueen which I hadn't seen. The gueen is placed magnificently on b4: defends the "a5" pawn, controls the important squares on the first rank b1 and e1, attacks f4 and q4 squares on the fourth rank. White would have to fight for the draw because 44.8g8+ \$f5 45.\$h2 is not good. because of \$e1 and \$f4+, and after 44.\$f1 Black can play at least 44...當b6 threatening 增b1+.

Shereshevsky – Lputian					
Tiflis 1980					
1.d4	30	e6	30		
2.∙2f3	30	d5	31		
3.e3	31	c5	33		
4.4 d2	35	Ø)f6	34		

I didn't want to play 4. Ad3. I didn't like 4...c4 After 4. 2d2 I was afraid of 4... \$\omega\$c6 and if 5.b3 - 5...q6.

> 5.b3 32 6.cd 41 6.ed 38 **4b4** 43 7.4b2 43 De4 44 8.4d3 47 변a5 48

I didn't enjoy much the possibility of moves like 8... 4c3.

9.04 48 **②:d2** 06 10.40:d2 50 dc 07 11.bc 51 **€)c6** 10 12.當c2 58 e5 20.

Playing the move 12.世c2 I didn't see 12...e5. and saw it only afterwards. I thought 13.d5 necessary. I was calculating 13.a3 A:d2+ 14.曾:d2 曾:d2+ 15.曾:d2, but I gave it up, because of 15...ed. I didn't see the line mentioned by S. Loutian after the game: 13.de ②:e5 14. 0-0 ②:d3 15.賞:d3 A:d2 16.A:g7 Eg8 17.2h. This line is of course far from forced, but still he intended to play 13... 4e6 abd if 14.a3 Δ·d2 15.世·d2 世·d2+ 16.Φ·d2 0-0-0.

14. £:d4	04	ed	33
15. £d1	05	∆g4	36
16.f3	07	∆d7	36
17. 0-0	80	∆a4	37
18. <i>€</i> ∆b3	10	當c7	38
19. 當e2+	35	⊈ <b>#8</b>	41

03 Pd4 33

13.d5

I dign't see the manoeuvre of the Black bishop to a4. After move 18 levaluated the position and I came to the conclusion — my position was worse. I lost a lot of time to find for me in the line: 18. £b5 g6 19. £e4+ £e7 20. £e4 0-0 21.d6 £e5 22.c5 £e3 and Black is much better. The endgame after 19. £e7 20. £e7+ £e7 21. £e2 £b3 seemed to me very difficult for White. After 19. £e7 1 intended to play 20. £e7 to force Black to castle and then to exchange of e7, going to a slightly inferior endgame. The move 19. £f8 was a pleasant surprise for me.

				ed to play 20.\$12 se of e7, going to
htly inferior en	idgame. Th	ne mo	ve 19s	⊉f8 was a pleas
prise for me.				
	20. 當b2	40	∄e8	53
	21. 2: d4	55		
thought I was	better after	that		
	21		Ac5	01
	22. Ac2	57	Be2	12
	23. ⊈h1	59	£:d4	13
	24. 當b4+	01	Ac5	15
	25. 営:a4	01	<b>≌f4</b>	70
	26. 営d7	06	.ûd6	22
	27. ⊈d8+	80	₿e8	23
	28.g3	09	增h6	23
didn't see that	t.			
	29. #d7	15	£:a3	28

I didn't see that.

29.皆d7 15 点:g3 28
30.h3 15 g5 31.皆g4 19 点4 36
32.指64 23 全g7 45.

ı

After the move 32. Efe1 I considered the position equal and offered a draw

I thought over this move rather long studying the line 33...Bc8 34.c6 bc 35.d6 and I came to the conclusion that I was OK. I was feeling intuitively that I had to keep two pairs of rooks, placing one of the rooks on the first rank and the other on the second.

33		<i>2</i> :e1+	<b>+</b> 47
34. £:e1	36	<b>≝f6</b>	47
35. ≌f5	35	些c3	49

The move 35.增f5 was simply a blunder. I thought that Black can not play 35...增c3, because of 36.是e7, but I had forgotten that the pawn on "3" remains defenseless

I hadn't seen this move. I had expected 38...h6, after which I intended to play 39.富e2 and if 39...增d6 — 40.增f1. Lputian was afraid of 39.昂e6 after 38...h6.

Notes like this, made right after the game, enable you to understand your mistakes better and to make the correct conclusions about the drawbacks of your playing, when you annotate your games calmly back home. Afterwards you start looking for the ways to improve.

Finally, I would like to share with you the following observation. The majority of the young players, I have been coaching are excellent analytics. P. Korzubov, A. Kovalev, A. Alexandrov could easily cope with every kind of analytical problem. Life taught them that. They had to meet a lot of strong opponents and in the opening stage they were coAfter my experience with Elena Zayac, I can say that her opening reperfoire, which at first was modified as early as the level of the first degree, had not changed substantially up to now. She used to obtain good positions, with fair perspectives at all levels of competitions, the Interzonal tournament included. When women play chess the intensity of the conflict in the opening is less than in men's chess, therefore there is not any incentive to a serious analytical work. Far back in time, E. Zayac and A. Alexandrov had an approximately equal practical strength and they played training games in 1988 which were full of an intense, levelled fight. Now, the trains they have taken are going in different directions. If we disregard the difference in the physiological capabilities of the female and male body, I think that the margin between their

relative strength was caused not so much by the scope of their chess talents, or the difference of the opposition. Zayac used to play in a lot of men's tournaments, against strong opponents in 1988 and 1989; tournaments of the same class as those A. Alexandrov played. I think that the margin was caused mainly by the difference of their approach to the

independent analytical work.

nfronted with plenty of new problems they had to solve independently. To work with girls however was much harder.